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SUPRA-EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC AND PAN-ARAB IDENTITIES AND ACCULTURATED 
MUSLIM EGYPTIAN INTELLECTUALS, 1892-1952 
Dennis Patrick WALKER. 
PhD, Australian National University 1991. 
Chairman: Professor Anthony Johns. 
This dissertation surveys the development of pan-Islamic and pan-Arab identifications 
among two main groups of Westernizing-educated intellectuals: (a) those in the independence 
movement launched by Mustafa Kamil (to 1918) and (b) that around the newspapers al-Jaridah 
(1908-1914) of the Ummah Party and then, after 1922, around the successor al-Siyasah and Party 
of Liberal Constitutionalists. Our focus on the conflict and interblending of Arab and Western 
high cultures stresses impoverishing and positive educational and aesthetic experiences in the 
age of imperialism as the motive for the pan-Islamic and pan-Arab identification that this 
Muslim Egyptian elite built up. 
Book 1 (1892-1918). The literature has over-stressed Egyptianist and pan-Islamic 
attitudes in Kamil's Hizb al-Watani and Egyptianist and secularoid ones from Ahmad Lutfi 
al-Sayyid's al-Jaridah --- doubly neglecting pre-1918 Egyptian Arabism. This study details 
respectful or at least very engaged evocation from both groups of "the [classical] Arab Nation". 
Neither group rigorously articulated a contemporary Arab successor-community, but we review 
proto-pan-Arab interactions and disorderly transitional terminology in contexts of Arab World 
literary activity that did point forward to the later post-1922 modern pan-Arab nation. Despite it~ 
particularoid homeland frame, pre-1913 Egyptian political nationalism already had features more 
like linguistic nationalism. Dual-cultured, both Kamilist and al-Jaridah writers became more and 
more aware of modern sectors of life that the standard literary Arabic of the classical Arabs had 
to be extended to cover. They made the ultra-politicized Qur'an-defined deterritorializing high 
Arabic their rallying-ground of struggle against the British. Language only instanced how 
extensively the intellectuals had, by 1914, integrated their Arab-Islamic and modern make-up. 
Kamilist pan-Islam, a spiritual stage ahead of Western nationalisms, had already synthesized the 
global technology and economic drives of imperialism into the chipped-down essence of Islam's 
wide community impulse. 
standard Arabic 
independence. It assesses al-Siyasah alternation or conflict --- but, again, also 
Kamilist-like blending and synthesis --- between (a) secularoid Western and (b) politicized 
classical Arab and Islamic motifs. Post-1922 Zionism again alternated and blended this elite's 
two cultures. Real data and prejudices from Western polities about Jews there blended into (b) 
Islam's old community concepts and shrines to (c) define Zionism as an internationally coherent 
Darwinian enemy. 
Our examinations of the growth of pan-Arabism into Egypt's official community 
ideology in the 1930s and 1940s show it was still often fitting well into Western liberal cultures 
and technology. The new post-1930 establishment Arabism was only sectionally neo-classical: 
advancing to a purely linguistic nationhood, it dropped fondness for Arab race or lineage in the 
classical high literature and in Egyptian villages in order to integrate the diverse Arabic-speakin~ 
populations (using the West's economic and technological modernity). Although the 
intellectuals still developed affinities and outreaches to wider non-Arab Muslim and Eastern 
peoples, the inner more unitary political community is gradually contracted and separated to 
within the sphere of daily Arabic speech (we concentrate on Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat). 
The classical Arabs' language had some less Islamic literature and extending it to cover 
all modernity was a joint enterprize of Muslim Egyptian and non-Egyptian Christian Arab 
intellectuals. Despite patches of transformation from the positivist West, however, Islam held as 
a community basis for the Muslim intellectuals: they could not carry through a fusion with Copt~ 
within abortive post~1922 neo-Pharaonic particularism and in the 1930s and 1940s failed to 
adequately perceive within political decolonization West Asian Christian Arab groups that they 
culturally appreciated. 
1: 
This sets out the origins of the bilingualized Muslim Egyptian elite 
that solidified during the forty years British colonial rule (1882 - 1922). It surveys broader 
patterns of acculturation and deculturation, some continuous across both the colonial period and 
the partially-independent monarchical state (1922 - 1952). The wider range of ethnic and 
cultural groups that colored or inhibited acculturated Muslim community concepts are defined. 
DESIGN AND INQUIRIES OF THESIS 
This study of acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals between 1892 - 1952 explores 
how classical Arab culture and Islam --- and the new wide political communities they proceeded 
to define --- not just survived, but were stimulated by, the West's global power and culture. We 
draw most of the multi-lingual writers and nationalist leaders examined from two 
intellectual-political settings: (a) the pan-Islamic independence movement launched by Mustafa 
Kamil (1874 - 1908) and (b) the milieu of the pre- 15 al-Jaridah, edited by Ahmad Lutfi 
al-Sayyid, and its post-1922 successor, the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists with its organ 
al-Siyasah. al-Siyasah and its weekly literary supplement were edited by Lutfi's disciple 
Muhammad Husayn Haykal (1888 - 1956). 
Chapters 1 and 3 review Anglicization policies of the British in education and public 
administration up to 1919 that, by threatening the Qur'an-derived literary Arabic language, made 
it more central for M-E elite identity in the age of Imperialism. The threat of deculturization ---
like the military presence of the British themselves --- lingered after the limited independence of 
1922. Our second Book shows where elaboration, politicization and implementation of linguistic 
Islamo-Arab nationality in the monarchical-parliamentary state (1922-1952) by our category of 
often long-lived intellectuals, worked out traumas that colonial deculturization had inflicted on 
them in youth prior to 1922. 
Our inquiry will trace ways in which Islam and the classical Arabs both (a) clashed with 
and (b) were made relevant by, Westerners and their liberal-secularoid and racist discourses. In 
the face of Imperialism, Islam and Arabism offered a ready-made rallying-ground for writers 
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more formally-educated in those imperial countries' thought and literatures. However, as against 
some West-resident scholars who have over-dichotomized Arabo-Islamic elements and the West, 
this thesis is always alert to elements in classical Arab Islam that equaled and dovetailed into 
sectors of post-Reformation Western creativity. Needs of the modernity that the intellectuals 
were grafting often led them to select comparable facets in Islam and the past of the classical 
Arabs. In this pattern, the West was one catalyst that helped restructure the modern elite's vision 
and exploration of Islam, its classical history and the high literature of the classical Arabs that 
was still being recovered. 
Pro-Ottoman Pan-Islamism. Our discussion of Kamilist pan-Islam (Chs. 3 and 4) and the 
Jaridists' more covert or qualified pan-Islamic impulses (Ch. 6) seeks stimulants in French and 
British intellectualism and in the Islamophobic or racist political discourses of Westerners (eg. 
Gladstone). The pan-Islamism of multi-lingualized elite Egyptians detatched gripping, primary 
motifs from the Qur'an and traditional Islam that were already universally understood among all 
Muslim classes. More than trans-classes mobilization, Ch. 4 is concerned to identify novel ---
only recently restored --- aspects of the classical Arabs' proto-modern creativity that contributed 
to the new synthesis of Kamilist pan-Islam. Overheard imperialist fear and scorn against 
resisting African and Asian Muslims expanded the frontiers of pan-Islam for multi-lingualized 
Kamilists and Jaridists, but with ambivalences. We will stress the multi-cultured newness of 
Egyptian pan-Islamism that blended the modern West's designs and instruments, unfamiliar 
sectors of the Muslim Arab golden age, and the ongoing relationship with Muslim Turks for 
unprecedented tasks. 
Egyptian Arabism. It is in respect to the development of pan-Arab nationality that 
West-published analyses most over-dichotomize periods in post-1882 high Egypto-Arabic 
literature and culture and in the contemporary communities they fostered. We reinterpret the 
periods more as altering blends of a range of elements, all always present from the outset in at 
least basic form. However much attitudes --- even of individual writers within short time-spans 
--- varied towards them, at least shards of classical Arab elements always survived, accumulated 
and then finally cohered as pan-Arab linguistic nationalism. Chapters 2, 5 and 6 show how 
shared classical language always made Muslim Egyptian writers acutely sensitive to the 
experiences and aspirations of West Asian Arabs under Turkish rule prior to 1919: the 
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West-resident analysts' obsession with particularoid and pro-Ottoman identifications that 
dampened solidarity from the Kamilists and Jaridists has missed how strongly the joint, if 
still-fragile, culture of standard Arabic was already fostering future pan-Arab community. Book 
2 sets out post-1922 establishment or governmental pursuit of pan-Arabism through 
nee-capitalism and as official foreign policy: it will place the crystallization of modernist 
pan-Arab nationalism, and the conversion of the intellectual leaders essential for official 
Arabism, back earlier than usual (into the 1920s). We challenge Orientalist stereotypes that that 
decade was neo-Pharaonist or particularist in any full-hearted way. 
Our inquiry underscores how necessary, if strenuous, it is to relate the two 
acculturated-elite identifications of pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism. Both were thoroughly 
modern and West-aware orientations. Both Kamilist pan-Islamism (Ch. 4) and post-1922 
pan-Arabism sought to integrate the globe's Muslims or the narrowed Arab sphere with modern 
instruments and technologies developed in the West --- railways, steamers, trade, 
industrialization. Pan-Islamic impulses and images long persisted around the in some respects 
very modernist pan-Arabism being developed in the 1930s and 1940s (eg. Arab League SG 
'Azzam's impulse to relink with the Turks: Ch. 9): we trace how Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat finally 
territorially delimited a pan-Arab nation and fused parochial-ethnic and wider Arab elements to 
connect Egyptians at last into the West Asian Arabs' revolt against the Turks (Ch. 10). 
Pan-Muslim and pan-Arab community got differentiated, but Islam could persist as one 
precondition for community amid self-modernization at variance with Sunni orthodox 
traditionalism. We test this with repeated examination of the evolution of Kamilist, Jaridist and 
Siyasahist perceptions of non-Muslim "Easterners" and (mainly Christian Fertile Crescent) 
Arabs, over the six decades. Collaboration was fruitful for reviving a vulnerable standard Arabic 
--- but would Muslim Egyptians after 1930 correspondingly perceive the Christian Arabs who 
transformed them as comrades in the Arab Nation's decisive decolonization struggles? 
(al-Zayyat: B 332-340). 
We view the Egyptian intellectuals sampled as persistently positive and incorporative for 
their context of imperialism and colonization. Their adaption of Arabism and Islam into modern, 
liberal successor-community was a tribute to their capacity to relax amid gunfire. Amid 
inferiorization and violence by Britishers, French, Italians and Spaniards that could make Arabs 
out our 
states. Such Eurocentric Grunebaum and more 
Gershoni Jankowski been reluctant to perceive pervasive presence 
Arabo-Islamic culture dual-cultured intellectuals: their facile dichotomizations white-out 
Arabo-Islamic identifications from those periods (notably, the 1920s) and those strata in which 
Western influence was strong; when Islam is seen as coloring modern Egyptians this --- rather 
than the West's behavior --- has to predoom their adaption of Western liberal parliamentarism 
(Von Grunebaum); serious commitment by intellectuals to Western insights minimizes their 
growing incorporation and synthesis of Arabo-Islamic elements after 1930 into a defensive 
mock-adaption to a reaction in other wider classes (C.D. Smith)1• Yet even tensions and 
destructive conflict between Western and Arabo-Islamic elements also related and fitted 
1. For C.D Smith's dismissal of the development of Arabo-Islamic identifications by veteran 
Jaridist-Siyasahist politician-litterateurs as a veneer to fob off wider groups, see his "The 'Crisis of Orientation': The 
Shift of Egyptian Intellectuals to Islamic Subjects in the 1930s", IHvlES v. 4:4 (October 1973) pp. 382-410, and 
Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt: A Biography of Muhammad Husayn Haykal (Albany: 
SUNY Press 1983) pp. 89-198. Cf. our thesis B 36-42 and B 450-454. In contrast to Smith's simple Westernist 
image of Haykal and other acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals, Von Grunebaum atomized their persistent 
blending of cultures, reducing them to their inhering Arabo-Islamic essence. For instance, he dismissed Egypt's 
post-1922 liberal-parliamentarist experiment almost as predoomed. For Von Grunebaum, a 1936 conflict between 
parliament and the executive in which modernists as well as the Muslim Brotherhood allied to call for the 
dissolution of parties showed the non-seriousness of an Arab parliamentarism that had indeed been a bit 
non-Western. That call to replace party strife with an integrated political front, the abandonment ofparliamentarism, 
was the only possible outcome from a tendency to adopt "a reflection" of European practice without accepting the 
West's theory or attitude towards the world and man. Gustave Von Grunebaum, Modern Islam: The Search for 
Cultural Identity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1962) p. 139. Alternation of Westemist 
and Islamist stances is important for acculturated intellectuals, but the electrifying call to abolish parties itself also 
has to be related to Egyptian party politics: it was promoted by the rump of the Kamilist al-Hizb al-Watani (Patriotic 
Party) as a means to eliminate the Wafd and its offshoots after they signed the 1936 Treaty with Britain. Zakariya 
Sulayman Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani wa Dawruhu fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah 1907-1953 (Cairo: Wikalat Fabrant 
1981) p. 85. As more context, our Second Book reviews British behavior after 1922 designed to prevent a strong 
democracy and any successful nationalist parties from developing in Egypt --- not just the W afd, but the 
incrementalist Party of Liberal Constitutionalists whom the British used up to trip up the Wafd. If Ahmad Hasan 
al-Zayyat and other old al-Jaridah/al-Siyasah intellectuals finally dichotomized the liberal West and Islam/Arabism, 
that was after unforced solidarity with it against the advancing Axis yet again did not pay off with (enough) 
decolonization (B 250-263). Although able to read Arabic, Vatikiotis in 1961 shrank Egypt's Arabism to not much 
more than the "imperial instrument" with which Nasser tried to dominate outside Arabs. Inside Egypt itself, Arab 
nationalism was something contrived or imported that the military clique had its work cut out even to "superimpose" 
upon the immemorial Egyptian nationality of bemused ordinary Egyptians --- so much harder than Syrians to 
"Arabize". PJ. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics: Pattern for New Nations? (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press 1961) pp. 204-210. We contextualize Nasser and his rising petty-bourgeois Arab-Muslim class as 
heirs of a century of synthesis of Arabness with modernity by the A-M Egyptian elite they dislodged. Because elite 
and masses shared one popular Arab culture, elite pan-Arabism readily threaded Egyptian classes together in the 
nationhood alliance: Taha fn 138; al-Zayyat B 274 fn 66). 
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Islam-Arabism and the West into each other as comparable alternative histories. Deeply 
dualistic, M-E liberal intellectuals stood with the pluralist-parliamentary West against fascism, 
and only contracted borrowing from it, long into their limited Arabo-Islamic reaction against its 
imperialism and racism (Chs. 9 and 10). 
Already relating several high cultures to each other and to political history, this work can 
hardly resolve all broader-guage issues. Since our concern is the supra-Egyptian communities 
that acculturation, imperialism, religion and language fueled, space forced us to sidestep some 
questions about the nature of Islam as a religion. Some of our more West-shaped intellectuals ---
Haykal and Ahmad Husayn were glaring instances --- were ignorant of central components of 
Islam when they started to write. Their final adoption of Islam as collective identity in the 1930s 
does testify to its inherent vitality through all the odds of exclusion from the public and modem 
sector by aliens. Our focus remains, though, the supra-Egyptianization of the self-image of 
indigenous community in the modem elite. While this was fueled by a diversification of imaged 
Islamic theologies among the West-tinted bourgeoisie, it is not within the scope of this inquiry to 
opt for --- or exclude --- any of these alternatives as "true Islam". Can Islam survive the death of 
religious ritual practice and even belief in God? Its function, for example, as a socio-political 
demarcator in al-Jaridah/Ummah Party and al-Siyasah-/Liberal Constitutionalist conflicts with 
Copts can figure for us only in the aspect that territorial particularist community breaks down 
and the polemics open into wider pan-Muslim and pan-Arab community identifications. 
Our review, from a variety of cultural and political angles, of the development over 
decades of West-aware Muslim Egyptian political and opinion leaders puts in truer perspective 
that elite's balance of supra-Egyptian and local identity elements. 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY MODERNIZATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
ACCULTURATED MUSLIM PROFESSIONAL CLASS 
It was under Britain's constricting colonial rule (1882-1922) that Muslim secular-stream 
students, lawyers, civil servants and other professionals who received and implemented 
Europe-derived knowledge, solidified into an elite strictly separate from Egyptians who received 
traditional Islamic education. However, this acculturated elite in many ways was the 
to or 
'Ali, ruled Egypt 1 
to 1849, had been impressed by the military strength France to conquer and occupy 
Egypt (1798-1801). He strove to modernize Egypt on European lines, mainly in order to achieve 
the military strength to maintain his own independence as ruler of Egypt, and perhaps carve an 
empire out from the Ottoman Empire. In 1811, to aid the Porte, he despatched an army of 8,000 
men to Arabia to fight the Wahhabis and in 1820 he ordered the conquest of the Eastern Sudan. 
Between 1831and1833, his troops conquered Syria, which he occupied until 1841. Muhammad 
'Ali's occupation of Ottoman Arab lands in West Asia bequeathed long-term ill-feeling between 
Ottoman Turks and Egyptians, which was to hamper efforts by Egyptian anti-imperialist 
intellectuals, notably Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad Farid, to build up the pan-Islamic alliance 
between Egypt and the Ottoman State, during the period of British colonial rule. Muhammad 
'Ali's rule over Arabs who were subjects of the Ottoman Empire set the pattern for ex-Khedive 
Isma'il and the Khedive 'Abbas (reigned 1892-1914) later to assert leadership of restive Ottoman 
Arabs, challenging the Ottoman State's authority (Chapter 5). Muhammad 'Ali's long-bygone 
empire moreover further justified pursuit by Egyptians --- still led by 'Alid monarchs --- of new 
economic and political Arab unification in the 1920s (B 49-50), 1930s (B 50; transition from 
Pharaonism to pan-Arabism by Ahmad Husayn B 213-214) and in the 1940s. 
Mainly to support military strength, Muhammad' Ali strove to modernize Egypt's 
economy and to create new specialized institutions and personnel. In the process he transformed 
Egyptian society. While he laid foundations for the long-term development of the acculturated 
Muslim Egyptian strata, 'Ali devastated the traditional Islamic-educated elite or 'ulama' 
(religious scholars) that could have impeded the new strata's rise and Europe-derived concepts. 
Partly to eliminate any further challenge from them, he confiscated the 'ulama's extensive 
religious land-holdings. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, many 'ulama were poor 
and of peasant origin and the class' moral influence over Egypt's Muslim community had 
declined with the economic deterioration2. If Muhammad 'Ali undermined the social strata that 
2. Gabriel Baer, "Social Change in Egypt: 1800-1914" in P.M. Holt (ed), Political and Social Change in 
Modem Egypt (London: OUP, 1968), p. 147. 
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had had custody of traditional Islamic culture and civilization, his modernization endeavors also 
started to revive and spread the classical Arabs'3 language, past and literature. The hoary 
classical Arabic and Turkish had to be extended into flexible instruments to convey the new 
knowledge from Europe, an aim served by publishing these two languages' resources of past 
literature, previously available only in manuscripts. Muhammad 'Ali established the Bulaq 
printing press in 1821 mainly to produce the modern text books needed to train personnel for his 
new Europe-modelled army and administration. However, it also diffused long-neglected Arabic 
works of Arab or Islamic history, theology and high literature among unprecedented numbers of 
Egyptians and neighboring Arabs4• P.J. Vatikiotis observed that the "printing and translation" 
initiated by Muhammad 'Ali simultaneously led to "the revival of the Arabic language and 
Arabic studies generally, which ultimately resulted in a neo-classical tradition"5• 
The printing press, European technology that Muhammad 'Ali imported to diffuse 
Europe-derived knowledge in Egypt, from the outset simultaneously conveyed to the new 
educated Muslim strata increasingly diverse minds and experiences of Arab antiquity. 
Turkish-medium military colleges trained mostly Turco-Circassian officers. Partly to 
meet military needs, the tyrant also founded such higher schools as those of Medicine (1827), 
Languages and Translation (1834) and of Veterinary Science. This less military category of new 
secular colleges had a high proportion of Arab Egyptian students, in large part drawn from 
religious Islamic kuttabs (Qur'an schools) or al-Azhar, and exposed them extensively to 
3. The term "classical Arabs" in this dissertation means individuals whose native speech was Arabic or who 
used Arabic as their main language and identified with the Arab entity in history, up until the Mongols sacked 
Baghdad and murdered the last "Arab" 'Abbasid Caliph al-Musta'sim in 1258. By "classical Islam" or classical 
"Arab" Islam we mean Islam as conceptualized, led and implemented by Muslims whose literary language was 
Arabic and who used Arabic in daily life because it was the established language in government and society, up to 
the fall of Baghdad. 
4. A.L. Tibawi documented circulation in Syria during the Egyptian occupation (1831-1840) of classical or 
early post-classical Arabic works printed for the first time by Bulaq press. Among them were grammatical works of 
the Spanish-born Ibn Malik (1203-1274), including his thousand-verse Alfiyyah summarizing previous Arab 
grammatical thought but which established rules of grammar from hadiths, not just the pre-Islamic Arabic poetry 
and the Quran which all previous grammarians favored (see art. "Ibn Malik" EI2). Also printed was the dictionary 
of Arabic by al-Firuzabadi (1329-1415), Persian-born but who mostly lived in Jerusalem, Mecca and Yemen (see 
art. "al-Firuzabadi" E12): this book, too, was sold in Syria during the Egyptian occupation. Bulaq also distributed in 
Egypt-occupied Syria its printing of Kalilah wa Dimnah (The Fables of Bidpai) of the 'Abbasid Ibn al-Muqaffa' (c. 
720- c. 756). A.L. Tibawi, American Interests in Syria 1800-1901: A Study of Educational. Literary and Religious 
Work (London: OUP, 1966) pp. 69-70. Apropos of the Bulaq press' pan-Arab radiation, its first director Nicolas 
al-Masabki (d. 1830) was of Christian Lebanese origin. Art. "Bulak" E12. 
5. P J. Vatikiotis, The Modem Histm:y of Egypt (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1969) pp. 98-100. 
most were 
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Europeans French or Italian extempore came to given Arabic. 
Muhammad' Ali introduced large-scale cotton cultivation for export, binding Egypt's 
economy to the West's markets --- a pattern that accentuated throughout the periods of British 
colonial rule and the monarchy. To educate staff in the Europe-originated knowledge needed to 
run his administration, enterprises and army, he allowed mission schools to operate and sent 
student groups to Europe, as well as improvising his own new government-run educational 
system in Egypt7. Residence in post-revolutionary secular France even for the practical, 
strength-building studies favored by Muhammad 'Ali enduringly transformed the outlook of 
several writers who greatly influenced Egypt's subsequent development Rifa'ah Badawi Rafi' 
al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) was one Arab Egyptian sent in the educational missions who 
subsequently held up French ways and creativity for imitation in numerous Arabic works8. 
Muhammad 'Ali showed his occasionally broad conception of the European civilization he 
wanted to implant when he encouraged al-Tahtawi to pen or supervise many Arabic translations 
from French books about ancient, medieval and modern European history, as head of the School 
of Languages from 18369. From modernization's nineteenth century beginnings, Europe's 
concepts and patterns stimulated the bilingualized intellectuals' identification with the classical 
Arabs. Already, al-Tahtawi tried to synthesize their model qualities with those of the modern 
French and suggested that classical Arab mariners discovered or nearly discovered America long 
before Christopher Columbus10 --- a theme that the pioneer Egyptian pan-Arabist Ahmad Zaki 
6. Louis Armine Aroian, Education. Language and Culture in Modem Egypt: Dar al-'Ulum and its 
Graduates (PhD dissertation: University of Michigan 1978) p. 18. 
7. Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1961), pp, 30-31. 
8. al-Tahtawi learned French well enough in Paris to read its high literature. A graduate of al-Azhar, he 
went as imam with the first substantial mission sent by Muhammad 'Ali to study there. Refusing to be confined 
within a predictable pastoral role, al-Tahtawi learnt French with breakneck speed so that he could take part in classes 
with the others. Hourani has surveyed Europe-influenced reflections by al-Tahtawi in his writings about the 
functions of the autocratic ruler (synthesizing Fenelon and traditional Muslim concepts), about the need to modify 
traditional Muslim law, about education, modem international communications, ancient Pharaonic Egypt and 
patriotism. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age. 1743-1939 (London, 2nd ed: OUP paperback, 
1970), pp. 69-83. 
9. Ibid pp. 71-72. 
10. References to al-Tahtawi's Arabic works in Ahmad' Abd al-Mu'ti Hijazi, Ru'yah Hadariyvah 
Tabaqiyyah li-'Urubati Misr: Dirasah wa Watha'iq (Bayrut: Dar al-Adab 1979) pp. 157-159. al-Tahtawi likened the 
was 
caught 
Liwa'ists were to do in the early 1900s 
sexes France11 • As multi-lingual 
154-162), al-Tahtawi synthesized restoration of 
very old Arab elements from pristine Islam with the pattern of the West European bourgeois 
family: Islam and the classical Arabs would henceforth validate equal educations to Woman, but 
concentrating upon literature in order to equip her to be the intelligent life-companion of a 
monogamous husband, an effective educator of children within the home and a productive, 
textiles-spinning housewife12• It was unclear how far al-Tahtawi's transformed design might 
French in their faithfulness to their plighted word, in pride, and love of honor and freedom to "al-' Arab" (the 
[classical] Arabs) --- affinity not shared by "the Turks". Hijazi, ibid p. 157. al-Tahtawi proudly referred to his Arab 
descent in his writings and claimed that the ancient Arabs of Himyar, Yemen, "ruled the whole world, both 'Arabs 
and non-Arabs(' Aiam)" and that the conqueror-prophet Dhul-Qarnayn, mentioned in the Qur'an, was one 
world-conquering Himyarite. Ibid. While "al-' Arab" often clearly means the bygone classical Arabs in al-Tahtawi's 
usage, modern France also sometimes stimulated in him a sense of "al-' Arab" as a juxtaposed contemporary 
community: as where he wrote that European women fix their hair above their heads with various devices in contrast 
to "the women of the Arabs" who let their hair hang down. Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi in "al-Mar' ah fi Mu'allafat 
Rifa'ah Rafi' al-Tahtawi" (Woman in the Works ofRifa'ah Rafi' al-Tahtawi) in Mahrajanu Rifa'ah Rafi' al-Tahtawi 
(Cairo: al-Majlis al-A'la li-Ri'ayat al-Funun wal-Adab wal-'Ulum al-Ijtima'iyyah 1960) pp. 57-58. 
11. The best-documented and most vivid overview of al-Tahtawi's statements about women and the 
distributions of roles between sexes in various societies may be Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi's essay in Mahrajanu pp. 
47-89. C.D. Smith speculated that "al-Tahtawi's real views on reform" were more radical than his public statements. 
"He argued all his life for equal education for men and women" but with retention of veiling and separation (1872: 
justifying Khedive Isma'il's opening of a government school for girls). Smith contrasted to this the 1830 Takhlis 
al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Bariz, written in Paris, in which al-Tahtawi came close to openly favoring "the relative freedom of 
French women in public life compared to the seclusion of Muslim women". Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search 
pp. 13-14. al-Tahtawi did reveal some responsiveness in Takhlis to the glamorous dress of the Parisian women of 
the time, and to the meeting of young men and women every Monday evening in the gardens along the Champs 
Elysees. Mahrajanu p. 55 --- though the rush of mostly old Arabic love-poetry that these conjunctions set off shows 
his perpetual Western/classicist-Arab blendedness. al-Qalamawi viewed al-Tahtawi as self-divided, vacillating and 
disorientated by the roles of women in Europe, rather than modifying a single Westernist message for varying 
contexts. al-Tahtawi also encountered, and approved, the roles of women as eminent writers and translators in 
France etc. Ibid p. 59. 
12. al-Tahtawi often prefigured the ad hoc blendings of classical Arab motifs and modernist Western 
elements by Qasim Amin, the Kamilists and the Jaridists, in restructuring the relationship between the two sexes. 
al-Tahtawi cited the Qur'an and hadiths, the Umayyad-period proto-Sufi al-Hasan al-Basri, Ibn Zurayq al-Katib 
al-Baghdadi and al-Ghazzali to validate for Muslim countries much-tightened (and preferably monogamous?) 
marriages, sometimes concluded through encounter and prolonged chaste love rather than arranged, that sound like 
the French bourgeois nuclear family. He specifically praised the modesty and loyalty of wives of "the middle 
category of people" in France as against those of aristocrats and "the rabble" there. al-Qalamawi, Mahrajanu pp. 56, 
60, 84-85: for the same selection from Europe's classes by Qasim Amin in his 1900 book The New Woman, see 
Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 169. al-Tahtawi regarded the universalization of education for both males and females 
in Germany and France as one factor that made these among the strongest states in the world. However, he also 
justified teaching Egyptian females literature, arithmetic and religion from the literacy, knowledge of religion, 
eloquence and consequent political influence of various wives of the prophet. Ibid pp. 68-70. Education was 
primarily to make women the intelligent companions for their husbands and productive textiles-weaving 
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advance to such radical Westernization as abolition of veiling, and to not just education but 
public jobs for women outside their homes. Whatever, encounter with the West was making the 
classical Arabs more, not less, vivid, and from new angles. al-Tahtawi's attempts to transfer into 
Arabic literature the French neo-classicist literary adaption of Greek mythology --- his long 
translation of Fenelon' s Telemaque interested subsequent generations of intellectuals ---
implanted the covert model of the West-disparaging neo-Pharaonic "national literature" of the 
1920s (appendices 1and2: B 374ff)13• Exposed in France to the early Egyptology sparked by 
Champollion' s decipherment of hieroglyphics, al-Tahtawi soon promoted pride in the Pharaonic 
Egyptians14• More massive, and prefiguring central features of future modernist Egyptian 
Arabism, was his publication of data about the life of the Prophet Muhammad and his copious 
quotations from forgotten classical West Asian Arab works --- some tinged with 
quasi-rationalistic philosophical concepts, heretical for Egypt's established late Sunnism ---, 
evoking a broader-minded indigenous culture that could admit some borrowings from Western 
states, while denouncing their imperialism against Arabs and Muslims15• 
al-Tahtawi's writings and translations had long-term influence. In the 1880s and 1890s, 
they were a crucial conduit that got some concepts of European scholarship --- for instance, the 
geographical thought of Malte-Brun (A 103) --.., tardily across to the monolingual pioneer 
pan-Islamist 'Abdallah al-Nadim (1844-1896) (Ch. 2). In the twentieth century, they continued 
to help lead Islamically-educated intellectuals such as the very young Taha Husayn to their first 
housewives, like the model women of early Islam. Ibid p. 71. They could, however, work outside if that were a 
necessity. 
13. Fenelon's 1699 Les A ventures de Telemague ostensibly narrated Telemachus' adventures in search of 
his father Ulysses, as an imaginative continuation of Book IV of the Odyssey. It really expressed symbolically 
Fenelon' s fundamental liberal political ideas: it implied criticisms of the autocracy of Louis XIV that cost him favor 
at that monarch's court. In al-Ahram in mid-1881, 'Abduh categorized al-Tahtawi's Talimag with Tun al-Muqaffa's 
Kalilah wa Dimnah among (originally non-Arabic) works of fiction widely read by Egyptians as models of literary 
style, and as sources of virtues and data about the nations. Mahrajanu p. 159. The lift in al-Tahtawi's prose 
responded with gusto to the classical setting and myth-narratives of Odysseus' much-buffetted return home to 
Penelope, etc. Ibid pp. 159 - 160. 
14. While in Paris, al-Tahtawi interacted deeply with such Orientalists as Silvestre de Sacy, and through 
them became aware of the discoveries of the Egyptologists in that science's first great age. Hourani, Arabic 
Thought p. 70. Items 1, 2 and 3 in Daghir' s list of al-Tahatawi' s publications were voluminous books on the ancient 
history of Egypt and its region. Yusuf As'ad Daghir, Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyyah v. 2 (Bayrut: Matabi' Lubnan 
1956) p. 570. 
15. Smith, Islam and the Search p. 14; cf al-Tahtawi's uses of classical Arab philosophy-aware theology, 
high literature and Islamic sciences noted fn 12. Anti-imperialism while borrowing: al-Tahtawi wrote critically of 
the French in Algeria. Mahrajanu p. 148. 
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conjunction with European thought and culture. The works were not for Taha in 1911 one 
preliminary step --- but, rather, a quality prototype for a synthesis of (a) borrowing of modern 
Western "sciences" with (b) "resurrection" qua medium of the semi-integral language of the 
classical Arabs, which had been dying amid the dialectized barbarization of the Arab lands prior 
to 1805 (Muhammad' Ali's coup). Taha paid tribute to that "glorious commander/ruler (Amir)" 
and later 'Alid Khedives for, through translations programs, missions to Europe and new 
education, giving standard Arabic the role within modernization that saved it16 --- paralleling 
tributes by al-Nadim in 1893 (Al20). 
'Abbas I (1848-1854) cut westernization and Europe-modelled education. Sa'id Pasha 
(1854-1863) revived the Arabic-promoting government school system, but in particular 
subsidized the multiplication of foreign, especially French, schools in Egypt, which bilingualized 
Egyptians while modernizing them17• 
Westernization Under Isma'il 
The Khedive Isma'il, who ruled Egypt from 1863 to 1879, had received a French 
education at the Staff College in Paris. His energetic Europeanization endeavors greatly 
increased the number of Egyptians exposed to Western concepts and languages. Isma'il knitted 
Egypt and Europe much closer together by dramatically extending Egypt's internal and 
international communications, its commerce and to a lesser extent its industries: he built 64 sugar 
mills18• He encouraged the immigration of Europeans who developed Egypt's banking system, 
transportation, importing and exporting, and land sales19• 
Isma'il gave development of state education top priority, hiring European educators such 
16. Taha Husayn, "Hal Tastaridd al-Lughatu Majdaha al-Qadim? --- 9: Nahdat al-Lughah fil-' Asr al-Jadid" 
(Will The Language Recover its Ancient Glory? --- The Renaissance of the Language in the Modern Period), 
al-Jaridah 6 November 1911 pp. 1 - 2. 
17. Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image from its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi 
al-Sayyid (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 132; Aroian, Dar al-Ulum, p. 23. 
18. In 1866, Isma'il had the port of Alexandria enlarged to make it the largest harbor in the Mediterranean; 
other harbor works were constructed at Suez. He also built a string of lighthouses along the Mediterranean coast. 
The Suez Canal was opened to international traffic in 1869 and by 1880 a score or more of steamship lines touched 
Egyptian ports. By 1880, 1,300 kilometres of railways had been laid, and 5,200 kilometres of telegraph lines, which 
Isma'il even stretched far down into the Sudan. Art. "Egypt" EB 14th ed (1929), v. 8, p. 92; Raymond Flower, 
Napoleon to Nasser: the Story of Modem Egypt (London: London Editions 1976) p. 95. 
19. Ba'er, "Social Change ... " in Holt, Political and Social Change p. 158. 
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for children of wealthy Muslim Egyptians21 • Tertiary 
education bilingualized Egyptians more: from 1868 the Law School conducted classes 
French22• Isma'il patronized opera in European languages and Europe-modelled theater in 
Arabic: European high culture was now sought for itself in Egypt's ruling circles. 
Europe-derived secular law, independent of Islam, was born as the consequence of 
'Alid-ruled Egypt's ever-increasing interaction with Europe, and with foreigners resident on 
Egyptian soil. The European powers had rejected any jurisdiction by Egypt's indigenous Islamic 
shari' ah courts over their subjects. It was partly in the vain hope of drawing those residents 
within Egypt's legal jurisdiction that Penal and Civil Codes drawing on French law were 
promulgated in 1875 and Mixed Courts employing European as well as Egyptian judges were set 
up in 1876. Native Courts based on French law and procedure came into existence in 1883. 
Islamic law was disestablished: the 1880 law on the shari'ah courts explicitly limited their 
competence to matters of personal status homicide23 • 
The establishment under Isma'il and Khedive Tawfiq of a France-derived legal tradition 
necessarily brought into being a class of Egyptians, educated in European law and civilization, to 
apply and execute it. In the periods of British colonial rule and the monarchy, this group of 
Egyptian professionals was one core for the development of a distinct highly Westernized 
Muslim intelligentsia. The stratum of Muslim secular lawyers had its beginnings amid intense, 
bilingualism-imposing acculturation, which could occur on the soil of Egypt after French was 
20. Aroian, Dar al-'Ulum p. 25. 
21. By 1875 there were nearly 20,000 pupils in foreign schools of all kinds. Richmond, Egypt 1798-1952 
p. 115. Most were resident Europeans but some were sons and daughters of wealthy Muslim Egyptians. To advance 
Egypt's modernization, Isma'il also aided Coptic private schools, also de-Islamizing though less Arabic-sapping 
than the European Christian schools. He granted them 500 feddans of the best Egyptian land, and allocated an 
annual grant from the Egyptian budget. Samirah Bahr, al-Aqbat fil-Hayat al-Siyasiyyah al-Misriyyah (Cairo: 
Anglo-Egyptian, 1979), p. 22. Eminent Muslims educated in Coptic schools included Turco-Circassian Husayn 
Rushdi, Prime Minister in World War I under British military rule; and' Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat, a minister and 
Prime Minister of the post-World War I Party of Liberal Constitutionalists. Ibid p. 23. 
22. Aroian, Dar al-'Ulum p. 185. 
23. J.N.D. Anderson. "Law Refonn in Egypt: 1850-1950" in Holt, Political and Social Change p. 210. 
From a comparison of the codes, Anderson assessed the nineteenth-century "ruling circles in Egypt" as more 
determined to radically break with Islamic legal tradition than Ottoman Turkey's law reformers". Ibid pp. 130, 137. 
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made the medium of instruction of the School of Law in 1868; other Muslim Egyptians studied 
secular law abroad in Europe. The nascent Muslim secular legal stratum was small and was not 
to become properly defined until somewhat after Britain's 1882 conquest of Egypt24• 
Monolingual Islamically-cultured intellectuals and Arab-Egyptian soldiers provided leadership in 
the constitutionalist movement that culminated in the 'Urabi revolt. It was later during Britain's 
colonial rule (1882-1922) that (often youngish) secular lawyers such as Mustafa Kamil, 
Muhammad Farid, Sa'd Zaghlul et al headed political nationalist movements and that Egyptian 
society readily accepted the stratum's leadership. The internationalization of the Egyptian 
question after 1882 called for a new political leadership with the knowledge of European 
languages and thought to persuade Europe to end an "illegal" Occupation. 
Pre-British Containment of Westernization 
Other Muslim populations in India, Indonesia, Central Asia and Africa knew little of 
Western thought and cultures before the British, French, Dutch and Russians conquered them. In 
contrast, the Egyptians were pre-equipped to respond to the West's civilization on their own 
terms by Britain's 1882 Occupation. Classical Arabic had already been revived over 75 years as 
one medium within West-patterned modernization. 
Already, Arabo-Islamically-cultured Egyptian followers of the anti-imperialist Jamal 
al-Din al-Afghani had warned against milder multi-lingualization and deculturization taking 
place in the modem Muslim elite before 1882. They orientated educated Egyptians in advance to 
recognize, parry and defeat the onslaughts against neo-classical Arabic that British colonial rule 
was to bring. 
'Abdallah al-Nadim in 1881 disputed the assumption of Europhile or pragmatic modem 
Muslim Egyptians that European tongues offered "precise meanings" that Arabic was unable to 
convey, that they went with the "age of civilization" while literary Arabic was a relic from a 
bygone "age of barbarism". al-Nadim himself, before the British invasion, approved the modem 
classes' pursuit of necessary and useful European sciences and thus European languages; yet he 
also warned that preferred use of French etc in daily life ruptured educated individuals from their 
24. "Until 1888 there were only thirteen Muslim lawyers among the first forty-five registered with the 
Court of Appeal". Some Muslim secular lawyers were Azharites who crossed over into secular law without formal 
training for it. Ziadeh Lawyers p. 40. 
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parents, siblings and society and from Islam, psychologically preparing them to commit political 
treason: whoever surrenders his language in daily life may well surrender his homeland lat~r25 . 
This pre-British ultra-politicization of languages could open out into ethno-linguistic rather than 
territorial nationalism. However, the Arab ethnicity that al-Nadim already evoked against 
adoption of French splinters and mores by youth was usually still kept parochial, an assumption 
that hermetic Arabness of language was part of being Egyptian. 
Pre-British modernization in 1872 established an institution, Dar al-'Ulum, that later (a) 
produced numerous grammars of classical Arabic as the Kamilists defended it under British 
colonial rule26 and (b) related Islam to the Europe-originated sciences for acculturated Muslim 
Egyptian intellectuals. The Dar was designed to prepare graduates of the Islamic al-Azhar to 
teach the Arabic language and some modem subjects in Arabic medium in the State's primary 
and secondary schools. The lecture schedule tried to combine modem Europe-derived 
knowledge (including substantial instruction in European languages) with dense courses in the 
classical Arabs' religious sciences, language and literature27• In the British period, (a) the Dar 
al-'Ulum students and scholars and (b) acculturated students, intellectuals and professionals who 
tried to synthesize classical Arab Islam with modernization (eg neo-capitalizing pan-Islamist and 
pan-Arab Tala'at Harb), were collaborating elites28• Among Dar al- 'Ulum intellectuals, Tantawi 
25. Extracts from the 1881 article "Ida' at al-Lughati Taslimun lil-Dhat" (To Lose One's Language is to 
Surrender the Self) in Najib Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim. Khatib al-Thawrat al- 'Urabiyyah (Cairo: Maktabat 
al-Kulliyat al-Azhariyyah c. 1963) pp. 133-134; 'Ali al-Hadidi, 'Abdallah al-Nadim. Khatib al-Wataniyyah (Cairo: 
Ministry of Culture and National Guidance, n.d) pp. 119-120. al-Nadim had a unerring eye for the detailed, painful 
edges of the West's quotidian linguistic impact in Egyptian society. In a rueful 1881 piece titled "An Arab Who Got 
Europeanized" ("'Arabi Tafarnaj"), he depicted a young man who, returning from studies in Europe, would not 
respond to Arabic greetings from his father. He cannot even make his mother understand what dish he wants, 
because he now knew only the French term for "onion" having forgotten the Arabic basal. Article"' Arabi Tafarnaj" 
published in al-Tankit wal-Tabkit excerpted Tawfiq op. cit pp. 167-8; al-Hadidi op. cit p. 113. 
26. The acculturated Kamilists evoked and tried to explore the great classical Arabs; Dar al-'Ulum authors 
provided guiding new materials that were modem in arrangement. Its faculty included Hasan Tawfiq al-' Adi 
(1862-1904), the pioneer of the study of classical Arabic literature: his Ta'rikh Adab al-Lughat al-' Arabivvah was 
the first modem history of the subject in Arabic. Mustafa Kami! attended his 1904 funeral. Aroian Dar al-'Ulum, p. 
128. 
27. Aroian gave Dar al-'Ulum's initial lecture schedule in 1871 as made up of Literary Sciences, 
Astronomy, Natural Sciences, Architecture, Mechanics, General History, Hanafi Fiqh (religious law), Tafsir 
(Qur'anic Exegesis) and Hadith, Physics and Botany. Aroian, Dar al-'Ulum, p. 37. Students at Dar al-'Ulum 
studied foreign language for five hours per week until foreign language study was abrogated in 1904. Ibid p. 184. 
28. Dar al- 'Ulum and the true acculturating-educated M-E intellectuals collaborated in the recovery of the 
classical Arabs' past. For instance, Tala'at Harb's 1905 Ta'rikh Duwal al-' Arab wal-Islam (History of the States of 
the [Classical] Arabs and Islam) was used to teach history at the Dar. Aroian, Dar al-'Ulum, pp. 201-202. Harb (d. 
1941) was an 1889 graduate of the Law School in Cairo, the matrix of Kami! and his watanist anti-imperialist 
comrades; he hung around the Kamilists --- and after World War I became a towering Egyptian capitalist (B 45-51). 
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Jawhari (1862-1940), who had strong links with Kamil's movement, strove in many works to 
achieve a symbiosis between the modern West's science and Islam29• 
Before the British conquest, then, Egypt's 'Alid rulers conducted modernization that 
already acculturated some Muslim Egyptians. Arabizing and Islamizing agencies, however, had 
been built into modernization: these reassembled the classical Arabs' literary language and 
extended it to convey and incorporate modernity from the West. After 1882, this neo-classical, 
fed from such institutions as a grammatically purist Dar al- 'Ulum, would fend off both Britain's 
linguistic onslaughts on the M-E elite and high cultural expression of Egyptian particularity (any 
dialectization in literature). Arab culture and Islam and modernity had already been extensively 
intermeshed by 1882. 
Acculturation in the Period of British Colonial Rule ( 1882 - 1922) 
Hisham Sharabi surveyed the emergence in the Arab East in the decades prior to World 
War I of the first educated elite "since the high Middle Ages ... distinctly separate from the 
closed religious stratum of the 'ulama' who for generations had monopolized ... intellectual 
activity"30• The new intelligentsia were "administrators, professionals particularly lawyers and 
doctors, hommes des lettres", "journalists and essayists who with the written word exercised 
considerable influence upon political development", and, crucially, the politically activist 
secular-stream student group focussed from themid-1890s by Mustafa Kamil's movement for 
independence from British colonial rule31 • Sharabi also characterized that the pre-1914 
modem-educated Muslims' preference for careers lay in government service, the army and law 
rather than in commerce or industry --- although Jaridist and Kamilist M-E acculturateds had, in 
the period of British colonial rule, already become more at least conceptually interested in the 
·~~ 
resident Syrian Christians' "entrepreneurial spirit" than-\li.J~attems32 . Arab Egyptian 
neo-capitalism was actualized from the later 1920s, but the rudimentary aspiration among Arab 
29. Yusuf As'ad Daghir's assessment was that "he strove in all his works to reconcile science and what 
came in the Qur'an". Daghir, Masadir v. 2 p. 281. Jawhari had to leave Dar al-'Ulum when World War I broke out 
because of his links to the Patriotic Party founded by Kamil. Aroian, Dar al-'Ulum pp. 129-134. 
30. Hisham Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years 1875-1914 (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins 1970) p. 3. 
31. Ibid pp. 88-89. 
32. Ibid p. 20. 
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Muslim-Egyptian and SC Jaridists already entailed crude ideas for economic pan-Arabism before 
1915 (A 328-329). 
A consistent feature of the British colonial period was that those Egyptians who passed 
through the secular, non-Islamic stream in education were increasingly immersed in European 
languages: French, but also more and more English. On the other hand, British policies often 
reduced the scope for neo-classical Arabic. Prior to the British conquest, Arabic was the medium 
of several tertiary colleges in Egypt, among them the College of Medicine. As the British 
established their authority, they imposed European (mainly English) faculty upon the College 
and English as the medium of instruction: "in 1911 the School of Pharmacy, attached to the 
Medical School, did not graduate a single student, while the Medical School graduated only 
six"33• Fewer Egyptians were graduating from tertiary institutions, but those who could were 
acculturated more. Acculturated Muslim Egyptians formed under British colonial rule were 
insecure both in linguistic identity and professionally. Competition from immigrant Europeans 
constricted career openings in the fields of medicine, architecture, engineering and to some 
extent the secular law. Lutfi al-Sayyid's al-Jaridah vented the modem-educated Egyptians' 
resentment at British restriction of medical education and hence the class' growth in that field34• 
Westernized-Legal Nationalist Vanguard Forms. After 1882, European or 
Europe-originated law was studied both on Egypt's soil and in Europe (mainly France). The 
School of Law, Egypt's best tertiary ins~itution, taught in French and, in response to unremitting 
pressure from British officials, later increasingly in English medium35• The French professors 
communicated to their Egyptian students not just the specificities but also the institutional 
foundations of modem Western law, ideas of the rights of nations and sovereignty of the people 
--- concepts that furious British officials regarded as subversive of their colonial rule. Degree 
33. Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt. 1882-1914 (Princeton University 
Press 1966) p. 333. 
34. "Egypt had a dangerously low ratio of doctors and pharmacists to the total population, even in the 
wealthier cities of Cairo and Alexandria. The restricted supply of graduates from the Medical School" meant that 
frequently unqualified immigrant foreigners "dominated the practice of medicine in Egypt". Ibid p. 333. al-Jaridah 
fumed in 1907 that "no one denied that doctors are few in [our] land and most of them are foreigners. Everyone who 
knows the great disparity between the number of medical students and number of students at the Law School" would 
demand that the Ministry of Education should subsidize study in the School of Medicine to attract more students to 
it. "Nazarat al-Ma'arif --- al-Majaniyyah wa Madrasat al-Muhandiskhanah" (The Ministry of Education --- Free 
Education and the School of Engineering), al-Jaridah, 23 May 1907, p. 3. 
35. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 333-336. 
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study at the Egyptian Law School lastingly tinctured with French even graduates' intimate or 
domestic life, even when they did not undergo subsequent higher studies in Europe or much live 
or travel there (eg. al-Jaridah's Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid)36• The deep commitment to 
secularoid-positivist France --- a true liberal West alternative to imperialist Britain? --- certainly 
proved very deep-seated in the acculturated Muslim Egyptian psyche. More accommodating 
than the Watanists to Britain, al-Jaridah still encouraged Egyptians to study law in France in 
preference: it would make degrees much harder given that the British had filled Egypt's schools 
and colleges with English --- but would renew the "independence" relationship Mustafa Kamil 
had established with France through Lambert, director of the School of Law whom the British 
had finally replaced with an Englishman in 190737• The attachment of top Kamilist and Jaridist 
intellectuals to French as the preferred medium through which to approach Europe's thought and 
modernity kept them chasing the will-o'-the-wisp of intervention by France to evict Britain38•· 
The tri-lingualoid new vanguard of law students and professional secular lawyers henceforth 
usually organized the political movements against British rule with the cautious approach 
dictated by its legal culture and class linkages. In regard to the more militant al-Hizb al-Watani 
(Patriotic Party), its founder Mustafa Kamil (d. 1908) was educated at the University of Toulouse 
in French Law while his successor as party leader, Muhammad Farid, graduated from the 
36. The Azhar-educated Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat (1885-1968), after he launched the seminal literary 
monthly al-Risalah in 1933, paid the Egypt-centric modernist Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (1872-1954) a visit in his villa. 
Lutfi was educated at the Egyptian Law School, apart from which he had attended a brief summer school on 
literature and philosophy in Geneva in 1897. During al-Zayyat's visit to his villa inc. 1933, Lutfi gave orders in 
French to his dog, who readily obeyed them! Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, Wahy al-Risalah v. 1 (Cairo: Dar Nahdat 
Misr 1953) p. 26. . . 
37. "al-Katib al-Ma'ruf' (pseud.), "Fil-Safar Aydan: al-Wusul ila Marsilya wal-Safaru minha" (Travelling, 
Yet Again: Arrival in Marseille and Departure From It), al-Jaridah 2 September 1909. 
38. In the years leading up to World War 1, the Jaridists often mocked the Kamilists for relapses into their 
old culturally sentimental lobbying for French intervention (A 320-321 ). Yet they, too, were a bit prone to the 
syndrome. In concluding the 1904 Entente Cordiale with Britain, France accepted that British rule in Egypt would 
last. Yet, in a 1908 address in ethnically mixed Alexandria, Lutfi still tried to dissuade resident aliens --- and 
probably the France with whom many were affiliated --- from going along with Britain's manipulative proposal for 
an international legislative council, a ploy to deny Egyptians a constitution. "The French, who once could aspire on 
good grounds to be the first among the States in influence in Egypt --- given the moral impact that they have had, the 
long-standing influence of their language and law and of their educational patterns/ideologies (anmat ta'alimihim) 
--- find themselves stripped of this preeminence". Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Safahat Matwiyyah min Ta'rikh 
al-Harakat al-Istiglaliyyah fi Misr v. 1, ed. Isma'il Mazhar, (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Misriyyah 1946) p. 35. 
Lutfi was explicitly conveying Egyptian aspirations to the residents' foreign-language papers, whose old 
anti-Britishism was fading, and he probably hoped that the French government, too, would hear yet another offer of 
an associaition from an Egyptian. 
- A18 -
Egyptian Law School in 1887 and became a deputy Attorney-General at the Court of Appeal: he 
wrote and orated French fluently39• The secular law students became a well-organized, acti~ist 
core of opposition to British rule, which Kamil raised to a new level when he organized in 1906 
the first of innumerable strikes in the Egyptian Law School. Secular Muslim Egyptian lawyers 
took the lead in 1907 in founding the moderate nationalist al-Ummah Party, moderated by its 
propertied Arab-Egyptian land-owners40• 
Literary Arabic's Survival Threatened. Once they consolidated their rule, the British 
waged a constantly expanding campaign to impose English as the core and medium of 
instruction in Egypt's government schools, primary as well as secondary. This drive was 
directed over the years by the Scots ex-missionary Douglas Dunlop (1861-1937) whom 
Proconsul Cromer appointed "adviser" to the Egyptian Ministry of Education in 188741 • By 1900 
"a large number of courses in the primary schools were given in English; in the secondary 
schools all subjects except Arabic and some mathematics were either in English or French"42• 
From the turn of the century, government secondary schools concentrated on teaching 
post-Renaissance European history (Russian, French, German and Austrian as well as British)43 : 
such British-fostered curricula Europeanized and de-Arabized Egyptians' historical 
consciousness. The linguistic depersonalization built compensating Arabizing, anti-European 
reflexes into the youthful personality of Muhammad Husayn Haykal, that he was to resolve much 
later as a pan-Arab educationalist in the 1930s and 1940s: he was to apply Western technologies 
then to enable the schools to popularize classical Arabic as the crucial definant of selfhood, 
counter-constricting the Western languages of the "enslavers" of "the Muslims" in primary and 
secondary education (B 191-195). 
Virtually all strata of literate Muslim Egyptians bitterly opposed the imposition of 
39. Ziadeh, Lawyers p. 66. 
40. "Some prominent lawyers who had looked askance at the National Party's radical approach joined with 
a number of notables to form the Ummah Party" (Ziadeh). Ziadeh mentioned Fathi Zaghlul, president of the Cairo 
Court of First Instance, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Qasim Amin a judge, Ahmad 'Afifi a judge in the courts of appeal, 
'Abd al-' Aziz Fahrni a prominent advocate --- and' Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat, then an outstanding official in the 
Ministry of Justice, and a future post-independence Liberal Constitutionalist PM (cf fn 21). Ziadeh, Lawyers p. 90. 
41. Tignor, British Colonial Rule, pp. 328-329. 
42. Thill. pp. 325-326. 
43. Tarek Fakhrel-Deen, 'Abdal Rahman Shukri (1886-1958): An Egyptian Writer in The Age of 
Imperialism and Nationalism (PhD dissertation: New York University Press 1972) p. 153. 
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English on the schools, given that the Qur'an had to be read in Arabic44• Chapter 5 will show 
that the Kamilists, for all their exposure to European languages and concepts, had in full this 
tradition-rooted reflex that European languages in Egypt's schools and life threatened access to 
Islam. However, a cluster of separate intellectual elites, whose formal educations ranged from 
monolingual traditional-Islamic to the most Westernizing, strove together to safeguard Arabic as 
the core of identity. Another disciple of al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh ( 1849-1905), having 
returned from exile in 1888, developed a stormy career as Mufti of Egypt (1889-1905) under the 
British. 'Abduh's formal education was Arab-Islamic, yet he skilfully lobbied metropolitan 
England to rein the anglicizing drives by British officials in Egypt. After visits to London, 
'Abduh in 1905 got the anti-imperialist Liberal M.P. John Robertson to publish, in English, a 
book of "letters from an Egyptian" that appealed to the British to reverse the policy because it 
threatened the Egyptians' language and thus their religion45• In Egypt, 'Abduh tirelessly 
published almost lost classical Arab works for acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals 
already curious about Islam's golden age (Ch. 2). The Kamilists, in particular, long resisted 
English with French as well as neo-classical Arabic, but by 1910 even their younger activists had 
become fluent in it46• They were coming to use English to communicate Egypt's demands to 
Anglo-Saxons, whose utilitarian liberalism they adopted more and more, like the Jaridists47• 
44. In 1900 the editor of the Cairo Himarat Munyati wrote that Dunlop had decreed "that our children 
should learn all subjects in English or they would be dismissed from [the] schools" and satirically observed that 
there would be nothing wrong if the students had to study even the Qur'an in English: "they shall either read it in 
English or omit it altogether from the curriculum". Himarat Munyati v. 3:20 (17 August 1900) pp. 310-311 quoted 
Fakhrel-Deen, 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri p. 157. 
45. 'Abduh's letters were published anonymously after his death under the title Letters from an Egyptian to 
an English Politician upon the Affairs of Egypt (London: G. Routledge and Sons Ltd, 1908), with an introduction 
written by John M. Robertson, M.P. 'Abduh vividly depicted the linguistic depersonalization of the younger 
generation of Egyptians under Cromer's rule: "the result of teaching nearly every subject in English is that the young 
Egyptian at the age of fourteen or fifteen speaks the language well ... entirely without accent. He can read and write 
English fluently ... But at what cost does he acquire this proficiency? ... Everything else almost --- and religion and 
the Arabic language most of all --- is sacrificed to achieve this end". Letters p. 143, quoted Fakhrel-Deen, 'Abd 
al-Rahman Shukri p. 158. 
46. British endeavors to make English the literary language of Egypt's educated modem classes had effects 
even in the ranks of the Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) organized by Mustafa Kamil to drive them out. Dr. 
Mansur Rifa'at, an exiled Party member, in 1917 during a conflict with its leader Muhammad Farid, wrote a cold 
letter to him from Berlin in idiomatic glacial English quite in the style that an educated born Englishman would have 
used. Photocopied in Farid, Awrag Muhammad Farid (Cairo: v. 1 al-Hay'at al-Misriyyah lil-Kitab 1978) p. 376. 
47. There was marked political and ideological convergence of al-Jaridah/Hizb al-Ummah with the 
Kamilists during in particular the repressive incumbancy of Gorst. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani p. 147. al-Jaridah in 
mid-1910 publicized the English monthly newspaper Egypt that al-Hizb al-Watani youth activist Muhammad Lutfi 
Jum'ah had just started to bring out from Geneva: he was particularly directing it to British parliamentarians, while 
striving to inform general "English public opinion in England and Ireland". Lutfi Jum'ah evoked English liberalism 
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Private European Schools. The British were slow to extend government schooling for 
girls. As before 1882, the wealthiest Egyptians sent in particular their daughters to the exorbitant 
French-medium missionary schools48 • Generations of upper-class Muslim Egyptian women 
educated by missionaries in French and English grew up unequipped to read even simple Arabic 
books. Images of mass-attending Muslim Egyptian children greatly stimulated linguistic 
nationalist stances among Egyptian intellectuals, even those more inclined to territorial identity 
and pragmatic self-Westernization. Ideologically converging, al-Afghani's disciple the 
traditionally-cultured' Abdallah al-Nadim, the Egypto-Syrian Islamic revivalist Rashid Rida 
(1865-1935) and the relatively Westernizing- and territorially-oriented Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid 
(1872-1954), educated as a secular lawyer, all denounced the Catholic Freres' and Soeurs' 
schools49• 
to sap the English will to stay on in an Egypt that clearly did not want them. The newspaper took as its motto a 
phrase by John Stuart Mill that only self-government by a nation could have meaning: any rule by one nation over 
another could neither have meaning or be real. Had not the former Liberal Prime Minister Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman stated that good government was no substitute for self-government? The first number of 
~carried an article by the old anti-imperialist war-horse Sir Wilfrid Scawen Blunt on the Suez Canal 
Concession: much of the number was meant to deter the British campaign to get that extended to 2008 (fn 55). The 
newspaper denied connection with any political party ... "Jaridah Jadidah lil-Difa' 'an Misr" (A New Paper for 
Defending Egypt), al-Jaridah 19 May 1910 p. 5. For the evolution of Jum'ah's ultra-acculturated Arabo-Islamism to 
his death in 1953, A 98-99, B 56-59, B 216-217. 
48. European observers confirm the sustained strength of the French educational and cultural impact, and 
the centrality of the Catholic missionaries in it, throughout the whole period of British colonial rule. Symons fumed 
as late as 1925 that the Freres' and Soeurs' widespread provision of French-medium education, and the much 
weaker British and American missionary counter-effort to provide English medium schools, had enabled the French 
to "triumph" linguistically over Britain although, politically, the latter ruled Egypt. M. Travers Symons, Britain and 
Egypt: The Rise of Egyptian Nationalism (London: Cecil Palmer 1925) p. 296. However, Symons had in mind the 
French schools' successful attraction of Syrian Christian and "Levantine" students as much as original Egyptians. In 
regard to English-diffusing private primary and secondary schools, during British colonial rule there usually were 
around one hundred American Presbyterian schools in Egypt. Fakhrel-Deen, 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri p. 146. 
49. 'Abdallah al-Nadim (initial ideological mentor of the young Kamil) warned that the schools of the 
Freres or Jesuits or Protestants in Egypt or in such Ottoman provinces as 'Iraq assimilated their native students to the 
European nationalities of the teachers: they made the students a "third group" (qism thalith) that was Eastern in race 
and speech, but acted on behalf of the West. Wendell, Egyptian National Image, p. 156. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid 
was as apprehensive that Freres' and Soeurs' schools denationalized Egyptian students and undermined the unity 
essential for building the Egyptian national political community. A young woman who graduated from some school 
of nuns was bereft of any common ground of costume, tastes or conversation with either her mother or other 
Egyptian females of her age. She had been alienated from her people (qawm) by an educational system that failed to 
ground her in the ethics of her religion. The education offered by Catholic and other missions cut students off from 
their nation (ummah), failed to ground them in the ummah's commercial and economic life, and left them unable to 
view events through the ethos of their countrymen. Yet the mission schools in Egypt had not truly brought modem 
educational methods (or modem thought --- al-madhahib al-hadithah) to Egyptians. Lutfi, "al-Hukm al-Dhati: 
al-Ta'lim al-' Amm: Qa'idatuhu" (Autonomy: Public Education: What its Basis Should Be) al-Jaridah, 17 September 
1907; Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyyah pp. 118-119. For Rida's denunciation of the education provided by the Freres, 
Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West p. 51. 
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The British never dislodged French as the common language of the resident Europeans 
dominant in the cities' modem economy; educated Egyptians transacted with them in French 
daily. Because French was already known to Egyptian officials and far more convenient for 
English appointees than literary Arabic, and because the English legally were not supposed to 
administer Egypt for long, even British officials in their puppet Egyptian government often had 
to use French as the medium of administration, even up to World War 150• Thus, the government 
apparatus long consolidated and diffused French rather than English among Egyptians. 
The ever-available French press of the local resident Europeans built up modem-educated 
Muslims' grasp of the language and some metropolitan French thought-patterns --- but also from 
very adolescence could embitter against several categories of Europeans. Cromer did not dare 
censor these long-critical papers, linked through the capitulations to Britain's rival France51 • 
Even the monolingual' Abdallah al-Nadim, Mustafa Kamil's first ideological mentor, in 1892 
noted Le Phare d' Alexandrie's services to Egypt and respect for the Egyptian princes, which had 
won it "the love of the natives"52• The first generation of educated Muslim Egyptians being 
acculturated under British rule, of which Kami! was one, from adolescence read Le Phare, or 
Bosphore Egyptien because they criticized the British occupiers53. However, these newspapers 
also reflected simmering socio-economic ill-will between the resident Europeans and 
still-modernizing Muslim Egyptians. Borelli, editor of Bosphore, campaigned against British 
50. Anglo-Egyptian officials in the Department of Education long had to converse and correspond in 
French. Peter Mellini, Sir Eldon Gorst: the Overshadowed Proconsul (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution 
Press, Hoover Colonial Studies 1977) p. 51. Symons fumed as late as 1925 that the bizarre habit of two British 
officials in separate Egyptian government departments corresponding with each other in poor French, not English, 
was still in vogue even during World War I. His account makes clear that Egyptian staffs' knowledge only of 
French apart from Arabic constrained these British officials from using English. "The Official Journal continued to 
be printed in French, with only certain parts in English, the Cabinet made all its announcements in French, and the 
laws were promulgated in French and Arabic". Symons, Britain and Egypt, pp. 298-299. 
51. In the early years of the Occupation, ten French newspapers were published in Egypt, all of them 
hostile to Britain. Fak:hrel-Deen, 'Abdal Rahman Shukri, p. 144. In his 1907 valedictory address, Cromer 
reminisced that, after he arrived in 1883, the local French papers regularly denounced him as "the beast Cromer" and 
even Moloch --- but lately were starting to accept him as a father-figure. Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyyah p. 90. He could 
afford some good-humor: the local French newspapers, mouthpieces of resident Europeans increasingly frightened 
by rising Muslim Egyptian nationalism, had been moving towards his Residency for some time. 
52. al-Nadim in al-Ustadh, 18 October 1892, pp. 209-210. 
53. "In the hands of such men as Borelli and Gavillot, a paper like the Bosphore frequently made trouble 
for the Government; whence the resentment felt against it by the British authorities, and its prestige in Egyptian 
opinion". Jacques Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution tsd. Jean Stewart (London: Faber and Faber, 1972) p. 
207. Berque identified the "European papers published in Egypt" as the model for the development of a modem 
Arabic press, "this modem source of power". Ibid. 
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rule over Egypt, but argued for joint rule by European powers ("internationalization"), not 
Egyptian independence --- a viewpoint he got across to metropolitan France at the exact time that 
Mustafa Kamil arrived to lobby for Egyptian independence54. Polemics with these papers of the 
residents in various ways pulled acculturated Egyptians' thought out from territorial Egyptian 
community to wide religious communities. Chapter 4 will show how support by Le Phare 
d' Alexandrie's Greek editor for Greece against the Ottoman State during their 1897 war involved 
the young Mustafa Kamil more deeply in that extra-Egyptian conflict. Apprehensive that 
Karnilist nationalism might harm their economic postition, the residents came to accept the 
Occupation more. The more incorporative Jaridists, too, fumed when even less anti-Egyptian 
local French newspapers backed Britain's efforts to extend the Concession of the (France-based) 
Suez Canal Company to 200855 --- or chimed in with British themes that the drive to found an 
Egyptian University was more xenophobic Islamic "fanaticism"56• 
Pragmatic in spasms, the J aridists sometimes sounded more prepared than the Kamilists 
to admit Western terms, or current Egyptian usage, into the formal Arabic being extended for 
modernity --- not just the classical Arabs' idioms. Yet al-Jaridah, too, published 
characterizations of Western languages as a threat to Arabic or sovereignty. The salience of 
French alongside English in Egypt made contributors think not of Egyptians-versus-Britishers 
but two wider camps: "the Easterners in general" against "Imperialist Europe". This vacillating 
mid-1911 response saw missionary educationalists as (a) an instrument by which their not 
invariably Christianity-motivated States implanted their languages and cultural "influence" to 
54. Borelli got his simultaneously anti-British and anti-Egyptian viewpoint across to the metropolitan 
French public in his 1895 book Choses politigues d'Egypt. 1883-1895. Madam Juliette Adam took note of Borelli's 
book and its contradictory stance on Egyptian affairs at the very time that she introduced Mustafa Kamil and the first 
article by him that she published, in her La Nouvelle Revue. Adam, "Lettres Sur La Politique Exterieure", La_ 
Nouvelle Revue September-October 1895, pp. 834-835. 
55. After the Journal de Caire mistakenly contrasted "moderate" al-Jaridah to nationalist elements opposing 
extension of the Suez Canal concession, Yusuf al-Bustani, a Syrian Christian al-Jaridah sub-editor, set out economic 
and political advantages for Egypt in rejecting any extension. Yusuf al-Bustani, "Mas'alat Qanat al-Suways" (The 
Suez Canal Question), al-Jaridah 24 June 1911 p. 1. al-Jaridah had been intent to court the Journal as an important 
avenue for giving Egyptian nationalism a respectable image in Western states, particularly France, so important for 
independence. Recognition that Journal de Caire would be happy to help in this, though, was in the context of one 
communal organization of the resident Greeks condemning the paper for not automatically standing with resident 
aliens who violated Egyptian laws. "Bayn al-Misriyyina wal-Nuzala"' (Between the Egyptians and the Resident 
Europeans), al-Jaridah 28 June 1910 p. 1. 
56. Lutfi, "Ma lil-Siyasah wal-'Ilm?" (What Does Politics Have to do with Knowledge?), al-Jaridah, 25 
May 1907; Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyyah, pp. 170-172. 
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soften Muslim countries for colonization or (b) in their drive to Christianize Muslim children and 
societies at variance with the modernist laicism of, for instance, (goodish?) French governments 
that pressured them to offer neutral knowledge57• Such Jaridist hatred of missionaries saw the 
staying-power of Christianity in the societies and politics of Western states: but was 
non-traditional in its differentiation of a host of political, religious and ideological factions there 
whose voices are tuned in. al-Jaridah's pluralization of Westerners prefigured nuanced, mixed, 
religio-secularoid explications of French imperialism in North Africa from the Young Men's 
Muslim Association milieu in 1930 (B 71-72fn). 
The opening of the Canal in 1869 had made Egypt the highway that linked Europe and 
Asia. Under Britain's efficient administration, Egypt's internal and international 
communications further developed, making Europe even more accessible. It became 
commonplace for well-off, relatively modernized Muslim Egyptians to holiday in summer-time 
in Europe, a practice defended against its own insularists58 by sectional Westernizers in Ahmad 
Lutfi al-Sayyid's al-Jaridah. As much as they could, the British blocked Egyptians from getting 
tertiary humanities education within Egypt or Europe: some Jaridists championed summer 
57. "al-Madaris al-Ajnabiyyah fil-Qutr al-Misri: Kalimah fi Sabil Allah" (Foreign Schools in Egypt: Time 
for Some Plain Speaking), al-Jaridah 11 May 1911 p. 4. This item throbbed with all the contradictions of 
acculturation. It sharply characterized the acculturated new specialized elite: the schools provided by the Freres, 
Jesuits and Americans made possible the subsequent qualifications and careers of "a large proportion of our 
physicians, lawyers, engineers and government officials". The purpose of the schools, though, was to convert those 
Egyptians whom the modern knowledge bait drew in. The central paradox of acculturation, then, was that the 
stratum of Muslim Egyptians most intimately exposed to Wes tern Christianity and clerical elites was the modern 
bilingualized professionals --- not Islam's monolingual guardian scholars and clerics. The West's religious elites 
had elaborately interwoven their sects into modernity and its instruments: they were a deadly opponent that would 
not fade away of itself in face of the world's Progress. Yet such M-E acculturateds could swing in different 
directions. They could view the overall modem West, its governments included, as still motivated by Christianity to 
be anti-Muslim. Or they could view secularoid Westerners as neutral at least: dichotomizing missionaries and other 
fanatical Christians against that now central better West. This item sometimes approved a post-Christian good West, 
quoting denunciations of the Catholic Church and its schools by French anti-clerical ministers and prime ministers. 
One French Prime Minister, Rene Waldeck-Rousseau, had regretted that French governments could not prohibit 
parents from sending their children to Catholic schools --- "but we can, as is our most sacred duty, withhold 
government employment from those who do not study in our purely scientific schools". "Madaris ... " This Egyptian 
acculturated had been drawn into France's hatreds but the ambiguity is the range of sometimes sub-conscious 
motives for his militant conjunction with Western anti-clericalism as a means to harm foreign Christian structures in 
"the East". 
58. The Europe-avoiders were not a faction outside al-Jaridah but a variant concentration of elements 
amply present even in its interactionism. One mid-1910 item item fumed at the hemorrhaging of money overseas. 
The increasing preference for overseas holiday destinations had halved the number of Egyptians who summered 
along the Alexandrian coasts: Europe and Istanbul were raking in LlOO, 000 that could have benefitted Alexandria's 
fellow-Egyptians, apart from huge sums rich Egyptian gamblers squandered at Monte Carlo. The claim by some 
that they were going to Europe to observe its public affairs was only a blind: they had more personal and 
idiosyncratic aims. Anon, "Fasl al-Sayf' (The Summer Season), al-Jaridah 9 July 1910 p. 2. 
as a to encounter European 
these 
already-acculturated tourists who most strove to Europeans were 
jarred by the disdain some of them evinced towards "the Easterners"59. France could be a 
detailed model for Egypt's "Reform", but tin-pot supremacism or rudeness met there would 
quickly ignite an identification with an internationally hard-hitting classical Arab entity centred 
outside Egypt: this, though, was still as "the Egyptian Nation" in "the East" counter-camp60• 
al-Jaridah alternately saw the interaction of (a) Britishers/Frenchmen/Europeans with (b) 
Egyptians/Arabic/Muslims/Islam/the East from multiple perspectives that it could finally blend: 
eg. in terms of a range of Western ideologies, some secularoid but others Christianoid, several 
Western polities simultaneously, and in almost all items also from some parallel situation under 
classical Arab Islam. The semi-intimate responsiveness to France and to French --- but 
eventually even British --- culture and thought, defined the self/Arabic and Western elements 
59. An unsigned 1907 al-Jaridah editorial tried to check one-sided criticism of the custom of summer 
holidays in Europe. The critics contended that wealthy Egyptians who holidayed there squandered the country's 
money in gambling, gave a bad image of Egypt by committing indecencies and returned full of contempt for their 
land of birth. al-Jaridah in reply depicted this contact between "the Easterners and the Westerners" through tourism 
as educational for both. The holidaying Egyptians, being mostly educated, acquainted themselves in Europe with its 
society, sciences, educational curricula and latest books and spread knowledge about them among their 
fellow-Egyptians when they returned. They would see Europe's factories and new agricultural inventions, and upon 
return introduce such technology in Egypt. This editorial, ostensibly a defence of contact with Europeans, fully 
manifested the ambivalent, tense attitudes to them characteristic of Lutfi' s modernist proto-particularist group. It 
assumed that European politicians and travel-writers had implanted contemptuous ideas about Egypt/the East there: 
Egyptians holidaying in Europe should try to convince its philosophers, opinion-makers and leaders "that the East is 
not devoid of all literature and morality as most [Europeans] suppose". "al-Istiyaffi Urubba" (Summer Holidays in 
Europe), al-Jaridah 29 May 1907, p. 1. 
60. "Fil-Safar Aydan" loc. cit. The specific area of "Reform" or modernization for Egypt that France 
suggested to this traveller this time around was the sanitary housing provided to urban and rural poor and laborers: 
no French farmer tethered his livestock inside his home near where he slept, as was the case in Egypt. The writer 
chided the Turco-Circassian absentee landed aristocracy headed by the Khedivial family for not carrying through the 
building of equivalent pilot housing for tenants on their vast estates. Ibid. For the similar nausea felt by Lutfi and 
his young disciple Muhammad Husayn Haykal at the squalor of rural Egyptian family houses during their 1911 tour 
of al-Daqahlawiyyah, see Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 285 fn. Despite his feel for rural France, the 
al-Jaridah writer was not star-struck by it, being well aware of inherently different aspects of Egyptian agriculture. 
The classical Arabs rose up in his mind when he experienced nonchalance and abrasive ill-treatment in Marseille 
from petty French customs officials "of less standing and rank than most of those standing in that queue". The 
exorbitant customs-dues they exacted on the luggage of incoming Egyptians made him doubt if "the modem 
Western nations [can soon] attain the civilization of that [classical] Arab Nation that placed freedom of trade and 
prohibition of imposts and duties among the fundamental principles of the righteous religion". The writer recalled 
"the Arab woman" in the reign of the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Mu'tasim who came to trade "Arab goods" in the 
Byzantine Empire. When she refused to pay customs dues, the Byzantines ill-treated and imprisoned her --- drawing 
the retaliatory campaign by the Arabs that sped the Byzantine State on its road to extinction. So ethnicistally Arab 
as regarded the past, this 1909 writer only termed contemporary Arabs "the Easterners". "Fil-Safar Aydan". 
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against each other with ultra-sharpness. France's French-staffed facilities for tourists brought 
home that "the language of the Qur'an" was being cosmopolitanized into a patois in multi-ethnic 
Egyptian cities --- where visiting and resident foreigners, adept at networking, syphoned what 
wealth they brought in or stimulated, for instance in tourism, off to Europe61 • Jaridists and 
Kamilists tended not to respond in a compartmentalized or discrete way to specific groups of 
Westerners or specific cultural problems, but rather pulling together and bracketing all Arab 
history with the whole West or most Western nations. This unification of perspectives energized 
the pre-1919 struggle of acculturated M-E movements to save literary Arabic. One 1909 article 
traced the crisis to sharply-focussed features of social and political power in Egypt: "general 
ignorance": too many Turco-Circassian "rulers" grew up without learning the standard language 
and then refused to encourage or promote it: foreigners heading government departments made 
their language the medium of administration: the use of English and French as mediums for 
government primary and secondary schools, the inferior remuneration and promotion 
opportunities awarded Arabic teachers etc. But --- simultaneous perspective from classical Arab 
history: it was essential "for the preservation of our nationalism/nationality (qawmiyyatina)" to 
restore the integral styles of the literary language once patronized by "those Kings who exercized 
power from Andalusia and the coasts of Morocco to India". That those governing Arabs could 
eliminate languages that otherwise would have threatened Arabic --- Coptic: and Persian nearly, 
until the Persians came to rule themselves again --- showed the vulnerable dependence of all 
literary languages upon political power (Algeria peril)62• 
Many patterns of interaction with Westerners and Western cultures before 1919, then, 
61. "Fil-Safar Aydan". 
62. "A Student in the Khedivial Teachers' College", "al-Lughat al-' Arabiyyah fi Misr" (The Arabic 
Language in Egypt), al-Jaridah 9 July 1910 pp. 1-2. This youthful essay succinctly anticipated many of the themes 
and stances explored by Taha Husayn in a series of al-J aridah articles on language and literature in the following 
year. As Taha was to do in more detail then, this anonymous student exulted at Arabic's destruction of Coptic, to 
which a particularist would have felt at least some ambivalence. Like Taha, he had ambivalent awareness of the 
Persians who almost fused with the classical Arabs: "the language of the Persians almost faded away into extinction 
after the Arabs conquered their land. Their scholars became Arabized and composed more --- and more precious ---
Arabic books than the Arabs themselves. Their language was resurrected up from the embers again only after 
political power trickled back to them". While alert to all disadvantages facing literary Arabic in Egypt and to all 
resources that could be mustered to save it, this writer was --- as Taha was to be in late 1911 --- well aware that the 
peril literary Arabic faced under the French in Algeria and Tunisia was much deadlier: he likened the hybridization 
and degeneration of the forms of Arabic that lingered there to the composite Maltese and Hindustani languages. 
Ibid. The item's condemnation of those West-influenced writers who did not maintain the classical Arabs' styles 
would impinge on Haykal but not Taha. 
as the core selfhood. long sought 
interaction France and its versions of Western thought and culture, in preference to 
imperialist England's version, would finally make them relate the two as both components in one 
often anti-Muslim Western camp: assaults on the Arabic of Algerians were more ferocious. The 
great classical Arabs were not only a handy equal counter-past but a source of genuine 
perspective about the interweave between political power and languages in macro-history. 
Overall, acculturated M-E intellectuals before 1919 understood the British enemy, but 
also the wider cluster of European states and cultures, more variedly than the British 
deculturizers did Egyptians. The acculturateds' greater motivatedness and clearer vision of 
languages in history enabled them to fight Dunlap's banal Anglicization campaigns to a halt. 
Study in Europe. In July 1909, Haykal sailed to study law for three years at the 
Sorbonne. It was a strain after his Dunlopian primary and secondary education to build an active 
command of French63 . The youthful Haykal committed himself deeply in France both to its 
literature and its positivist thought. barely arrived the French co-lodgers made 
clear to him that they could apply laicist repudiation of "fanaticism" to brand the Egyptians as 
retrograde Muslims and gratuitously stand with the British64. In the diaries he kept in Europe, 
63. The young Haykal arrived in Paris on 13 July 1909, the eve of "the Day of Liberty". He responded 
enthusiastically to France as a centre of modernity which "deepened man's belief in freedom of belief and opinion· 
and that fanaticism is to be detested". Haykal, Mudhakkirat v. l, p. 40. But then, on 20 February 1910 back in 
Egypt, the Europe-educated Muslim Egyptian pharmacist Ibrahim al-Wardani assassinated the pro-British Coptic 
Prime Minister Butrus Ghali. The young Haykal, an impressionable 21 years old, had been in France slightly above 
six months. Over a meal in their rooming-house, a French secondary-school teacher told him that "fanaticism has 
led a Muslim Egyptian youth to shoot Butrus Ghali dead". Haykal "quickly" argued in reply that al-Wardani's 
motive for the assassination was "political", B utrus Ghali' s long series of acts of collaboration with British colonial 
rule: Ghali had signed the Anglo-Egypt accord for the Sudan in 1899 which put that country under British 
administration disguised as a condominium, Ghali "was the one who headed the exceptional tribunal which tried the 
Egyptians at Dinshawai [in June 1906] and passed cruel sentences against them made even crueler because they 
were carred out in a savage manner unknown in the Middle Ages". The French teacher replied: "It's true that the 
youth said what you say. But I fancy that the Prime Minister's Christian faith influenced this youth to commit his 
crime". Ibid p. 41. For the background of Ghali's premiership and his assassination, B. Lynn Carter, The Copts in 
Egyptian Politics (London: Croom Helm 1986) pp. 12-13. Nasif al-Miqdadi, a Coptic publicist who had studied in 
Europe with al-Wardani and knew him well, wrote a letter from Switzerland in the wake of the assassination, 
denying that the youth was religiously fanatical. Relatives of al-Miqbadi brought out the militantly Coptist al-Watan 
daily. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani pp. 56-57. 
64. The school teacher's Islamophobic anti-Egyptianism aside, Haykal found the French impossible people 
to connect with as human beings. He responded enthusiastically to the freedom of expression, especially in 
celebration of eros, that he found in the canvases of the Louvre --- such a vital contrast to the fake "virtue and 
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Haykal already perceived hostility from the French --- as from the British and other Westerners 
--- in campoid terms: the competition between the European powers to seize Morocco in August 
1909 made him hope that "the Easterners" would awake in Islam-focussed "revolution" to free 
their lands of "the rule of the [enslavers] who seize their fruits". Morocco, though, did in 1909 
make him conceive the Easterners as having made themselves colonizable by long "slumber" 
following greatness --- ambivalence matched by the dual-cultured Kamilists' intermittent 
alienation from Moroccan, Black African and other traditional Muslims who had not borrowed 
from the West (Ch. 3)65• The youthful Haykal's first more critical responses to Europe and its 
attitudes prefigured the al-Siyasah pan-Easternism in which pan-Arab linguistic nationalism was 
to crystallize in the 1920s (B 90 - 95). Such surviving bonds to Islam in the 1930s and 1940s 
were to thicken and intermesh into his Arabo-Islamic reaction against the West. As a young 
student in Europe, though, the West's modernity had relativized Egypt's religion: Carlyle's On 
Heroes and Hero Worship reassured that Muhammad had been one great man but had the sincere 
prophets received their inspirations from God or their subconsciousnesses?: the obstructive 
'ulama' had to realise that every age offered a different path for the upward Comtean Progess of 
nations, about to contract their roles in society as the Renaissance did Western clergies'66• (In 
the 1920s, such modernist responsiveness to laicizing Kemalist Turkey allowed a residue of 
pan-Muslim relationship to continue: B 17 - 19). 
Most Muslim Egyptians who studied in Europe responded to its more religiously neutral 
thought, if less deeply than Haykal. Yet when they saw Europeans opposing in unison the 
aspirations of Muslim peoples, such intellectuals often swung back to some wide Muslim/ Arab 
bloc as a more appropriate means to face Europe than Europe-modelled territorial nationalism. 
Hisham Sharabi has stressed the language difficulties, dislocation and culture shock experienced 
shame" stultifying "the Eastern soul''. Entry in Haykal's Paris diaries dated 16September1909 17 July 1909, cited 
Baber Johansen, Muhammad Husain Haikal: Europa und der Orient im Weltbild Eines Agyptischen Liberalen 
(Bayrut: Franz Steiner Verlag 1967) pp. 14, 252. Johansen notes, though, that Haykal continually mentions 
loneliness and always intersperses critical remarks about the Europeans' indifference to fellow-humans alongside his 
enthusiastic responses to Western culture. Ibid p. 14. He wrote that the 20 co-tenants in the house where he boarded 
"have no more feeling towards me than to anybody in the street": Paris diary for 17 July 1909 analysed Johansen, 
ibid pp. 14, 252. I am grateful for help in translating cited passages from Johansen, given by Mr Walter Struve of 
the State Library of Victoria, Melbourne. 
65. Haykal's Paris diaries, 11 August 1909, analysed Johansen, Haikal pp. 11, 252; 28 February 1910 cited 
ibid pp. 15, 253. For Kamil's marginal ambivalence to Morocco and other Muslim countries still little touched by 
the West's modernity, A 169-171 ·.;for the Jaridists', A 296, A 321. 
66. Ibid p. 16; cf Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 41-42. 
most to 
never 
young men who resisted "came 
their traditional customs and manners intact"67 • The Islamically-educated 
pan-Islamists had at the outset of our time-frame shrewdly sized up the emergent acculturateds, 
so assaulted by deculturation and all the Western hatred they overheard, as the elite that ---
instead of caving --- might be steeled to lead an ultra-conscious countering Arabo-Islamism. 
al-Nadim and 'Abduh had skilfully passed seeds from the classical Arabs' past across the 
inter-elite divide. 
We surveyed France-modelled modernization by' Alid rulers up to 1882 that founded 
modern administration, semi-secular state education and West-derived law. These over the long 
term brought into existence strata of secular students, secular lawyers, bilingualized civil 
servants. Prior to 1882, Arabic's resurgence within modernization (the bureaucracy and 
education) limited linguistic Europeanization. Egyptians transformed in Muhammad 'Ali's 
specialized colleges or on missions in Europe had nonetheless often been drawn from graduates 
of ancient Islamic "The continued elaboration educational institutions taking 
place under the British ... accelerated the division of Egyptian society into definite groups". The 
Westernizing educational system, which prepared Egyptians to undertake specialized functions 
in the government bureaucracy, became self-contained, separated from the Islamic schools which 
now just prepared religious personnel and school teachers. Few Egyptians under British rule 
crossed from one educational system or elite to the other "since regular channels of access did 
not exist"68 . 
67. Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West p. 90. 
68. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 386-387. For a while under British colonial rule, the legal 
requirements for practising Europe-derived law were not too strict and some Muslim Egyptians who had received 
Islamic fonnal education did cross over into the field of secular law. Sa'd Zaghlul (1860-1927) was one instance. 
Born in al-Gharbiyyah province, he was educated at a local old Islamic school and at al-Azhar. In 1880 he became 
an editor of the Arabic Official Journal al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyyah. The conquering British imprisioned him for a time. 
In 1884 Sa' d began to practise at the secular bar, learnt French and studied at the French School of Law in Cairo. 
His career as a lawyer and judge in the secular Europe-derived law drew him into Egyptian government and politics. 
Hourani, Arabic Thought pp. 210-211. Sa'd's Paris-educated lawyer brother Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul translated into 
Arabic Rosseau's Social Contract, Bentham's Principles of Legislation, E.R. Desmoulin's A Ouoi Tient la 
Superiorite des Anglo Saxons?, Gustave Lebon's Spirit of Society. Ibrahim al-Hilbawi was another Egyptian on the 
staff of al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyyah who never received formal modem legal training but became an eminent secular 
lawyer after 1882 and President of the National Bar Association upon its fonnation in 1912. Ziadeh Lawyers, p. 39. 
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Acculturation in "Independent" Egypt (1922-1952) 
The collapse of British colonial rule in the wake of World War I ended restriction by 
British officials of standard literary Arabic. The politicians, officials and modernist intellectual 
leaders of the new Egyptian nation-state gradually widened its scope in Egyptian life. 
As part of the new governing elite's partial reaction away from English, Fu'ad I 
University long used French as the medium of instruction for many humanities and up to 1952 
for law subjects. Fu'ad I, and subsequent additional institutions such as the University of 
Alexandria (opened 1942), always used English as the medium of formal lectures in science 
subjects into the Nasser period. Egyptians who had learnt French in the schools under and 
immediately after British rule were only a fraction of the number taught English. The use of 
French as a medium for instruction at King Fu'ad I University made assimilation of Western 
thought and culture stressful for this young generation. Robert Graves, who taught English 
Literature there, found that the Faculty of Letters had 
a full complement of highly-paid professors ... predominantly French and Belgian. The 
Frenchmen lectured [in French] with the help of Arabic interpreters, which made neither 
for speed nor for accuracy ... Only one of my colleagues could speak English and none 
had any knowledge of Arabic; yet of the two hundred Egyptian students, mostly sons of 
rich merchants and landowners, fewer than twenty knew more than a smattering of 
French --- just enough for shopping purposes in the elegant stores --- though every one of 
them had learned English in the secondary schools. All official correspondence was 
conducted in classical Arabic69• 
In 1926, 'Abd al-Latif Ramadan, speaking particularly for students at the Egyptian 
University's Law Faculty, protested "the misery" and the threat to the students' futures caused by 
the use of French as the medium of instruction: the students "had been unable to follow a single 
lesson". Egyptian tutors who stumblingly extemporized Arabic translations during the lectures 
distorted them and prevented the students from asking the French professors questions. 
Elementary French classes had not helped the students cope with complex French lectures on 
Philosophy, Political Economy etc. The students protested the length of the law course (five 
69. Robert Graves, Goodbye to All That (London: Cassell 4th ed 1966) pp. 289-290. Graves "assented" 
when "British officials at the Ministry of Education" asked him to "keep the British flag flying" against the French 
professors in the Faculty of Letters. "It irked me to see the French indulge in semi-political activities at my 
expense". Ibidp. 289. 
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years) and that they had to study Latin as the key to Roman Law although they could not hope to 
get a working knowledge of it within the two years provided70• The Westernizing educationalist 
Taha Husayn stressed that Greek and Latin were the languages of Western Civilization's 
classical base. He early strove to implant both Greek and Latin in Fu'ad I University as crucial 
humanities subjects, not just for specialized studies of Western law --- and even to get them 
offered in government secondary schools 71 • 
The 1925-founded University of Cairo, then, was designed by the new governing elite to 
implant in Egypt the West's whole civilization, not just to convey strength-conferring Western 
sciences and knowledge useful for widening Egypt's new independence vis-a-vis Europe. The 
early Fu'ad I University clearly would enduringly acculturate and multi-lingualize those who 
lasted. Its graduates, however, would be unlikely to feel at ease in relation to the West, or to the 
western knowledge and languages they had acquired at such cost. 
The small political and cultural elite that led Egypt under the monarchy persistently 
maintained its preference for French and French variants of Western aesthetic culture over 
British. During a visit to Cairo early in the reign of King Faruq (succeeded 1936) to foster 
dialogue between British and Egyptian religious intellectuals, Rom Landau noted that Egyptian 
Foreign Ministry officials conversed with the rector of the Egyptian University in Arabic 
70. 'Abd al-Latif Ramadan, "Shikwa Murratun Yabuththuha Talabat al-Jami'at al-Misriyyah" (A Bitter 
Complaint from the Egyptian University's Students), al-Muqattam 17 January 1926. The student Ramadan claimed 
to be presenting the grievances of "we students of the University", the whole student body, although chiefly those of 
the Law Faculty's students. Ramadan mentioned an extraordinarily wide range of subjects as bring taught in 
French, to students who were still writing simple essays about camels and horses in the emergency French classes:·. 
Philosophy, Political Economy, Ancient History, Latin and Greek Literature, French Literature, even Arabic high 
literature --- "all those we study in the French language". Ibid. 
71. When Taha returned to Egypt in 1919, his first academic appointment was as a lecturer in ancient 
history at the old Egyptian University: he commenced his prolonged popularization of Greek and Latin thought and 
literature through Arabic translations and essays. 'Ali Mahir while Minister of Education in Ahmad Ziwar's second 
Ministry (13 March 1925 - 7 June 1926) "put Latin and Greek into the curricula of the Faculties of Art and Law" at 
the new Fu'ad I University, which he founded: even, he abortively introduced "Greek [and] Latin ... in a few 
secondary schools". See Taha Husayn's tribute in The Future Culture of Egypt (1938) tsd. Sidney Glazier 
(Washington: American Council of Learned Societies 1954), p. 34. Taha undoubtedly had a hand in Mahir's 
aborted promotion of Latin and Greek in 1925-1926. "Taha Husayn [tried] on several occasions to introduce Greek 
and Latin into secondary school curricula". AnwarLouca, "Taha Hussein and the West", Cultures v. 2:21974 p. 
130. After 1925, Taha chaired the Department of Arab and Oriental Studeis at Fu'ad I University. Mohamed H. 
El-Zayyat, "Taha Hussein and the Arab World", Cultures v.27:2 1974, p. 105. Taha was the main Egyptian 
protagonist in bitter disputes in the new Fu'ad I University's Council between those who briefly imposed Latin as a 
compulsory core subject in the Faculty of Law and those who wanted to eliminate it. He defended Greek, Latin and 
classical studies in the Faculty of Arts until in 1932 Isma'il Sidqi's government dismissed him from his post of Dean 
of the Faculty of Arts and eliminated the Department of Classical Studies at Fu'ad I University. Future pp. 74-75. 
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was to 
manners were 
foreign resident European to most Jews were 
affiliated, maintained French as main written and educational language. When Nasser finally 
nationalized European schools following the 1956 attack by Israel, France and Britain, 
French-medium private schools in Egypt still had 150,000 pupils, of whom 40,000 were 
Muslims73 . Because of these French-medium schools, the French language and Catholic 
influence pervaded whole family units of the Muslim haute bourgeoisie to 1952. Their female 
Muslim Egyptian pupils graduated as fluent French speakers but almost without any grounding 
in literary Arabic or the fundamentals of Islam. Najib Mahfuz's novel Qasr al-Shawq (1956?) 
depicted this situation in the 1920s. Kamal, son of a petty-bourgeois merchant, and then aged 
about fourteen, at his government Arabic-medium secondary school becomes a friend of the rich 
Husayn Shaddad, son of a (Turco-Circassian?) "aristocratic" family once close to the Khedive 
'Abbas74. In Husayn's home in the then exclusive al-' Abbasiyyah suburb of Cairo, he meets 
Husayn's sister, 'Ayidah, whom loves hopelessly. 'Ayidah is being educated in French 
medium at the Mere de Dieu Catholic secondary school, where she sings hymns at mass. She 
plays European music on her household piano and proposes that Kamal read Balzac, George 
Sand, Madame De Stael and Pierre Loti as models for the fiction he wants to write75• 
For Husayn and 'Ayidah, Kamal represents "the quarter of Religion" al-Husayn and the 
populist nationalism led by Sa' d Zaghlul --- both alien to their Francophone, politically cautious 
class76• For Husayn --- but not for Kamal --- it is life-or-death to get to Paris and immerse 
himself in French culture and society77• However the habit of reading Arabic political 
72. Rom Landau, Personalia (London: Faber 1949) pp. 117-118. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry's furniture 
was an over-flamboyant Egyptian ttempt to recapture Louis Quinze. Ibid, p. 114. 
73. Jean and Simonne Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (London: Methuen 1958) p. 219. 
74. Najib Mahfuz, Oasr al-Shawq (Cairo: Maktabat Misr n.d.) pp. 19-24. Kamal first went to Husayn's 
house and met' Ayidah before the British exiled Sa'd Zaghlul the second time --- that is to say, before late 1921. 
75. Ibid pp. 204-205. 
76. On the picnic Kamal emits an Islamic religious exclamation at the natural beauty to which 'Ayidah 
reponds in French. Husayn tells him "you always find behind things either God or Sa'd Zaghlul ... Your habit of 
mentioning God gives you a special religious appearance as though you were one of the men of religion ... But what 
wonder, when you are from the quarter of the Religion!". Ibid p. 199. 
77. "I may prefer to be in France than in Egypt ... I love France". Ibid p. 198. On the picnic Kamal tells 
-A32-
maintained literary Arabic among haute bourgeois youth most dyed by the West: leaders of 
Haykal' s elitist Party of Liberal Constitutionalists recur in Husayn Shaddad' s f amil Y circle, 
including at the beloved' Ayidah's (champagne-and-orchestral!) wedding~ 
French continued to sap neo-classical Arabic in wealthy Egyptian high society in the 
1930s and 1940s. That haute bourgeoisie might have provided crucial patronage for Arabic's 
impoverished creative writers. Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat knew French well but he suffered 
culture shock at a 1937 literary dinner and party. Society women there flaunted French as their 
language for cultured conversation and made clear to the invited Egyptian writers their ignorance 
of, and low esteem for, modern Arabic literature and the literary Arabic language79• In his 1938 
program for future Egyptian education and culture, the very Westernist Taha Husayn was 
insistent that the government should impose controls to assure "the national language" Arabic 
and the "national religion" Islam, and Egyptian history and geography, be properly taught to 
Muslim Egyptian children attending missionary-run foreign schools80• Retaining some 
sensitivity to feminist dissatisfactions from his earlier Jaridist-al-Siyasah modernist milieu, 
al-Zayyat skilfully drew Francophone Egyptian women into al-Risalah's archaicist integral 
Arabic and Islamism81 • 
Husayn that he in contrast would be very unwilling to go outside Egypt. But Kamal has enrolled at the Teachers' 
College not in preparation for a career as a teacher but because the English "professors" there offer initial grounding 
in (European) literature, pholosophy, history, education and psychology, and in English, the linguistic instrument he 
has chosen for his own explorations and future writings on these subjects. Ibid pp. 58, 167, 203. Kamal, the 
believing Muslim adolescent and cultural and political nativist firmly rooted in Arabic literary tradition, had already 
commenced his private, self-aq:ulturating journey to the West's Darwinism, but on Egypt's soil. 
78. Ibid Pf. 341 , l 70 J 2l 0 , ·:LO() 
79. The Arab-orientated modernist Egyptian writer' Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini (1890-1949) had been 
publishing fiction and articles for thirty years. A woman who fancied herself a potential new writer, on being 
introduced at the function, asked him if he came from Syria or Egypt. al-Mazini and al-Zayyat and others present 
clearly were enraged by the Francophone high society women's ignorance and successful imposition of French as 
the language of discourse at a party supposedly held to honor the Arabic language's masters. On the other hand, 
al-Zayyat's account confirms that most Egyptian writers and intellectual leaders knew French intimately. Of the 
eminent writers present, only a few drifted to the margin of the party because English was their foreign language or 
they only knew, or would speak, Arabic. All the other journalists, creative writers and university lecturers, "the 
leaders of the Arabic language", spoke French with the society women. al-Zayyat, "Fi Haflatin Adabiyyah" (At A 
Literary Function), written in al-Risalah, on 7 March 1937; Wahy v. 1, pp. 418-420. 
80. Taha Husayn's 1938 Mustaqbal al-Thaqafah fi Misr (The Future of Culture in Egypt) summarized in 
Hourani Arabic Thought p. 336. 
81. In 1933, and again in 1939, al-Zayyat conducted in al-Risalah a painful dialogue with "Miss Hayat". 
She was a subscriber in Cairo's elite Ma'adi suburb who had passed through the French-medium foreign missionary 
schools and whose language of considered thought and written discourse consequently was French: al-Zayyat had 
noted French articles by her in (Zionist) Leon Castro's La Liberte. She had gruellingly taught herself enough high 
Arabic to passively follow al-Zayyat's writings: but still necessarily wrote all her letters to him in French, so that he 
languages and 
at outbreak of War The 
upon 
al-Mashkurah were a 
new middle-class 
of Arabic-medium 
private schools that imparted modem knowledge and skills, as well as Islam. Zayn underscored 
how the presence of non-Arabic-speaking European communities, notably Greeks and Italians, 
stimulated limited active use of French or English by middle-class as well as wealthy Egyptians. 
The injecting of Western words into Arabic speech had especially spread among fashionable 
Egyptian women: the writer challenged his readers to pass through the leading 
(European-owned) stores to hear for themselves "what will make you laugh or weep". Walking 
one summer along Stanley Bay --- frequented by the resident European element but also 
increasingly by educated young acculturated Muslims ready to defy Islam's conventions of dress 
and separation of the sexes --- Zayn "heard only seldom an Egyptian speaking Arabic". (Cf 
Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat's puritanical reactions in 1933 and 1945: B 246 fn). Ahmad Zayn's 
fellow secondary students extensively larded their conversations with French phrases. The wide 
diffusion of European languages in Egypt was due to the prestige won by the West through 
military might: "the conquered ever imitate the conqueror". Splinters of Western languages were 
also spread in urban Egyptian society through the acculturated Egyptian upper classes' use of 
them as a marker to register their ascendancy over monolingual Egyptian classes82• 
The by then veteran litterateurs of the generation we sample were very worried by the 
persistent lowly status of Arabic in those urban enterprises that resident Europeans dominated in 
the 1930s and 1940s. al-Zayyat: 
You may enter any store or bank or some casino or a company and read only 
advertisements and documents in a foreign script and hear only foreign languages ... If 
had to translate for excerpting in al-Risalah. The need of two Egyptians to use two languages to communicate 
aroused his "bitter fury" against the foreign-language missionary schools that broke "national unity". Miss Hayat 
had resisted all efforts of nuns and classmates to convert her from Islam --- but she had internalized there West 
European prescriptions on the roles of the two sexes. Moving towards al-Zayyat's liberal conservatism, she by 1939 
rejected the "permissiveness" of the al-Jazirah function of the [Prince] Muhammad' Ali Charity, where the top 
elite's men and women mixed freely with Parisian manners, gambled and danced. "Min Barid al-Risalah: Bayn 
al-Risalah wal-Mar'ah" (al-Risalah's Mail: Between al-Risalah and Woman), al-Risalah 1June1933 pp. 3-4; "Min 
Barid al-Risalah: Jawab al-Anisah Hayat" (al-Risalah's Mail: Miss Hayat's Reply), al-Risalah 15 June 1933 pp. 3 -
4; and "Min Barid al-Rislah" (In al-Risalah's Mail) written 26 February 1939: Wahy v. 2 pp. 163-166. 
82. Ahmad Muhammad Zayn in Majallat al-Masa'i al-Mashkurah 1939 number 2 (2nd year) p. 11. 
government "expel 
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older intellectuals, Ahmad Husayn's "Young Egypt" movement exhorted Egyptians in 1938: "Do 
not speak except in Arabic, and do not reply to anyone who does not speak to you in and do 
not enter any premises the name of which is not written in Arabic"85. 
Older liberal intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s noted with concern that the new 
government mass primary and secondary education still failed to ground new generations in the 
integral Arabic language. Ahmad Amin from 1929 to 1953 published a series of books that in 
aggregate reviewed the whole of classical Islamic-Arab history in its Prophetic, Rashidi, 
Umayyad and' Abbasid periods86. In 1933 he warned that even up-and-coming writers were not 
linguistically equipped to understand ancient classical Arab texts87 . In the later 1920s, Haykal 
had become sharply aware how difficult it was for modern-educated Egyptians to follow the 
style or presentation of classical Islamic histories88 . His first of many histories of non-Egyptian 
classical Arabs was his 1935 Hayat Muhammad (The Life of Muhammad): he wrote it lest 
"growing youth" at foreign Christian educational institutions in particular might "change" from 
attenuated Islam to Christianity89 • Haykal's biography renarrated Muhammad's career in clear 
83. al-Zayyat, "Istiqlal al-Lughah" (Linguistic Independence) written 3 December 1936 for al-Risalah; 
Wahy v. 1 pp. 336-337. Cf B 178 fn. The Westemist Copt Salamah Musa did not lack a touch of the same blending 
of linguistic (Arabic-focussed) and economic resentment of resident foreigners: Ghali Shukri, Salamah Musa p. 50 
(citing a 1932 statement). 
84. Ibid p. 339. al-Zayyat in this article mentioned several bilingualizing agencies in Egyptian life in which 
he wanted Arabic to replace the dominant European languages: trade fairs, industrial enterprises, places of pleasure, 
shops, banks, casinos, aristocratic bars and clubs, the mixed courts, and in regard to establishing Arabic as the 
educational medium "the foreign schools, ... faculties of the Egyptian University" (the science faculty especially?) 
"Istiqlal al-Lughah" passim. 
85. "'al-Mabadi' al-'Asharatu likayma takunu Jundiyyan min Junudi Misr al-Fatat" (The Ten Principles by 
Which you May Become One of the Soldiers of Young Egypt), Misr al-Fatat 17 February 1938 p. 16. For further 
linguistic compensation pushing Misr al-Fatat from particularist to Arab nationalism see B l 79fn. 
86. The works were Fajr al-Islam (The Dawn oflslam) published in 1929; Duha al-Islam Gslam's 
Pre-Noon) published in 3 volumes 1933-1936; and Zuhr al-Islam (Islam's Noon), published in 4 volumes. 
87. Ahmad Amin, "Turathuna 1-Qadim" (Our Ancient Heritage) al-Risalah 15 March 1933. 
88. Haykal observed in 1929 that numerous though classical Arab histories were, their extensive material 
"has been presented in old forms and images unsuited to modem thought and taste". "Tanzimu Dirasat al-Ta'rikh 
al-Misri" (Organizing the Study of Egyptian History) al-Siyasat al-Yawmiyyah 12 April 1929 quoted Smith Islam 
and the Search p. 99. This specific article was focussed on Egypt's history in the Arab-Islamic period. 
89. Antonie Wessels, A Modem Arabic Biography of Muhammad: A Critical Study of Muhammad Husayn 
Haykal's 'Hayat Muhammad' (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1972) pp. 43-48. 
- A35 -
as 
acculturated intellectuals' simplified Arabic, alone get 
classical Arabs. With concern, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat early the 1950s noted "youth's hatred 
of [literary] Arabic", a hatred not due to it being inherently difficult but "to the poor methods 
used to teach . Not great classical Arab works nor the limited modern Egyptian literature, but 
masterpieces read in Western languages first inspired some young Egyptians to try to write 
poetry and other high literature. In this pattern of acculturation, raw European content and 
idioms flooded into Arabic literature without adaption to its past legacy. Indeed, as al-Zayyat 
observed, when such West-inspired youth tried to become creative writers, their limited literary 
Arabic could not cope and they therefore wrote in the colloquial90. 
Acculturation and Deculturation: Overview 
The preceding review showed that Westerners and Western languages continually 
threatened the survival of classical Arabic from 1892-1952. This made nationalism in Egypt 
likelier to take ethno-linguistic --- rather than territorial --- turns. Overall, the odds, more 
demoralizing, galvanized West-transformed Egyptians to explore, defend and extend 
neo-classical Arabic within modernity as the core of selfhood. In India, English was Western 
civilization and interaction with Westerners largely a one-on-one relationship with Anglosaxons. 
Egypt was different The ultra-international context of Britain's rule, outreach by Egyptians to 
France, the elite's penchant to balance English with French in acculturation, the non-British, 
Francophone European minority in Egypt, all made Egyptians always see a range of Western 
polities and cultures together. The diverse nature of Egypt's exposure to Westerners thus 
encouraged intellectuals to think in terms of wide blocs: (a) Europe, the West and (b) 
Arabs/Muslims/Easterners. 
90. "Shababun wa Shuyukh 'aw 'Ammiyyatun wa Fusha" (Youths and Old Men or Colloquial and 
Classical Arabic) Wahy, v. 4 pp. 121-122. al-Zayyat appealed to young men who wanted to become creative writers 
to devote the same "effort" and "time" they directed to "the study of French or English" to mastering standard 
Arabic. Ibid. 
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KEY ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 
THE TURCO-CIRCASSIANS 
The declining Muslim Turkish-speaking minority affected the evolution of Egyptian 
pan-Arabism in diverse ways after 1882. Some have argued that having a non-Arab' Alid 
dynasty delayed the cohering of Arab national identifications and pan-Arab policies in Egypt91 • 
The TCs, by existing and as patrons, tended to make supra-Egyptian community supra-Arab as 
well --- pan-Islamic or pan-Eastern. Yet if the 'Alid family connected Egyptians to the Turkish 
Ottoman elite, into which it was so incestuously, so competitively locked, that also opened up 
some ethnicizing relations with Arabs under Ottoman rule, too. 
Small Turkish-speaking groups have played crucial political and social roles in Egypt 
over a millenium of its Islamic history. Arab forces conquered Egypt in 640-642; following 
appointment as acting governor of Egypt in 868, Ahmad Ibn Tulun, son of a Turkic slave from 
Bukhara, used a Turcophone slave-army to start a dynasty of governors in Egypt (868-905) 
virtually independent of the 'Abbasid Caliphs. Rule from Constantinople by Ottoman Turks who 
used Turkish as one language of administration (1517-1798)92, and the weight of 
Turco-Circassians under Muhammad' Ali and the Khedives brought Turkish loan-words into 
colloquial Egyptian Arabic. Such language-oriented Egyptians as 'Abdallah al-N adim and 
Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat (A 120, 258), abhorred the Turks' use of Turkish in administering 
Egypt and other Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. 
The secularist Copt Salamah Musa, on the grounds that all Prime Ministers, most 
Ministers and many wealthy families were then "Turkish" and that it was fashionable to spend 
one's summer holidays in Istanbul, thought late 19th-century Egypt "in reality a Turkicized 
91. "There are multiple reasons underlying the absence of a sense of Arabism among Egyptians in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries .... The major developments in nineteenth century Egypt --- equally in the 
political, the socio-economic and the intellectual spheres --- pulled articulate Egyptians towards concepts of 
Egyptian territorial patriotism rather than towards ethnic-linguistic nationalism. Thus, Egypt's de facto separate 
political existence under the family of Muhammad' Ali; ... the non-Arab (Turco-Circassian and European) origin of 
much of Egypt's elite ... " James Jankowski, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914", The Muslim World v. 
70 nos 3-4 1980 pp. 245 - 246. 
92. al-Nadim, especially, felt that the use of Turkish for government threatened Arabic in the Ottoman 
Empire's Arab regions. "al-Lughatu wal-Insha'" (Language and Composition), al-Ustadh 1892 p. 176. Relevant 
here is Stanford J. Shaw's observation that many materials originating in Egypt sent by Ottoman officials to 
Constantinople prior to 1807 were in Arabic. Shaw, "Turkish Source-Materials for Egyptian History", Holt, 
Political and Social Change p. 33. 
to was, 
was 
officered by Turkish-speakers Turkish therefore was a 
the military colleges he founded95. From the outset, however, Arab Egyptians were the majority 
of students in fields crucial for modernization such as Agriculture and Medicine with the result 
that colleges teaching them used Arabic. Turkish could not continue in Egypt as a medium 
within modernizing education, although influential TCs made sure that it was taught as a subject 
in government schools under the British in order to transmit a passive reading knowledge to new 
generations96• The Kamilists' pro-Ottoman pan-Islamism was supportive of keeping Turkish as a 
subject, although primarily intent to make Qur'an-derived standard Arabic pervade all 
education97. Before the British conquest, as Arab Egyptian recruits increasingly outnumbered 
Turkish officials, Arabic had replaced Turkish as the language of government administration98; it 
also became the language of deliberation of the Constitutional Assembly and even of the Council 
of Ministers (largely Turco-Circassian)99• Under British rule the linguistic Arabization of the 
93. Salamah Musa, The Education of Salamah Musa [tsd] by L.O. Schuman (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1961) p. 30. 
94. "Even under Muhammad 'Ali, a majority of the qadis is the towns and villages outside of Cairo were 
native Egyptians rather than Ottoman Turks". Samuel Becker Grant Jr, Modern Egvpt and the New 
(Turco-Egyptian) Aristocracy (University of Michigan: Ph.D 1968) p. 91. 
95. In the elite Staff College at Khanqah, geometry was taught in Turkish and arithmetic in Arabic although 
French was the chief medium of instruction. J. Heyworth-Dunne, An Introduction to the History of Education in 
Modern Egypt (London: Luzac, 1939) p. 119. The Nakilah at Jidah Abad to train junior officers had 500 students in 
1826 who were mainly taught in Turkish, which they spoke but could not write; although there were three European 
instructors and mainly modern European knowledge was being taught. Ibid p. 120. In the Damietta Infantry School 
for officers and under-officers, Turkish, Arabic and Persian were taught. Ibid p. 138. 
96. Grant traced this pattern from llyas Zakhurah's biographies of lesser as well as major Turco-Circassian 
figures. Grant, Turco-Egyptian Aristocracy p. 115. 
97. A 1903 al-Liwa' article assailed the British-directed Egyptian Education Department because it had 
reduced Turkish to an optional subject in its schools, a derogation from Egypt's status as a possession of the 
Ottoman State. "Mudarris" (A Teacher) "Dusturun am Istibdad" (Constitution or Despotism), al-Liwa' 10 January 
1903, pp. 1-2. 
98. For the ethnic-Arab terminology with which the Khedive Sa' id exhorted non-TC Egyptians to seize 
opportunities for recruitment as officials and army officers, see Baer, "Social Change" p. 148. The ethnic tension as 
the growing numbers of Arab Egyptian recruits came to challenge more experienced TC officials with technical 
skills is traced in F. Hunter, "Egypt's High Officials in Transition to a Turkish to a Modern Administrative Elite, 
1849-1879", Middle Eastern Studies v. 19 (July 1983) pp. 277-300. Stanford J. Shaw observed that "while the 
language of administration gradually became Arabic, especially under Muhammad 'Ali and his successors, the bulk 
of government records were kept in Turkish until late in the 19th century". Shaw, "Turkish Source-Materials for 
Egyptian History", Holt, Political and Social Change p. 33. 
99. Grant, Turco-Circassian Aristocracy p. 121. The Khedive Sa'id (ruled 1854-1863) made Arabic the 
official language of government and the Khedive Isma'il in 1869 made it the official language of the country. Ibid. 
mouthpiece the 
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Khedive 'Abbas 100. 
court 
the twentieth-century, members 
minority increasingly intermarried with Arab Egyptians, previously uncommon: Haykal's wife 
and Tawfiq al-Hakim's mother were TC101 • 
The exception to comprehensive linguistic Arabization was the' Alid royal family, the 
minority's apex. From 1892 to 1914, the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi was Egypt's nominal head of 
state under the British. His financial support of movements of protest against British rule gave 
him prominence in the minds of Egyptians in those years. The public ceremonies of 'Abbas' 
reign strongly impressed upon his subjects that he (and the whole 'Alid family) was 
Turkish-speaking. "Until his death in 1973, Taha Husayn remembered how boys of school age 
in his native province of Men ya, Upper Egypt, were taught to chant a Turkish song about justice, 
equality and liberty when a train carrying the Khedive 'Abbas stopped in town": none 
comprehended the Turkish102. 
100. al-Oan!An al-Asasi, published by Muhammad Qadri at the tum of the century, was one of the last 
papers with Turkish as well as Arabic sections. Grant, Turco-Circassian Egyptian Aristocracy p. 128. The 
secularist Copt Salamah Musa recalled that scions of aristocratic Turco-Circassian families routinely read the wholly 
Arabic al-Mu'ayyad at tum-of-century as the mouthpiece of the Khedive and their class: P.J. Vatikiotis, The Modem 
History of Egypt (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1969) p. 226. That anti-Hamidian and then anti-CUP emigres 
from Turkey itself used Egypt as a base from which they published anti-regime magazines in Turkish, kept some 
TCs, too, in touch with the latest forms of the language. Nineteenth century Arabic-Turkish bilingualism among 
TCs sometimes matched the totalistic high-culturist trilingualism (Turkish-Arabic-Persian) characteristic of court 
strata in Istanbul. Cairo-born TC 'A'ishah al-Taymuriyyah (1840-1902), a pioneer writer on women's issues like 
the veil and unveiledness, was an archaist given to rhymed-prose she modelled upon such mannered' Abbasid 
literature as the Kalilah wa Dimnah of Ibn al-Muqaffa' and the maqamat of al-Hamadhani and al-Hariri (cf B 107fn 
and B 500-501): she also brought out di wans in Turkish and Persian. Her poetical eulogy was concentrated upon the 
Khedive. Sincerity and taste in her poetry still won her analysis in Haykal's modernist al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah in 
1928 and an edition of her diwan as late as 1952. Daghir, Masadir v. 2 pp. 238-240. She was appreciated by SC 
authoress Mayy Ziyadah (1886-1941), al-Siyasah al-Usbu'iyyah's women's page editor, as a pioneer of Arab 
women's literature and emancipation. Widad Sakakini, Mayy Zivadah: Fi Hayatiha wa Athariha (Cairo: Dar 
al-Ma'arif nd) p. 96fn. Cf Cairo-born TC Hasan Husni al-Tuwayrani (1850-1897) who edited Turkish newspapers 
in Istanbul and Arabic ones in Cairo. Daghir, Masadir v. 2 pp. 580-583. 
101. Grant, Turco-Circassian Aristocracy pp. 129-131. Towards the tum of the twentieth century "among 
Turkish women it was considered advantageous to marry an aspiring government employee of Egyptian birth and 
this was undoubtedly the case with" the [Turco-Circassian] mother of the Egyptian playwright Tawfiq al-Hakim 
(1899-1987). The contempt she voiced towards (Arab) "Egyptians", though, figured in al-Hakim's fiction and 
drama. Ibid p. 131. 
102. Mohamed H. El-Zayyat, "Taha Hussein and the Arab World", Cultures (Unesco quarterly) v. 2:2 
(1974) p. 101. 
over as as 
The Khedive 1863- modes the so 
one component subsequent modern Egyptian music 103 • The Turco-Circassian 'Alid 
milieu continued to diffuse Turkey's music in the post-1922 Egyptian nation-state. The 'Alid 
Prince Muhammad 'Ali, in 1926, arranged for a visiting Turkish orchestra to perform its music 
his palace; he invited figures from Egypt's political and social elite104• Many of the Prince's 
cultural interests would foster a specific Arab identity: yet this item's terminology illustrated 
how his and his 'Alid royal House's special ethnic links with Turkey's Turks was one factor that, 
for the 1920s, blurred supra-Egyptian pan-Arab community out to a supra-national pan-"Eastem" 
community identification 105• Of those Arab Egyptians present at Prince Muhammad 'Ali's 1926 
function, the lawyer Ibrahim al-Hilbawi more than a decade before in March 1914 had publicly 
condemned the Young Turks' arrest of the Egypto-Ottoman officer 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri, involved 
in Arab ethnic movements in the Ottoman Empire, although in the name of Egyptians' even 
friendship for "the Ottoman community whether Turkish or Arab" (al-ummat al-'Uthmaniyyah 
Turkiyyatan aw 'Arabiyyah) 106• 
Turco-Circassians the 1920s legitimized their continuing non-Arab identity and 
103. "Isma'il, who found the Turkish art more pleasing to the ear, sent his court minstrel' Abd al-Hamuli to 
Constantinople to become better acquainted with Turkish music. He later returned with an entire orchestra; in time 
such forms as Turkish melodic and rhythmic modes became institutionalized as types of Egyptian music". Grant, 
Turco-Egyptian Aristocracy pp. 126-127. 
104. "Haflatun Musiqiyyatun Sha'iqah fi Saray al-Manyal" (A Spendid Musical Performance at [Prince 
Muhammad' Ali's] al-Manyal Palace) al-Muqattam 12 January 1926 p. 5. (The name and ethnic group of writer 
was not indicated). Among those invited were the Turco-Circassian Liberal Constitutionalists' party leader' Ali 
Yakan (to be Prime Minister in the ministry of 7 June 1926 - 19 April 1927); the Sa'idi Arab-Egyptian Muhammad 
Mahmud, a great landowner, future Minister of Education in 'Ali Y akan' s Ministry and Prime Minister 27 June 
1928 to 2 October 1929, and in three ministries from 30 December 1937 to 12 August 1939; Isma'il Sidqi, of 
Turco-Circassian descent, fellow-exile with Zaghlul in the Seychelles but to rule Egypt in anti-Wafd autocracy from 
June 1930 to September 1933; and Ibrahim al-Hilbawi. 
105. The al-Muqattam item on the function of Turkish music mentioned that Prince Muhammad 'Ali had 
built up a beautiful collection of Arab art objects (al-athar al-' Arabiyyah) at his al-Manya! palace, and "encouraged" 
outstanding artists of "Arab music in particular and Eastern music in general". He, however, did this as part of a 
general endeavor to "raise up the East" and realize "the welfare of the Easterners" --- not a discrete Arab entity. 
Ibid. 
106. "Khutbatu Hilbawi Bik fi Haflat 'Aziz Bik al-Misri" (Mr Hilbawi's Speech at the Meeting About 
'Aziz al-Misti), al-Muqattam 26 March 1914 pp. 1-2. Cf fn 68. al-Hilbawi was an old disciple of al-Afghani who 
acted for the British as prosecutor against the peasants of Dinshaway in 1906; he was elected President of the 
National Bar association upon its formation in 1912. For al-Hilbawi see Farhat Ziadeh, Lawyers. the Rule of Law 
and Liberalism in Modem Egypt (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford 
University 1968) p. 39. He was associated with the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists after 1922. 
the League 
Kamal partly financed the Eastern League's published from 1928 107• Shaykh Rashid 
Rida, and perhaps other Arabs West Asia the League, had an Arab-centrism steeled 
conflicts with Ottoman Turks; but TC participation in it held up the demarcation of the discrete 
pan-Arabism crystallizing within pan-Eastemism in the 1920s (Ch. 8). 
Pre-1914 pan-Islamism and then a pan-Easternism that could accommodate Ataturk's 
de-Islamizing Turkey, may have validated Turco-Circassians keeping up contact with Turkish 
and Turkey. 'Alid princes and other TCs were at the fore of organizing Egyptian aid to Turkey 
during the 1911-1912 Italo-Ottoman War. Yet the relationship between the expansionist house 
of Muhammad' Ali and the Ottoman Sultans (self-styled "Caliphs") had been one of conflict 
from the outset. 'Abbas Il's prolonged public subversion --- ably aided by the Prince 
Muhammad 'Ali himself! --- of Arabs chafing under Turkish rule, made Arab Egyptians 
hyper-aware of early Arab nationalism in West Asia. It sucked into Arab-Turkish conflict even 
Egyptian nationalists aligned with the Ottoman Turks within pan-Islamism (Chs. 5 and 6). 
TC Links to Arabness. Egypt's Arabness somewhat attuned royalty to understand 
Arab national feelings. Even the 'Alid royal family only partially withstood the general 
Arabization of Turco-Circassians. Harry Boyle, a British official who knew Arabic and Turkish, 
wrote that the Khedives "Sa'id and Isma'il spoke at best only a sort of broken Arabic jargon"108: 
yet preliminary, passive Arabization already was under way in the case of Isma'il, for he 
patronized and regularly viewed nippy colloquial comedies written by such a pioneer of Egypt's 
early Arabic theater as Jewish-Egyptian Ya'qub Sannu' (1839-1912) 109. The Khedive 'Abbas II 
spoke Turkish most naturally and for formal purposes was most at home in French but did 
communicate with Arab Egyptians in colloquial Egyptian Arabic: indeed for many years he 
107. James Jankowski, "The Eastern Idea and the Eastern Union in Interwar Egypt", International Journal 
of African Historical Studies v 14: 4 (1981) pp. 654, 656. 
108. Grant, Turco-Egyptian Aristocracy p. 114. 
109. For Sannu', see Irene L. Gendzier, The Practical Visions ofYa'qub Sannu' (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press 1966) and Matti Moosa, "Ya'qub Sannu' and the Rise of Arab Drama in Egypt", IJMES 
(1974) pp. 401-433. 
an movement numerous 
10 
did high as one emblem 
state's autonomy the Ottoman The' Alid Prince 'Umar used neo-classical 
Arabic as the learned language which he wrote his books on modem Egyptian history and 
exploration of the Nile Valley111 • In the interwar period Tusun gave leadership and finance to 
the Kamilists' rump al-Hizb al-Watani against the Wafd112 and encouraged calls for (a) an 
Egypt-based Caliphate to replace that abolished by Mustafa Kemal in 1924 and for (b) some 
pan-Easternism/proto-pan-Arabism alternative to post-1922 insularist particularism. Another 
tri-cultured Arabism-tinctured Turco-Circassian prominent in the Turcophone Khedivial milieu 
was Ahmad Shafiq Pasha (1860-1940), a leading historian in Arabic of modern Egypt and its 
politics113 : as a pan-Easternist in the 1920s he helped lead Palestinians as well as Egyptians to 
narrowed pan-Arabism (B 47fn). He was chief of the Khedivial cabinet under' Abbas Hilmi, 
with whom he spoke Turkish114• Despite this Turkish-pervaded work-milieu, Shafiq was 
friendly with some Arabs who weakened Egyptians' relationship with the Ottoman Turks ---
among them Muhammad' Abduh's disciple Rashid Rida, the Syrian-Egyptian writer who 
developed the salafiyyah (Islamic reformative return to Islam's first pious generations) in the 
direction of anti-Turk, secessionist, Arab nationalism. Shafiq was also close to the M-E Arab 
110. Muhammad Farid, Kamil's successor as leader of the Patriotic Party, excerpted copious, fluent 
colloquial Arab retorts made by 'Abbas during his acrimonious political conversations with Mustafa Kamil, Farid 
and watani Mahmud al-Nasr in August 1904 in the French spar-town of Divonne. Farid, Awraq Muhammad Farid 
v. 1 pp. 51-52. Harry Boyle's judgement that"' Abbas II did not get beyond a style of speech acquired from the 
native servants of the harem" (Grant, Turco-Egyptian Aristocracy p. 114) does not square with' Abbas' use of 
colloquial Egyptian Arabic as the medium through which he conducted his prolonged politial relationship with 
Kamil, Farid and many other watanis in organized Egyptian nationalism. He also turned his Arabic to good use to 
subvert Ottoman Arabs throughout his reign. 
111. A listing of Prince 'U mar Tusun' s numerous Arabic works was given by Yusuf As' ad Daghir, Masadir 
al-Dirasat al-Adabiyyah, v. 2 pp. 574-577. 
112. In regard to Egypt's domestic politics, after World War I Tusun headed (along with Turco-Circassian 
ex-Prime Minister Muhammad Sa'id) the al-Wafd al-Watani ("the Patriotic Wafd"), a short-lived alternative to 
Zaghlul's Wafd, to demand independence from the British. Most of al-Wafd al-Watani's other members belonged 
to the administrative committee of al-Hizb al-Watani (the Patriotic Party), that Mustafa Kamil had founded. Arthur 
Goldschmidt Jr., "The National Party from Spotlight to Shadow", Asian and African Studies (Haifa) March 1982 pp. 
22-23. The Turco-Circassian ex-Prime Minister Muhammad Sa'id, financed the full slate of candidates that al-Hizb 
al-Watani ran against the Wafd in the 1923 elections. Ibid, p. 27. 
113. Yusuf As'ad Daghir listed the numerous books published by Shafiq in Arabic and French on modern 
Egypt and its unfolding current politics. Daghir, Masadir v. 2, pp. 185-187. 
114. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, 'Abbas Hilmi II: The Khedive and Egypt's Struggle For Independence 2 vols 
(University of Michigan: PhD Thesis 1978)? ) , 
loanwords s post- B 
The classical language patterns and their past desert 
Arabia, 'Abbasid 'Iraq, Muslim Andalusia etc, were salient in the poetry and dramas TC 
Ahmad Shawqi --- which on publication immediately electrified and transformed Arabs from 
Morocco to 'Iraq115. Like Shafiq, Shawqi (1868-1932) was educated in France (in law) at 
Khedivial expense, and was long the Khedive 'Abbas' court laureate. Racially non-Arab, 
Shawqi grew up in a Turkish-speaking household116, while French was the language of his 
formal education and intellectual culture: he early steeped himself in Victor Hugo, Musset and 
Lamartine, as well as such classical Arab poetical models as Ibn al-Rumi and al-Mutanabbi117. 
Shawqi' s situation as a Turco-Circassian in Arab Egypt sometimes influenced him to evoke a 
115. Works by Shawqi upon classical Arab subjects, some of them set in pre-Islamic peninsular Arabia, 
included his 1931 poetical drama Majnun Layla, his 1932 Amirat al-Andalus (inspired by his period of exile in 
Spain during World War I as a man of the Khedive 'Abbas) and his 1932 drama' Antarah. There is a good 
discussion of Majnun Layla in Antoine Boudot-Lamotte, Ahmad Shawgi: L'Homme et L'Oeuvre (Universite de 
Lille III: Service de Reproduction des Theses 1974) v. 1 pp. 523-535. In accord with the ethnicism of classical 
Arabo-Andalusian sources, Shawqi in Amirat al-Andalus or Ghaniyat al-Andalus depicted the King of Seville, 
al-Mu'tamid Ibn 'Abbad, as a noble sensitive poet he had been cruelly wronged by Morocco's puritannical ---
Berber --- Murabit despot Yusuf Ibn Tashufin. When al-Mu'tamid and other petty Muslim kings of Spain called 
Yusuf in a second time to beat back Alfonso V of Castille, Yusuf sent him into exile in Morocco to herd camels: 
al-Mu'tamid died there in chains, a pauper. There is an interesting illustration of the speed with which Shawqi's 
poetry and drama were propagated across the length and breadth of the Arab world and the intense emotions they 
released. When, in 1933, the play was performed by a Fas troupe in Marrakish, which contains Yusuf's grave, the 
Moroccan poet Muhammad Ibrahim, a nationalist activist, wrote an ode defending his actions as in defence of Islam, 
and mocking al-Mu'tamid and Shawqi. The luxurious hedonism of al-Mu 'tamid --- indeed, that of the Spanish 
Muslims in general ---was reviled and it was charged that al-Mu'tamid had made Alfonso such a menace in the first 
place by allying with him against other Muslim petty monarchs. Mustafa al-Qasri, "al-Shi'rn fi Khidmat al-Haqiqah 
wal-Ta'rikh" (Poetry in the Service of Historical Truth), al-Bahth al-'Ilmi (Muhammad V University, Rabat) v. 1:1 
January-April 1964 pp. 113-128. 
116. For Shawqi's sense, blending criteria of cultures and the diverse stocks of his extended family, that he 
was simultaneously Arab, Turkish, Greek and especially Circassian, Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 9fn. In 
this passage, Shawqi was very aware that not just he but both his parents were born in Egypt, where some 
forefathers were buried: homelands integrate plural blood-identities. Ibid. For classical Arabic's compulsive hold 
over him as his choice as literary medium despite his family and education rather inculcating Turkish and French, 
Berque, .fuml! p. 356. 
117. An extravagant tribute by Shawqi to Victor Hugo showed how much that ultra-political French 
poet-novelist had shaped his own verse, never far from current politics. Boudot-Lamotte, Shawgi v. l p. 738. 
Shawqi had not frequented literary circles while studying in France and Taha Husayn regretted his glaringly 
sectional exploration of French literature: Shawqi gained so much from Lamartine but never spoke of Baudelaire, 
Verlaine, Prudhomme or Mallarme --- he had never examined such "philosophers" as Taine, Renan and Borges. Fm 
Taha, this failure to attempt a comprehensive self-acculturation was typical of young Egyptians who studied in 
Europe at the tum of the century. Ibid v. 1 pp. 141-142, 747. 
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territorial Egyptian nationhood open to all who lived in the land regardless of their racial origins 
or languages (eg. his 1917 play The Death of Cleopatra)118• Prior to World War 1, his polit~cal 
poetry encouraged pan-Islamic solidarity with the Ottoman Turks against Christian nationalities 
and states; after 1922 he became a pan-Arab culture symbol --- and himself contributed to 
pan-Arabism with poetical tributes to Libyan and Syrian uprisings against imperialists (B 1 lfn; B 
76fn) and to King Faysal I of 'Iraq119• Shawqi and the less elegantly neo-classicist 
Arab-Egyptian Hafiz Ibrahim (1871-1932) were older-generation poets who offered al-Jaridah 
modernists like Muhammad Husayn Haykal a poetical idiom both directed to topical issues, and 
continuous with the classical Arabs' masterpieces: Haykal and others in their very Egyptianist 
criticisms kept up understanding of that supra-Egyptian idiom (B 384-386). 
Egypto-Turco-Circassians always had at hand multiple ethnic identifications ---
Turco-Ottoman, Arab, territorial-Egyptian --- from which they could unpredictably select, but 
also blend, at any point. They played both pan-Islamizing and narrower pan-Arabizing roles, 
connecting Arab Egyptians to factions and movements among both Turkish and Arab Ottomans. 
Subjective influence: while most elite Arab Egyptians did allow themselves to be influenced, 
some --- notably Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat --- denied hard-core Turco-Circassians title to be 
Egyptians or participants in high Arab culture or to play important roles in Islam. Anachronistic, 
mythological ethnic images of Turco-Circassians as oppressors of Arab Egyptians and enemies 
of Arabic did, projected outwards, help lead Arab Egyptians to a conjunction with Arab 
nationalists in West Asia who had revolted against a very different set of Turkish-speakers 
(al-Zayyat: B 302-318). 
THE RESIDENT SYRIAN CHRISTIANS 
The Syrian Christians, like the Turco-Circassians, were a tiny minority central in the 
118. For Egypt's territoriality as an integrant of Shawqi's multiple ethnic origins, fn 116. Shawqi's first 
youthful attempts at fiction included some on Pharaonic themes: listed Daghir, Masadir v. 2 p. 505. Shawqi 
expressed his sense that the territorial homeland maintained a continuous Egyptian people and history in his 1917 
drama Cleopatra: this accepted the Greek-speaking Ptolemies as Egyptian through long residence. Communal Copts 
rejected her title --- and that of Shawqi's TC ethnic group --- to be considered Egyptian. See B 479: and B 478-485 
for the divergent ways in which Coptic as against Muslim neo-Pharaonists viewed the periods of Egyptian history. 
119. For verse by Shawqi in praise ofFaysal I of 'Iraq, Boudot-Lamotte, Shawgi p. 610. Pan-Arabization: 
his 1932 drama 'Antarah, set in pre-Islamic Arabia, contained anachronistic speeches and passages calling for a 
wide, strong Arab state. Ibid pp. 575-577. For the responsiveness of Moroccans to Shawqi's poetical drama in the 
era of the crystallization of Moroccan nationalism and independence struggle, fn 115 supra. 
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thoughts of Arab-Muslim Egyptians into the early 1930s. This was in part due to the weight 
their modernist-scientific (but also restorationist-Arabist) literary contributions had for 
acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals aware of the peril facing the standard language under 
imperialism. Negatively or positively, the c. 30,000 Christian Syrians in Egypt influenced the 
development of pan-Islamic and pan-Arab consciousness among Muslim Egyptians more than all 
Egypt's native Coptic Christians, climbing to one million under British colonial rule. That 
newspapers established by pro-British SCs in Egypt publicized Arab national protests in the 
Ottoman State in the short term made some Muslim Egyptians more pro-Turkish. The SC 
minority's disproportionate economic success, as well as collaboration with the British 
occupation by key Syrian Christian journalists, sparked negative Egyptian responses to the 
minority and against connected West Asian Ottoman Arabs. 
The Europeanizing Khedive Isma'il (r. 1863-1879) found Syrian Christian graduates of 
foreign European missionary schools in Lebanon-Syria useful by reason of their grasp of West 
European languages for the running of his modernizing administration 120• The English after their 
1882 occupation similarly utilized such Syrian-Christian graduates as petty officials, especially 
those trained at the Syrian Protestant College (later the American University of Bayrut). Such 
SCs rendered essential service as physicians, pharmacists, clerks and officials in the civil and 
military services of the administration of Egypt and the Sudan; without them, British officials 
admitted, it might have been impossible to maintain the Occupation121 • Their Arabic made them 
useful to spy on and control the Egyptians122• In the British colonial period, Syrian Christians 
won an increasingly prominent role in the modernizing sector of the Egyptian economy, 
120. Thomas Philipp, The Syrians in Egypt 1725-1975 (Stuttgart Sranz Steiner-Verlag 1985) pp~ 84-85. 
121. Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present (london: MacMillan 1957) 
p. 474. Cromer was much given to contemptuous generalizations about Arab "Orientals" regardless of their religion. 
It was a tribute with no parallel that he felt educated Christian Syrians who knew both a European language and 
Arabic made "intelligent employees" who "from their training and habits of thought possessed some aptitude for 
assimilating European administrative procedures". Quoted Fakhrel-Deen, Abdal-Rahman Shukri p. 27. 
122. Anti-imperialist Muslim Egyptians' hatred against the whole Syrian Christian minority was fueled by 
the careers in Egypt of such oppressive immigrants as' Abdallah Pasha Sufayr al-Shami ("the Syrian"). This Syrian 
Christian was born in Bayrut in 1854, and migrated to Alexandria when he was sixteen. Sufayr rose swiftly under 
the British from a clerk in the European Department to Assistant Commissioner of Police in Alexandria, to 
Commissioner of Alexandria Police, to Director of the Intelligence Police force in Egypt (under the Ministry of the 
Interior) from 1891 on. Muhammad Farid though that this Syrian Christian figure, an instrument of British control 
in Egypt, might have channeled funds to the faction from the Patriotic Party trying to bring him (Farid) down from 
the presidency of the Party, to which he had been elected after Mustafa Kamil's death in February 1908. Farid, 
Awrag Muhammad Farid v. 1p.69. 
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especially in the cities and towns, as middle-men, entrepreneurs and small businessmen directly 
competitive with the European immigrant communities. They reached perhaps 30,000 by tfie 
end of British colonial rule in 1922: this small but successful community's disproportionate share 
of Egypt's national wealth, however, was 50,000,000 pounds sterling or one-tenth in 1907123• 
Some Syrian Christians were money-lenders in villages, and this influenced perception of the 
minority in Egyptian folk-lore 124, but the Syrians' private enterprise had no conflict with the 
landowning Arab Egyptian politicians and intellectuals around al-Jaridah, who needed SC ideas 
for organizing a future M-E entrepreneurial-financial counter-class to the resident Europeans. A 
Muslim Egyptian private-enterprise bourgeoisie really got off the ground only around 1930125• 
Muslim Egyptian-SC Ethnic Antagonism. Pre-1918 acculturated M-E professionals 
resented that immigrant Syrians took jobs in the civil service, medicine and law that incoming 
British recruits and resident Europeans left over. Pressured, the veteran statesman Riyad Pasha 
almost issued a law in 1900 prohibiting Syrian immigrants from taking up government 
positions126• Between 1892 and 1914, the Kamilists denounced dukhala' (intruders) and 
ghuraba' (aliens) who served the British and exploited Egypt. 
The religious difference was crucial among the factors keeping Syrian Christians a group 
apart from the Muslim-majority Egyptian host community, despite residence in Egypt that had 
123. Hitti, Lebanon in History p. 474. The British did not collect precise statistics of the number of Syrian 
Christians resident at given times in Egypt during their rule. They tended to lump them in one category with 
Muslim immigrants from Syria or even with all immigrants from the whole Ottoman Empire. "It is not possible to 
state how many Syrian Christians there are in Egypt". Cromer, Modem Egypt (London: MacMillan, 1908) v. II, p. 
214. Philipp's rough estimate, based on an "extremely low birthrate'', projected that Egypt in 1910 had a Syrian 
Christian community made up of 10,000 Greek Catholics, 6,000 Maronites and 5,000 Syrian Orthodox. Philipp, 
Syrians in Egypt p. 86. Over one in 15 Greek Catholics, one of 50 Maronites and one of 60 Greek Orthodox in 
Lebanon-Syria had migrated to Egypt. 
124. Cromer wrote that a Syrian "usurer" was to be found in almost every village of rural Egypt and that 
Syrians were thus "regarded by the mass of the population with those feelings of dislike which improvident debtors 
usually entertain towards creditors who hold them in their grip". Cromer, Modem Egypt (london: MacMillan 1908) 
v. II, p. 214. 
125. Foreigners owned most industry before 1930, but thereafter Egyptians owned the bulk of 
newly-founded plants and by 1950 owned most of the total industry. Growing numbers of native Egyptian 
industrialists, merchants and financiers thus were competitive with Syrian Christian (as well as European) 
businessmen after 1930. Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and 
Political Evolution of Egypt. 1804-1952 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1961) p. 183. 
126. Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu'asir (Bayrut Dar 
al-Irshad 1970) v. 2 p. 213. Total exclusion of Syrian Christians from government posts was not pursued. By late 
1902, however, al-Muqattam complained that the doors to government positions were being closed in the faces of 
Syrian applicants. For instance, the Egyptian Department of Health now gave preference in recruitment to Egyptian 
graduates of the Qasr al-' Ayni Medical School, and was reluctant to employ qualified Syrian doctors. "Misr 
wal-Muhajarah" (Egypt and Migration) al-Muqattam 1December1902 p. 1. 
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extended to several generations by the Palestine War of 1948. Christianity and Islam ruled out 
assimilation through intermarriage127• Clearly, though, Muslim Syrian immigrants shared with 
the SCs characteristics of dialect, non-Egyptian customs and separate homeland of origin ---
bonds that helped draw all sects of Syrians together into specific urban areas128• The ultimate 
point of the Kamilists' fear of sniping against Ottoman governments from the emigre SC press, 
was that it might recruit Muslim Arabs in West Asia, starting with such Muslim Egypto-Syrian 
resident intellectuals as Rashid Rida, the editor of' Abduh's al-Manar. Rida regarded the 
Kamilists' denunciations of Syrian "intruders" as also targetted against Muslim intellectuals like 
himself, and indeed the immigrant Muslim Syrians in general. Rida's support for' Abduh's 
attempts to reform al-Azhar, controlled by the Khedive 'Abbas, also led the M-E al-Mu'ayyad 
and the Kamilists to include him in the dukhala' 129• Rida skilfully tried to unite Muslim and 
Christian Syrians both in the diaspora and in an Arab autonomist movement in Ottoman Wes{ 
Asia itself130, projected from al-Jaridah as well as the SC al-Muqattam (Chapter 6). Some 
Muslim Egyptian hostility to SCs associated Muslim Syrians with them: the secularist Copt 
Salamah Musa juxtaposed neo-classicist Islamist poet Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i whose family had 
come from Syria131 . 
Syrian Christian Contributions to Arabic 
SC Culturist Arab Neo-Classicism. Economic and political factors set SC and Muslim 
Egyptians in conflict, but SC writers made possible whole sectors of the Arab culture and 
127. Economist Charles Issawi (SC), who was born in 1916 and grew up in Egypt, wrote after the 
monarchy collapsed: "the' relative absence of race feeling, together with the fact that women are prohibited from 
marrying non-Muslims, has greatly increased the country's capacity to assimilate Muslims, while making extremely 
difficult any solution to the problems presented by its non-Muslim minorities. Lebanese and Syrian Christians, for 
instance, find themselves still unassimilated after five or six generations of unbroken residence in Egypt. Syrian 
Muslims, on the other hand, are often Egyptianized a few years after arrival, and invariably after one generation. 
Similarly, Negroes, Tunisians, Arabians and even Indians have been quite easy to assimilate". Charles Issawi, ~ 
in Revolution: An Economic Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed 1965), p. 16. Cf Thomas Philipp, 
"Language, History and Arab National Consciousness in the Thought of Jurji Zaydan (1861-1914)", IJMES 4 
(1973), p. 13. 
128. Philipp, Syrians in Egypt p. 89. 
129. Ibid, pp. 113-114. Rida's ethnicity here placed him in the position of defending as the best, SC 
journals whose scientism and secularism would be happy to subvert all religion. 
130. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 303 and Philipp, Syrians in Egypt pp. 114-117. 
131. By 1900, around 240 members of the al-Rafi'i family lived in Egypt. Philipp, Syrians in Egyptp. 56 
fn. For Salamah Musa's evocation of Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i's Syrian descent in a 1929-1931 campaign from 
al-Majallat al-Jadidah to discredit his nee-classicist, Islamist message, A 335 fn 126. 
s 
language strove to them through 
publications. Some Maronite m~o-classicists had considerable impact upon Muslim Egyptian 
intellectuals. Among Lebanese Catholic writers who revived the old idioms and history of the 
classical Arabs was Ibrahim al-Yaziji (1847-1906) who came to Egypt in 1895 and brought out 
there the magazine al-Diya' (1898-1906): he meant it to be a purist watchdog on the Arabic of all 
writers in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. al-Yaziji's ultra-archaising writings influenced the 
young M-E Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat's development of his own neo-classical style and his 
acceptance of the Syrian Christians' viewpoint that they had been oppressed by the Muslim 
Turks --- a stance crucial for transition by Muslim Egyptians from pan-Islam to narrowed 
language-determined pan-Arabism (B 332-339)132• Literary restoration of the classical Arabs· 
was a joint enterprise in which, to take the ethnically-divided British colonial period, (a) 
Egypt-resident Syrian Christians and (b) both Mustafa Kamil's party and the Jaridists, (c) 
Dar 'Ulumists could meet. The youthful Kamil encouraged the Paris-domiciled Lebanese 
Maronite Shukri Ghanim to write a French-language play 'Antarah, celebrating that pre-Islamic 
black hero, to get Arab heroism across to the French public: the play was hailed in al-Jaridah and 
helped inspire Ahmad Shawqi's 1932 poetical drama Antarah133 • The Bayrut-resident (but 
'Iraq-born) Jesuit Louis Shaykhu (1859-1928) published, and wrote literary criticism about, 
much pre-Islamic, Umayyad and' Abbasid Arabic literature, stressing contributions from 
132. In his 1941 tribute to the recently-deceased Mayy Ziyadah, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, under Nasser to 
become editor of al-Azhar' s learned journal, saw the Lebanese stream of writers as having been indispensable to the 
revival of the fossilized Arabic language and literature. Here he was viewing the Lebanese Christian litterateurs 
more as adapters and transmitters of creativity from the West; and he was primarily concerned with those SC 
Lebanese writers who had lived in Egypt. He however noted both integrally neo-classicist SCs --- he mentioned 
Ibrahim al-Yaziji's Cairo magazine al-Diya' (1898-1906) --- and the SC modernists around al-Muqattam and 
al-Muqtatafas sources of the Mayy's "Arabism". al-Zayyat, "Bi-Munasabat al-Arba'in: Ba'd al-Kalam fi 'Mayy'" 
(On the Occasion of the Fortieth Day Since Her Death: Some Observations on Mayy), written 8 December 1941; 
Wahy al-Risalah v. 2 p. 314. Cf. B 336 fn. Ibrahim al-Yaziji agreed with the Ottoman modernists that the East was 
in a deplorable condition, but was concerned only with the Arabs. To him the Arabs were the most remarkable of 
nations because they achieved more in a short period than any other people. The Europeans had been able to 
progress rapidly only because they borrowed from the Arabs. The Arabs had declined after the non-Arabs (Turks) 
came to dominate them and reduced learning to the religious sciences and fanaticism. Dawn, From Ottomanism to 
Arabism p. 132. For the influence of al-Y aziji on multi-lingualized Jaridists: A 292 fn 25). 
133. Shukri Ghanim's historical drama on 'Antarah Ibn Shaddad played at the Odeon of Paris on 10 
February 1910: Antar, drame en 5 Actes en vers (Paris: Libraire Theatral 1910). Boudot-Lamotte, Ahmad Shawqi v. 
2 pp. 564-5. For Shukri Ghanim and the Kamilists see Ch. 5: A 237-238. 
s 
s 
Christian intellectuals 
the Arabic bequeathed by the classical Arabs the medium of political and scientific modernity. 
The SC brothers Salim and Bisharah Taqla launched al-Ahram, Egypt's first, greatest (and 
still-extant) newspaper in 1875. The pre-1882 constitutionalist movement by Arab-Muslim 
Egyptians against the Khedives Isma'il and Tawfiq and the Turco-Circassian caste had linguistic 
and Araboid aspects: SC journalists such as Salim al-Naqqash and Adib Ishaq (1856-1884) 
stressed their Arab identity in order to participate135. In the ensuing period of British colonial 
rule, Syrian Christians long nearly monopolized the editorship of the important Arabic 
newspapers and magazines in Egypt, and at all points up to the Palestine War brought out key 
Arabic newspapers and magazines with mainly Muslim Egyptian readership: al-Ahram (widely 
read by Muslim Egyptians between 1882 and 1922 because it opposed the British occupation), 
another daily al-Muqattam (1889-1952), its sister science-popularizing magazine al-Muqtataf, 
and Jurji Zaydan's magazine al-Hilal (founded 1892) which for decades popularized the great 
classical Arabs the contemporary population that spoke These 
durable SC organs for decades poured into the consciousness of Egyptian Muslims an 
uninterrupted stream of information about Arab populations of West Asia, the Egypto-Syrians' 
region of origin. Key M-E pan-Arabs like al-Zayyat and Arab League SG 'Azzam worked 
closely with al-Ahram SC editor Antun al-Jumayyil after 1922 (B 229-230; B 334). Sects 
134. For a list of the anthologies and almost lost classical Arab ms diwans and prose works that Shaykhu 
edited and published, Daghir, Masadir v. 2 pp. 521-523, 517-521. Egypt was ever the arena and audience for the 
disputes that Syrians had with each other over the common Arab heritage: the Islamic cleric Rashid Rida' lent his 
Cairene al-Manar as a platform for attacks on SiXularizing revaluations of the classical Arabs' past and literature by 
SC Jurji Zaydan. Rida's al-Manar Press published a critique by the equally religious Jesuit Shaykhu --- a 
razor-penned foe of all freemasons --- of Zaydan's new vision of Arab civilization: Intiqadu Kutubi Ta'rikh Adab 
al-Lughat al-' Arabiyyah wa Tabaqat al-Umam. Ta'lif Jurii Zaydan, Daghir, Masadir v. 2. p. 518. 
135. The 'Urabists' slogan Misru lil-Misriyyina (Egypt for the Egyptians) was devised or taken up by the 
Egyptian-resident Christian Salim al-Naqqash. The Egypt-resident SC Adib Ishaq was conscious of his spiXific 
Arab identity --- although in at least his later writings he subordinated it to Ottomanism as a broader front with 
which to face the Westerners. C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab 
Nationalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973) pp. 149-150, 20. Jankowski has shown that during his 
support for the 'Urabists, Ishaq spoke of a linguistic nationality (presumably one that would fuse immigrant 
Christian Syrians and Muslim Egyptians): "we in the watan are brothers joined by the bond of language". 
Jankowski, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914" p. 252. 
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persisted as units among Egypto-Syrians and vis-a-vis Muslim Egyptians. Yet SC writers, in 
particular, wanted to forge some new community that would span all sects of Christianity and 
Islam. The sombre Anglo-Saxon missionary-Protestant educational background of Faris Nimr, 
Ya'qub Sarruf and Shahin Makarius, editors of al-Muqattam and al-Muqtataf, always tinted 
them 136 --- and was common ground with the (likewise post-Christian?) Cromer. However, their 
youthful encounter with Western sciences at Bayrut's tense (American) Syrian Protestant 
College had triggered their life-long propagation of Darwinism137• The Arabic-medium 
post-Christian scientism and Darwinism of SC writers resident in Egypt was crucial for first 
enabling such Coptic writers as Salamah Musa and such Muslims as Taha Husayn to grapple 
with Western secular thought, while still within the sphere of Arabic138• The Christian 
Egypto-Syrians were acutely attuned to developments in Western thought and societies which 
they then transmitted into Arabic, as we see in sometimes judicious and far-seeing dissection of 
136. For the Protestan;zed Lebano-Syrian milieu that produced al-Mug_attam editor Shahin Makarius, Cecil 
' Hourani, An Unfinished Odyssey: Lebanon and Beyond (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1984) p. 34. 
137. For the formative impact of Darwinianism --- in the setting of American-run Syrian Protestant 
College! --- on the Anglophone Orthodox and Protestantized Lebano-Syrians who later edited al-Mug_tataf and 
al-Muqattam from Cairo, see N. Farag, "The Lewis Affair and the Fortunes of al-Mug_tataf' in Middle Eastern 
Studies v. 8 (1972) pp. 73-83. For an 1893 denunciation by the early nationalist al-Nadim of the post-religious 
Darwinist scientism of al-Muqattam(-al-Muqtataf) --- their vulnerable point with the Egyptian public --- see A 103 
fn 81. Philipp rightly remarks that "for the founders of al-Mug_tataf and al-Mug_attam, Faris Nimr and Ya'qub 
Sarruf, it was the Protestant dogmatism of the [American administrators and faculty] of the Syrian Protestant 
College that made them leave Bayrut in 1884 to look for better opportunities in Egypt, ... not Muslim persecution 
nor Ottoman oppression". Philipp, The Syrians in Egypt. 1925-1975 p. 79. SC co-editor Khalil Thabit's statement 
at the 1926 anniversary of al-Muqtataf that Egypt had been a sanctuary for "the ill-treated" avoided naming those 
who had driven Nimr and Sarruf out of Lebanon-Syria in their youth: B 74. Jurji Zaydan (1861-1914), the 
secularized Maronite who founded the monthly al-Hilal in Cairo in 1892, had also been a medical student at the 
Syrian Protestant College. Probably yet another SC post-Christian freemason, he diffused such components of 
Anglo-Saxon civilization as the self-help work ethic, rather than Protestant Christian concepts. 
138. Egypt-resid'ent Syrian Christian modernist writers gave some Coptic as well as Muslim Egyptians their 
crucial first glimpse of the West. The Coptic secularist Salamah Musa, for example, stumbling benighted around 
1906 in neo-classical Arabist rhetoric, instantly won from a chance copy he read of Farah Antun's al-Jami'ah a "new 
perspective, a first glance of the new world of European literature ... the literature of rebellion". Musa, Education p. 
41. Musa viewed Antun as a French-style "free-thinker" who popularized Nietzsche and Rousseau but also tried to 
take an active part in the Egyptian independence movement. Indeed, Antun even edited the Kamilists' al-Liwa' for 
a while. Ibid. p. 154. Ya'qub Sarruf, and his journal al-Muqtataf were another transformatory influence, as was the 
immigrant Syrian Christian Shibli Shumayyil (1850-1916) whose Arabic translation of The Origin of the Species 
occasioned polemics as far away as 'Iraq. Musa, Education pp. 33, 37-38, 124, 254. This was the translation of 
Darwin that Lutfi al-Sayyid read as a secondary school student Smith, Islam and the Search p. 25; Wendell, 
Egyptian National Image p. 208. As late as a 1950 number of al-Mugtataf, Salamah paid grateful tribute to all he 
had gained from the journal as reader and contributor over 50 years. Daghir, Masadir v. 2 p. 545. For the 
sciencizing impact of Sarruf and al-Muqattam on the adolescent Taha while still an al-Azhar student, B 74 fn 50. 
Taha also remembered that during those vacations from al-Azhar he also read Jurji Zaydan's articles and traditional 
popular literature that would orientate towards ancient extra-Egyptian Arabs: "stories of' Antarah and Sayf Ibn Dhi 
Yazan". Taha Husayn, al-Ayyam (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif 1962) v. 2 pp. 175-176. 
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Western socialisms by al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah sub-editor Mayy Ziyadah from 1923139 • Her 
Western languages and modernity fostered her romantic, ever-separated, responsiveness to the 
Qur'an: the macro-historical scope --- and competition from --- Greek, Latin, English etc helped 
her accept Islamic bases of classical Arab culture and the standard language140• Visiting the 
Lebanon of her birth almost annually, its development of a Catholic particularism after 1920 was 
meaningless to her: to her death in 1941, she tried to connect her two homelands as both 
"Eastern"141 • (In the 1920s, Mayy's acculturated feel for macro-history made her block 
139. Mayy's contribution to the development of socialist ideas in the Arab countries is discussed by 
Sakakini, Mayy Ziyadah pp. 101-106. Her book al-Musawat (Equality: 207 pages), composed and first published as 
articles from 1923, discussed various moderate and radical schools of Western socialism. In it, Mayy traced 
connections between originating ideas in Hegel and the materialist socialism subsequently developed by Marx ---
which, however, she, after consideration, judiciously sidestepped. Ibid p. 103. "The Morrow" would witness the 
triumph of egalitarian Socialism, which in a succeeding stage would be superseded by a successor-system led by a 
"class of the Future" that had been defined by capacity within "the heart of socialism". Ibid p. 104. As a liberated 
Arab woman-intellectual, Mayy lacked a stable position or function in the Egyptian society of the 1920s. Her 
feminist bitterness spilled over during a discussion of the various types of slavery in human history: women remain 
chained in slavery in the very age in which they have begun to educate themselves and demand their emancipation 
amid calls for socialism: necklaces, bangles, earrings and welcome tributes to their beauty by male authors are but 
other means to buy them and terrible shackles upon their souls. Ibid pp. 104-5. 
140. In some remarks on the reasons for the survival of Arabic down the ages, Mayy extolled "the Arab 
Prophet Muhammad" --- who had traded in Syria in youth on behalf of Quraysh --- as the founder of "this national 
civilization ... The source of that civilization is the Qur'an". Mayy felt the Qur'an's verbal power: it had spread with 
greater speed than any other book in history, and captivated nations whose distinctive, immemorially-developed 
civilizations might have been expected to remain impervious to its injunctions. The main attraction Mayy felt was 
to Arab elements fostered within Islamic civilization: "the Qur'an brought into being an Arab religion, an Arab state, 
Arab laws and Arabic literatures that all became [complimentary] components of one single nationalism that bound 
together peoples which had not had Arabic as their language". Although drawn to Muslim history by her purely 
linguistic bond with Islam, Mayy had dipped into the classical Arabs' Islamic sciences and geographers and had a 
generous feel for ways in which the Qur'an's motifs and requirements stimulated even such sciences as geography, 
mathematics and astronomy. Her defence of the unique greatness of standard Arabic in universal macro-history far 
beyond the Arab sphere of her day, requiring that she accommodate Islam, was a sort of acculturated 
competitiveness with the scope of the ancient Greek and Latin of the West. Ibid pp. 237-9. 
141. Mayy was truly pan-Arab, so irrevocably had she blended Egypt and Lebanon in her personality ---
and in her routine of residence. From her father's migration to Cairo in 1908, it was essential for her to holiday in 
every summer in Mount Lebanon, yet with home-sickness for Egypt. Although responsive to Egyptian nationalism, 
she could not convey herself with either "Egyptian" or "Syrian" in either of her two matrixes. She groped for terms 
of public self-definition that would get across her inherent blendedness. Mayy evoked an "Eastern" community as 
the collective to which she contributed. When a literary-minded notable in Duhur al-Shuwayr, Lebanon, built her a 
sapling hut to write in, she orated to thank them for the zeal with which they "encouraged the Eastern Woman in 
general", not just herself as an individual. Ibid pp. 79-80. In a long "Hymn to the East", she saw the totality of its 
mountains, rivers, plains and its broiling desert winds in one vast canvas. The poor, ignorant, "dismembered" East 
as yet lacked the skyscrapers, institutes, museums, banks and factories --- the deposits of wealth extracted from the 
most distant lands --- that "the strong" of her age commanded as they moaned in their darkness. But now the East 
had to awake for the new dawn of which it would be the tower. Ibid pp. 225-6. Her "East" was undoubtedly centred 
on the Middle East but perhaps not just the period synonym for Arabs that Sakakini supposed (p. 56): Mayy may not 
have been thinking of far-away Buddhists but the term undoubtedly covered the Turks vivid in her childhood 
Lebanon, whose language had Arabic in it, and who remained engaged under Ataturk in parallel self-modernization 
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mythologization of the Pharaonic past into a pretext for Westernization --- or exploitation by 
Westerners: B 412-414). 
1922-1952: The Syrians Under the Quasi-Independent Monarchy 
A large number of the most political immigrant Syrian intellectuals went back to the new 
Arab state-units of the Fertile Crescent after 1919. The settled intelligentsia that remained 
around al-Muqattam, al-Muqtataf, al-Hilal and other SC publications made the leap from support 
or neutrality towards the Occupation to accommodation to Egyptian nationalism which, however, 
they now strove to pull towards a crude pan-Arabism. 
The daily al-Muqattam in the 1920s maintained identification with a sort of international 
Syrian "nation". This was made up of the populations actually resident in the Greater Syria 
territorial homeland but also of the diaspora communities --- including those in the Americas that 
could not keep up the Egypt-resident Syrians' periodical contact with Syria through summer 
vacations. A contributor from the Americas, writing on the problems of Syrian immigrants in 
Argentina and Brazil, in August 1910 described al-Muqattam as "the mouthpiece of the Syrian 
nation (al-ummat al-Suriyyah) in particular" among "the Arab(ic) nations" in general142• 
Syrians in Egypt recurrently resisted taking Egyptian political nationality, which would 
sever formally their community with the homeland of origin. In the British colonial period the 
Jaridists spoke out for naturalization for immigrant Syrians, and even the Kamilists at odd times 
discussed whether they could become Egyptians: however, both Egyptians and the immigrant 
Syrian Christians formally were subjects of the same Ottoman Sultan. After World War 1, the 
particularist Egyptian nation-state and the French-mandated Lebanese and Syrian states were 
born, confronting Egypt-resident Syrians with a choice of mutually-exclusive citizenships. 
al-Muqattam in July 1926 published a lawyer's article protesting legislation allegedly designed 
to force Syrians and Lebanese in Egypt to either become citizens or leave the country "despite 
their wishes and the wishes of the Egyptian people which has no enthusiasm for this immature 
Egyptianisation". Some SCs had "come to Egypt solely as refugees". Despite the sufferings they 
had endured because of this "valid nationalist commitment to Syria" under the Ottomans, the 
--- in, for instance, the roles of women. 
142. "al-Suriyyuna fi Amirika" (The Syrians in America), al-Muqattam, 10 August 1910. 
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article also defended the similar reluctance of Turks in Egypt to take citizenship143• Whatever 
their criticisms, the SC press always so intimately fleshed West Asia's Turks as well as Arabs 
out to Egyptians over decades. 
al-Muqattam in 1926, then, evoked a stubborn commitment to the land and people of 
Syria that made it impossible to accept exclusive Egyptian nationality after decades in Egypt. 
The attitudes and procedures of Egyptians after 1922 also helped keep generations of 
Egypto-Syrians marginal. al-Muqattam in 1945 still referred to the problems in getting passports 
and visas faced by two SC categories: (a) those who had maintained Ottoman citizenship or 
derived Syrian, Lebanese or 'Iraqi nationalities and (b) those who had accepted Egyptian 
citizenship. The paper hoped that the formation of the League of Arab States, meant to increase 
travel and contact and standardize laws between Egypt and the Arab states, would end their 
problems in getting passports and visas for travelling to other Arab countries from which they or 
their forefathers came144• SC insecurities in Egypt thus further fueled their journals' 
encouragement and projection of the Arabo-Islamic high-tide in Egypt after 1930. 
Under the monarchical Egyptian nation-state, Egypto-Syrian professionals maintained a 
commitment to Lebanon-Syria that sometimes continued to reject a separate state-entity of 
Lebanon even after World War 2. The multi-lingual, business-orientated SCs developed ever 
closer interactions with Europeans in Egypt145: so often, though, proximity nourished some 
special antipathies. A 1945 al-Muqattam article bitingly linked the implantation of political 
sectarianism in Lebanon in the mid-nineteenth century to the penetration of (West Europe's) 
143. "al-Suriyyuna wal-Lubnaniyyun wa Qanun al-Jinsiyyat al-Misriyyah" (The Syrians and the Lebanese 
and the Egyptian Nationality Law) al-Muqattam 15 July 1926. 
144. "al-Jinsiyyat al-Misriyyah wa Ithbatuha: Jawazat al-Safar wal-Iqamah" (Egyptian Nationality and 
Proving [Entitlement to] It: Passports and Residence Permits) al-Muqattam 16 July 1945 p. 3. The writer's langauge 
shows his continuing sense of national or semi-national territory-determined groups in the Arabic-speaking world: 
he expected the Arab League's council to discuss the Egypto-Syrians' nationality and travel problems in the context 
of "promoting contacts between the League's peoples" (shu'ub) and reciprocal treatment between its "lands" Crul!fil). 
Ibid. 
145. Cecil Hourani considered the World War II years "the Indian summer" of a closed Anglo-Levantine 
society made up of Turco-Circassian aristocracy, "the wealthy Lebanese and Syrian families who had made their 
money in commerce and industry or were prominent civil servants or writers", and a few select Arab Egyptians: in 
the Muhammad 'Ali and Gezira clubs British generals lunched with Egyptian pashas, and Lebanese-Egyptian .QQn_ 
viveurs and wealthy SC women played bridge. Hourani, Unfinished Odyssey p. 43. In comparison to Philipp's 
dichotomization (Syrians pp. 118, 133-5, 152-6), Cecil Hourani's recollections image better acceptance of SC 
pan-Arab intellectuals like Nimr among the SC commercial elite, admittedly intent to tighten its commercial and 
cultural relations with resident Europeans. For greater intermarriage with resideht Europeans than with Egyptians, 
Philipp, Syrians pp. 150-152. 
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"knowledge" (al- 'ilm) and civilization (al-tamaddun). It equated the Ottoman Turks and the 
European powers as "foreign elements" motivated by selfish "interests" when in 1861 they set up 
the autonomous sanjaq of Lebanon on sectarian lines, to the lasting harm of the Lebanese146• 
After World War I, al-Muqattam had been a vocal mouthpiece for resistance by Egypt's 
Christian and Muslim Syrians to France and Britain's partition of the erstwhile wide 
geographical Syria into Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Transjordan. France proclaimed the 
expanded state of Greater Lebanon in 1920. al-Muqattam pitted itself against the sectarian 
Catholic Maronites who collaborated with French rule and partition for the ascendency it offered 
over other sects. Thus, in 1924 it printed a call from the Cairo-based Committee for the Defence 
of the Rights of Syria and Lebanon addressed to Syrians, Lebanese and Palestinians in the 
homeland and in the diaspora that defined them all as one people (sha'b). The separate states of 
Syria, Lebanon and Palestine into which the victorious Allies had partitioned geographical Syria 
were a pluralization of names out of one name147• In 1925, the French Foreign Minister Briand, 
echoed by the Parisian Press, dismissed "Syria" as a geographical expression: those "peoples" 
could never form a political nation. al-Muqattam replied that there were no national divisions in 
Syria, only divisions of sect that outsiders had inflamed artifically from the mid-19th century. 
Christians, Muslims, Druzes and Arabic-speaking Jews in Syria were all sons of a single Syrian 
race whose forefathers had happened to adopt different religions148• al-Muqattam proudly and 
146. "al-Hizbiyyatu wal-Ta'ifiyyah fi Lubnan" (Divisive Party-Partisanship and Sectarianism in Lebanon), 
al-Mugattam 5 September 1945 p. 3. 
147. "Nida' ila Ahli Suriyyah wa Lubnan wa Filastin" (A Call to the People of Syria and Lebanon and 
Palestine), al-Muqattam 28 June 1924. This Appeal was very much a communication from diaspora Syrians of 
diverse sects whose Syrianism was the outcome of having been thrown together outside Syria, and the uncertainty 
hanging over their position in Egypt. al-Shaykh Rashid Rida' (Muslim) had launched the Syro-Palestine Congress 
in Cairo in August 1921 with financial and organizational support from the Egypt-resident Orthodox Mikha'il 
Lutfullah. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under the French Mandate (London: OUP 1958) p. 143. 
148. "Muhimmatu Faransa fi Suriyyah: Hal il-Suriyyuna 'Ummah?" (France's Task in Syria: Are the 
Syrians A Nation?) al-Muqattam 22 December, 1925 p. 1. One motif in this editorial underscores the continuity 
over decades of al-Muqattam's reserve vis-a-vis the Catholic sectarian basis of the separate Lebanon state. The 
Catholic Greater Lebanonists constantly cited Droze and Muslim massacres of Christians in 1860. In order to 
dismiss any need for a separate Lebanon polity, the al-Muqattam editorialist denied that the population of Lebanon 
had had serious sectarian divisions in the early nineteenth century. Rather, he argued, Lebanon's society was 
divided into partisan groups that cut across the sects: the Yamani group had both Droze and Christians in its ranks, 
as did the opposed Qaysi faction. Thus Christians in one partisan group would fight Christians in the opposed group 
and Droze other Druzes. "Muhimmatu Faransa ... " Thus al-Muqattam in 1925. Twenty years later, the 1945 article 
of lament at party division and sectarianism in the independent Lebanese state repeated the same argument. Before 
Western influence became strong, the population of Lebanon was divided into Qaysiyah-vs -Y amaniyyah factions 
(later Yazbakiyyah-vs-Junbulatiyyah), each group having both Droze and Christians in its ranks so that Droze were 
fighting Droze and Christians Christians. Lebanon's sectarian structure and sectarian politics thus originated from 
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excitedly covered the 1925 armed revolt by mainly Sunni Muslim and Druze Syrians against 
French rule. It sought a deeper and longer-term effect on Egyptians through regular books, too, 
including a 1925 work on the Druze in the Syrian Revolution (B 12-13). al-Muqattam was the 
main publication from which SC intellectuals like Nasim Sayba'ah tried to draw Egyptians ---
including Haykal and al-Siyasah --- into Zionist-Palestinian conflict in 1929 (B 126-131). 
The Egypto-Syrian intellectuals energetically and effectively resisted Britain and 
France's post-World War 1 partition of geographical Syria into the mandated statelets of Syria, 
Palestine, Lebanon and Transjordan. Even after World War 2, during decolonization, some 
Egypto-Syrians accepted the new sub-Syrian statelets reluctantly and grudgingly. 
Supra-Syria Arabism. al-Muqattam projected not merely the cause of the Druze and 
Muslim-dominated Syrians' post-World War 1 uprising against the French, but also the war of 
the Rifled by 'Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi against Spanish and French colonialism in Morocco149• 
Indeed an al-Muqattam editor even published a book' Abd al-Krim wal-Harb al-Rifiyyah (Abd 
al-Krim and the Rif War). The Egypt-resident Syrian Christian Jurji Zaydan (1861-1914) in the 
period of British colonial rule had already written of the contemporary Arabic-determined "Arab 
nation" (al-ummat al-' Arabiyyah) extending over Iraq, Syria, the Arabian peninsula, Egypt, 
Sudan, the Maghrib (North Africa)150• al-Muqattam had regularly assailed French misrule in the 
western wing of the Arab world until the 1904 Entente: al-Ahram showed the same impulse but 
feared discontinuation of the subsidy it received from the French Government to sustain its 
criticisms of British rule in Egypt151 • 
In the 1930's, when Syria of Damascus, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan consolidated 
Europe. "al-Hizbiyyatu wal-Ta'ifiyyah". For the Qays-Yamani feud in the seventeenth century, and its devastation 
of the position of the Druze in Lebanon vis-a-vis its Maronites, Robert Brenton Betts, The Druze (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 1988) pp. 75-6, 146. Cf. Wendell on the trans-sectarian "bipolar structure" that the Qays-vs-Kalb 
fighting gave Lebano-Syrian society "as late as the eighteenth century", Egyptian National Image pp. 113-114. 
149. Some al-Muqattam articles bracketed the (geographically widely separated) struggles of the Syrians 
and 'Abd al-Karim's Rifians against the common French colonialist foe. One such article was titled "al-Harb fi 
Suriya wa fil-Maghrib; Taharruj al-Halati fil-Maghrib; Sultan Basha la Yastaslim" (The War In Syria And North 
Africa: the Deteriorating Situation In North Africa: Sultan Pasha [al-Atrash the Druze leader] Refuses to Surrender 
[in Syria]), al-Muqattam 11 August, 1926. The "mukatib siyasi sharqi" ("Eastern political correspondent") who 
wrote the article explicitly linked Syria's struggle to that of another country (Morocco) at the other, far western end 
of the Arab world, observing that "it seems to us the fighting shall continue in Syria and Morocco until the French 
Government treats its indigenous populations fairly and meets their demands ... It is actions that tell for people, not 
words" Ibid. 
150. Philipp "Language, History ... Jurji Zaydan" p. 14. 
151. Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution p.208. 
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as separate state units, Christian Egypto-Syrians lost heart in endeavors to put geographical Syria 
together again into one political unit. Instead, they accepted that Lebanon at least had 
irreversibly become a political state separate from Syria. In 1938, al-Muqattam' s editor Khalil 
Thabit proposed that the challenge of Zionism and the Jewish national home in Palestine be 
solved by annexing Palestine to Egypt152• Thus, the shifting ethnic needs of the SCs was one 
factor prodding the Egyptian establishment towards a pan-Arab adventure in Palestine. Khalil's 
son Karim Thabit became pan-Arabist editor of al-Muqattam (B 228) and an advisor who guided 
King Faruq through the maze of Lebanon and Syria's sects and factions: after 1945, Egyptian 
pan-Arab policy helped consolidate an independent Christian-led Lebanese state against any 
irredentism from Syria's Sunni elite. 
To sum up, Christian Egypto-Syrian journalists and intellectuals persistently felt bonded 
to a Syrian people with Christian, Muslim and Druze components. Migration and life in the 
Egyptian geographical enviroment in various ways dislocated them from the sectarian units that 
retained more importance for those SCs active in Egyptian commerce. SC writers explored and 
propagated supra-territorial concepts of pan-Arab unity or Arab nationality that could offer 
community with Egyptians without excising their own links with their homeland of provenance. 
The floods of information that SC newspapers and magazines got across about political and 
social conditions in "Syria" were important for involving Egyptians in, for instance, the 
Druze-Sunni Syrian uprisings against France in the 1920s (B 76fn). 
THECOPTS 
Numerically, the most important minority in Egypt was the country's Copts. These 
Arabic-speaking Christians made up substantial enough a proportion of the indigenous 
population to present a fundamental problem to all who tried to define political community 
throughout the whole period (1892-1952) covered by our inquiry. In 1917 there were an 
estimated 857,000 Copts as against 11,624,000 Muslims in Egypt153• In 1937 the number of 
Copts was estimated at 1,099,186 as against 14,552,704 Muslims154• Copts were more 
152. Khalil Thabit, "Limadha la Tudammu Filastin ila Misr: Iqtirah" (Why Not Join Palestine to Egypt: A 
Proposal). al-Muqattam 23 March, 1938 p.4, cited by James Jankowski, "Egyptian Responses to the Palestine 
Problem in the Interwar Period" IJMES August 1980 p. 27. 
153. EB, 1917 art. "Egypt". 
154. "Egypt", EB, 1947. 
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concentrated in Upper Egypt, constituting over 20 percent of the population around Asyut, but 
there were no areas in Egypt of any extent where they formed a demographic majority. They 
lived interwoven with the Muslim majority populations of Egypt's villages, towns, and cities, 
although still sometimes clustered somewhat in particular sections155• 
Egypt's large minority of Christian Copts --- perhaps one-eightth of its population ---
inevitably influenced the acculturated Muslim intellectuals' shifting community identifications in 
all periods to 1952. They shared the language but not the religion of their Muslim compatriots. 
Both under outright colonial rule (1882 - 1922) and in the period of nominal independence, 
Muslim-Egyptian anti-imperialists feared that Britain would pose as the Copts' protector and 
detach them from the independence movement. This could motivate Muslim intellectuals to 
favor more secular identifications likelier to enlist the Copts --- after 1922, neo-Pharaonist 
particularism (B 475-486). 
Sectarian Inter-Elite Conflict. However, social and economic changes in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries drew modern-educated Copts and similarly-educated 
Muslims into conflicts. lntercommunal ill-feeling confirmed the traditional assumption that 
religious sect was a determinant of community to precisely the modernizing-educated Muslim 
strata most intellectually orientated to build new secular communities. Copts traditionally had 
held a virtual monopoly over clerical positions in government and as late as the beginning of the 
twentieth century 97-98% of all sarrafs (tax collectors) were still Copts156• But as Egypt 
modernized, the emergent elite of Arab-Muslim secular-educated intellectuals-professionals 
more and more tried to enter such careers. This clash between two competitive elites culminated 
in the rival congresses of Copts and Muslims held in 1911. The most enterprising Copts had 
shrewdly seized new technology and possibilities. Combining trade with agriculture, by the end 
of the nineteenth century they had established for the first time in Egypt's history a Coptic 
landowning aristocracy. One English observer described them as "a few wealthy Copts" who 
155. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule p. 308; Baer, "Social Change ... " in Holt (ed.) 
Political and Social Change pp. 145-6. Although the strict segregation of urban Coptic communities in "particular 
quarters ... for defence" that prevailed in the first half of the nineteenth century had ended by the beginning of the 
twentieth, "there still were quarters almost exclusively inhabited by Muslims, such as Khalifah and Sayyidah Zaynab 
in Cairo or Minat al-Basal in Alexandria: in 1897 there were 56 shiyakhat (sub-quarters) in Cairo, out of 195, in 
each of which lived less than 10 Copts, and in Alexandria 34 out of 108. Ibid. 
156. Ibid p. 146. 
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through "scientific agriculture" and "the introduction of every sort of modern appliance", 
especially in regard to irrigation, had achieved perennial agriculture on estate lands that formerly 
only bore one crop from the annual flooding of the Nile; these landowners reclaimed "pure desert 
and brine-logged earth" 157• Sir Eldon Gorst, Cromer's successor as Britain's Consul-General, in 
his report of 25 March 1911 described "the organizers of this [Coptic] Conference" as "a small 
clique of wealthy landowners in Upper Egypt" who "did not claim to represent more than some 
12,000 out of the 700,000 Copts of Egypt"158• 
The Coptic communalists did have some real grievances. Whereas modernization was 
breaking the Copts' monopoly of some governmental functions, the British reserved the most 
responsible administrative positions, the offices of mudir and ma'mur for Muslims, on the 
ground that rural Muslims might not accept the authority of Copts in such positions. Fighting 
back against Dunlop, educated Muslim Egyptians were getting more Qur'an-pervaded curricula 
into government primary and secondary schools, exposing Coptic pupils to Islam159• 
During the period of British colonial rule, then, two modernizing West-tinctured elites, 
the Coptic and the Muslim, came into sharpening competition. Their economic and careers 
competition made some modernizing-educated Muslims and Copts more conscious of the 
capacity of sects to determine political community than traditional Muslims and Copts were. 
British-Coptic Alienation. Coptic scholars have stressed that the constitutionalist "Egypt 
for the Egyptians" movement of the early 1880s was supported by Copts, including Pope Kirillus 
V; and that Copts actively supplied and transported Ahmad 'Urabi's troops when the British 
invaded160• Anglo-Saxon missionary assaults upon the Coptic Church had laid a foundation of 
dislike of Anglo-Saxon Protestants well before the British occupied Egypt. In 1867 Kirillus V 
went to Asyut, to announce excommunication of any Copt who sent his children to the (mainly 
American) Prorestant missionaries' schools or visited their libraries or befriended any 
157. S.H. Leeder, Modern Sons of the Pharaohs (London: Hodder and Stroughton 1918) pp. 3-4. 
158. Gorst's report quoted Kyriakos Mikhail, Copts and Muslims under British Control (London: Smith 
Elder & Co 1911) p. 36. Carter has to concede Gorst's point: "no leading Cairene family seems to have taken part in 
the conference; mainly Upper Egyptians were in attendance" --- although the Patriarch opposed because he was 
"senile", under government pressure. Carter, Copts in Egyptian Politics p. 13. 
159. Carter, Copts in Egyptian Politics pp. 223-225. 
160. Bahr, al-Aqbat pp.23-27. Samirah Bahr drew for this original interpretation of the constitutionalist 
movement upon unpublished researches of the Copt scholar Dr. Zahir Riyad, upon political texts from the period 
and upon works by Muslim scholars. 
-A58-
missionary161• The Protestant missionaries' frontal assaults on the Coptic Church, meant to bring 
Copts into alternative new native Protestant Churches, went on in the period of British colonial 
rule. Zafar Ishaq Ansari characterized the Coptic Church as "a national Church, confined to 
Egypt"; this apartness from Europe's Churches consolidated their status as "an integral part of 
the Egyptian nation" in both their and the Egyptian Muslims' eyes 162• Ever since their Church 
broke with Byzantine Orthodoxy, the Copts' relations with European or Western Christians had 
been ambivalent at best. Shared elements of Christianity were not enough of a bond for the 
Copts to collaborate with the British: Cromer long lumped them contemptuously with 
Arab-Muslim Egyptians. It was vital in international diplomacy that the Muslim Egyptian 
intellectuals lobbying for independence for Egypt be able to claim support from the Coptic 
minority. Embarrassing them before foreigners, some militant Copts rejected the pre-1919 
Kamilist independence movement as anti-Christian because pan-Islamic163• 
Coptic Influence On Community Ideologies 
The inherent inwovenness of the Copts in Egyptian life, combined with the need to win 
them over to a united front able to end British control, led nearly all the Muslim-Egyptian 
intellectuals we examine to affirm at some point that Egypt's Muslims and Copts made up one 
common patriotic community. Crudely under British colonial rule (1882-1922), but with 
increased ideological sophistication during the parliamentarist-particularoid nation-state 
(1922-1952), almost all acculturated Muslim figures examined, at some time affirmed that 
secular factors of shared race, a shared Pharaonic golden age, shared geographical homeland etc 
could unite Copts and Muslim Egyptians in an Egyptianist political community. 
161. Bahr, al-Aqbat p. 21. 
162. Zafar lshaq Ansari, "Egyptian Nationalism vis-a-vis Islam", Pakistan Horizon v. XIII (1960) p. 34. 
163. In 1910, Farid tried to laugh off suggestions by visiting American ex-President Teddy Roosevelt that 
Christian-Muslim conflict had so seriously disturbed public order that the Egyptians could not be ready for 
independence. The British-subsidized al-Muqattam opened its columns to the Coptic communalist lkhnukh Fanus to 
challenge Farid's title to speak for other than Muslim Egyptians. Fanus claimed that when he travelled with him on 
a steamer to Istanbul, a year earlier, Farid told him in the presence of two delegates to the Ottoman Parliament that 
al-Hizb al-Watani had only gone through the motions of verbally endorsing the appointment of B utrus Ghali as 
Prime Minister out of political expediency, without believing that a Christian should occupy such a position in 
Islamic countries. Polemical letter from lkhnukh Fanus in al-Muqattam 2 April 1910. Fanus organized a short-lived 
Pharaonic Egyptian Party (sic) that worked to keep Copts out of the Muslim-led independence movements: this 
would have helped perpetuate the British hold. B. Lynn Carter The Copts in Egyptian Politics pp. 11-12. 
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The presence of the Copts could dampen, but never eliminate, the deep supra-Egyptian 
impulses of acculturated Muslims. The inhibiting Copts only made Egyptians likelier to 
alternate (a) insular patriotism with (b) their development of wider Islamic and pan-Arab 
communities. Both the Kamilists and Jaridists instance pre-1919 alternation. In the period of 
British colonial rule, Mustafa Kamil could both affirm (a) the partial Arab race of Muslim 
Egyptian peasants and (b) joint Egyptianness --- even the predominant Pharaonic "blood" of that 
same Muslim peasantry--- with Copt compatriots (Ch. 5 on pre-1919 Arab identity in Egypt: A 
~9, A 227-280). In Chapter 6 we note such alternation from the more anti-Ottoman 
particularoids around Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah: they did formulate (a) sometimes 
rigorous paradigms of integrative secular Egyptian territorial nationality during Coptic-Muslim 
ill-feeling but at the very same time (b) a sense that Muslim Egyptians had a partial Arab 
descent, which focussed elite M-E communal interests against those of the equally acculturated 
Coptic professional counter-elite. Our study will give particular attention to ex-Jaridist 
Muhammad Husayn Haykal's arguments in the 1920s that Egypt's pagan Pharaonic golden age 
originated, and eternally defined a continuous Egyptian nation, over which subsequent 
Christianity and Islam were a mere superficial patina (B 385-405). We shall see that the need to 
unite Copts and Muslims in the post-1922 proto-independent state was one --- but only one ---
consideration for Haykal and other al-Siyasah intellectuals' development of this abortive 
neo-Pharaonic identity. Amid uneasy relations between Coptic and Muslim 
modernizing-educated professionals in the Arabo-Islamic-orientated 1930s, Ahmad Husayn, 
leader of Misr al-Fatat, again was to soothingly argue that Pharaonic Egypt, Christian Egypt and 
Islamic Egypt were phases through which the single, continuous Egyptian nation passed (B 
218-220). 
In one recurrent pattern, then, the Copts' preferences or presence strengthened the 
acculturated Muslims' consideration of community confined to Egypt. They constrained the 
acculturated Muslim intellectual leaders' development of perceivedly Islam-promoted wider 
communities --- Ottomanoid, pan-Islamic or pan-Arab --- lest they undermine bisectarian 
Egyptian national community. 
The Copts and Pan-Arabism. It is striking that the Copts did not, just by being there, 
more often dam the modern-educated Muslim Egyptians' development of frankly Islamic 
states 
movement (A 
4 
to 
9 presents a few efforts the 1930s 
independence 
1940s --- for instance 
by' Abd al-Rahman' Azzam, later Secretary-General of the League of Arab States (B 229-230; B 
443-4) --- to make pan-Arabism more sects-neutral and attractive to Copts and other Arab 
Christians. A common pattern presented there, though, is of ideological discontinuity between 
religions-marginalizing neo-Pharaonist particularism and a sudden pan-Arabism tinctured with 
Islam. An example is Young Egypt leader Ahmad Husayn: after anti-Arab Egyptianism that 
integrated Egypt's Copts, Muslims and Jews, he abruptly switched to a vocally Islamic 
pan-Arabism, snapping his relationship with the Copts as he did so (B 216-220). Chapter 10 
traces Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat's gradual differentiation in the 1930s and 1940s of the 
language-determined Arab nation from other nations in Islam. al-Zayyat socialized with Copts 
and resident SCs and was aware of Christian contributions to the classical and modern Arab 
cultural community. Could he perceive Arab Christians as full participants also in the 
contemporary Arab political and its struggles for independence? 
Stances that Copts, themselves, took towards classical cultural elements that nourished 
pan-Arabism and to pan-Arab issues, helped shape the community's relationship to the Arab 
nationalism unfolding in Egypt Syrian Christian intellectuals in Egypt wrote extensively on the 
classical Arabs and classical Arab literature and language: these writings impressed Fertile 
Crescent Christians as Arabs upon the minds of even Muslim Egyptian pan-Arabs much attached 
to Islam. The Copts developed no comparable Arabist culturism, but did have elements for 
something similar. The Coptic historian Mikha'il Sharubim in a tum-of-century overall history 
of Egypt had rather judiciously balanced or counterpointed the Pharaonic period and the 
emergence of Arab Islam in Arabia as sources of Egypt's history and personality164• His 
164. The first volume of Sharrubim's history set out Egypt's pagan and early Christian history. The second 
surveyed the history of the ancient pre-Islamic Arabs and the rise of Islam in the Arabian peninsula, in a mostly 
non-Western classicoid-Arabist way: a Christian divergence was its muting of reverence for the Prophet 
Muhammad, while still allowing the classical excerpts to depict him as a great human leader. Sharrubim felicitously 
drew on the histories oflbn Khaldun's disciple al-Maqrizi (1364-1442), of al-Mas'udi (born Baghdad: d. 957 in 
al-Fustat) and Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam (798-871), to depict Arabia, the classical Arab Caliphates and the Arab conquest 
of Egypt: from Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, he characterized that the Copts aided the invading Arabs as a chance to destroy 
the rule of their Byzantine persecutors. Ibid pp. 49-50. All these classical Arab writers were utilized as 
dysfunctionally pan-Arabizing sources within the post-1922 neo-Pharaonist particularism of such Muslim Egyptian 
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wholesale incorporation of archaic passages by classical Arab authors, and his own 
backwards-looking Arabic style --- and some awareness of "the sons of this tongue" as a 
contemporary supra-Egypt community or audience---, were acceptable to some Coptic educators 
whose sectarian schools might have come to propagate something like the integral neo-classical 
that non-missionary Maronite schools diffused in Lebanon165• The Coptic Church, though, was 
long content to use literary Arabic of a poor standard: an apalled Taha Husayn offered his help to 
rewrite its Arabic liturgy166 --- with odd Coptic neo-classicists in the 1930s urging their 
community to move beyond careerist attitudes to literary Arabic, read the classical Arabs' 
masterpieces of rhetoric and match Muslim stylistic purism in new creative literature (Farid 
Kamil 1941)167• Sharubim prefigured stances and conflicts in post-1922 neo-Pharaonism among 
both Copts and Muslims. Much of the European data he incorporated into the account of ancient 
Pharaonic Egypt that made up volume 1 was pre-Egyptological, but he had nonetheless 
attempted a survey: and information about Pharaonic Egypt already suggested doubts about the 
Bible's inerrancy --- the post-religious pattern recurrent in later culturist Egyptianist 
intellectuals as 'Abdallah 'Inan (B 437-438). Sharrubim at the close of the nineteenth century was thus already as 
well-read in classical Arab historiography as M-E intellectuals becoming serious historians in the 1920s and 1930s. 
165. The archaic, culturally pan-Arab, features of Sharubim 's work were acceptable in the milieu of a 
developing Coptic elite still pervasively, iflightly, tinted by the majority's Arabo-Islamic learning. A tribute to his 
vast history by Wah bi Bey, Director of Coptic Schools, while no doubt aware of its recreation of the Pharaonic era, 
and references to Coptic Church history under Islam, in part also saw it in Araboid terms as reestablishing "the 
ancient history" of "the sons of this tongue" --- which would include Sharubim's detailed recreation of pre-Islamic 
and early Islamic peninsula Arabia. Wahbi on his own account referred to the classical Arab-Muslim historians Ibn 
Khallikan, 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi (1162-1231) and Ibn Khaldun, none of them born in Egypt and all recurrent 
influences in both the particularoidism and heightening pan-Arabism of our acculturated Muslim intellectuals in the 
1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Ibid p. 516. 
166. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 334. 
167. Farid Kamil, "al-Qibt wa Ma Yajibu 'Alayhim Nahwa Hadhihil-Lughah" (The Copts and Their 
Obligations Towards This Language), al-Mugtataf August 1941 pp. 263-266. The specific works of classical Arab 
"eloquence" and rhetoric that he cited were the same ones that Muhammad Husayn Haykal, 'Abdallah 'Inan and 
other Jaridist or Siyasahist intellectuals educated in Western languages were always citing: the pre-Islamic Arabian 
"suspended odes", al-Jahiz' al-Bayan wal-Tabyin on rhetoric, the Andalusian al-'Igd al-Farid, the diwans of 
al-Buhturi and Abul-Tammam. Ibid p. 265. Kamil saw himself as furthering a modest high Arabic tradition within 
the Coptic community also represented by Wasif Ghali Pasha, one of the first Copts to join Zaghlul's Wafd in the 
lead-up to the initial struggle. He referred to Ghali's efforts to discover and publish old Arabic literary masterpieces, 
and his transmission of the classical Arabs' literary sensibility to French audiences through French works that he 
published in Paris. Farid Kami! proudly excerpted a eulogy by Shawqi to these services to Arabic literature by 
Ghali. Ibid p. 266. As a Christian, Farid Kamil was encouraged to hope for a new role for the Copts in Arabic 
letters by the eminence therein of Egypt-resident SCs, such as modernists Sarruf and Nimr and neo-classicist poets 
such as Khalil Mutran. He was also aware of the politician-poet Bisharah al-Khuri in Lebanon and the 'Iraqi 
Catholic purist philologist Fr Anastas al-Karmali (who so f~cinated the M-E pioneer pan-Arabist Ahmad Hasan 
al-Zayyat: B 335 fn183). Ibid p. 264. See also B 189 fn 88. 
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nationalism 168• 
SC Arabist aestheticism and scientism were bases for a new sensibility of literate Muslim 
Egyptians. In contrast, the Coptic literary faction that most stimulated a modernist Arab M-E 
consciousness did so negatively by spasmodically denouncing supra-Egyptian Arab culture and 
community. Salamah Musa (1887-1958), in the name of the West's modern secular values, and 
Egypt's non-Arab Pharaonic origin, for decades assailed classical Arab cultural elements and ---
intermittently --- pan-Arab community identifications in Egypt. His calculated provocations, 
extending free speech in Egypt, stimulated some constructive responses by Muslims in the 
Egyptian press. 'Ali' Awni (1935) accurately identified anti-religious Darwinianism as Musa's 
central drive, and Pharaonism as secondary and an instrument with which to parry the (Islamic) 
spiritual revival now pressing in. 'A wni, like the Kamilists and like the J aridists in their Arabist 
spasms, identified language as "the very heart of nationalism" in rejection of Musa's 
Egyptianism169• Yet he admitted Musa's charge that Qur'an-defined literary Arabic had not been 
expanded to convey modern sciences or kept pace with other (=Western) literatures --- Arab 
168. Although Sharubim's history offered a steady if modest flow of data about the history of the Coptic 
Church, it bequeathed many more elements for a non-sectarian Egyptianist-particularist view of history. Volume 1 
did set out, however stiffly and sketchily, Egypt's ancient Pharaonic history. Its reliance on the chronology of 
Pharaonic dynasties by the ancient pagan Egyptian priest Manetho, incorporated into Josephus and Julius Africanus, 
drew more on outmoded Western histories, inadequately utilising post-Champollion Egyptology. Even so, 
Sharubim found it extremely hard to dovetail even thinish Pharaonic history into the Old Testament's quantification 
of history between the Creation and the Flood. The Westerners' Higher Criticism of the Old Testament unsettlingly 
festered on the margin of his mind: he noted the existence in Europe of "an extremist group" that had even gone so. 
far as to claim that the books of Moses had been written long after him in Babylonian exile. Sharubim, al-Kafi v. 1 
p. 16. In a very crude way, these slivers in Sharubim thus prefigured the loss of faith in the Bible as unhistorical and 
alien after 1922 among some Coptic converts to neo-Pharaonist nationalism (eg. Kamil Ghabriyal Pasha: B 
473-474). Moreover, Sharubim was like the later Muslim-Egyptian neo-Pharaonist particularists of the 1920s in his 
sense of Egypt as an ongoing political community under Muslim leadership long after the Pharaonic period. Thus, 
he depicted the Mamluk regime as an indigenous government leading "the Egyptian army" into battle against the 
invading Ottomans in 1516-1517, and Egyptians as mourning a resultant loss of sovereignty. Ibid v. 2 pp. 
Sharrubim's very hostile portrayal of most Ottoman governors as corrupt, exploitative and violent did not declare 
many sectarian dimensions, although he did tersely note the Wali (Governor) Ibrahim Pasha's demolition of a 
splendid Coptic Church. Ibid v. 3 pp. 60-61. 
169. Musa "has extreme views in all that bears on religion and literature ... He feels that his people must 
actively take up a strong modernist orientation befitting the generation to which they belong ... Mr Musa earlier 
wrote about the theory of Evolution. But the East, and especially Egypt in whose life spirituality has such a 
respected place, reduced our author --- glory be to God --- to despair and he brought the curtain down on those 
Darwinian tenets. Instead, he plunged into spiritual reverence and a great religiosity (al-iman al-'azim) as the 
enviroment imposed ... Mr Musa calls frankly for Arab culture to be repudiated. How can you say this when you are 
always chasing after relics of the Pharaohs? And how can it be reconciled with the dedication to nationalism that 
you so vocally advocate? Is not language the very heart of nationalism?" 'Ali 'Awni, "al-Adab al-' Arabi" (Arabic 
Literature), al-Wadi 17 September 1935. 
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intellectuals now had to meet Musa' s challenge by achieving both 170. 'A wni had a rich aesthetic 
component of which the utilitarian Fabian Musa was bereft: it was essential to maintain enough 
connectedness of vocabulary to keep classical Arab writers like al-Mutanabbi intelligible, just as 
(=acculturated parallelism) Britishers continued to steep themselves in Shakespeare while 
reading Salamah's master H.G. Wells 171 • In youth, Musa and Jaridist-Siyasahist intellectuals 
together had sniped Muslim stylistic neo-classicists: from the 1930s he enragingly heightened 
their Islamoid pan-Arabism 172• Salamah Musa sometimes opposed solidarity with the "Eastern" 
Palestinians because he felt more akin to the Western modernity and scientism of the supremacist 
Zionists173 • His Coptic disciple Louis' Awad electrified Egypt's Arabist intelligentsia by 
demanding from 1947 that colloquial Egyptian replace standard Arabic as literary language ---
his atheist strategy to starve Islam174• But Musa and similar post-Christian Westernists were not 
170. 'Awni: "Arabic, which expanded to absorb and convey an ancient civilization and spread throughout 
many lands, would have the capacity to keep pace with modern civilization if only it could find people to care for it 
with the attention it met from its ancient masters. If we find that Arabic falls short of the mark, is too limited for 
modern sciences and is unfitted to keep pace with other literatures, then let us blame ourselves". Ibid. 
171. Ibid. 
172. In his book al-Balaghat al-' Asriyyah wal-Lughat al-' Arabiyyah (Education p. 80), Salamah Musa 
dismissed neo-classical high rhetorical stylism from Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i et al as a survival from long-extinct 
exploitative feudal societies: it had to replaced with functional styles that could convey Egypt's realities and the 
requirements of industrial modernity. CfGhali, Salamah Musa wa Azmat... pp. 75-80. In a mordant review, 'Abbas 
Mahmud al-' Aqqad, once a denouncer of al-Rafi 'i, wrote that the author had proven one important thing --- that he 
was not an Arab. Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat's Arabo-Islamic journal al-Risalah was as caustic: Musa's book on 
Arabic had only once more illustrated that its author had a better grasp of Latin than Arabic. Shukri, Salamah Musa 
wa Azmat... p. 75. 
173. Writing in al-Majallat al-Jadidah in early 1934, Musa described the future as "dark, indeed grim, for. 
the Palestinians, for the number of Jews in the month of last January reached 245,000 --- 63,000 of them having 
migrated to there in the last two years". Musa had no illusions about Zionist motives: the Jews were "using all 
modem scientific and economic means to achieve sovereignty for themselves over the Palestinians". Yet, as a 
modernist, he could not but admire the futuristic energy with which the Zionists were building cities, founding 
factories with an international export market and "tilling the land with modem machinery which has enabled them to 
dispense with the Palestinian peasant". He did not much like the Palestinians, whom he stereotyped as "stagnant, 
clinging to their Eastemism which must inevitably inflict defeat upon them before the modern methods with which 
the Zionists are dealing with them". a1-Majallat al-Jadidah editorial of March 1934. 
174. Carter cited' Awad's ideologically systematic call to make the colloquial the literary language ---
which would harm only Islam's priests, not Islam proper --- in his introduction to his 1947 Plutoland, a collection of 
poems he wrote in dialect. In much franker remarks in a private interview to her on 29 February 1980, 'Awad said 
that he had wanted such use of the colloquial to snap access to Islam, and usher in a secular society. Carter, Copts in 
Egyptian Politics pp. 120-121. Although mainly directed --- if discreetly --- against Islam, Plutoland contained a 
colloquial poem in which he denied there was any God in even fifty heavens above to hear him, and offered to 
trample underfoot any church to which he was led: "Khamsin sama fu' rasi/Ma fiha min ilah yisma' li/Iddini ay 
kanisah/Adusha taht na'li". Hilmi Muhammad al-Qa'ud, "Luwis 'Awad: Usturat al-Ta'assub wal-Hiqd al-Aswad---
Aw al-Tamarrud al-Rafid li-Hadaratina al-Islamiyyah" (Luwis 'Awad: the Legend of Fanaticism and Black 
Malevolence --- Or, the Insurrection to Eliminate Our Islamic Civilization), al-I'tisam (Cairo) June 1990 p. 29. As 
editor of al-Ahram's literary page under Muhammad Husanayn Haykal, 'Awad had published post-Islamic 
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representative of the non-radical temper of the Coptic middle classes: and their later Coptism 
was hyper-militant to compensate for its on-off quality175• They were inconsistent, not carrying 
the elimination of standard Arabic components through even in their own prose. Salamah, 
though mainly modernist, benefitted from some classical Arab authors' styles and lauded 
classical Arab science (B 479 fn 158). 
Copts who contributed to pan-Arab identifications in the 1930s and 1940s included the 
Wafdist leader Makram 'Ubayd, inspired by a blend of (a) his unusual self-cultivation of 
classical Arab literature, (b) the viabilty a wider Arab entity might give the capitalism his haute 
bourgeoisie was constructing and (c) to increase regional bargaining power vis-a-vis the British. 
Overall, the Coptic 10% of Egyptians influenced the Muslim Egyptian intellectuals' 
particularism more than their developing Arabism. Had M-E writers taken greater pains to 
secularize Arabism they might have been able to draw the Copts more into it. 
THE CLASS CONTEXT OF SOME INTELLECTUALS 
The Muslim intellectuals we will sample did not formulate their supra-Egyptian identities 
on a high cultural Mount Olympus uninfluenced by the social realities below. Their connections 
to often increasingly well-off Arab-Egyptian classes sometimes orientated, heightened, or 
moderated the range of supra-Egyptian drives they articulated. 
The economic solidity of most of the writers and politicians analyzed must be stressed. 
Their families were able to finance higher educations that would qualify them for leading 
positions in society. It is true that the British recruits and resident Europeans increasingly 
blocked the graduates from entry into the professions up to 1918; still, our writers and orators did 
not often come from those more embattled neo-bourgeoisifying families whom Cromer's 
tightness knocked out of the education game176• Kamil --- although his father, as an engineer, 
non-metrical poetry. al-Qa'ud argued that' Awad's evocation in the late eighties of Christian influences upon the 
blind sceptical Syrian poet Abul-' Ala' al-Ma'arri showed a residual self-identification as Christian. Ibid pp. 31-32. 
175. Salamah Musa's rather ambivalent and tense relationship with the educated Coptic class that produced 
him has been reconstructed by Vernon Egger, A Fabian in Egypt: Salamah Musa and the Rise of Professional 
Classes in Egypt. 1909-1939 (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America 1986). Musa's woolly-headed 
socialism, radicalism an~~atheism were in aggregate unacceptable to his conservative class; after he 
became editor of the CopfiC compensated with an aggressive hyper-communalism that some Copts feared invited 
attacks in a period in which the parliamentarist order was breaking down. Carter, Copts in Egyptian Politics pp. 
297-8. 
176. Cromer contracted a sector that could have bourgeoisified when he slapped tuition fees on primary 
was one not a 
a bourgeois' sons 
Ummah Party that al-Jaridah supported. But wealthy Arab-Egyptian landowners were 
in its leadership and an even more conservative influence was dependence on donations from 
wealthy Turco-Circassians178• In contrast, Lutfi, al-Jaridah and Hizb al-Ummah sometimes 
opposed that declining non-Arab aristocracy. Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, whose transition after 
1930 from pan-Islamism to a narrowed Arab linguistic nationalism we examine in Chapter 10, 
does not seem to have had too affluent a rural family background and had to teach for years 
before attempting higher education in France. Taha, his class-friend at al-Azhar, was somewhat 
better off. Yet, whatever their often woolly hankerings for more social justice, both men 
associated for decades with the magazines and newspapers of first the Ummah Party and then its 
post-1922 successor, the Liberal Constitutionalists, both dominated by Arab-Muslim Egyptians 
with huge hereditary landholdings. Such intellectuals were bound to --- Haykal was a member in 
--- a rich social group that, whatever its egalitarian-sounding Araboid ethnic motifs (Liberal PM 
Muhammad Mahmud's nativism 1939 an 'Alid Prince excluded rich 
Arab-Egyptians: B 307-9), wanted to keep other classes separated and under hegemony lest they 
wrest away property179• The future Liberal leader, Muhammad Mahmud, while still a member of 
the Wafd mass independence movement, refused to share accommodation with another (but only 
bourgeois) Wafdist on the ground that he "was not a member of his social class" 180• (For the class 
schools, and took other measures, to thin out those who only took primary school certificates and entered 
government service at a junior level. Tignor. British Colonial Rule p. 324. 
177. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party: 1892-1919", in Holt, Political and Social 
Change p. 312. 
178. Goldschmidt clearly regards Kamil's Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) as more diverse than the 
al-Ummah Party founded shortly before September 1907 from wealthy notables, senior officials and intellectuals. 
Nonetheless, the limited class base of al-Hizb al-Watani identified it as "not truly a national party" although it did 
successfully mobilize the small Muslim urban middle class. "The formal leadership of the party came mainly from 
wealthy beys and pashas at first, but a number of younger members prominent in the Nationalist press and other 
activities were elected to the 1911 administrative board. The overall picture invites comparison with the W afd". 
Lack of funds, and British repression, prevented the Party from carrying on the outreach to the urban proletariat and 
peasantry begun under Kamil's successor, Muhammad Farid. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 333. 
179. Discussing the declaration of the al-Ummah Party on 21 September 1907, Bayyumi notes that many 
a'yan saw party activity as a means to advance their class interests against the growing number of small landholders 
who were competing socially and economically. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani p. 41. Smith would see Haykal, but 
not all Jaridists and Ummah members, as fitting into some such paradigm. Islam and the Search pp. 45-47. 
180. Ahmad Zakariya Shilliq, Hizb al-Dusturiyyin al-Ahrar. 1922-1954 (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif 1982) p. 
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antagonism of Arab-Egyptian peasants to his father during the 1919 independence movement, B 
5 f12). 
It is true that the pre-1918 al-Hizb al-Watani independence movement of Mustafa Kamil, 
the most extensively analyzed in Book 1, drew members and support from a variety of urban 
petty-bourgeois as well as richer strata, towards its end mobilizing even some urban workers and 
peasants. The post-World War 1 Wafd was a diverse mass nationalist movement that retained 
participation from a range of ideological groups and classes up until Nasir' s 1952 military 
revolution --- yet the petty bourgeois populist component in its upper leadership quickly got 
assimilated into the landowner class after 1922, softening its struggle against Britain (B 5-7; 
1933 bombastic spectator-solidarity with Syria B 164; 1942 entrance of cabinet imposed by 
British tanks B 140-141). 
The party of Liberal Constitutionalists and the intellectuals around their mouthpiece, 
al-Siyasah on whom Book 2 focuses, were successors of Hizb al-Ummah (and al-Jaridah) in 
personnel and the continuing rural kibar al-'a'yan class core. Both newspapers/parties claimed 
leadership over Egypt with an abrasive elitism fed by class as well as the highly-educated 
acculturation of some of their publicists. The pre-1918 Kamilists and then the Wafd reached out 
to a wider range of classes than al-Ummah and Haykal's post-1922 Liberals: yet their 
educational formation as Francophone lawyers --- watertight legal briefs as the path to 
independence---, and class stakes in evolution, made the Kamilist founder-leaders oppose 
violence against the British by youth militants181 • Most intellectuals whom we analyze would try 
109. al-Siyasah used to refer to the moneyed background of the landlord-financier founders of the Liberal 
Constitutionalists Party as a qualification for political office in contrast to plebeian, almost-socialist, Wafdists who 
had to degrade politics into a commerce because it was their only means to get bread to eat. They were the 
cigarette-butt collectors who had stumbled into Egyptian political life. Ibid p. 108. The Party of Liberal 
Constitutionalists under the monarchy was viewed as a structure through which the rural kibar al-a'yan maintained 
their interests vis-a-vis the peasants and the urban-based Wafd, in Hamied Ansari, Egypt: the Stalled Society (New 
York: SUNY Press 1986) pp. 70-78. 
181. Instead of insurrection, Mustafa Kamil urged the Khedive 'Abbas to restore a constitution and 
parliamentarism as the pathway to independence: it might prove hard for the British to stop a real legislative 
assembly from scrutinizing all new regulations and laws given the promises with which they had justified their 
Occupation. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani p. 103. Muhammad Farid, Kamil's successor as Patriotic Party leader, 
similarly urged' Abbas to restore the 1881 Constitution as a transitional basis for a parliamentary system that would 
lead to independence, as against Gorst's containment-strategy of expanding the powers of provincial councils. Ibid 
p. 104. When Ibrahim al-Wardani, a Europe-educated Hizb al-Watani activist, assassinated pro-British PM Butrus 
Ghali in 1910, it underscored that at least the most frustrated secret societies around the Party were lurching to 
revolution. Gorst and Kitchener made violence likely by hounding the Watanists into exile. Ahmad Mukhtar, a 
student at the military academy in Istanbul, smuggled issues of the magazine al-Oisas ("Vengeance") --- which 
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out various forms of lobbying and appeals in and to Europe first: only when desperate would 
they trigger the action by the masses that could devastate property. 
Hizb al-Ummah/al-Jaridah and the Liberal Constitutionalists/al-Siyasah instance the 
tenacious growth and drive for political power from the 1850s to today of the Arab-Egyptian 
a'yan landholding stratum. This rural class skilfully white-anted and survived Nasir's fleeting 
Arab socialism182• After their 1882 conquest, the British long maintained a quasi-monopoly of 
the Turcophone element in the Egyptian cabinets. But the American Civil War that starved 
Europe of cotton made the capitalist transformation of Egypt's agriculture irreversible: its further 
integration into the world capitalist market under British rule made many rising Arab-Egyptian 
landowners rich. Egypt's role as a cotton producer made the developing rural-based 
Arab-Muslim (and Coptic) elite dependent upon the European states: it was in their interest to 
moderate their drive for independence so as to maintain exchanges with Westerners. Sharp 
fluctuations of cotton prices on the world market, though, gave the new elite reservations about 
Europe, further deepened by the audibility of European anti-Muslim racism as education 
trilingualized183• These factors contributed to the ambivalence and resentment of the al-Jaridah 
and al-Siyasah intellectuals towards all imperialist powers, their alternation of 
accommodationism and Islamoid militancy towards states almost determined to expose and 
destroy the very Arab elites that sought partnerships. (Eg. Siyasahists' fury that Britain/the West 
set up explosions between Arab masses and Zionists over Palestine in 1929 and 1947-1948 --- B 
133-135; B 203-206). 
Egyptian historians 'Asim al-Disuqi and Ahmad Shilliq have shown that large 
landowners of Haykal' s class were prominent among those who invested in industrialization and 
the creation of a modem Egyptian private enterprise, commerce and banking --- through, for 
instance, the Bank Misr, closely linked to the Party of Liberal Constitutionalists184• This 
called for terrorism against Britishers and extolled al-W ardani --- back into Egypt. Mukhtar belonged to a secret 
society in Istanbul headed by Shaykh 'Abd al-' Aziz Jawish, enemy of Party leader Muhammad Farid. Bayyumi, 
al-Hizb al-Watani p. 118. Farid was uninformed about, and non-responsive to, the "terroristic" and socialism-tinged 
al-Oisas: Farid, Awrag pp. 88-89. 
182. Hamied Ansari, Egypt: The Stalled Society (New York: SUNY Press 1986) passim. 
183. Ibid pp. 61-69. 
184. Shilliq, Hizb al-Dusturiyyin al-Ahrar pp. 112-114. 'Asim al-Disuqi subsumed Egyptian 
industrialization under the wing of the landowning class in his major archival study Kibar Mullak al-Aradi 
al-Zira'iyyah wa Dawruhum fil-Mujtama' al-Misri 1914-1952 (Cairo 1975). al-Disuqi drew his extensive evidence 
from a study of memberships of boards of directors and from information on capital investment. Peter Gran, 
"Modem Trends in Egyptian Historiography: A Review Article", IJMES v. 9 (1978) pp. 369-370. 
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extending Arab-Egyptian class elite was early intent to control the urban working class like the 
peasants, but with constructive paternalism. al-Jaridah noted wild-cat worker militancy185 but 
Haykal called for the workers to be given the right to strike: they had to be made subordinate 
partners in the same way that Bismarck and German governments had offered improved 
conditions and welfare186• Building an Egyptian capitalism required development of a numerous, 
skilled and satisfied industrial proletariat, and pan-Arab markets beyond Egypt. From 1930, 
Haykal used Arab-Islamic nationalism to contructively thread his neo-capitalist elite, Egyptian 
workers and poor who had to be reconciled, and the outside Arabs. 
SOME INTELLECTUALS ANALYZED IN THESIS 
1. Period of British Colonial Rule (1890-1919) 
'Abduh. Muhammad (1849-1905). Born in a Nile Delta village. Formal education was 
traditional-Islamic: received degree of alim (Islamic scholar) from the al-Azhar mosque 
university in 1877. 'Abduh became a disciple of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in 1872 and in 1880 
editor of al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyyah (Egyptian government's official gazette), in which he 
advocated reforms. Involved in 'Urabi's movement to free Egypt from foreign control; exiled by 
185. An example of the paper's capacity for relative even-handedness about the new urban class-struggles 
was SC editor Yusuf al-Bustani's "Munawashat 'Ummal al-Atram --- Munawashat al-Bulis wal-Junud" 
(Provocations of the Tramways Workers --- And Those by the Police and Troops), al-Jaridah 3 August 1911 p. 4. 
Having virtually given up hope that official France could be lobbyied into ejecting Britain, Muhammad Farid, 
Kamil's successor, opted to activate the urban working class by fanning trade-unionism. Tignor, British Colonial 
Rule pp. 303-304. The repeated strikes alarmed some SCs. In November 1910, the Cairo correspondent of the 
Bayrut Lisan al-Hal wrote that a perusal of the Hizb al-Watani press, especially al-Balagh al-Misri, confinned the 
consensus that that "political nationalist movement" had whipped up a recent wave of strikes that included some by 
the railway workers and those of the Tramways Department workshop. Almost every issue of al-Balagh al-Misri 
came out "bulging with petitions and complaints from the workers or the employees and threats to go out on strike". 
"Murasalat: al-Qahirah: li Mukatibina fiha, fi 6 minhu" (Dispatches: Cairo: By Our Correspondent There: the 6th), 
Lisan al-Hal 11November1910 p. 2. Cf Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watanip. 80 for Watani-fannned worker unrest into 
World War 1. 
186. Haykal was as aware as the Lisan al-Hal correspondent of the element of pathos in strikes by 
poverty-stricken trade-unionists who would be unable to keep feeding their families: "the Worker is weak because 
his powers of resistance are confined to his resolve and persistence in pressing his demands: if he pursues them for 
too long in a strike, he may harm or lose his life. In contrast, the only loss the financier suffers is a material one. 
That is why the law now has to invest the workers with enough strength to achieve a partial parity with the business 
magnate by conceding the right to assembly and to strike". Haykal, "Himayat al-'Ummal" (Protecting the Workers), 
al-Jaridah 9 August 1911. Haykal was writing from Europe where he was studying for three years; his article 
showed a fair knowledge of French and German trade union movements and trade union legislations and early 
governmental social services in the united Germany. 
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conquering British from Egypt in 1882. Taught at Islamic college in Bayrut for three years 
(pan-Islamizing, Ottomanizing, pan-Arabizing milieu). In 1884 Abduh helped al-Afghani to 
publish from Paris the anti-colonialist journal al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa. In 1888 returned to Egypt 
where he began judicial career: in 1899 with British help became Mufti of Egypt. Served on 
Legislative Council advocating long-term legal and educational reform and short-term 
collaboration with Britain. In British-occupied Egypt, 'Abduh published Risalat al-Tawhid 
(Essay on God's Oneness) and an historically pan-Arab polemic on Islam's inherent superiority 
to Christianity in receptivity to science and civilization. Died 11 July 1905 Alexandria. 
al-Afghani. Jamal al-Din 0838/1839-1897). Persian Shi'ite born in As'adabad near 
Hamadhan in Persia. Formal education: Islamic. Educated in youth in Arabic medium in 
Karbala' and al-Najaf, Shi'ite centers in 'Iraq (Arab-centerizing linguistic and cultural milieu). 
Lived in Egypt from 1871 to 1879, where he inspired Christian Syrian disciples Salim 
al-Naqqash and Adib Ishaq to bring out the newspapers Misr (1877) and al-Tijarah (1878) as 
forums for anti-despotic, anti-imperialist ideas; expelled by Khedive, in 1884 he brought out the 
pan-Islamic journal al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa from Paris to hit British colonial rule in Egypt and 
India. His periodization of Islamic history offered an initial Arab-led golden age liable to foster 
pan-Arabizing tendencies in Egyptians. 
al-Nadim, 'Abdallah (1844-1896). Monolingual disciple of al-Afgahani. Became, as an 
incendiary journalist and mass orator, the spokesman of 'Urabi's constitutionalist movement in 
the lead-up to Britain's 1882 Occupation. Remained in hiding until caught in 1891 and exiled. · 
Allowed to return by Khedive 'Abbas and published anti-British al-Ustadh from August 1892 to 
June 1893 when Cromer reexpelled him. Orientated precocious young Mustafa Kamil before 
driven out. Assessment: Linguistic, historically Arabist nationalist, although Egyptian territorial 
frame still strong. 
Farid. Muhammad ( 1868-1919). Born Cairo of Turkish descent. Educated at Egyptian 
Law School, achieving active spoken and written French, although unlike Kamil without 
studying in Europe. Initially worked as a translator for the law department of the Khedivial 
estates, then transferred to become a deputy attorney general at the Court of Appeal. Wrote 
extensively in magazines al-Adab and al-Mawsu'at on such subjects as British and French 
expansion in Black Africa. After Mustafa Kamil' s death in 1908, Farid succeeded him as leader 
movement. 
on a strove to 
workers, encouraging strikes, through cooperatives peasants. 
continental Europe and Ottoman Empire by repression under Proconsuls Gorst and 
Kitchener. Lobbied continental governments and built nationalist movement among Egyptian 
students in Europe. Assessment: transition from (a) Egyptian patriotism and pan-Islamism to (b) 
pan-Arab political nation separate from the Turks. 
Kamil, 'Ali Fahrni (1870-1926). Acculturating, non-Islamic, non-traditional education. 
Born and died in Cairo. Educated there at the School of Languages and at the Military Academy, 
'Ali Fahrni became an Egyptian army officer. His nationalist principles brought him into 
collision with the British who stripped him of his rank and interned him. Translated Juliette 
Adam's 1922 L' Angleterre en Egvpt into Arabic and long publicized Egypt's cause in articles 
published in French in France. Assessment: Bilingualized Muslim nationalist whose 
acculturation went with, or fostered, strong pan-Islamic aid for the Muslim Ottoman Empire. 
'Ali, Sayyid (1880-1932). Intensively acculturating or bilingualizing formal education, 
and residence abroad. After secondary school he worked as a translator 
al-Liwa'. He studied at Cairo's French Law School. When Mustafa Kamil established 
L'Etendard Egyptien 1907 he appointed Sayyid 'Ali to translate excerpts from the Arabic 
press into French for publication. Sayyid 'Ali went to Paris to be correspondent of al-Liwa' 
there in 1907. For his synthesis of puritanical neo-Islamic and West European bourgeois 
attitudes to women and the family: A 156-157. Assessment: bilingual acculturated Muslim 
Egyptian who presented favorable images of general Europe as benign, and wanted 
Egypto-Muslim life-styles to be adapted to modern Europe's patterns, long after most 
pan-Islamic Kamilists rejected the West (not just Britain, Egypt's occupier) as hostile to 
Muslims. 
Kamil, Mustafa (1874-1908). Non-traditional West-derived formal education in 
government and European French-medium schools. To support right of eighteen-year-old 
Khedive 'Abbas to change his Prime Minister without consulting British Consul-General, 
Mustafa at eighteen led student demonstration in front of office of pro-British daily al-Muqattam. 
In 1894 obtained licence in French law from University of Toulouse. In 1894 returned to Egypt 
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and became leader of the Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) founded by former 'Urabist Latif 
Salim. May 1895: funded by the Khedive 'Abbas, Kamil sailed to Paris to lobby France and 
other European governments to force Britain to evacuate the Nile Valley. On 2 January 1900, he 
launched his independent daily al-Liwa', widely read by secular-stream Egyptian students and 
professionals. 'Abbas financed it but Kamil was now developing independent base among 
student and professional classes. 1906: Kamil greatly stimulated angry reactions among 
Egyptians against Britain's bullying of Ottoman State over the borders of Sinai (the Tabah crisis) 
and against her repression of peasants of Danish way. 1907: Kamil proclaimed al-Hizb al-Watani 
(Patriotic Party) but died aged only 34 on 10 February 1908 before he could lead Egypt to 
independence. Assessment: Acculturated pro-Ottoman pan-Islamist --- but neo-classical 
Arab-centric in his view of Islam's past and culture. 
Hilmi. Ahmad (1875-1936). Purely Arab-Islamic (and restricted) formal education; but 
learnt French from urban milieus and self-education. He was born in February 1875 in Cairo's 
Khan al-Khalili bazaar quarter, the son of a merchant named Hasan al-Mahdi, who sold clothing 
there but died before the baby was born. Hilmi was sent to Khan Ja'far maktab (Islamic primary 
school) in Cairo and this was all the formal education at any institution that he received. 
However, he learned French from working for a private company in cosmopolitan Alexandria 
and, paralleling the acculturated-professional pattern, became a government clerk. Ahmad Hilmi 
often functioned as senior staff writer of the Kamilist independence movement's daily al-Liwa' 
(founded 1900), up to 1908. For a time he was editor of the Kamilist al-Qutr al-Misri. He 
served a period in prison when the British revived the Press Law in their crackdowns following 
Cromer's retirement, an experience recorded by him in his book al-Sujun al-Misriyyah fi 'Ahd 
al-Ihtilal al-lnglizi (The Egyptian Prisons in the Era of the British Occupation), published in 
Cairo in 1911. Assessment: Hilmi's strikingly quasi-secular, pragmatic stances and 
Europe-derived community ideas checked the pan-Islamic drives of his Kamilist milieu. 
Lutfi al-Sayyid. Ahmad 0872-1963). Father an 'umdah who was a rich landowner. 
From 1906-1915 edited al-Jaridah, daily mouthpiece of the Ummah Party of rural landlords. 
Termed "Teacher of the Generation" for formulating a comparatively secular if Muslim-led 
Egyptian Nationalism, for translating Greek philosophical works into Arabic, and for his salon in 
which many younger intellectuals such as Taha Husayn, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, 'Abdallah 
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'Inan and' Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini before 1915 received their first ideological and political 
orientation. After World War 1, took part in Wafd and its lobbying for independence in Paris. 
Became Professor of Philosophy at Cairo University and then Rector, serving it for 20 years. 
Zaki, Ahmad (1867-1934). During British colonial rule, acculturated high official and 
".Khedive's man" who popularized the classical Arabs in the Egyptian press and imposed 
extended forms of their language in government. See biodata section 2. 
Intellectuals Active in the Independent State (1922-1952) 
'Azzam, 'Abd al-Rahman (1891-1971). Acculturating formal education: completed 
government secondary school under British colonial rule, incomplete tertiary medical studies in 
London. Kamilist youth activist and pan-Islamist: at the age of around 21 went to fight with 
Ottoman forces against Italy in Libya, with Ottoman forces in Balkans. 1924: elected deputy of 
W afd in Egyptian parliament. 1939: Minister of Islamic Religious Endowments (Awqaf), 
1939-1940 Minister of Social Affairs, in collaboration with King Faruq (reigned 1937-1952). 
First Secretary-General of the League of Arab States 1945-1952. Acculturated pan-Arab and 
pan-Islamist. 
Haykal, Muhammad Husayn (1888-1956). De-Arabizing English-medium and 
French-medium primary, secondary and tertiary education in Egypt and France. Born 1888 son 
of a wealthy Arab-Egyptian 'umdah or village headman who was technologically innovative in 
his farming. Attended secular government schools from the age of seven at height of British 
campaign to impose English as medium of education and government. Obtained doctorate in 
Law from Sorbonne'in 1912. While in Paris 1909-1912 wrote Zaynab, the first novel in Arabic 
about Egyptian rural life. In 1922 Haykal was a leading founder of the Party of Liberal 
Constitutionalists, politically incrementalist ("moderate"), being opposed to Wafd' s socially 
disruptive populist struggles against Britain's presence in "independent" Egypt). Haykal also 
edited the party's daily, al-Siyasah, the forum of radical-secular-liberal thought in the 1920s. 
Isma'il Sidqi (ruled 1930-1933) banned al-Siyasah and its weekly literary supplement on 2 
February 1931; al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah came out again in January 1937. 1935: Haykal 
published Life of Muhammad in accord with wide pan-Arab reaction in Egypt against West and 
particularist Egyptian identity. When his party's leader Muhammad Mahmud died in 19411 
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Haykal succeeded him and led Liberal Constitutionalists into the coalition that ruled Egypt 
1944-1949; he was president of Egyptian Senate in these years. Haykal was Minister of 
Education 27 April 1938 until 12 August 1939. Assessment: despite acculturation a recmTently 
Arab-orientated sectional westernizer. 
Husayn, Ahmad (1911-). Formal education: secularizing, West-derived secondary and 
law studies in medium of French as well as Arabic. Tertiary education: graduated in 
Europe-derived law from Cairo University's Faculty. Ahmad Husayn began political activity as 
representative at the Law Faculty of the "Egyptians Buy Egyptian Goods" League founded by 
the secularist Copt Salamah Musa. 1933: Husayn founded Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt 
movement or party), which called for a secular Pharaonic particularist nationalism open to all of 
Egypt's Arabic-speaking sects: Muslims, Copts and Jews. Islamization and pan-Arabization of 
his ideology: in 1940 the Young Egypt party changed its name to the National Islamic Party,· 
which demanded reapplication of Islamic law and zakat, abolition of interest-banking and usury 
and pan-Islamic support for all movements against imperialism in the Muslim countries. After 
the U.N. General Assembly's recommendation in November 1947 that Palestine be partitioned, 
Ahmad Husayn participated with Hasan al-Banna, Salih Harb and Muhammad 'Abdallah in "the 
Nile Valley Committee" to rescue Palestine. Husayn sent the Mustafa al-Wakil brigade of 
Young Egypt Volunteers to fight with the Palestinians against the Zionists. After World War II 
Ahmad Husayn renamed his party "the Socialist Party": it shifted sharply leftward, calling for 
Islamic socialism to limit landownership to 50 feddans, the overthrow of Egypt's capitalists and 
monarchy, and a United Arab States. Assessment: The Francophone Ahmad Husayn evolved 
from a secular-territorial Egyptian Pharaonic nationalist into an Islamist pan-Arab. 
Husayn, Taha (1889-1973). Formal tertiary education: both traditional Islamic (al-Azhar: 
and extreme acculturating, bilingualizing tertiary education in France. Born in a small Upper 
Egyptian town in 1889. Taha studied Arabic language and grammar and other Islamic religious 
sciences for ten years at al-Azhar. Attended lectures at the secular Egyptian University 
1908-1914, submitting doctorate (in Arabic) on classical Syrian Arab poet Abul-'Ala' al-Ma'arri 
in May 1914. From 1914 to 1919 studied French, Latin, Greek, sociology, history and Roman 
Law at the Sorbonne, and submitted a doctoral thesis on Ibn Khaldun there. 1919: on his return, 
Taha was appointed Professor of Ancient History at Fu'ad I University, and popularized ancient 
poetry, a basis exegesis: this raised controversy that the 
Isma'il Sidqi government exploited to dismiss him from his office of Dean of the Faculty of Art~ 
at Cairo University. A Liberal Constitutionalist and al-Siyasah contributor in the 1920s, Taha 
was a Wafdist from the early 1930s. As adviser to the Ministry of Education 1942-4 and Wafdis 
Minister of Education 1950-2 he founded Alexandria University and mass education in Egypt. 
Assessment: post-Muslim Westernizer and multi-lingualizer but maintaining the classical Arabs' 
old literary language as the identity-marker when joining the West. 
al-Hakim. Tawfiq (1899-1987). Born into a well-to-do family, his mother being of 
aristocratic Turkish descent. After studying Law at Cairo University, he went to Paris to 
continue his legal studies, but instead devoted most of his time to the theatre. On his return to 
Egypt in 1930, he worked for the Ministry of Justice in a rural area, as well as for the Ministry of 
he. 
Education in Cairo. However,~resigned in 1936 to devote himself to writing novels, stories, 
essays and plays, becoming the Arab World's greatest playwright. Developed Haykal's linking 
of popular Egyptian life and a "spiritual" --- anti-Western? --- Pharaonic golden age. 
West-steeped anti-Western, anti-Arab neo-Pharaonist in early 1930s who later moderately 
Islamized. 
Zaki, Ahmad (1867-1934), Bilingualizing formal education in France-derived law, 
bilingualizing professional life in government and service of the Khedive, reinforced by 
extensive travel in Europe and regular interaction with scholarly Europeans in Egypt. Graduated 
with Law Diploma in 1887. 1889-1922, government career: translator then (1897) Second 
Secretary, then (from 1911) General Secretary to the Egyptian Council of Ministers (Majlis 
al-Nuzzar). From 1906 Zaki was the Khedive 'Abbas' Master of Ceremonies. He used his 
official positions to drive out Turkish and European loan-words from official correspondence, 
imposing rigorous neo-classical Arabic, and to get Ministry of Education funds to publish old 
classical Arabic texts (from 1911). Zaki was briefly General Secretary of the (old) Egyptian 
University when it opened in 1908 in Cairo where he lectured about pre-Islamic and Umayyad 
classical Arabs. Commenced his life-long glorification of Arab Andalusia in Egypt's Arabic 
press from his first visit to Spain in 1892. On his "retirement", from government service, in 1922 
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Zaki embarked in his full-time, public career as a prolific popularizer of the classical Arabs' 
ancient history and literary relics in Egypt's daily press, and as an early pan-Arab politician. In 
Palestine in 1930, argued Muslims' legal title to al-Buraq-Wailing-Wall shrine in testimony 
before the League of Nations Inquiry that followed the September 1929 clashes between Zionist 
settlers and Palestinians. Leading founder January 1922 of "the Eastern League" (al-Rabitat 
al-Sharqiyyah) that drew Egyptians out from particularist nationality to supra-Egyptian 
pan-Islamic and pan-Arab communities. Zaki and his hospitable home were a nexus of social, 
intellectual and political interaction between Egyptians and non-Egyptian Muslims and Arabs, ui: 
to his death in 1934. Assessment: acculturation-stimulated pan-Arab and pan-Islamist: his 
images of past and present supra-Egyptian Arab or Muslim communities served, or adjusted to, 
the needs of facing the dominant West. 
al-Zayyat. Ahmad Hasan (1885-1968). Born in village of Kafr Damirah, al-Daqahliyyah 
governate. Formal education overwhelmingly Islamic-traditional: from before turning thirteen, 
he studied at al-Azhar mosque-university for ten years (1898-1908). He and Taha Husayn were 
friends and brother-rebels against traditionalist Muslim scholasticism at al-Azhar. With Taha, 
al-Zayyat while at al-Azhar came into contact with acculturated anti-pan-Islamic Ahmad Lutfi 
al-Sayyid and Europe-orientated milieu around his newspaper al-Jaridah. Linguistic Francifying 
milieu: before World War I, al-Zayyat taught Arabic (and, necessarif;,, mastered French) for 
seven years in the French-medium Catholic missionary school at al-Khurunfush, Cairo. In 1914 
he transferred to a secondary school founded by' Abd al-Aziz Shawish (anti-British, Kamilist, 
pan-Islamic milieu): from it published anti-British pamphlets during 1919 national uprising. 
al-Zayyat lectured in Arabic literature at Baghdad Teachers' College 1929-1933. 1933-1953 
edited al-Risalah in Cairo. October 1949 elected to the Academy of the Arabic Language 
(Cairo). During Jamal' Abd al-Nasir's military revolution, al-Zayyat edited Majallat al-Azhar 
(learned journal of al-Azhar). Died 1968. Pan-Arab. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY PAN-ISLAMISTS' LEGACY TO LATER 
ACCULTURATED INTELLECTUALS IN EGYPT 
Inquiries and arrangement of the Chapter 
This Chapter examines a group of pioneering anti-imperialist intellectuals who in youth 
steeped themselves in classical and traditional Arab-Islamic thought and culture: they politicized 
it and formed the crucial bridge over which it passed to later Europeanizing-educated 
intellectuals formed under the British occupation, such as Mustafa Kamil, Muhammad Farid, 
'Abd al-Rahman' Azzaro and Muhammad Husayn Haykal. 
Jamal al-Din al-"Afghani" (1838/1839 - 1897) was Iranian-born, not an Egyptian or 
Arab. However, he was bilingual in Arabic as a result of his youthful education in 'Iraq's Shi'ite 
centers of Karbala' and al-Najaf; he resided from 1871 to August 1879 in Egypt, where he 
fanned local constitutionalism and republicanism, and in 1884 he issued from Paris the 
anti-British Arabic magazine al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa that to a great extent addressed Egyptians 
under British colonial rule. Muhammad' Abduh (1849 - 1905), a native Egyptian, graduated as 
'alim from al-Azhar in 1877, and became al-Afghani's disciple in 1872. He was implicated in 
'Urabi Pasha's rebellion of 1882 and exiled, and in 1884 collaborated with al-Afghani in the 
publication of al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa. In 1888 the British allowed him to return to Egypt and 
commence a judicial career: he was Mufti of Egypt from 1899 to his death in 1905. The chapter 
examines views expressed by' Abduh that would predispose Egyptians to supra-Egyptian 
Arab-Islamic political communities: his persistent international pan-Islamic anti-imperialism, his 
Araboid definition of the ethnicity of Egypt's Arabic-speaking Muslims, above all his evocation 
of the wide classical Arabs, centered outside Egypt. The third traditionally-cultured pan-Islamist 
examined is' Abdallah al-Nadim (1844 - 1896). An Egyptian disciple of al-Afghani, al-Nadim 
participated as an incendiary mass-orator in the movement by the Constitutionalists and 'Urabi 1. 
1. On 9 September 1881, 'Urabi led the march by Egyptian troops on' Abidin square that forced the 
Khedive to change prime ministers. Extolling al-Nadim' s effective exhortation of the soldiers on that day, 'Urabi 
described him as "my most dear, brave friend". Najib Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim: Khatib al-Thawrat 
al-'Urabiyyah (Cairo: Mak:tabat al-Kulliyyat al-Azhariyyah 1970) p. 120. A judicious overview of al-Nadim's role 
in 'Urabi's constitutionalist movement as orator, organizer of mass demonstrations and editor of the anti-foreign 
al-Ta'if was given by Gilbert Delanoue, '" Abd Allah Nadim (1845-1896): Les Idees Politiques et Morales d'un 
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Following the 1882 British conquest of Egypt, he wandered the Delta in various disguises for 
nine years until he was captured and the British exiled him. Briefly allowed back before Cromer 
had him re-expelled, al-Nadim from August 1892 to June 1893 published the anti-occupation 
weekly al-Ustadh. We assess from this journal al-Nadim's contribution to identification with the 
supra-Egypt classical Arab past, to the development of linguistic nationalist drives and to 
contemporary supra-Egyptian Arab or Islamic communities among new secularizing-educated 
intellectuals. 
1: AL-AFGHANI: ANTI-IMPERIALISM SPOTLIGHTED CLASSICAL ARABS 
While living in Egypt between 1871 and 1879, al-Afghani fanned constitutionalist and 
social discontent against the' Alid monarchs Isma'il and Tawfiq. However, his Arabic 
journalism and oratory already charged the British with expansionist imperialism2, although they 
were to conquer Egypt only in s·eptember 1882. That development made the 1884 al-'Urwat 
al-Wuthqa the peak of al-Afghani's life-long activism against the British empire. The need for 
an indigenous source or inspiration for international strength and resistance was now bound to 
make al-Afghani and' Abduh reexplore the classical Arabs and their early Islam because their 
greatness had been so many-faceted. Their swift, globe-circling conquests and military prowess 
could restore the fighting morale of Muslims facing conquest or colonial rule. But classical 
Arabo-Islamic civilization, further, uniquely patterned the blend of intellectual and technological 
openness and military-political impenetrability towards aliens that these modern Muslims 
needed. 
al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa did not denounce ongoing expansion at Muslim expense by France 
and Russia, whose aid al-Afghani and colleagues courted to dislodge Britain from Egypt and 
India3: their efforts prefigured later much more acculturated, sophisticated, bonded lobbying for 
Journaliste Egyptien", Institut Francais (Damascus), Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales v. 17 (1961-2) pp. 89-94. 
2. The journal Misr, the launching of which al-Afghani had inspired, in August 1878 published a 
denunciation by him of Britain's rule in India and her past and present designs on Afghanistan. Nikkie Keddie, 
Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani": A Political Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972), pp. 
102-103. As his relations with the new young Khedive Tawfiq deteriorated, al-Afghani, according to a left-wing 
French journalist present, rebuked Tawfiq to 4,000 people in a Cairo mosque for serving British ambitions in Egypt 
and called upon the Egyptians to revolt to save Egypt's independence. al-Afghani was expelled from Egypt shortly 
thereafter in August 1879. Elie Kedourie, al-Afghani and' Abduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political 
Activism in Modern Islam (London: Frank Cass 1966) pp. 29-30. 
3. Of the European powers, al- 'Urwat al-Wuthqa attacked only Britain by name: yet its generalized 
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aid by Mustafa Kamil and his followers in Europe (Chs. 3 and 4). As Britain's conquests and 
colonial repression demoralized the Muslims of India and Egypt, al-Afghani-' Abduh calculatedly 
exulted in 1884 that the early (Arab) Muslims, although few and ill-equipped, conquered a 
world-wide empire that stretched from the Pyrenees to the Great Wall of China, within only 
eighty years. They flattened mountain peaks under their horses' hooves, replacing them with 
mountains of the skulls of those who had rejected their rule4• Thus, the two political activists 
manipulated images of mighty classical Arabs to repair the confidence of their conquered 
Egyptian and Indian Muslim readers. It checked contribution from this theme to Arab national 
consciousness among Muslim Egyptians that al-Afghani also mentioned other later Muslims ---
Turks and Persians --- as conquerors5• Other Muslim peoples --- and the definition of Muslim is 
now so inclusively ecumenical --- can substantially duplicate the classical Arabs' international 
military might because Islam produced it, rather than the Arabs' human attributes. Islam's belief 
that God predestined the affairs and fates of human beings was what made the Muslims almost 
discussions of the Muslim need for military strength through unity could equally apply to French or Russian 
imperialism. In the articles attacking British imperialism that he published in Egypt while there between 1871 and 
1879, al-Afghani praised French rule in Algeria, which had made its people so much happier than the Indians. He 
also eulogized the contributions of French personnel to West-patterned higher education in Egypt since the time of 
Muhammad 'Ali. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani" pp. 102-103. Kedourie charged that al-Afghani was a 
French and then Russian agent: Afghani and 'Abduh pp. 39-40, 56-57. It is to be noted, though, that in 1882 in 
Calcutta, al-Afghani had equated France, which had just "seized Tunisia" with Britain that from India now 
threatened Afghanistan: "the Europeans" were taking over "every part of the world". Keddie, An Islamic Response 
to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (Berkeley: University of 
California Press 1968) p. 102. al-Afghani and his colleagues may have hoped to manipulate France and Russia to · 
dislodge Britain from Egypt or India (Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din pp. 221-223) but al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa left no · 
doubt that the French government was faint-hearted (parliament less) when international opportunities came for 
self-assertion over Egypt. "Injilitarra wa Faransa" (England and France), al- 'Urwat al-Wuthqa wal-Thawrat 
al-Tahririyyat al-Kubra (Cairo: Dar al-' Arab 1956) pp. 325-328; "al-Ittifaq" (The [Anglo-French] Agreement), ibid 
pp. 329-332; for a more hopeful assessment "Injilitarra wa Faransa", ibid p. 404. al-Afghani's disciple al-Nadim 
very bitterly attacked French colonialism in Tunisia a decade later in his magazine al-Ustadh. 
4. "al-Qada' wal-Qadar" (God-decreed Predestination), al-Urwat al-Wuthqa pp. 53-54. 
5. "al-Nasraniyyah wal-Islam wa Ahluhuma" (Christianity and Islam and Their Followers), al-'Urwat 
al-Wuthqa p. 27. Islam's fundamental aim is supremacy, military might, and conquest. The Muslims should be the 
premier military nation (millah) in the world ahead of all others in invention of weapons, and in study of the 
sciences that sustain military supremacy --- physics, chemistry, geometry/engineering (al-handasah) etc. Ibid, p. 26. 
al-Afghani or' Abduh undoubtedly would have placed the widely-conquering Ottoman Turks, who terrified Europe, 
among the Persians and Turks (as well as Arabs) who conquered many kingdoms. Yet their orientation towards 
early salafi Islam here again strongly draws their historical vision back to "the Muslims in the youth of their 
religion". The article thus cites Turkish Muslim conqueror Mahmud of Ghaznah, son of Sebuktigan, who invaded 
India seventeen times between 1001and1026. The weak later' Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad encouraged the 
conquests of the virtually independent Mahmud; he is a late classical, not post-classical, non-Arab Muslim. The 
article approvingly cited Mahmud's use of artillery against Indian pagans and (non-Arab) Muslim leaders' use of 
artillery-like fire weapons agains the Crusaders. Ibid p. 27. 
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suicidally fearless in "the early days of their emergence" (fi awa 'ili nash' atihim) so that they 
vanquished mighty states6• To prove that religion, especially Islam, was the transforming force 
indispensable to establish ethics, justice and civilization among human beings, al- 'Urwat 
al-Wuthqa pointed to "the [classical] Arab Nation" (al-Ummat al-' Arabiyyah). Before Islam it 
was "among the most immemorially savage, cruel (hardhearted) and uncouth of nations": then 
transforming Islam "raised [it] up to the highest stages of wisdom (al-hikmah) and civilization in 
the shortest period"7• 
Despite some supra-Muslim utilitarian leaven8, al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa was interested in the 
classical Arabs less for their own human virtues or accomplishments than as the nation that 
exemplified the strength Islam could enable any believing group to achieve. The followers of 
Mustafa Kamil, up to World War 1, would long maintain al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa's sense of the 
Arabs as a prototype of Islamic creativity that Ottoman Turks as well as Egyptians or Arabs 
could now fulfil in modernization. 
Classical Arabs Validate Borrowing 
al-' Afghani and' Abduh's yearning for indigenous military and political strength that 
could beat off the Western powers was shifting the gravity of Muslim history back to the 
classical Arabs with their universalist states. That Islam propelled the Arabs up to al-hikmah, the 
6. "al-Qada' wal-Qadr", al-'Urwat al-Wuthga pp. 49-53 for al-Afghani and' Abduh's argument that 
Predestination (al-gada' wal-gadar) sustained the early Arab Muslims in their sweeping international conquests. The 
article distinguished Islam's gada wal-gadar from non-Islamic or at best heretical doctrines of al-jabr (determinism): 
that God compels human beings to carry out their deeds in an absolute way that would leave them no volition. No 
extant sect of the Muslims --- (incorporatively) comprised of Sunnis, (Twelver) Shi'is, Zaydis, Isma'ilis, Wahhabis, 
Kharijites --- believes in such a will-sapping fatalistic doctrine. Ibid pp. 51-52. In its sharp awareness of European 
stereotypes (fatalistic Muslims) and deep need to refute them, this 1884 item of al-Afghani and' Abduh was already 
acculturated after a fashion. 
7. "al-Ta'assub" (Fanaticism), ibid p. 43. 
8. al-Afghani's article on Predestination does suggest a utilitarian, relativist interest in political by-products 
of religious belief --- cohesion, international military might --- for themselves. In fact, just before he exalted the 
conquests that Islam's tenet of predestination motivated the classical Arabs to undfalce CUrwat, pp. 53-54), 
al-Afghani implied that traditions other than Islam had somewhat parallel beliefs that would similarly motivate their 
followers to conquer. Even the "ignorant" person who denied that a Creator initiated cause and effect recognises 
predestination when he admits the effect of natural phenomena upon human will. Some (atheistical or agnostic 
political?) sages of the Westerners congently argued the reality of Predestination. Ibid p. 52. From the origins of 
human society in remotest pagan antiquity, belief in Predestination has been the indispensable precondition for 
conquest, needed to free the conqueror from fear of death before battle: Napoleon Bonaparte was the most tenacious 
believer in it. Ibid pp. 55-56. For al-Nadim's recognition of post-Christian ideologies in the West and its 
nationalisms, fns 81 and 161. 
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height of "wisdom", though, was terminology that evoked the post-conquest symbiosis of (a) 
Islam and Arab elements with (b) philosophy and sciences borrowed from the ancient Western 
and other non-Muslim civilizations under the' Abbasids. The 'Abbasid Caliph al-Ma'mun (r. 
813 - 833) created a Bayt al-Hikmah (House of Wisdom) in Baghdad to systematically bring out 
Arabic versions of Greek philosophical works. al- 'Urwat al-Wuthqa itself was clear: 
[The Arab Nation's Islamic] religious law and teachings motivated it to seek diverse 
sciences/arts [funun] ... They transferred into their own territories the medicine of 
Hippocrates and Galen, Euclid's geometry, the astronomy of Ptolemy, the wisdom of 
Plato and Aristotle. Before the religion's impact, they had no inkling of such things9• 
Thus, the pristine model Islam that al-Afghani and 'Abduh imaged in 1884 prescribed 
that "every" Muslim "nation" (ummah) assimilate as one condition for Islam's sovereignty the 
best achievements of all human minds. The Muslims had to seize and then originally develop 
not only sciences and techniques of utility for strength and well-being but distinguished 
speculation by non-Muslims about existence. The classical Arabs had thus far best achieved this 
synthesis in Muslim history --- which validated learning from, while resisting, modem 
Westerners. 
The challenges from the West were thus shifting historical focus backwards from later 
non-Arab Muslims and Egypt's late Sunni traditionalism to the classical Arabs, in al- 'Urwat 
al-Wuthqa. Blending might and incorporationist rationalism, the classical Arabs both (a) fitted 
into adoption of Western technologies and liberal political systems for strength to resist 
imperialism and (b) could reverse a deculturizing Westernization turning the new elite that had to 
direct the borrowing into collaborators with imperialism10• Later acculturated Egyptian 
9. "Madil-Ummah wa Hadiruha wa 'Ilaju 'Ilaliha" (The Past and the Present of the Nation and How to 
Treat its Ailments) al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa p. 21. In this Arabic article, al-Afghani concentrated on applied Greek 
sciences as the object of classical borrowing. In an 1882 lecture in Calcutta to Indian Muslims, he spelled out that 
philosophy was the crucial motive for the Caliph al-Mansur's program of translations of Greek scientific texts into 
Arabic. In this Indian set of his communications, the philosophical outlook founded by the classical Arabs now 
required Muslims to concentrate on assimilating the sciences of the modem West. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din 
"al-Afghani" pp. 161-165. 
10. Keddie faulted al-Afghani for not setting out to Arabs and Muslims in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa the 
immense technological, scientific, economic, political and educational advances that their societies would have to 
carry out in order to really dislodge or hold back the Western states. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal al-Din "al-Afghani" pp. 
226. We could contrast at least this Arabic journal of al-Afghani to much more detailed argumentation for adoption 
of the West's sciences and modem mechanical civilization in his Persian-language essays and speeches to Indian 
Muslim audiences: writing from a princely state of South India in 1880-1881, he was aware of --- and mentioned 
along with railroads and photography --- phonographs or telephones only just invented in the far-away USA in 
1876-77. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism pp. 121-122. However, al-Afghani had already written of 
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intellectuals whom we examine repeatedly refer to the classical Arabs' assimilation of Greek 
thought, earlier argued by al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa, some (Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Taha 
Husayn, Tawfiq al-Hakim) obviously to justify assimilating sectors of modern Europe's 
Greek-originated civilization, but perpetuating the non-Egyptian classical Arabs' definitiveness, 
too. 
Particularization-Retarding 
al-Afghani and 'Abduh's presentation of Islam's past in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa ran against 
the crystallization of national political consciousness framed within Egypt. The periods they 
glorified were the earlier ones in which wide Arab (but also possibly other post-classical 
Muslim) empires most tightly controlled Egypt. Because their concern was international strength 
against the West, the indigenous past that al-Afghani and' Abduh favored was the far-extending 
but administratively integrated Rashidi, Umayyad and 'Abbasid empires. al-Afghani and his 
Egyptian disciple denounced the emergence of alternative provincial power centers, and then the 
break-up of the 'Abbasid Empire, as initiating the disintegration of the Muslim millah's "body" 11 
which finally led to the situation in which Britain could conquer the Egyptians, Persians and 
Afghans one by one without meeting co-ordinated resistance12. This strongly identified the 
classical Arab Muslims' intellectual creativity with the political unity of their empires. The 
process of disintegration and weakness that made the Muslims colonizable began when the 
temporal authority, the Caliphate, ceased to promote knowledge ('ilm: religious learning, 
science}, and original opinion (ijtihad) in religious matters. From Islam's third century, divisive 
doctrines multiplied, and the unity of the Caliphate broke up into three states: the 'Abbasid based 
in Baghdad, the Fatimid in Egypt and North Africa, the Umayyad in Spain. The consequence 
was that "the wo of the ummah was split up ... Caliphate degenerated into monarchy, losing the 
phonographs and telephones as well as Western republicanism and constitutionalism in Misr (Alexandria) in 1878. 
Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani" p. 91 fn. In 1884, al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa's tenor throughout was that sources of 
Western strength had to be urgently duplicated, although the focus was more on the West's military technology than 
in al-Afghani's other Arabic and Persian publications. For al-Afghani-' Abduh's concern that the 
Westernizing-educated elite in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire had to have a coherent political identity so that they 
would apply their modern functions to maintaining the interests of the indigenous community, as it faced 
imperialism: "Madil-Ummah wa Hadiruha ... ", al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa pp. 16-19. 
11. "Inhitat al-Muslimina wa Sukunuhum wa Sababu Dhalik" (The Decadence of the Muslims and their 
Passivity: the Reasons) al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa. 
12. Ibid p. 31. 
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passages al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa 
imaged as the archetype for an indigenous polity wide but organically undivided Islamic states in 
which Arabs and Arabic dominated and Egypt was a province. al-Afghani conditioned Muslim 
Egyptians in the later independence movement of Mustafa Kamil to deplore as fragmentation 
changes in the 'Abbasid empire that enabled leaders resident in Egypt to wrest autonomy or 
independence and keep more money and resources at home (A 187-188). The internationally 
mighty early empires lanced back at the British were all centered outside the land of Egypt in 
Mecca, Damascus and Baghdad. It braked the development of Egypt-centered historical 
consciousness, which was to crystallize only in the 1920s. Indeed, in over-asserting after 1922 
that later Egypt-centered states produced Arabic literature or intellectualism or international 
might equal to Baghdad's (Book 2), temporarily particularoid intellectuals such as those around 
al-Siyasah never shook off al-Afghani and' Abduh's reverence. 
Language and Arabness 
As a Persian bilingual Arabic since his youthful studies 'Iraq's Shi'ite centers14, 
al-Afghani was emotionally bound to the classical Arabs and to the 'Iraq they had ruled. The 
pre-Islamic peninsular Arabs had composed fine heroic poetry but their nomadism, irreligion and 
failure to produce coherent political states or intellectual life had little appeal to him. 
In some formulations, al-Afghani did move closer to commitment to the Arabs as a 
13. Ibid p. 34. A decade later, and in Egypt, al-Nadim reinforced that the later decentralization and 
disintegration of the 'Abbasid Empire led to intellectual and cultural stagnation. The Arabs established freedom of 
thought: it was with the break-up of the large Muslim states that "those [rulers] in rebellion proceeded to kill the 
scholars and burn books and destroy schools so that the light of Eastern sciences was snuffed out and the kings of 
the East constricted the writers" (=scholastic Sunnism?). "Bi-ma Taqaddamu wa Ta'akhkhama wal-Khalqu 
Wahid?" (By what Things did they Achieve Progess and we Fall Behind When we and they were Created Equal?), 
al-Ustadh 29 November 1892 p. 348. 
14. Even during his career as a pan-Islamist in the Sunni world, he was known there to have done his 
formative higher studies in 'Iraq's Shi 'i holy cities of Najaf and Karbala': "his writings and lectures [showed] 
knowledge of the tradition of Islamic philosophy, particularly of Ibn Sina ... more easily come by at that time in the 
Shi'i schools, where the Avicennian tradition was still alive, than in those of Sunni Islam". After this formation in 
classical Arab texts that validated borrowing from non-Islamic sources much more than those offered in Sunni 
institutions in the Middle East, al-Afghani, still young, moved to India. There "he acquired ... his first knowledge of 
the sciences and mathematics of modern Europe". Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 
(London: OUP paperback 1970) p. 108. 
most came 
1 
as to rational life. God-revealed Islam, despite 
Persian origin, defended the Arabs, arguing creative, decisive contribution to classical 
Islamic civilization against Renan's racist attribution its achievements to subjugated Aryan 
peoples, especially the Persians. Against Renan's disparagement of the capacity of Semites for 
creative and rational thought, he argued that the Arabs had demonstrated "their natural love for 
sciences" and following their conquest of their Islamic empire quickly assimilated and developed 
such originally foreign sciences as Philosophy. At points, al-Afghani addressed Renan's own 
racial world-view: to argue the Arabs' creativity he enumerated leading Islamic scientists and 
philosophers of Arabian provenance or descent. At another point, he showed an impulse to 
challenge Renan's assumption that races could define nationalities or intellectuality. Islam's 
rational sciences in Arabic and racially non-Arab thinkers who produced them, al-Afghani 
argued, belonged to "Arab civilization" because it is the language used, not racial origins, that 
determines the group or culture to which individuals feel that they belong. The Arabs can claim 
the racially Iranian Ibn Sina (Avicenna), and Spain-resident Islamic philosophers of mixed 
descents, so long as the French claim Mazarin and Napoleon. al-Afghani also argued the Arabs' 
racial capacity for scientific and rational thought from the also Semitic Syriac-speaking 
Christians' capacity for it he stressed their close interactions, especially intellectual, with the 
classical Muslim Arabs15. 
al-Afghani's theme that fluidly-bordered languages weld each nation or a coherent 
civilizational community around it, from many races, was to be crucial in the development of 
pan-Arab linguistic nationalism in Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s (Chapters 9 and 10: esp. 'Abd 
al-Rahman 'Azzam and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat). 'Abdallah al-Nadim a decade later (1892) 
was to tighten --- and already applied to contemporary history --- al-Afghani's 1883 theme that 
15. Translation of al-Afghani's 1883 reply to Renan in the Journal des Debats in Keddie, An Islamic 
Response to Imperialism, pp. 181-187. Discussion of the controversy by Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 120-123. 
Cf. Kedourie, Afghani and Abduh pp. 41-45 polemically charging that al-Afghani was chiming in with, rather than 
refuting, Renan's hostility to Islam. In refutation ofRenan's racism, the Indian Syed Ameer Ali in a 1922 work 
threw together a preliminary list of classical Muslim writers and thinkers of peninsular Arabian racial descent. Ali, 
The Spirit of Islam (London: Christophers 1935) pp. 482-485. Ameer Ali was a recurring source for Islamic 
apologetical themes by Muhammad Husayn Haykal and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in the 1930s and 1940s. 
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an adopted language of formal discourse attaches to its nation individuals from various racial 
origins. 
Overall, al-Afghani in 1883-1884 offered a body of images from classical indigenous 
history suited to suggest a contemporary wide pan-Arab nation. That application to 
contemporary history and politics, however, came later and from others. In 1883, al-Afghani 
mentioned in the Paris L'Intransigeant intrigues by the British to establish an Arabian Caliphate 
at Mecca at the expense of the Ottoman Sultan's authority16. Keddie at least considered the 
possibility that al-Afghani, at odd points anyway, worked for some such scheme, and with the 
new Egyptian Khedive 'Abbas, in the period 1883-189517• 'Abbas Hilmi did unceasingly fan 
such unrest in Arab West Asia until the British deposed him in 1914 (Chapter 5). However, 
al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa did not give its classical Arabo-Islamic identity elements any 
contemporary application divisive for the Ottoman State, the last core for Muslim sovereignty18. 
The Supra-Arab Pan-Muslim Sphere 
al-Afghani's calls in this period for unity and simultaneous Muslim uprisings and 
resistance to the British Empire over much of the globe was not a context that encouraged him or 
16. al-Afghani, "le Mahdi", L'Intransigeant 11December1883, reprinted Kedourie, Afghani and Abduh 
pp. 80-81. The passage shows al-Afghani's sharp awareness that many peninsular and other Arab subjects of the 
Ottoman State wanted a Caliphate vested in a member of the Prophet's Arab Quraysh tribe. Thus, the Ottoman 
Sultan could not sap any future Arab uprising, perhaps to be sparked by some sweeping success of the Sudanese 
Mahdi, by citing his status as a sort of Caliph. al-Afghani specified that Britain intended to set up as a mock-Caliph 
one of the Banu 'Awn family, of which a member was currently Sharif of Mecca, as the means to impose their · 
domination on the Muslims. Ibid. 
17. Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani" pp. 211-212, 261-262; An Islamic Response to Imperialism 
pp. 30-31. Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in 1946 viewed al-Afghani, his ideological master, as in his final Istanbul period 
encouraging not just the democratization of the Ottoman Empire but its division into autonomous "khedivites". 
al-Zayyat, "Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: Nahiyatun min Jihadihi" (Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: an Aspect of his Holy 
Struggle), written for al-Risalah 11 March 1946; Wahy al-Risalah v. 3 (Cairo: Maktabat Nahdat Misr, 1963) p. 59. 
Cromer later believed that al-Afghani influenced the young Khedive 'Abbas --- who met him in Istanbul in 1895 ---
to start Arab Caliphate subversion against the Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid. Elie Khedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs and 
Other Studies (London: Cass 1974) p. 108. 
18. For argumentation that Islam had obliterated divisive national loyalties, leading Muslims to accept 
political rule by Muslims from other national groups, see "al-Jinsiyyah wal-Dinayat al-Islamiyyah" (Nationality and 
the Islamic Religion), al- 'Urwat al-Wuthqa pp. 9-12. Yet, years later, while supporting the Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid's 
pan-Islamism, al-Afghani proposed a restructuring of the Ottoman Empire to take more account of the special 
position of its Arabs. The Empire had to give up indefensible Balkan territories altogether, make the Arab provinces 
semi-autonomous "khedivial states", adopt the language of the Qur'an as an official language overshadowing 
Turkish, create a "capital of Islam" in Baghdad, and invite Iran, Afghanistan and Muslim India to attach to the 
Empire in a pan-Islamic union. The Caliphate would remain vested in the house of Osman. Hisham Sharabi, Arab 
Intellectuals and the West: the Formative Years 1875-1914 (Baltimore: John Hopkins 1970) p. 123. 
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his disciples to differentiate Muslim nationalities or homelands. The model classical Arabs' 
sphere of conquests and rule encompassed almost the whole Islamic area visualized by 
al-Afghani and he made clear in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa that Persian- and Turkish-speaking 
Muslims had conquered far beyond defined territorial units. 
While interweaving all Muslim populations, the somewhat "utilitarian"19 al- 'Urwat 
al-Wuthqa could in the same appeals highlight proto-elements for much later Arab, Iranian and 
Turkish nationalisms if only to help improvise very specific coalitions of Muslim groups against 
imperialism (Britain). A cultural semi-fusion of Persians with Arabs under classical Islam was 
countered by stress upon a separate contemporary Persian linguistic zone in the article "Call for 
the Persians to Unite with the Afghans". It tried to convince the antagonistic Shi'ite Persians and 
Sunni Afghans to ally against the British in India. al-Afghani enumerated fundamental 
contributions by at least proto-Sunni Persians in Arabic to mainstream Islam in its definitive 
classical period: it was right for them now to "renew the Islamic unity" with Islam's majority 
Sunni community (the Afghans most urgently) against imperialists20. 
Awareness of massive contributions by Persians to Arabic literature under classical 
Islam, in the twentieth century was to contribute, for example, to Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat's 
preparedness in the 1930s and 1940s to associate Persians and Afghans with a pan-Arab political 
confederation (Ch. 10: B 291-297). But al-Afghani also conveyed to his Egyptian/Arab readers 
19. The decidedly unaesthetic SC Farah Antun did not have even his master Renan's feel for the language 
and past of the classical Arabs. Yet Antun, from American exile in 1906 after his controversy against 'Abduh on 
Ibn Rushd, finally came to sense this-wordly, ultra-political, rather West-shaped sectors, far from traditionally 
orthodox, in those pan-Islamists' relation with Islam. By 1906, Antun was writing that al-Afghani had been using 
the Islamic religion as a "means" to negatively resist Europe (although thereby incapacitating the resistant 
population from absorbing its strength-conferring science). al-Afghani's utilitarian or pragmatic (naf'i) drive to 
maintain religion as "the thread holding together the social system" threatened religion itself. The fundamentalist 
secularist Antun, though, still equated Islam with passivity: al-Afghani's call would sap all will among the Muslims 
to modernize and enable the men of religion to keep exploiting them. Haydar Hajj lsma'il, al-Mujtama' wal-Din 
wal-Ishtirakiyyah: Farah Antun (Bayrut: np. 1972) pp. 29-30. 
20. Breaking down his Arab and other Sunni readers' automatic equation of Persians with Shi'ism, 
al-Afghani mentioned among "those whom the lands of Iran produced" the authors of six classical hadith collections 
canonical for Sunnis. (However, he also mentioned Muhammad Tun Ya'qub al-Kul, Iranian compiler of a purely 
Shi'ite collection). He also characterized many classical grammarians of Arabic as Iranian: "the people of Persia 
were among the first to serve the Arab tongue and found its genres of literature". He further represented as "Iranian" 
such major contributors to classical Arab high literature as Abul-Faraj al-Isfahani (b. 897 in Persia but of pure Arab 
race, d. 967) who assembled Kitab al-Aghani a compendium of pre-Islamic Arabian, Umayyad, and 'Abbasid songs, 
poetry and social life and Badi' al-Zaman al-Hamadhani (968-1008) who originated the semi-dramatic maqamat 
"assemblies" genre. "Da'wat al-Furs ilal-Ittihad ma' al-Afghan" (Call for the Persians to Unite with the Afghans), 
'Urwatpp. 106-110. 
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post-classical thinning of Arabic as a second learned literary language, dividing the modern 
Muslim world into several language spheres. He distinguished (a) "the lands of the Arabs" , 
where Arabic remained a daily spoken or literary language and al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa had its 
direct audience from (b) another sphere --- Persia, Afghanistan, India (and Central Asia?) --- in 
which people understand Persian although the native tongues of the different peoples vary21 . The 
Afghans will readily respond to any call to Islamic unity from the Persians, and not only for 
linguistic reasons: the Afghans and the Persians are both of "the ancient Persian stock/origin 
(asl)" --- together, they could duplicate the strength German nationalism brought when it united a 
people similarly enfeebled before when they let a secondary sectarian difference within one 
religion divide them22. 
al-Afghani's sometimes transitional Arabic writings greatly sharpened awareness of 
modern or contemporary Afghan, Iranian, Turkish and Indian Muslims among Egyptian and 
Arab Muslims. His attacks on the pro-British Indian Muslim educationalist Sir Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan, a modernist theologian whom al-Afghani branded a "materialist"23 , at least introduced 
Egyptians to a sector of India, a composite Hindu-Muslim country that was to focus important 
dilemmas of acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals. 
21. "Da'wat al-Furs ... " p. 106. al-Afghani had a realistic understanding that only a limited number in the· 
sphere of Persian read Arabic well, yet it sufficed to relay al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa by proxy, since Persian papers 
(Ittila', Firhang) published translations of al-'Urwat's anti-imperialist articles. Ibid. With less realism, the 
Egypt-resident Syrian Christian Jurji Zaydan (1861-1914) viewed the Arabic language as an established instrument 
of communication that united "the Easterners in India, Persia and Turkistan, in addition to Iraq, Syria, Egypt, the 
Arab countries". Thomas Philipp, "Language, History and National Arab Consciousness in the Thought of Jurji 
Zaydan (1861-1914)" IJMES v. 4 (January 1973) p. 10. 
22. "Da'watal-Furs ... ",pp. 106, 109. 
23. For denunciation of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his Westernizing, collaborative school of Muslim 
modernists as a tool of the British, see "al-Dahriyyuna fil-Hind" (The Materialists in India), al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa pp. 
383-387, translated in full by Keddie in An Islamic Response to Imperialism pp. 175-180. Kedourie argued 
(Afghani and Abduh p. 36) that al-Afghani's attacks on Sir Sayyid in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa and elsewhere lacked 
ideological content: he objected more to Sir Sayyid's political collaboration with the British than to his heterodox 
modernism that resembled his own. Kedourie's and --- for a time, Keddie's --- speculation that al-Afghani had 
naturist and West-influenced views akin to, and influenced by, those of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, were refuted by 
Aziz Ahmed, "Afghani's Indian Contacts", Journal of the American Oriental Society v. 89 (1969) p. 489. For a 
bitter warning to the newly conquered Egyptians of the poverty to which the British had reduced Indian farmers and 
urban workers, "Tasarruf al-Injiliz fil-Hind" (The Conduct of the British in India), al- 'Urwat al-Wuthga pp. 289-291; 
'Urwat articles were translated in Urdu journals, "al-Suhuf al-Hindiyyah" (The Indian Press), ibid p. 275. 
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2: MUHAMMAD 'ABDUH: RESTORATION OF THE CLASSICAL ARABS WITHIN 
ASSIMILATION OF WESTERN CREATIVITY 
After 1882 al-Afghani more often narrowed his appeals to Arab audiences down to 
pan-Islamic self-defence: he thenceforth advocated adoption of the West's political institutions 
and sciences more in generalized language. In contrast, 'Abduh after he came to terms with the 
British and returned to Egypt in 1888, centered his publications and activities around (a) 
constructive reforms in part patterned on the modernity of Western societies and (b) the revival 
of aspects oflslam and the classical Arabs that could be synthesized with that modernity. 
'Abduh too, however, further catered to the needs of the bullied small acculturated elite 
solidifying under the British by discreetly weaving in --- and developing --- muted, distilled, 
themes from the old rage against the West in al-Afghani's pan-Islamism. 
We now examine' Abduh's replies, published in 1902 in Rashid Rida's al-Manar, to the 
secularizing Syrian Christian Farah Antun's observations about Ibn Rushd (Averroes): echoing 
Renan, these had characterized Islam and past Islamic government as hostile to science, in 
contrast to the greater scope that Christianity gave science because it separated the temporal and 
religious authorities24• From Ibn Rushd --- the very rational-scientific Arab-Islamic golden past 
that al-Afghani and 'Abduh had so long evoked25 --- Antun justified "materialist science" to 
Muslim Arabs as the only basis for social progress26: al-Afghani and his followers had only 
24. Antun set out his views on Ibn Rushd and Islam in several articles in his Alexandria magazine 
al-Jami'ah. These were published with revisions as Ibn Rushd wa Falsafatuhu (Alexandria: 1January1903). The· 
controversy was discussed by Hourani, Arabic Thought pp. 253-259 and by Charles C. Adams, Islam and 
Modernism in Egypt (London: OUP 1933) pp. 89-90. We cite' Abduh's Islam-centric counter-characterizations of 
Ibn Rushd and classical Muslim philosophy in this final semi-official period of his life from the collection al-Islam 
wal-Nasraniyyah ma' al-'Ilm wal-Madaniyyah (Islam and Christianity Vis-a-Vis Science and Civilization), with the 
comments of Rashid Rida, who edited al-Manar in which 'Abduh published his replies to Antun (Cairo: Muhammad 
'Ali Subayh & Sons, n.d.). 
25. The orientalist perspective on Muslim philosophy, as it stood by the late 1980s, had veered to' Abduh's 
old Islamic characterization of Ibn Rushd and away from Renan' s (and An tun' s) dichotomization. E.I.J. Rosenthal, 
who edited an extant Hebrew text of Ibn Rushd's commentary on Plato's Republic, again reviewed recurring 
opposition from the dialectical theologians (mutakallimun): however, both al-Murabit and al-Muwahhid Caliphs 
were often Ibn Rushd's patrons and allies against them and he did get appointed chief qadi of Cordova, a key 
Islamic post not confined to the administration of justice. Ibn Rushd harmonized (a) the shari'ah and Islam with (b) 
philosophy and the nomos or law of Plato's philosopher-king. "There is only one truth for Averroes, that of the 
religious law, which is the same law that the metaphysician is seeking. The theory of the double truth was ... 
formulated [later] by ... the Latin Averroists. Nor is it justifiable to say that philosophy is for the metaphysician 
what religion [the Hereafter] is for the masses. Averroes stated explicitly and unequivocally that religion is for all 
three classes". Rosenthal, "Averroes'', EB 15 ed. 
26. Antun tried to use Ibn Rushd to establish an indigenous rationalist-naturalist framework within Islamic 
thought itself. Man could know God less by prayer than by research into the universe (science). Yet for Antun, 
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fostered "backwardness" by trying to found a political community upon religious unity27• Antun 
was pressing for the full integration of the minority Arab Christians into a new secular political 
community with Muslims28 . 
Colonialism: The Persisting Context 
In his responses to Antun, 'Abduh was ambivalent towards Arabic-speaking Christians 
but much more tensely divided to the West. The post-Christian Antun had swallowed the 
modern West's own evaluation of itself as liberal, secular, Progressive, although he rebuked the 
Western powers' expansionist and colonial drives29 . 'Abduh, too, prized many areas of Western 
modernity but as a Muslim had to be much more aware of the durable Christianity-focused 
anti-Muslim attitudes in its imperialism. 'Abduh's latter preparedness to coexist with the British 
regime in Egypt had only dampened down and shelved, not eliminated, the fierce resistance to 
European colonialism that he and al-Afghani had propagated from al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa. After 
1888, 'Abduh alternated two attitudes to imperialism, prefiguring the duality of acculturated 
intellectuals from his landowning,~ Arab-Egyptian background in the twentieth century: 
humanity alone is eternal and replaces God: he rejected life after death. The philosophy of Ibn Rushd was really, 
like modem naturalism, "a materialist philosophy based on science". Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals pp. 74-76. In a 
later work, perhaps partly in amends, Antun praised the classical Arabs for lifting Greek sciences and philosophy out 
of a stagnation caused by a long conflict between Rome and Constantinople over the nature of Jesus. He ascribed 
the success of the Arabs in so rapidly carving out their empire to not just their monotheism but their racial quality as 
Semites fostered by Arabia's natural environment: he cited Semite-phobe Renan but exalted the Phoenicians as well 
in relation to Inda-Europeans. Farah Antun now stressed the affinity of the Syrian Nestorians' view of Christ to 
Islam and (repeating the 1902 'Abduh) the security they enjoyed under the patronage of the Caliphs as they 
translated Greek philosophy into Arabic, making possible such later Arab philosophers as Ibn Rushd. Isma'il, 
al-Mujtama' wal-Din pp. 150-154. 
27. See fn. 19. Antun's most far-reaching critique of al-Afghani and' Abduh's ideas came some years after 
the initial controversy after he had migrated to America (1905): from there he began to publish again his magazine 
al-Jami'ah, further extending his analysis. It was only through science, not religion, that social progess could be 
made: al-Afghani's setting up ofreligious unity as the basis for social progress had led only to "increasing weakness 
... retrogression and backwardness". Sharabi op. cit pp. 78-79. Cf. citations from vol 5 (1906) of al-Jami'ah in 
Isma'il, Farah Antun pp. 28-29: Antun now was specifically rebutting al-Afghani's Refutation of the Materialists, in 
'Abduh' s translation: a text that would long color Egyptian Arabism. (For classical Arab motifs from al-Afghani's 
Refutation in 1950 resistance to Communism by Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, see B 263-266). 
28. See Hourani, Arabic Thought pp. 255-6. 
29. In his polemic, Antun was at pains to dissociate the Eastern Christians from Western missionaries and 
Western powers that misused religion for political purposes: "we are not responsible for what Western Christendom 
has done; our loyalty is to the East --- we have always been faithful to to the Sultan". Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 
259. Sharabi even views Antun as, despite his objection as a Christian to pan-Islam as the basis for political 
community, discreetly aware of its "benefit as an instrument of resistance". Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals p. 78. 
During the polemic, Antun cited, al-Nadim-like, the Crusader wars as one of many occasions in which the Eastern 
Christians had united with their Muslim compatriots to defend their joint "homelands" against Western Christian 
powers. Isma'il, al-Mujt:ama' wal-Din pp. 51-52. 
-A89 -
denunciations of it as lethal and a constrained accommodation. In the latter mode, 'Abduh 
advised the Muslims of Algeria and Tunisia during his 1903 tour to deflate tensions with their 
French rulers by avoiding politics or any attempt to set another colonial power against France 
(Mustafa Kamil courted France to dislodge Britain from Egypt). The Algerians and Tunisians 
should strive to progress by pursuing both modem-secular and religious education, with 
assistance from a French government eager to court indigenous support in Algeria in particular. 
'Abduh and his Syrian-Egyptian adherent Rashid Rida, editor of al-Manar, at their most 
conciliatory remained disguisedly hostile to France and other European powers: shunning any 
political movement did not mean that the natives should not communicate their grievances to the 
government and if it was unresponsive they had title "to wait for ill-fortune to befall it"30. A 
word of criticism in al-Manar and the French would ban that life-line's entry to the Algerian 
Muslims deprived of Arabic publications31 --- and it was certainly advisable to court more 
liberal governors in North Africa when France could be so draconian against protest. Yet 
'Abduh and Rida's salafi Islam was like the Kamilists or later acculturated Muslim Egyptian 
intellectuals --- also interested in French North Africa --- in its concern to communicate with 
better Westerners, so as to win their support against the worst: and, beyond expediency, the two 
clerics had much the same self-conscious craving to stand well in the eyes of those people who 
radiated global Progress and clout. 
Farah Antun's idealization of the secular West as patterning a de-Islamized modernity for 
Egyptians and Arabs triggered all 'Abduh's pent-up rage against Europeans that, however, he 
still kept sectionalized. In 1900 he had conducted a fierce polemic in al-Mu'ayyad against 
French historian and Foreign Minister Gabriel Hanotaux: it saw both France's violent imperial 
expansion against Muslim (but also pagan) populations and resistance by the latter as motivated 
by non-religious interests, although recording how Europeans and the Muslims they hit or ruled 
defined themselves and each other in terms of the religions32 (cf. the Young Men's Muslim 
30. Rashid Rida, Ta'rikh al-Ustadh al-Imam, v. 1 (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Manar 1931) pp. 871-874. 'Abduh is 
presented as, during his journey, working to equip and steel his Algerian hosts to resist France in Muhammad B urj 's 
much later, very nationalist, "al-Jaza'ir fi Kitabat Muhammad' Abduh" (Algeria in the Writings of Muhammad 
'Abduh), al-Asalah (Algiers) December 1977 pp. 15-23. 
31. Syrian (but Egypt-resident) pioneer pan-Arab' Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakabi (c. 1849-1902) protested 
France's refusal to allow Arabic newspapers and magazines to enter Algeria. Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals p. 99: 
"al-Kawakibi viewed the Arab nation as extending over North Africa as well as 'Iraq". 
32. Burj, "al-Jaza'ir fi Kitabat..." pp. 15-22. Hanotaux's original article in Journal de Paris in early 1900 
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Association's non-religious explication in 1930 of even French manoeuvres to detach their 
Berber subjects from Islam: B 71-72 incl. fn 45). Now, in reply to the Christian-born Farah 
Antun, 'Abduh charged that French colonialism in North Africa, motivated by "fanaticism", 
violently attacked the subjected Muslims and denied them elementary religious toleration33 . He 
assailed general Christian European imperialism around the world: Europeans, from religious 
fanaticism, violently oppressed "non-followers of the Christian denominations" in the 
Dutch-colonized East Indies, in the Transvaal State before its fall and Natal34, in Russia's lands 
twenty years back35, and in Algeria and its neighboring lands. 'Abduh denounced France's 
"cruelty against the Muslims" in the lands that it had conquered36• The English were the 
exceptional European nation that granted religious tolerance to Muslims, in return for their 
submission to colonial rule; they had learnt this tolerance from the Muslims whom they fought 
during the Crusades, although they had not yet developed it to Islam's level37. Yet 'Abduh 
had confronted Egyptian Muslims with the secularoid-Christian duality persisting in the personality of the French, as 
of other imperial peoples. On one hand, he was proud of the laicist reforms that France had achieved and dismissed 
the Muslims as inflicting backwardness upon themselves, and requiring colonization, by refusing to separate Church 
and State in the same fashion. On the other hand, Hanotaux recognized Christianity as a part of the French 
personality. Christianity's Trinity --- God's immanence in human life --- and free-will had fostered French secular 
activism in contrast to Islam's transcendence and predestination that paralysed its believers with the sense of man's 
insignificance and helplessness. Adams, Islam and Modernism pp. 86-9. Haykal would become more and more 
aware after 1922 of the persistence of Christian anti-Islamism in anti-clerical West Europeans. 
33. al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah pp. 147-149. 
34. Ibid p. 146. Afrikaner settlers in the Transvaal proclaimed "the South African Republic" in 1857. The 
British annexed the Transvaal in 1877 but the Afrikaners regained independence in 1881. War between the two 
parties broke out in 1899; the Republic became a British colony when peace was concluded in 1902. The oppression 
by Christian Europeans that 'Abduh had in mind for the Transvaal, then, would be the Afrikaners' mistreatment of 
indigenous Africans in their periods of independence. The British annexed Natal in 1843, and mainly British · 
immigrants replaced departing Afrikaners. From 1860 onwards, many Indians entered Natal to labor in its sugar 
plantations. Thus, 'Abduh by Christian-European oppression for Natal meant racial segregation and discrimination 
that the British authorities imposed upon these Indians, mostly Hindus but including many Muslims. 'Abduh' s 
denunciation of European Christian mistreatment of non-Christians in Natal might conceivably have again meant 
Africans: Britain's annexation of Zululand to Natal through the 1879 British-Zulu war. 
35. When referring to Russian ill-treatment of non-Christians twenty years before, 'Abduh may have had in 
mind the mass expulsions and flight of Cherkes and other Muslims southwards caused by Russia's sanguinary 
advance into the Caucasus and annexation of Batun, Kars and Ardahan in the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman war. The 
Ottoman government resettled many such Caucasian Muslims in Syria, where 'Abduh was exiled. Kemal H. Karpat 
"The Status of the Muslim Under European Rule: The Eviction and Settlement of the Cherkes" Journal of the 
Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jeddah, v.1:2/v.2:1 pp. 7-11. (Cf. fn 133). Or 'Abduh might have meant 
bloodshed through which Russia imposed its authority over the Central Asians, such as the Turkmens (the 1881 
Geok-Tepe massacre and the occupation of the Merv Oasis in 1884). 
36. al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah p. 146. 
37. al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah p. 149-150. The passage may have been ironical. 'Abduh did mention 
Walter Scott as one of the English writers who early appreciated the Muslims. Scott's 1825 novel The Talisman 
which depicted a relationship of respect between Richard the Lionhearted and Salah al-Din ("Saladdin") was 
translated into Arabic. R.A. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs (London: Cambridge University Press 
1 -
seems to meant segregation 
were segregation 
s Indian Muslims38 , interacted 
as Mufti of Egypt39). last years discreetly, skilfully resisted the British administration's 
progressive contraction of standard Qur'an-derived Arabic Egyptian education40• 
The later' Abduh, then, recognized Egyptian (or North African Arab) comparative 
backwardness which tutelage might benefit: but submission in the first place was because the 
Westerners commanded such devastating military strength. In areas 'Abduh mapped for 
collaboration such as education, however, the British then infuriatingly excised the 
Qur'an-derived standard literary language: they exacted depersonalization as the price for what 
modern knowledge they delivered. 
Islam and Classical Arabs Promoted Rational Thought and Culture 
In affirming that the classical Arabs had been crucial to the development of human 
science and rational thought, 'Abduh maintained Islam as the emblem of collective identity for a 
new generation of elite Muslim Egyptians with less institutional access to He himself had 
repeatedly reinterpreted Qur'anic concepts so that they corresponded to recent West European 
science and social institutions, raising the question why the secular West should not be frankly 
accepted as the source for the elite's new thought and life. 'Abduh and other Muslims in 
al-Afghani's circle had been friends of secularized Syrian Christian intellectuals, drawing on 
their stock of radical Western concepts: an undivided sects-integrative indigenous community 
relegating Islam to the private sphere would fulfil such interaction. In his reply, however, 
1956) p. 469. The translation may have been the source of a real impression in' Abduh that the English learnt 
tolerance before the other anti-Muslim nations because "the [English nation's] commanders were among those 
Crusaders with the closest relations with the Sultan of the Muslims and the commanders of [his] army". al-Islam 
wal-Nasraniyyah p. 150. 
38. Eg. "Pretoria, fi 15 Shawwal lihadrati Mukatibina" al-Liwa', 16 February 1903, which mentioned Natal. 
39. As Mutfi of Egypt (1889-1905) 'Abduh received inquiries from South Africa's Muslims about how to 
apply Islam in their difficult conditions as a depressed minority in a non-Muslim land. 'Abduh issued the famous 
"Transvaal fatwa" pennitting South African Muslims to eat food served by non-Muslims in public places. 'Abbas 
Mahmud al-Aqqad, al-Ustadh al-Imam Muhammad' Abduh. 'Ubquriy al-Islah wal-Ta'lim (Ministry of Culture and 
National Guidance: Series' A'lam al-Arab 1) (Cairo: Maktabat Misr nd.) pp. 210-211. 
40. Tarek A. Fakhrel-Deen, Abdal Rahman Shukri (1886 - 1958): An Egyptian Writer in the Age of 
Imperialism and Nationalism (PhD, New York University Press 1972) p. 158. 
to set as 
to trace spurred the 
development of science and In contrast, Christianity stressed miracles, the 
capacity of its followers to reverse natural laws at will42 • The Christians' religion thus made 
them enemies of science. Islam established no religious hierarchy that would limit freedom of 
thought: instead, it virtually separated religion and state, leaving every Muslim to interpret the 
Qur'an etc how he liked, without any intermediary43 . (Haykal repeated this amid the 
Arabo-Islamic reaction of the 1930s and 1940s, to maintain the right of his West-tinted group of 
intellectuals to interpret Islam independently in face of a somewhat more assertive Muslim 
clergy44) 
'Abduh thus fitted Islam into the modern secular West's values, facilitating a transfer of 
custodianship of it from the 'ulama' to the West-dyed secular-educated elite. 
'Abduh in 1902 made extra-Egyptian classical Arabs, particularly 'Abbasid 'Iraq, the 
definitive historical community as Egyptians borrowed from the West. Description of that 
classical Muslim entity as "the Arabs" was stimulated use of the term by Islamophile 
American and European writers whom he copiously quoted45 . All contemporary "sons of the 
Arab nation" (abna al-ummat al-' Arabiyyah) should feel his pride in those Muslims who 
41. 'Abduh, al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah, pp. 48-51, 54-55, 165-166. 
42. 'Abduh tried to document denial by Christianity of rational laws and causality from the report that Jesus 
assured his followers that one mustard seed of faith would enable them to command a mountain to move at will 
(Matthew 17:20) or cast mountains into the sea (Mark 11:23). al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah pp. 22, 165. Antun replied 
in al-Jami'ah that the Qur'an itself in surahs such as Al 'Imran, endorsed or increased the miracles noted in 
Christianity, Isma'il, al-Mujtama' wal-Din p. 49. 
43. Ibid pp. 56-57. 
44. Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt: A Biography of Muhammad 
Husayn Haykal (Albany: SUNY Press 1983) pp. 137-140. Smith sees 'Abduh and Haykal as concerned that the 
Muslims benefit from Western science. He however sees Haykal in the 1930s and 1940s as eliminating, in his 
Arabo-Islamic writings, limits on reason kept by 'Abduh and as narrowing Islam's prescriptive age down to the 
Ras hi dun (=Rightly-Guided) Caliphs whereas 'Abduh accommodated 'Abbasid intellectual Islam within the 
indigenous golden age. Yet a wider scan of Haykal' s writings would show frequent praise of the in corporative 
'Abbasid achievements 'Abduh exalted: B 106-108. 
45. Eg. description by the Islamophile American John William Draper of "the early Muslims in the time of 
the Caliphs" as "the Arabs" in al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah pp. 15-16. The ethnicizing impact on' Abduh of use of the 
term "the Arabs" by European writers, like Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931: La Civilization des Arabes, 1884), is clear 
in his discussion of "the sciences of the Arabs and their discoveries". al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah p. 86. For use of 
Draper in 1922 by a later Muslim modernist apologist to denounce the Crusaders see Ameer Ali, The Spirit of Islam 
p. 221. 
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originated the observational-experimental method and thus true science46• 'Abduh affirmed the 
Arabs' innovative creativity in astronomy, chemistry --- in which the Greeks produced not a 
single experiment, the Arabs "hundreds" --- in inventing clocks and time-pieces and in physics 
(the properties of bodies). In very cautious language, he hinted (even while denying) that some 
classical Arabs had anticipated nineteenth century Europe's theories of evolution of species. 
'Abduh's portrayal of the classical Arabs as reviving and transforming the "dead" 
sciences/knowledge that they took from the Greeks recapitulated al-Afghani's arguments to 
Renan in 188347• Farah An tun depicted Ibn Rushd as a proponent of a "materialist", scientific 
explication of the universe48 , and in consequence in conflict with Islam and the Islamic state. 
'Abduh replied that Tun Rushd and his like represented mainstream Arab-Muslim society: 
Islam's causality led its theologians (al-mutakallimun) to research medicine, the sciences of 
animals and plants and minerals49• The roundness of the world was widely held under the 
'Abbasid Caliphate, although Christianity opposed it with violence later50• Christopher 
Columbus said that the books of "Averroes" (Ibn Rushd) first suggested to him that the world 
was round and prompted his voyage to America51 . The Muslim authorities --- the Islamic 
Caliphs, kings and governments --- fostered rational philosophical and scientific enquiry and 
awarded its sages (hukama: the practitioners of hikmah) and scholars/scientists ('ulama') the 
highest degrees and positions. Shams al-Dawlah (Persian Buyid prince, d. 1022) appointed the 
philosopher Ibn Sina his wazir and personal physician, al-Farabi had a similar position with the 
ruler of Aleppo Sayf al-Dawlah Ibn Hamdan (r. 947 - 967)52; Ibn Rushd was Islam's chief qadi 
(judge) at Cordova53• The religiously sceptical blind Syrian poet' Abul- 'Ala' al-Ma'arri 
46. Ibid pp. 84-85. 
47. Section on the sciences of the Arabs and their discoveries, pp. 84-88. Even 'Abduh's slipping of 
Evolution onto the agenda, which looks so West-stimulated, was simultaneously impelled by classical Arab 
influences. The' Abbasid essayist and proto-sociologist al-Jahiz, al-Masu'di and the Ikhwan al-Safa' speculated 
evolution --- a gradual ascent of life "from mineral to plant, from plant to animal, from animal to man". Gustave 
Von Grunebaum, Medieval Islam: a Study in Cultural Orientation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1954) p. 
331. 
48. 'Abduh, al-Islam wal-Nasranivyah pp. 156-157. This long quotation from Antun gestures more than 
other formulations by him to the religious and mystical sufi emotions of classical Arabs such as lbn Rushd, and their 
modem Muslim successors. 
49. Ibid p. 164. 
50. Ibid p. 37. 
51. Ibid p. 38. 
52. Ibid p. 20. 
53. Ibid p. 14. See fn. 25. 
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(973-1057) --- beloved of Haykal and Taha Husayn --- publicly said what Voltaire and Rousseau 
never dared to say: yet the people of his native al-Ma'arrah delegated him to negotiate a peace 
with the besieging chief of Aleppo54. 
'Abduh in 1902 almost exclusively extolled figures whose intellectual language was 
Arabic and who flourished in lands and periods in which racial as well as linguistic Arabs ruled 
politically. To Egypt's East (Western Asia) he mainly mentioned lands --- 'Iraq, Syria --- still of 
Arabic speech in his day. In 1902, 'Abduh's Islamic historical consciousness was nearly 
unaware of rational-intellectual or scientific creativity by post-classical non-Arab Muslims: the 
only exception was his remark that (Turkish-speaking) Muslims in Constantinople invented 
immunization55. His Risalat al-Tawhid (Epistle on Monotheism), written in his Bayrut exile 
(1885-1888), had had stray passages that apparently criticized Persians whom even the first 
'Abbasid Caliphs --- grateful for Persian aid in overthrowing the Umayyads --- already appointed 
to high posts at court, as ministers and in government administration. Many of these Persians, 
'Abduh imaged, were only nominal Muslims who discreetly propagated preceding Iranian 
religions or irreligion, obliging the Caliph al-Mansur to order the composition of refutations of 
this zandag_ah heresy. The work similarly condemned Isma'ili esoteric interpretations of the 
Qur' an as imported by non-Arabs. 'Abduh' s ethnoid criticisms were more devices to make the 
extinct' Abbasid-period mu'tazilah free-will theologians and even Muslim philosophers who 
drew on the Greeks look orthodox and akin to at least Ash'arite Sunnism in comparison56. 
54. Ibid p. 20. 
55. Ibid p. 38. 
56. Muhammad 'Abduh, Risalat al-Tawhid ed. Tahir al-Tannahi (Cairo: Dar al-Bilal 1963) pp. 25-41. For 
'Abduh, the 'Abbasid period unmistakably was the definitive articulation of Islam. The first four Rightly Guided 
Caliphs --- locked in wars and expansion against non-Muslim enemies outside the peninsula and then political 
conflicts and civil wars between the Muslims themselves ~-- had neither the time nor inclination to go beyond the 
outward meaning of the most straight-forward Qur'anic verses while the next dynasty, the virtually pagan 
'Umayyads, simply lacked the interest in religion to promote and guide its study, with the exception of the pious 
Caliph 'Umar Ibn 'Abd al-' Aziz. 'Abduh here adapted the propaganda historiography with which the 'Abbasids 
validated their own successor-dynasty. The 'Abbasids were the first Muslim rulers he mentioned as having 
promoted systematic literature to meet the intellectual challenge from established religions of the conquered 
populations. The insistence of the early Mu'tazilites that "reason" ~be applied to all sectors of religion, even 
rites of worship, was, tut-tutted 'Abduh, "an excess in support for the line of the Qur' an" which had awarded 
freedom to thought. Having a bit each way, he alternatingly characterized those 'ulama' who defied the 'Abbasid 
Caliphs' imposition of the mu'tazili doctrine of the Qur'an's createdness as (a) over-literal adherents to the surface 
meaning (zawahir) of the Qur'an and Sunnah and (b) persecuted or martyred resisters of an "heretical innovation" 
(bid'ah). 'Abduh verbally endorsed Abul-Hasan al-Ash'ari (873-935), founder of Sunni kalam (theology), as 
holding a rational mean between traditionalist proponents of al-salaf (the first pious generations of Muslims) and 
Mu'tazilism's more unbridled subjective speculators. Ibid. 
modernists as 
were to s use Greeks-tinted 
mu'tazilism falsafah to keep open to the modernity and contain 
or liberalize Egypt's Sunni 'ulama' --- or, later, Muslim Brotherhood fundamentalists57 • Yet 
even manipulation of classical Muslim ethnicity still cumulatively ethnicized the intellectuals. 
Over the long term, 'Abduh' s heavily Arab-directed scientific-rational Muslim past would 
dispose Egyptians to an Arab national successor-community narrowed down from pan-Islam58. 
Community with Indigenous Christians. 'Abduh described in detail the 'Abbasid 
Caliphs' unstinting patronage of Syriac-speaking Christian (and some Jewish) tutors, physicians, 
astronomers/astrologers, philosophers and translators (chiefly of Greek philosophical and 
medical texts). The Caliph al-Mutawakkil granted great tracts of land to Hunayn Ibn Ishaq (808 
- 873, translator of Hippocrates, Galen, Aristotle and Plato into Arabic)59. By a funny if 
misconstruable anecdote, 'Abduh conveyed the secure familiarity of such learned non-Muslims 
with the Arab Caliphs, their patrons60. A cumulative human tradition of rational thought, 
originated independently of religions, provided a neutral common ground for Muslims and 
Christians. 'Abduh designed his portrayal of the closeness of Arabic-literate Christians to the 
57. Egyptian pan-Arab ideologues who resisted the America-allied Sadat and Mubarak regimes in the 
1970s and 1980s developed an Arabist classicism that --- very like 'Abduh so long before --- exalted Mu' tazilism as 
the first, definitive articulation of Islam's inherent rationalism, one made to defend Islam (and Arabism) in the 
'Abbasid Empire against other religions. For Muhammad 'Imarah (1982), Mu'tazilism assimilated elements in 
Greek philosophy of use to Islam as the 'Abbasid Caliphs patronized its translation: it patterned the synthesis of 
openness with ethnic-nationalist and religious self-defence that he wanted for Egypt. Mu'tazilites of non-Arab 
descent opted for Arabism and defended it against the Shu'ubis. Thus, the Mu'tazilites represented the 
crystallization of the intellectualist "national-rationalist current" in the Arab personality, linked to merchantile strata. 
Dr Muhammad 'Imarah, Tayyarat al-Fikr al-Islami (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal 1982) pp. 61-145. 
58. Antun was aware of the elements for a contemporary Arab ethnic identity in 'Abduh's writings, his 
sense that Islam could be restored if its centre of gravity moved from Turks and Persians back to Arabs. Antun 
provocatively argued that the Turks' military virtues and the culture of the Persians had revived Islam, not destroyed 
its strength, as 'Abduh perceived at odd times. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 258. However, both 'Abduh and 
Antun's terminologies for contemporary indigenous communities were very confused, inconsistent and transitional. 
59. al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah p. 18. Cf. art. "Hunayn b. Ishak al-'Ibadi" EI2. 
60. "Bukhtishu' Ibn Jibril" (d. 870; the Caliph al-Mutawakk.il's physician for twelve years) "was one day in 
the presence of the Caliph al-Mutawakk.il who seated him at his side. Bukhtishu' was wearing a silken 
Byzantine-type durra'ah (loose shift slit in front) in which was a tear. al-Mutawakk.il proceeded to chat with 
Bukhtishu', but absent-mindedly fiddling with the tear until it reached the broad area of the robe (al-navfaq). Their 
conversation continued until al-Mutawakk.il asked him: 'By what symptom do you physicians know when the 
deranged person needs to be tied up?'. Bukhtishu' replied: 'When he fiddles with the tear of the durra'ah of his 
physician until it reaches the garment's broad part we tie him up'. al-Mutawakk.il laughed until he fell onto his 
back". al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah p. 18. For this family of eminent Christian physicians under the 'Abbasid Caliphs 
see art. "Bukhtishu'" EI2. 
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intellectual and political mainstream of 'Abbasid life61 to make contemporary Arab Christians 
feel at home in some modern Arab, predominantly Muslim, successor-community. But he was 
not prepared to state that Islam no longer mattered or had never been important in indigenous 
creativity, that the public community was undifferentiated as Antun wanted. 
New Acculturated Elite Accommodated and Inducted 
'Abduh may have been right that, for all his Gallic free thought, Antun residually 
identified with Christianity as a community marker. However, it was Christianity's stubborn 
emblemic salience in Western imperialist states that now made' Abduh denounce all Western 
Christianity --- the Protestantism of the Britain that colonized Egypt and India, and the 
Catholicism that still colored imperialist France despite all laicism. He depicted the Catholic 
Lateran Council (1502) cursing all who read the philosophy of Ibn Rushd and painted a 
horrifying picture of the Inquisition's cruelties62. 'Abduh, however, in 1902 was anxious to 
disillusion Muslim readers that Protestantism was in some way better than "the Roman Catholic 
Church", was a true movement of religious reform that encouraged ordinary people to examine 
the original scriptures for themselves and created tolerance that enabled modern science to 
emerge63. (al-Afghani sometimes viewed the Protestant Reformation as having provided the 
impulse for innovations and creative competitiveness that produced the modern West and on 
occasion saw himself as Islam's coming Luther64). As al-Na.dim, a former colleague in the 
61. Other Christians mentioned by 'Abduh included Yuhanna al-Batriq whom the 'Abbasid Caliph 
al-Ma'mun appointed to direct translation of books of medicine and philosophy; Nubakht the Maronite 
astrologer/astronomer who also gained al-Ma'mun's patronage; Tiyufil Ibn Tuma, an astrologer who translated 
Homer into Syriac and wrote historical works: he received the patronage of the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Mahdi. Ibid pp. 
16-17. 
62. Ibid pp. 33-35. 
63. Ibid pp. 40-42. 
64. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Maghribi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani: Dhikrayat wa Ahadith (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif 
1948) pp. 98-100. By setting men's minds free from the Catholic clergy, Luther --- politically --- also undermined 
the authority of despots. While al-Afghani saw Protestantism as Europe's crucial transition to modernity, he also 
mentioned many other factors: borrowings from Muslims through Andalusia and during the Crusader Wars, printing, 
the circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope and the discovery and conquest of the Americas. (al-Afghani 
confirmed the misgivings of his Arab disciple al-Maghribi that the parallel religious reformation he wanted for Islam 
would entail a radical assault on traditional Islam, clerical and popular: the orthodox had made hadiths about the last 
days their fatalistic excuse not to achieve in this life). Ibid. In contrast, 'Abduh in 1902 stressed Luther's bigoted 
opposition to Aristotle, whom Muslims termed the First Teacher, and depicted Calvin burning Michael Servetus at 
the stake in 1553 over a secondary disagreement about the nature of Christ Jesus. al-Islam wal-Nasranivvah pp. 
40-41. Cf. Smith, Islam and the Search p. 16. 
of 
accounts which he 
the genocides were "the [Catholic] Church 
pouring its anger Jews and Muslims together" because of their association with Ibn Rushd's 
philosophy, which sapped Christian beliefs. It was "Christianity's persecutions of the 
Muslims and the Jews and scholars in general"65. Post-classical, modem-day dispossession of 
Muslim populations that faced Slavic and Greek nationalisms and states probably also deepened 
'Abduh' s sense that Christianity genocidally ruled out plural societies. He bitterly contrasted 
Islam's tolerance of the non-Muslims it conquered and the expulsion of all populations that 
refused baptism from "every land that a Christian nation securely conquers"66. He ascribed the 
Christians' pitiless violence to their religion, citing exhortations to slaughter non-Hebrew 
populations in the Old Testament67 . The Christian religion has always been inimical to all 
rationality and science, in East as in West (its destruction of Alexandria's Greek library and 
burning of "the Egyptian woman Hypatia"68). 
Putting the blame on Christianity for imperialism exonerated non-religious sectors of the 
West from which Arab and other Muslims now could continue to borrow. 'Abduh had placed 
the persecuted Renaissance founders of modem Western secular science next to the Muslims in 
one trench from which both, together, faced attacks from Christians. The bulk of' Abduh's reply 
65. al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah pp. 36-37. Long after' Abduh died, the impulse to at least condone Queen . 
Isabella's genocide against the Muslim and Jewish enemies still springs perennially from the heart of triumphalist 
Catholicism. There were moves by the Vatican Congregation for the Causes of Saints in 1990 to beautify Queen 
Isabella, for all her collective expulsions and auto de fe. As protests and pressure mounted from Jewish and Muslim 
groups around the world, the Vatican Pontifical Council for Christian Unity passed a resolution against the proposal. 
Debra Nussbaum Cohen, "Catholic-Jewish Relations Improved: Queen Isabella was no Saint --- Vatican", Australian 
Jewish News 5 April 1991 p. 22. 
66. 'Abduh, al-Islam wal-Nasraniyvah pp. 64-65. 
67. 'Abduh cited verses from Deuteronomy (Ch. 20), contrasting to such calls to Hebrews to wipe out 
non-Hebrew populations the Prophet Muhammad's injunction to the believers that non-Muslim subjects "have [the 
rights] that we have and [the duties] that we have" (lahum ma lana wa 'alayhim ma 'alayna). al-Islam 
wal-Nasraniyyah p. 64. However, 'Abduh was hamfisted in attempting to argue that the shedding of blood was 
incited by statements and doctrines ascribed to Jesus --- belief and unbelief would separate daughters and sons from 
mothers and fathers, Jesus came with a sword, not peace, communion was a drinking of blood, Jesus' blood would 
atone for humanity's sins. Ibid pp. 41-42, 64-66. 
68. al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah pp. 30-31. Hypatia was a "lady learned in mathematics, astronomy and 
philosophy (d. AD 415). Daughter of the mathematician Theon of Alexandira, she revised the third book of his 
Commentary on the Almagest: commentaries by her on Diophantus and Apollonius are lost. Influential in 
Alexandria as a teacher of the pagan Neoplatonist philosophy, she was tom to pieces by a mob of Christians at the 
instigation of their bishop (later Saint) Cyril". N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard (ed): The Oxford Classical 
Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1970) p. 534. 
to 
to a new true science 
then developed to a further stage: science, 
borrowed back, would in no wise clash with true Islam. The demonization of Christianity and 
Westerners who supposedly implemented it history, contained and channeled the hatred that 
Muslims could not help but feel away from the science, technologies and secular-ameliorist 
thought-systems unfolding in the countries of the imperialists. 
'Abduh's attraction to products of Western creativity went beyond their utility for 
Muslim survival. His acquaintance with modern European thought was through Arabic 
translations until he learned French at the age of forty in order to read Western works at first 
hand. 'Abduh translated Herbert Spencer's work on Education from a French version into 
Arabic in order to utilize its insights when drafting his plans for the reform of Egyptian schools69 . 
If his vision of Islamic theology and classical Muslim greatness validated intensive borrowing 
from the West --- and thus the new specialized-acculturated professional classes---, by learning 
French he made himself liable to some of their special sensitivities, cleric though he was. His 
sarcastic section between warlike Islam and peaceful Christianity"70 was the 
response of one upon whom, the cushioning filter of linguistic incomprehension lifted, the 
Islamophobia of Europeans intimately registered. 
'Abduh's straight-forward --- but indigenous and classical--- style in his replies to Farah 
Antun would convey classical Arab-Islamic civilization to acculturating-educated intellectuals 
linguistically unequipped to move in the old Arabic primary sources. He made Islam and the 
classical Arabs come alive to young Muslim Egyptian professionals almost deracinated by the 
British linguistic Anglicization campaigns. An instance was Muhammad Lutfi Jum'ah who 
always restored classical Arab literature and philosophy, but as a particularist in the 1920s was to 
depict ancient Egypt as the egalitarian inspiration of later Greek democracy. Jum'ah until early 
in the 1930s opposed hasty steps to "Arab unity"; but then substituted Arab-Islamic for 
Pharaonic nationality (B 56-59; B 216-217). In childhood and youth he had undergone severe 
de-Islamizing submersion in the English language and culture in the secular government schools 
69. Adams, Islam and Modernism p. 95. 
70. al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah pp. 64-67. 
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as the British had structured them: "I grew up as every Muslim grows up knowing nothing of my 
religion except its name". Jum'ah's was the common acculturated modality ofreconnection 
with Islam and its classical Arabs: from within the very European high literatures in which 
intellectuals were formed under colonialism. Edwardian belles lettres: the philosophy of Bacon 
had triggered his exploration of Ibn Rushd (Averroes), he wrote in 1904 as a youthful student to 
'Abduh. With Ibn Rushd --- the classical Arab-Islamic philosophy that appropriated the 
rationality of Greece --- Jum' ah was coming into contiguity with al-Afghani and 'Abduh, whose 
writings would give him what he now wanted. He had felt attracted to the Qur'an at school but 
was alienated by the insistence of the 'ulama' that they alone were entitled to interpret it. The 
youthful Jum'ah confessed his religious "uncertainty" (ishkal) and sought in the Qur'an 
confirmation of the account of Western science that God created Earth by separating it from the 
sun: there were also hints that Darwin's theory of evolution could be validated by Islam. His 
adoring tone towards 'Abduh in 1904 was natural. 'Abduh's writings offered a linguistically 
accessible --- rationalized --- Islam and indigenous Arab past with which secular-educated 
Egyptians could stand before Europe and its science. Jum'ah wanted houris to stand for 
"spiritual perfections" in Paradise and' Abduh had many more allegoricist reinterpretations of the 
Qur'an to thicken the almost snapping hair of belief that held such acculturated youths to Islam 71 . 
'Abduh's Islamically-educated but self-cultivatedly modernist group and the most 
bilingualized anti-imperialist Egyptian intellectuals had many connections and exchanges. 
Mustafa Kamil and' Abduh were at loggerheads since Kamil's acculturated independence 
movement was long financed by the Khedive 'Abbas, the inveterate enemy of' Abduh's efforts 
to reform establishment Islam in Egypt, in particular al-Azhar. Yet in commitment to a 
liberalized Islam that could assimilate the strength of the West and to the pan-Arab golden age, 
Kamil and his followers were close to 'Abduh. When 'Abduh in 1900 replied to Hanotaux, the 
French-financed Syrian Christian-edited al-Ahram defended the record of the French and other 
Christian Europeans in regard to the Muslim peoples. Kamil's al-Liwa' promptly blasted all 
varieties of European colonialism, prompting the deputy editor of al-Ahram, who had come from 
Paris just before he assailed' Abduh, to challenge Kamil to a duel72 . 
71. Rida, Ta'rikh al-Ustadh al-Imam v. 1 pp. 791-796. 
72. Ibid p. 803. 
-AlOO-
Overall, Muhammad' Abduh under British colonial rule skilfully implanted within the 
modern functions of the new West-formed students, professionals and specialists relevant, 
durable sectors of Islam and the rediscovered classical Arab-Muslim past. He maintained ---
however adapted to European sciences and secularoid ideologies, and to the demands of local 
Arab Christians --- the essence of Islam in history: that religions continue to define political units 
and blocs. 
'Abduh' s 1902 explication of imperialism in terms of Christianity --- rather than 
economics or racist layers in Europe's secularoid concepts and cultures --- had 
dysfunctionalities. It warped his readers' understanding of Christianity. With Egypt under 
consolidated British occupation, by 1902 it had become unprecedentedly urgent to bring Copts 
(plus other Arab Christians) and Muslims together. Yet the mature 'Abduh, writing when as 
Mufti of Egypt his words reverberated most, divisively rejected all Christianity as evil per se. 
'Abduh in 1902 accepted the normativeness of the West's secular civilization nearly as 
much as Antun but saw it as a sector in still highly Christian European communities. He 
defended less a revealed Islam than the past Arab-Muslim communitv and its right to continue in 
an age in which Europe was sweeping the world. 
Linguistic Aestheticism.' Abduh' s aesthetic influence extended beyond those Egyptians 
liable to his sense of (a diffident) Islam as the public emblem of community. His limpid but 
musical Arabic style, which he could simplify for acculturated audiences, and the vanishing 
manuscripts of classical Arab high literature and grammar that he got printed73, connected all 
categories of intellectuals into the styles and literary sensibility of the classical Arabs. He 
offered a continuity with aspects of those Arabs' language and sensibility not always closely 
connected with Islam's design, and pan-Arabizing over the long term. In publishing beautiful 
73. 'Abduh's Arabic interests were directed to classical Islamic scholastic theology (kalam), relics of 
Mu'tazilism, and to classical Muslim philosophy. However, he published in Bayrut his commentary on the 
mag_amat of Badi' al-Zaman al-Hamadhani (969-1008) --- one of the classical Arab writers who were to shape 
Haykal's identifications: B 107 fn. His widely-read commentary on the Nahj al-Balaghah, too, was on the margin 
between religion and literature: he hoped that the classical work ascribed to the fourth Caliph 'Ali would enable 
students to cultivate classical Arab eloquence and also a sense of monotheism and Islam's greatness: he, however, 
believed that later additions to' Ali's original aphorisms in it ruled out use of the work as an accurate source on the 
Caliphate or theology. Rida', Ta'rikh al-Ustadh al-Imam v. 1 p. 778. Almost lost MS classical works that' Abduh 
got published to revive correct Arabic literary style included those of the literary critic and grammarian 'Abd 
al-Qahir al-Jurjani (d. 1078). Adams, Islam and Modernism p. 85. 
- AlOl -
ancient Arab texts and their works of rhetoric, literary criticism and grammar74 from al-Azhar as 
Rector, 'Abduh set such young Azharites as Taha Husayn and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat off to a 
neo-classicist aestheticism that cherishes the whole language of the classical Arabs but 
humanizes and relativizes them and then ranges from that classical Arab beauty to the West's 
aestheticism or even positivism or liberalism and back --- repeatedly blending the two ad hoc. 
The new devotion to old beautiful literature as a good in itself even where distinct from Islam 
clashed against the late scholastic texts and personnel of al-Azhar (Taha, al-Zayyat: B 241). 
'Abduh's publication of the texts reinforced parallel activity by such secular-educated members 
of the bureaucratic and professional elite as the multi-lingual non-shari'ah lawyer Ahmad Zaki 
Pasha, Secretary to the Council of Ministers ( 1897-1922). Because of his roles in drafting 
Arabic texts of laws, 'Abduh was able to lastingly install terminologies of the classical Arabs in 
the secular law derived from Europe, which the purist "Shaykh of Arabism" Zaki also did for 
other secular laws, for official ranks and in government correspondence. Taha Husayn in 1911 
viewed' Abduh as having provided crucial resources to make an extended version of the 
language of the classical Arabs --- not a West-distorted vulgarization --- the medium for modem 
government administration derived from the West75. As al-Afghani had in 1883, 'Abduh in 1900 
carefully refuted Hanotaux's Renan-like dichotomization of creative Aryans and sterile Semites, 
stressing that the Semites were equal precursors of Europeans from antiquity and that Aryans and 
Semites went well together, and had to borrow from each other, both within classica1 Islam and 
in the modern world76• This pointed forward to post-1930 refutations by Taha and al-Zayyat and 
74. Taha, "Hal Tastaridd al-Lughah Majdaha al-Qadim? - 9: Nahdat al-Lughah fil- 'Asr al-Jadid" (Will the 
Language Recover its Ancient Glory? - 9: The Renaissance of the Language in the Modem Age), al-Jaridah 6 
November 1911 p. 1. Taha specifically cited the work al-Mukhassas fil-Lughah by the Spain-resident philologist 
and lexicographer Ibn Sidalis (or Ibn Sidah) (d. 1066) as among those vanishing classical texts that' Abduh and his 
collaborators had saved just in the nick of time, by publication. Ibid. 'Abduh had secured the aid of Muhammad 
al-Shinqiti to edit and bring out the massive 17-volume work: in 1900 he had founded the Society for the Revival of 
the Arabic Sciences, observing that Islam cannot flourish unless its language does. Adams, Islam and Modernism 
pp. 85-6. Cf. art. "Ibn Sida" EI2. 
75. Taha, "Hal Tastaridd ... " p. 1. 
76. In his 1900 controversy with Hanotaux, 'Abduh was intent to argue the equal creativity of Semites with 
Aryans in a way that appreciated both and depicted it as a necessity that they borrow from each other. In part 
responding to West European classicism's time-frame, he projected fertile interaction between the two back far 
before Islam. The Greeks derived their civilization from contact with Semitic nations. When Europe knew no other 
civilization than war and bloodshed, Islam came bringing the arts, sciences and learning of such Aryan peoples of 
Asia as the Persians and Indians and of the Egyptians, Romans and Greeks. All nations borrow from one another 
according to need. Adams, Islam and Modernism p. 87. 
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in philosophical history by Mustafa' Abd al-Raziq of such Western anti-Semitic anti-Arabism: 
these mainly stayed constructive and open towards overall Western thought and culture while 
pan-Arabizing77• 'Abduh's drives to excise various aspects of late-traditional Sunni Islam gave 
such young sectional Westernists as Haykal more room --- but his offering of a multi-planed 
version of the language of the classical Arabs most crucially linked the styles of Haykal and 
other modernists to them in the face of deculturation. 
3. AL-NADIM'S AL-USTADH (AUGUST 1982 - ruNE 1893): THE CLASSICAL ARABS, 
RESISTANCE TO IMPERIALISM, AND MODERNIZATION 
al-Ustadh analyzed many social and cultural problems of Egypt but for the most part as 
phenomena that had made, or now kept, Egyptians colonizable. The broad themes about 
classical Arabs greatly shaped al-Nadim's responses to Egypt's current conditions and to an 
expanding West. In youth he had been too individualistic, and as a baker's son too penurious, to 
pass through the Azhar system78 and thus lacked extensive formal education at traditional Islamic 
universities, which al-Afghani and 'Abduh had. al-Afghani and 'Abduh read religious and 
philosophical classical works, al-Nadim more classical, especially' Abbasid, works of high 
literature and grammar --- which directed his development of pan-Islamism much more towards 
Arab linguistic nationalism. 
Not Pharaonic Egypt, but the classical Arabs imaged Umayyad-style as a "race" with the 
right to rule others, were al-Nadim's indigenous golden age79• Yet the expanding West's 
features; and its attitudes towards Muslims, made certain elements in the classical Arab past 
likelier to surge up in his communications than others. 
77. Eg. Taha in 1933 refuted stereotypes by Renan (and, perhaps, Dozy) --- snapped up by neo-Pharaonism 
--- that the racial Semitic Arabs did not contribute much to the brief literary and intellectual creativity under classical 
Islam, that these came from subject Aryans: B 464 - 465. It should be noted, though, that similar themes had been 
argued by classical Muslim writers, some of them shu 'ubis but also including the Arabian-descended Ibn Khaldun 
and which European scholars and neo-Pharaonists took up. Taha resisted Ibn Khaldun's theme from the 1920s, 
quoting the Orientalist Cassanova that "it is very hard to determine the origin of the Muslim philosophers and 
scholars because of the mixture of races". Assad N. B usool, "The Development of Taha Husayn' s Islamic 
Thought", The Muslim World v. 68:4 (October 1978) pp. 280-281. 
78. Najib Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 34-38. 
79. Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi 
al-Sayyid (Berkeley: University of Los Angeles Press, 1972) p. 149. 
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al-Nadim's Awareness of the West 
The Master al-Afghani had an appreciative eye for the sources of strength of the West he 
resisted. In Arabic writings while in Egypt he "referred not only to Western concepts of 
republicanism and constitutionalism" --- argued by him as the best forms of government --- but 
to telephones and/or phonographs invented only a year before he mentioned them80. al-Afghani 
learned to passively read French. al-Nadim never learned a European language, yet he 
sensitively registered some crucial creative aspects of the modern West which Egyptians and 
other Muslims had to duplicate to wrest back and sustain sovereignty. He also identified 
de-Arabizing aspects of the acculturation of the emergent Westernizing-education Egyptian 
Muslim elite that could pull its members towards collaboration with the occupying aliens. 
al-Nadim drew the maximum insights from those encounters with Westerners and 
Western thought that his monolingualism allowed: through freemasonry, from al-Afghani's 
Francophone Syrian Christian disciples such as Adib Ishaq, steeped in French anti-clerical 
"rationalism"81 , and from the few Western works available in Arabic translations in the period82. 
al-Nadim had developed a friendship with a French rural estate owner prior to the Occupation 
with whom he then continued to arrange meetings at risk of capture: the subjects they talked 
80. See fn 10. 
81. The post-Christian freemason Ishaq's relationship with al-Afghani and his feud with the Jesuit and 
other Catholic clergy in his native Lebanon-Syria is reviewed by Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs pp. 82-99. 
The Catholic clergy were reluctant to give Ishaq (1856 - 1884) a church burial, and finally did so in order to contain 
the use to which his admirers would put any funeral to project his militant rationalism: ibid p. 85. Although 
al-Nadim had been Ishaq's colleague in the constitutionalist movement before the British conquest, he in 1893 
homed in on the post-Christian Darwinism of the SC editors of al-Muqattam and al-Muqtataf. al-Nadim now blasted 
an unnamed newspaper of "hirelings" who fill its "sciences section" with translations of the discourse of those who 
believe in no religion and ascribe the miracles of the prophets to natural phenomena and chemical compounds and 
the Creation itself to matter and Nature, denying the existence of the True God. "A'da Allah wa Anbiya'ihi" (The 
Enemies of God and His Prophets), al-Ustadh 23 May 1893 pp. 923-924. Against these infidel collaborators with 
imperialism, al-Nadim contrasted a group of "Egyptian writers" that included "he whose memory is redolent, Adib 
Ishaq" at the side of Muhammad 'Abduh! Ibid, p. 938. al-Muqattam editors-to-be Faris Nimr and Ya'qub Sarruf 
had migrated to Egypt in 1884 after American missionaries ended their tutorships at the Syrian Protestant College 
because they gave space to Darwinian ideas in their magazine al-Muqtataf. A.L. Tibawi, American Interests in 
Syria. 1800-1901 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1966) pp. 244 - 248. For the strong long-term effects of 
al-Muqattam-al-Muqtataf scientism on Muslim Egyptian thought, B 74 (for 1926); Hourani op. cit. pp. 246-7. 
82. During his underground period after the 1882 conquest, al-Nadim had in his reading matter a geography 
of Conrad Malte-Brun (d.1829) in the translation of Rifa'at al-Tahtawi, as well as an exegesis of the Qur'an. 
Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim p. 103. For a list of translations of French geographical and legal works by al-Tahtawi 
(d.1873) see Yusuf As'ad Daghir, Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyyah v. 2 (Bayrut: Matabi' Lubnan 1956) pp. 570-1. 
For al-Tahtawi 's blending of a restoration of classical Muslim philosophical discourse with oblique justification of 
Westernization by the 'Alid Khedives, so as to contain the traditional Islamic 'ulama', Smith, Islam and the Search 
pp. 12-14. 
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about in Arabic included religions, international relations and reports in the English press of 
continuing criticism in the House of Commons against the occupation of Egypt83 • The religious 
psyche of the colonizers came across with unprecedented vividness: al-Nadim angrily noted the 
verbal arguments, sidewalk pamphlets, and schools, with which American missionaries and 
Jesuits tried to convert Muslim Egyptians to Christianity84• Religions were thoroughly 
politicized: Christian evangelism was seen as made possible by the protective military 
occupation, and a weapon to perpetuate it. al-Nadim saw Christianity as blending into the lethal 
nationalisms of Europeans which had to be imitated for wresting back independence. The 
schools of the resident Europeans, which transmitted chauvinist Europe's blended 
religious-linguistic nationalisms in unfavorable Egypt, prompted curricula of the Arabic-medium 
nationalist education that he promoted in (a) his pilot so-called Islamic charitable schools before 
the British invasion and then (b) through his dynamic theoretical discussions in al-Ustadh. He 
wanted new "patriotic" Egyptian schools to give priority to the indigenous equivalents of the 
core subjects of those alien schools: the language, the religion, patriotic education, history, and 
then other subjects. Such political education had enabled the European states to progress and 
achieve wealth. He voiced disdain for the traditional religious scholars ('ulama') of the East 
who, in contrast, only taught and studied religious sciences in isolation: the native rulers 
(al-umara) now only consulted others for ideas for education!85. 
al-Nadim's knowledge of Europe and its ideological drives, if uneven, was remarkable 
for a monolingual Muslim. Wendell traced al-Nadim's sharp awareness that the West's 
83. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim p. 63. 
84. The Americans and the Jesuits were handing out Arabic leaflets in the streets of Egypt, Syria and 
Arabia. al-Nadim felt a twinge of sympathy for Hindus, Buddhists and Taoists in India and China now facing the 
same --- not genuinely religious but political --- evangelizing onslaught. "A Tataqallab al-Umam bi-Taqallub 
al-Ahwal wa Nahnu Nahnu?" (As the Nations Transform Themselves to Meet Changing Conditions, Can We 
Remain As We Are?), al-Ustadh 20 December 1892 pp. 418 - 419. For a lethally documented account of the ethos 
and programs --- especially translations of the Bible into a multitude of Asian and African languages --- of 
evangelical Anglo-Saxon Protestantism, see "Hadha 'Indakum fa-ma Muqabiluhu 'Indana?" (This is What you have 
Going: What Equivalent to it do We Have?), al-Ustadh 25 April 1893 pp. 812 - 827. For education of Muslim 
minors in the schools of the Freres and Americans as a threat to their Islam and language, "Law Kuntum Mithlana 
la-Fa'altum Fi'lana" (If You were Like Us, You Would Do As We Have), al-Ustadh 17 January 1893 p. 527. 
al-Ustadh knew the attraction that "the [foreign] language and sports and foreign ethics" had for (even Muslim) 
Egyptians who sent their sons to Jesuit schools in [Lebanon-]Syria: it warned that the priests were secretly 
converting the pupils to Christianity there but coaching them to conceal their new religion when visiting their 
families. Such parents would bear the weight of the sin in judgement before God. "Natijat al-Ta'lim al-Ajnabi" 
(The Result of Foreign Education), al-Ustadh 17 January 1893 pp. 536-7. 
85. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 134-5. 
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mathematicians, scientists, engineers, schools, scientific and religious societies and commerce 
sustained its global activity and colonialism. Western heads of government were only "servants" 
of those institutions and specialists86• Humble "imitation of Europe" alone could pull Egypt into 
the ranks of "the civilized nations", al-Nadim warned Egyptians87• Traditionally-cultured 
pan-Islamists of his pattern stated tasks of sectional self-Westernization that they nominated a 
very different, multi-lingual elite, formed by the West, to detail and direct. al-Nadim offered 
al-Ustadh as the forum in which Egypt's acculturated specialists could set out the programs. His 
interest in the classical Arabs interacted with that of one of Egypt's early acculturated 
intellectuals 'Ali Mubarak (1823 - 1893) --- like al-Nadim, a crucial mentor of Mustafa Kamil in 
his formative student years. Mubarak was educated as an engineer in various secular schools 
established by Muhammad' Ali and in France for five years from 1884 - 1849/50 (two years at 
the military engineering school at Metz)88• During his long career as an educationalist, Mubarak 
synthesized high Arab-Islamic civilization with modernizing educational techniques derived 
from Europe. Thus, in 1870 he created the Dar al-'Ulum, "a teachers training college modelled 
on the French Ecole Normale Superieure"89. The College trained Arabic-medium teachers of 
modern subjects such as geography and mathematics as well as developing teaching of the 
Arabic language and Islam. Mubarak was Minister of Education from 1881 - 1891 during which 
he introduced the study of foreign (European) languages from the first year of primary school90. 
As a sectional Westernizer, he published in al-Ustadh in 1893 his article "On Education" in 
which he outlined the educational progress and policies of Prussia, Belgium and 
Austria-Hungary91 . Introducing the essay, al-Nadim described education as the means by which 
Europe achieved its modem scientific advances, prosperity and world primacy: Eastern peoples 
therefore should study European education to achieve the same things. al-Nadim noted here that 
86. Wendell, Egvvtian National Image pp. 148-9. 
87. Ibid p. 153. 
88. Jurji Zaydan, Bunat al-Nahdat al-' Arabiyyah (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, n.d. 1960?) p. 145. Zaydan's account 
of' Ali Mubarak's life and careers is pp. 142-148. Further details of Mubarak's education in France are given in 
Lois Armine Aroian, Education. Language and Culture in Modem Egypt: Dar al- 'Ulum and Its Graduates (Ph.D, 
University of Michigan: 1978) p. 31; his careers generally pp. 30-35. 
89. art. "Mubarak, 'Ali Pasha", EB. Mic., 15 ed. 
90. Aroian, op. cit, p. 185. 
91. "al-Tarbiyyah wal-Ta'lim" (On Education), al-Ustadh 9 May 1893, pp. 873-883, and 30 May 1893 pp. 
962-972. 
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Europe had gained the initial impetus for its revival from the Arab, Turkish and Persian books it 
translated, as the Arabs earlier derived impetus for their intellectual vitality from Greek, 
Nabatean and Latin works that they had translated92. 
The bilingualized technocrat Mubarak was al-Nadim's partner in restoring an historical 
consciousness of the classical Arabs. Proconsul Cromer denounced him as "corrupt, retrograde 
and extravagant" because he wanted to multiply the number of schools with state funds93 • An 
essay that Mubarak published in al-Ustadh shows how the classical Arabs maintained the 
self-esteem vis-a-vis Europe of precisely those Egyptian professionals borrowing most 
strenuously from it and whose careers colonialists wanted to end. Taking up stereotyped 
denigration by European anticlerical writers of Europe's religious Middle Ages, Mubarak wrote 
that Europeans 
before Islam's light shone and Arab power extended were sunk in the seas of ignorance 
and oppression, chained with the fetters of slavery, none of them knowing his rights ... 
Most [Europeans] lived then in huts and caves or wandered through the forests ... Then the 
Arabs entered and spread among them justice and virtues and commercial and 
agricultural achievements and architecture94• 
Besides flashing back after 1882 the rulers' excisive racial disdain, such early 
acculturated Arabism also enabled the Muslim Egyptian professionals to hold under provocation 
their eclecticism towards the modern West. Mubarak's argument that Europe had had tO borrow 
from the Arabs before it could emerge from the Dark Ages viewed large areas of the classical 
Arabs' civilization as secular and non-religious: Europeans could adopt these components 
without getting Islamized themselves. Conversely, modern Muslims could now borrow 
extensively from Europe, but remain Muslim: the cumulative stock of rational knowledge and 
technology that all human beings could draw on and develop. 
al-Nadim and Mubarak were an early case of collaborative reprojection of the classical 
Arabs by two West-obsessed Muslim Egyptian elites --- one monolingually educated, the other 
with linguistic access to specialized aspects of Europe. The traditionally-cultured pan-Islamists 
92. Thill p. 874. 
93. Letter of Cromer in 1883, early in his incumbency, to Granville FO. Aroian, Dar al-'Ulum p. 34. 
Another British official, Portal, in 1890 reported to London that Mubarak was "a narrow fanatical old agriculturist of 
the worst type". Ibid. 
94. "al-' Alim Sedillot al-Faransawi al-Shahir" (The Famous French Scholar Sedillot), al-Ustadh 20 
December 1892 p. 424. 
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Islamic Reexploration of Classical Arabs 
The school of al-Afghani was aware of Darwin, but Christian and Islamophobe motifs 
continued in European expansionism towards the Middle Easterners. This made the early 
pan-Islamists characterize the classical Arab past more religiously. For al-Nadim, the classical 
Arabs showed Muslims the way to build the international strength to again beat back the opposed 
entity of Europe or the West. The conquests of the Arabs spanned three continents --- Africa, 
Asia and the margins of Europe (Spain). Hitherto-divided Europe was however able to repel the 
advancing Arabs by adopting the sources of their strength: politically unifying "religious 
solidarity", purposeful pursuit and assimilation of knowledge, development of crafts or industries 
(al-sana'i') and readiness to sacrifice life to defend the homelands95. Like al-Afghani and 
'Abduh a decade before, al-Nadim in al-Ustadh viewed international military strength and 
sovereignty as eternally a product of religious faith but also energy in the assimilating and 
development of all human knowledge and techniques. 
The West's Christian negativity towards the classical Arabs pervaded and Islamized an 
Egyptian reexploration so dependent on Western works to recover that past. Mubarak's remarks 
on the Arabs' transformation of the Europeans were in his preface to the Arabic translation, 
commissioned by him as Minister, of L.A. Sedillot's 1854 Histoire des Arabes96• In introducing 
Sedillot's work, al-Nadim mentioned slanders by Europeans that "the Islamic religion forbids 
Paradise to women, even when pious", and "abuse ... of he who is innocent of all fault, our lord 
Muhammad" or that Islam originated when "poverty [of the classical Arabs] led a group of them 
to adopt brigandage, so that after choosing for that purpose a chief of the name of Muhammad 
son of' Abdallah, [they] marched out under his banner to attack and plunder the nations and 
lands". The value of Sedillot's work is that it will reassure "every [acculturated] Muslim" of the 
95. "al-Hayat al-Wataniyyah" (fhe Patriotic Life), al-Ustadh 30 August 1892, p. 30. al-Nadim mentioned 
"science and industry" (al-'ilm wal-sina'ah) as the source of modem Europe's prosperity and power, expressed in 
colonialism (al-isti'mar) p. 31. 
96. L.A. Sedillot, Histoire des Arabes, Paris: Hachette 1854. 
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untruth of "lies of the scholars of Europe" against the religion97• 
In 1892, then, al-Nadim argued the idealist view that Islam motivated the expansion and 
administrations of the classical Arabs, dismissing crude economic explications from modern 
Europeans. He was monolingual. The Christianity-originated distaste of Europeans for Muslims 
registered much more upon the true acculturated intellectual Mubarak who had lived in France. 
In reaction, he too argued that the Arab conquests were ideological --- to free humanity from 
savagery and bad customs by bringing justice and law derived from the Qur'an. They 
represented "Islam's light". His religious perception of history could make him unable to 
separate the classical Arabs from the general community of believers in Islam down history. 
European "slanderers" argued that the Greeks and Romans established civilization and that the 
Arabs' destructive conquests then contracted learning and human liberty. Such Westerners 
"desire to extinguish the light of truth, but God insists that He complete His Light", which 
one-sixth of humanity now has freely chosen, including Europeans building mosques in their 
own cities98• Mubarak's universalistic identification of the Arabs with all who subsequently 
adopted Islam, helped delay the tendency of such images of classical Arabs to focus a discrete 
modern Arab nationality. 
al-Nadim, and Mubarak more, reacted to reincarnations of Christian Islam-phobia in a 
European neo-classicism as liable to lance Greece and Rome against Jesus or the Church. The 
Enlightenment rights-of-man values that already helped shrink the Christian Europe of the 
Middle Ages vis-a-vis the classical Arabs could desacralize Egyptian understanding of classical 
Arab societies over the long term. Mubarak, however, was an early instance of how European 
writings, secularoid as well as Christian, rather for decades were to Islamize perceptions of the 
classical Arabs among acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals. Europe's residual fear of the 
medieval Arabs who had threatened France spotlighted them as the indigenous past with which 
to face imperialists in general --- not just the British. 
The Europeans' hostile themes and positive scholarship, alike, were indispensable for 
commitment to the classical Arabs as the definitive precursor community. Few Arabic-speakers 
now had access to the old Arabic manuscripts about the history of classical Arabs scattered in 
97. al-Nadim in "al-'Alim Sedillot ... "pp. 422-423. 
98. Mubarak, "al-' Alim Sedillot ... " p. 424. 
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libraries around the world. European studies of classical Arabs marred by anti-Islamic malice or 
linguistic misunderstandings "harmed our [acculturated] youth in its religious and temporal life". 
For a countering fair overview of "the [classical] Arab nation's" history, Mubarak ironically had 
to resort to translating another European work, Sedillot's survey99. 
The Arabic version of Sedillot's history offered Egyptians and other Arabs a new 
coherent vision of the Arabs as one, historically continuous, entity that spanned Asia, North 
Africa and Spain. It offered novel detail of the Muslim Arabs' wars with Byzantine, Spanish and 
French Christians. Book III'S account of "the expulsion by the Christians of the Moors 
(al-Magharibah) from Spain"100 reviewed a lethal depth in past Muslim-European conflict that 
acculturated intellectuals around al-Siyasah and al-Risalah in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s were to 
repeatedly recreate as a key to modern international relations, including the Palestinian-Zionist 
conflict. 
To Sects'-Integrative Arabism? 
al-Nadim depicted the classical Arab empires as culturally and religiously pluralistic: 
subject non-Arabs were allowed to keep their languages and Muslims, Christians, Jews and 
al-Majus (Zoroastrians primarily but also Hindus and Central Asian Buddhists) had equal 
religious freedom. In this pluralistic society that the Arab Muslims led, "the sciences were 
exchanged between" the different linguistic and religious groups101 • al-Nadim's argument that 
Christian minorities had equality and therefore stood with Muslim rulers in wars against 
European fellow Christians, such as during the criisades102 was meant to help integrate Copts and 
99. Ibid, pp. 425, 427. 
100. Ibid, pp. 426-427. 
101. "al-Hayat al-Wataniyyah" (Patriotic Life), al-Ustadh 30 August 1892 pp. 29-30. al-Nadim wrote that 
the (Arab) Caliphs employed Christian, Jewish and Majusi (mainly Zoroastrian) subjects "in clerical tasks, 
accountancy (computation) and scientific-rational-philosophical (hikmi) tasks", so that a community based on the 
territorial-patriotic bond integrated under Islam's non-discriminating law. "al-Jami'at al-Wataniyyah wal-Ikhtilat 
al-'Imrani" (The Community of Homeland and Social-Economic Mixing), al-Ustadh 13 September 1892 p. 74. 
When the Arabs' conquests brought millions of non-Muslims under Muslim rule "they came under the just law and 
it was ruled that they are like us in the patriotic rights" --- (lahum ma lana wa 'alayhim ma 'alayna: they have our 
rights but must carry out the same duties as us). "al-Jami'at al-Wataniyyah ... " p. 73. 'Abduh, too, cited the same 
phrase about the dhimmis, which he described as a hadith of the Prophet Muhammad. al-Islam wal-Nasraniyyah p. 
64. For ridicule of al-Nadim's sects-uniting characterization of the classical Muslim past as "pure fabrication": 
Wendell, Egyptian National Image pp. 151-2. 
102. "Ashtat al-Sharq wa 'Asabiyyat Urubba" (The East's Disunited Groups and Europe's Unifying 
Solidarities), al-Ustadh 30 January 1893 pp. 458-459. 
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Muslims in contemporary bi-sectarian Egyptian patriotic community against Britain --- but could 
contribute over the long term to bi-sectarian pan-Arab nationality (application by 'Abd 
al-Rahman 'Azzam, future Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, in the 1940s: B 
229-230). 
Arab Nation's Pre-Islamic Arabian Origins. al-Afghani and 'Abduh in al-'Urwat 
al-Wuthqa (1884) denigrated the pre-Islamic Arabians as cruel and barbarous, an in part religious 
habit of thought that he never shook off103• To beat back the West, the pan-Islamists wanted 
indigenous military strength, strong states and literate rational civilization, which the pre-Islamic 
Arabians could not offer. However in 1887 'Abduh urged study of pre-Islamic Arabian culture, 
on the face of it to understand Islam. The Qur'an is "the source of the successes of the 
Muslims": modern Muslims therefore now had to study the preceding idioms, history, customs 
and modes of disputation of the Arabs, so as to respond to the Qur' an as had its first audience of 
Arabian shepherds and camel-drivers104• Review of the Qur'an and earlier Islam for new 
purposes, and to bypass post-classical Sunni traditionalism and sufi mysticism, would expose the 
Egyptian Muslim public to the pre-Islamic and early Arabians' (originally oral) poetry, 
linguistically so different. 
In the school of al-Afghani, al-Nadim was closest to that commitment to the continuous 
nation (the classical Arabs) in all its periods of religious beliefs that leads to true linguistic 
nationalism. He had recourse to the pre-Islamic, as well as early Islamic, Arabs to ethically 
guide contemporary Egyptians, for example interactions between the sexes in new urban 
conditions of more nuclear families, freer mixing and anonymity. An Arabian "would travel and 
leave his wife at home; his neighbor would give her provisions and be the last of people to make 
advances to her ... because she was in his charge until the husband's return" 105• al-Nadim's 
acceptance of pre-Islamic as well as early Islamic Arabs as still the model in ethics and 
103. al-Afghani kept on calling the pagan Arabians savages to Arab disciples even into the last period of 
his life in Constantinople after he went to live there in 1892: the Qur'an transformed the Arabs from "a condition of 
indescribable barbarism" so that within one and a half centuries of its revelation they ruled the world of that time, 
and politically and in knowledge, philosophy, industry and trade surpassed all the other nations on earth. 
al-Maghribi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani p. 58. 
104. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism. Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (University 
of Illinois Press 1973) p. 136. 
105. Quotation by al-Nadim of verses ascribed to the pre-Islamic Arabian Hatim al-Ta'i, and others by 
Hamid Tun Thawr al-Hilali. "Mahasin al-' Arab" (fhe Virtues of the Arabs), al-Ustadh 15 November 1892, pp. 
305-6. 
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language106 suggested Arab identity's substantial independence of Islam. A non-sectarian Arab 
successor-nation could have Christian as well as Muslim members. The Christian Syro-Egyptian 
Jurji Zaydan and the Muslim Egyptian Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i were simultaneously to idealize 
pre-Islamic Arabian ethics and language (Ch. 5). 
One Syrian Christian tried to detach and extend the aspect of Arabism in al-Nadim's 
anti-imperialist political nationalism. As he forwarded his subscription, the Syrian, a resident of 
Saint Petersburg, lauded "your Arab patriotic line [that you help] propagate among the speakers 
of the dad [Arabic]" because it disregarded "variation of the religions": now Arab unity can 
advance and withstand the attacks of all the types of enemies. The Christian correspondent 
undertook to "circulate your [unifying] magazine among both Muslims and Christians" in Russia. 
al-Nadim used the term al-Ummat al-' Arabiyyah (the Arab Nation) to evoke a revered bygone 
classical entity rather than for a tightening contemporary community as the correspondent 
wanted, yet a shared sense of Arabness was clearly one motive why he published the letter. He 
also cited it to refute charges from Syrian Christian journalists and government officials 
collaborating with the British in Egypt that al-Ustadh was promoting "religious fanaticism or 
splitting the Eastern Word". Yet al-Nadim could not leap with the Syrian correspondent from (a) 
the unique worth of standard literary Arabic in all periods of history and of the Arab Nation in 
past history to (b) a contemporary "Arab nation" as the prime loyalty. 
If this excellent individual had said that we were calling for the maintenance of the 
Eastern unity compromising Arabs, Persians, Turks, Circassians, Kurds, Armenians and· 
others regardless of the differences of religion, he would have hit the mark. That is what 
we advocate, not the Arab league (al-jami'at al-' Arabiyyah) on its own107• 
al-Ustadh, then, highlighted a classical Arab nation, Arab qualities and languages as a 
determinant in political communities and differentiated linguistic communities both within Egypt 
and in the Middle East. Yet, al-Nadim refused to draw the political conclusion of separate 
sovereignty-seeking nationalisms in the Middle East. His indigenous classical Arab golden age 
106. Many of al-Nadim's essays (although not his colloquial dramas or dramatic sketches) drew on the 
mature-classical' Abbasid badi' style or maqamat. However, the much earlier pre-Islamic Arabs could also 
contribute to the style of modem Egyptians: he printed a prose letter from the pre-Islamic Arabian poet al-Nabighah 
al-Dhubyani appealing to 'Amr Ibn Harith, King of Ghassan, to release captives from al-Nabighah 's tribe. al-Nadim 
glossed archaic words with footnotes. "Ghurar al-Kalam" (Classic Passages from Literature), Ramadan literary 
supplement to al-Ustadh 13 June 1893, pp. 30-32. 
107. Letter by unnamed Christian Syrian from St Petersburg, al-Ustadh 6 June 1893 pp. 1004-5. 
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highlighted Islam as a dynamic of international strength; in contemporary history the Muslim 
East and Christian West were in life-and-death conflict: Turks and Arabs therefore had to unite 
with each other more in the 1890s. Later during British colonial rule, the party of Mustafa Kamil 
(initially al-Nadim's disciple) would long refuse to extend its high culturist and historical 
Arabism into divisive political support for West Asian Arabs against Ottoman Turks (Chapter 5). 
The classical period of the pan-Eastern system fostered Arab ethnic pride because it had 
been led by "the Arab race/folk" (al-jins al-' Arabi). For the post-classical period, however, the 
pan-Eastern unity that "the Arab race" originated would run against the crystallization of an Arab 
political nationality. al-Nadim wrote in a situation in which the Ottoman Turks governed some 
Arabs in West Asia and claimed authority over others in Egypt, the Sudan, Tunisia and Algeria. 
It was the disunity of the Easterners, increasing for four centuries past, that enabled Europeans to 
conquer them. The multiplying divisive "solidarities of race, language, religion and homeland" 
--- along with "selfish interests and personal power" --- split the pan-Eastern unity which had 
enabled the classical Arabs to beat Europe back. When his perspective was more international, 
al-Nadim thus opposed linguistic and geographical solidarities operating in his day that might 
eventually lead to an Arab political nationalism or political state (or smaller Arabic-speaking 
sub-nationalisms) within Islam's belief-community. The integrated "Eastern" system once 
originated and led by Arabs now would strengthen the authority of non-Arab Turks over Arabs in 
the Ottoman state and general pan-Islamic political community108. 
Ethnicity Within the Egyptian Homeland 
al-Nadim in his magazine al-Tankit wal-Tabkit in 1881 depicted a young Egyptian, 
disembarking after four years study in Paris, who refused to embrace or kiss his father on the 
quay. "[I] am not the rural person. You sons of the Arabs [abna' al-' Arab] are like animals. Say 
bon arrive and shake hands". al-Nadim gave this story the title"' Arabi Tafarnaj" ("An Arab who 
got Europeanized")109• Ordinary Muslim Egyptians did not just speak Arabic but were 
themselves Arab. al- 'Urwat al-Wuthqa assailed Nubar Pasha, a non-Arabic-speaking Armenian 
108. "Ashtat al-Sharq wa 'Asabiyyat Urubba", al-Ustadh 30 January 1893, pp. 457-8. 
109. Najib Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim p. 167: cf. 'Ali al-Hadidi, 'Abdallah al-Nadim. Khatib 
al-Wataniyyah. (Cairo: Maktabat Misr nd). p. 113. 
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who held office as Prime Minister under British rule from 1884 - 1888, as "not a Muslim that he 
should have zeal to safeguard this religion, nor an Egyptian that he should be fired with regard 
for his homeland, nor an Arab that pride to protect his race/racial nationality (iins) would seize 
him"110• Parochial Egyptian ethnicity in that period perceived a combination of geography, 
religious belief and Arabness (language, descent) as defining Egypt's majority indigenous ethnic 
community. 
al-Nadim while underground following the British conquest encountered ongoing 
perception of distinct Arab-Egyptian and Turco-Circassian ethnic groups among Egyptian 
Muslims. His identity was discovered by a Circassian Army officer who, however, did not arrest 
him: "although I am Circassian in origin, I am Arab in chivalry (al-muru'ah) and in noble 
compassion for others (al-shahamah)"111 • Prescriptive --- in origin pre-Islamic --- Arab virtues 
were to figure in the evolution of Arabism in the party of Mustafa Kamil (Ch. 5) and after the 
limited independence of 1922 (Ahmad Zaki Pasha, Ch. 8). al-Nadim repetitively used the terms 
"Arabs" and "Turks" in his lists of non-Western ethnic groups in Egypt: these had "the Copts" as 
another category while not otherwise mentioning Arabic-speaking Egyptians. For him, for his 
modern parochial Egyptian context, "Arabs" meant Muslim Egyptians whose mother tongue is 
Arabic. Language, then, profoundly influenced al-Nadim's perception of the units in the 
Egyptian community of his time but in combinations with religions. His sense that race also 
contributed to define the ethnic communities only deepened his perception of Egypt's 
Arabic-speaking Muslims as Arab because of the popular belief of some remote racial descent 
from incoming Arabs. But al-Nadim assumed that the Coptic community that maintained the 
Christian faith did not receive any Arab blood, and excluded them instinctively from the ethnic 
110. "al-Lurd Nurth Bruk, Hakim Misr al-Jadid" (Lord Northbrook, Egypt's New Ruler), al-'Urwat 
al-Wuthga, p. 375. Cf. "Jaridat al-Ahram" (The Newspaper al-Ahram), ibid p. 389 for a similarly-phrased attack on 
Nubar: the Muslims are there defined as the millah and the Arabs as the .fu:lli (racial nationality or ethnicity) from 
whose interests Nubar was alienated by his separate identity. Nubar Pasha Nubarian (1825-1899) was born outside 
Egypt in Smyrna, Izmir, Turkey. When he resigned from his third, last term as Prime Minister in 1895, he went to 
Paris for his retirement. Tignor sees Nubar as trying to delay the extension of British control after 1882, albeit to 
maintain his and his Turcophone clique's authority and interests, not for nationalism. Robert L. Tignor, 
Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt. 1882 - 1914 (Princeton University Press 1966) pp. 174-175. 
However, al-Nadim in 1882 placed among "the Egyptian pioneers" (al-Misriyyin al-uwal) some multi-lingual 
Armenians such as Hekakyan who served in the earlier nineteenth century modernization initiated by Muhammad 
'Ali. al-Ustadh v. 1 p. 38. 
111. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim p. 66. 
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category of the Arabs of Egypt112• 
al-Nadim in al-Ustadh, then, sharply defined a multitude of plural ethnic groups or units 
in Egypt, even in the ranks of the believers in Islam113• Allying the Egyptian independence 
movement to the restive Turco-Circassian Khedive 'Abbas, he used a cherishing tone in evoking 
the "Sons of the Turks" as distinct from "the sons of the Arabs" 114. His disciple Mustafa Kamil, 
long in need of funds, would carry forward this cooperation with parochial Turco-Circassians, 
checking Arabness. The Ummah Party-al-Jaridah milieu would perceive parochial Sons of the 
Turks and Arabs more sourly (Ch. 6). 
112. Discussing Muhammad 'Ali's provision of expanded government education to "the sons of Egypt" and 
that "the spark of love of learning and writing has lodged in the thoughts of the nation (al-ummah)", al-Nadim 
remarks that "all whom we see in administration nowadays, judges and clerks and ma'murs and mudirs and 
assistants (al-mu'awinin) be they Arabs, Turks, Circassians, Albanians, Copts, are the product of Egyptian schools 
and the native teachers from al-Azhar or the government school system". "al-Lughatu wal-Insha'" (Language and 
Literary Composition), al-Ustadh 11 October 1892, p. 177. al-Nadim praised Muhammad 'Ali because he "raised 
armies ... opened schools, taught the ignorant and appointed many Turks, Circassians, Albanians and Copts to the 
judiciary /administration (litaw liyat il-ahkam )". "al-Murafa' at al-W atani yyah --- Taqrir Ahl al-Khibrah" (The Le gal 
Plea of the Homeland --- the Report of those with Experience) al-Ustadh 11 October 1892, p. 186. 
113. If racial ancestry conjoined with Islam and native speech to determine Arabness in Egypt, it was 
usually a millenium-old provenance. "We mean by the Egyptians every native, that is Arabs, Turks and Circassians. 
As regards the Arabs they lived with the Copts from the start of the Islamic conquest until now so that they have 
gone far into (became largely assimilated to) native [Egyptian] identity (fa tawaghghalu fil-wataniyvah) from a 
remote period". "al-Jami' at al-Wataniyyah wal-Ikhtilat al-'Imrani", al-Ustadh, 13 September, 1892, p. 79. 
Sometimes, "Arab" meant more recently-arrived Arabians when he distinguished the maximum number of 
micro-races in Egypt: Muhammad 'Ali "gathered many Turks, Circassians, Albanians, Moreans (al-Muraliyyah) arid 
a group (fariqan) of the Arabs and of the Egyptians in the variety of their religions and he made the aggregate a 
single nation". "Haluna Amsi wal-Yawm" (Our Condition Yesterday and Today) al-Ustadh 28 February 1893 pp. 
645-7. 
114. For al-Nadim, rather less than lineage or race, the language of daily speech, in particular in the 
household, determined the individual's ethnic group within Egypt. Foreign schools inflicted divisive 
multi-lingualization within elite Muslim families: yet this sharpened his awareness of the division between 
Turco-Circassian and Arab Egyptians, also. Zakiyyah: "Is not the man you will marry a son of the Arabs or a son of 
the Turks? ... Then learn the Arabic or Turkish in which the people of our land talk to us. As for the man who would 
desert his language and speak to his wife in French or English when he is the son of the Arabs or Turks, he shows 
little taste, knowing that we daughters of the East are not French or English, to address us in their tongue". 
"Madrasat al-Banat" (A Girls' School), al-Ustadh 10 November 1892 p. 246. al-Nadim defined "the Turks" and "the 
Circassians" as as much Egyptian as "the Arabs" --- ie. Muslim Egyptians who were native Arabic-speakers. "As 
regards the Turks, although they settled later than the Arabs, they ... have resided [in Egypt] from father to son down 
successive generations until they forgot their country. If one of them returned to it he would be a foreigner because 
of all the time that has passed ... The most recently settled would have buried his father in Egypt and himself been 
born among its natives ... All of this enterprizing race of high aspiration are indigenous Egyptians, distinct from the 
others only in maintaining their language which they take from their parents. The three categories [of Muslim 
Egyptians: Arabs, Turks and Circassians] are united together by the religious community even more strongly than by 
the bond of shared homeland". "al-Jami' at al-Wataniyyah ... ", al-Ustadh 13 September 1892 p. n. 
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Languages and the Evolution of Nationalities 
A dominant, expanding race can absorb other races, itself somewhat changing in the 
process. A world religion such as Islam can provide a framework within which the dominant 
race's amalgamation with (but cultural assimilation of) other races takes place. He was 
conscious that concurrently with the expansions of Islam in Africa and Asia and "parts" of 
Europe, "the Arabs mixed/intermarried with the Persians, Syrians, Egyptians, Turks, [Byzantine] 
Greeks, Goths, and some Italians and French, Sudanese, the Abyssinians, the Indians, the Uigurs 
and others". Strengthened by a unifying religion, a new distinct "Arabized" jins (race/people) 
resulted, no members of which had any racial loyalty to external entities115• Issues of linguistic 
and social survival once faced by the classical Arabs decisively corroborated for al-Nadim those 
streams of West European nationalism that identified language, more than static homelands, as 
the crucial determinant of political communities. 
Ancient struggles of the classical Arabs to maintain their integral language in the oceans 
of non-Arab subjects could offer intense linguistic consciousness with which to resist threats to 
classical Arabic under the British. al-Nadim now, in the early 1890s, was installing in the 
confused acculturated youth --- the core now forming for the coming elite --- juxtapositions that 
were to last. He made Arab leaders of classical Islam, dead for 1000 years, speak in their own 
words to the issues of language with which colonialism and modem functions confronted youth 
such as Mustafa Kamil. Mighty classical Caliphs, but also the grammarians they encouraged to 
codify Arabic against change, now focussed resistance to imperialists in language. al-Nadim's 
fusion of (a) grammarians and classical written language with (b) political Caliphs with (c) new 
resistance to imperialism, defined continuity of Arabic as an essence of sovereignty --- to 1918 a 
stance of both the independence movement launched by his disciple Kamil and, less sustainedly, 
115. "Tajadhub al-Jinsiyyat wal-Adyan" (The Constant Tugs-of-War Between Nationalities and Religions) 
al-Ustadh 14 March 1893, pp. 706-707. 
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in the Ummah-al-Jaridahmilieu. Also to last in these and other acculturated-modernist Egyptian 
groups was al-Nadim's portrayal of the classical Islamic leaders' sense of (mainly linguistic but 
also somewhat physical) difference from non-Arabs (the Caliph 'Ali): classical Islam would 
henceforth legitimize symbiotic blending of religion and Arab ethnicity for West-modified 
Egyptians116• In al-Nadim's writings of the early 1890s, classical Arab-Muslim figures already 
tilted national identity for colonized Egyptians away from territoriality to an ethnic orientation 
for which the language actually used determines nationality. He cited 'Ali and the more profane 
(Umayyad-appointed governor) Ziyad Ibn Abihi to guide the Arabic-speaking Egyptians of his 
day to ward off the influx of "alien" European words into "our written and oral communications 
... our formal/official and colloquial speech" 117• 
al-Nadim's observations of modern European national movements increased his tendency 
to perceive history (including contemporary Egypt's) in terms of language conflicts between 
fluid, incorporative linguistic nationalities. Many nations (umam) temporarily subjected by more 
powerful nations had yet maintained their separate languages which later resurrected them to 
independence. Had such nations abandoned their languages for that of the nationality ruling 
them, they would have merged with it into a single nation. al-Nadim cited as examples "the 
Turks, the Persians, the Greeks, Spain, Rumania, Portugal, the Bulgars" 118. Change of languages 
changes a given population's nationality. The passing of power from (a) the classical Arabs to 
(b) Persians and Turks validly expressed the continuing separate nationalities the latter 
maintained when they refused to adopt alien Arabic. That the Persians and Turks became 
Muslim following their encounter with the Arabs but still regained "independence" (political 
116. al-Nadim affectionately listed classical grammarians who labored to record hitherto orally-transmitted 
Arabian literature and formulate phonetic and grammatical rules to save pure Arabic from "collapse" in face of the 
non-Arabian majority's impact in the Islamic Empire. He associated early religious Arabian leaders with them: the 
fourth pious or "Rightly Guided" Caliph 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib "the Commander of the Faithful", in early Islam gave the 
pioneer grammarian Abul-Aswad al-Du'ili --- putative founder of the Basrah school of Arabic grammarians --- a 
sheet setting out the rules for pronounciation and grammar of "the first Arabs". The Caliph 'Ali wanted to reverse a 
linguistic situation where, he reportedly said, "the speech of the Arabs has become corrupted through mixing with 
this red-faced multitude" of non-Arabs (al-hamra'). al-Nadim, "al-Lughatu wal-Insha"' al-Ustadh 11 October 1892 
pp. 170-172. 
117. Ibid p. 178. 'Abbasid historiography had depicted the Umayyads as secular usurpers after the Rashidi 
(Rightly Guided) Caliphs. In addition to the Caliph' Ali, venerated by Sunni as well as Shi'i Muslims, al-Nadim 
presented Ziyad, governor of al-Basrah under the machiavellian Mu'awiyah (first Umayyad Caliph, r. 661-680) as 
also promoting Abul-Aswad's initiation of the classical grammar and linguistics, as the means to preserve 
prescriptive standard Arabic. Ibid. 
118. "Bab al-Lughah", al-Ustadh 30 January 1893, p. 469. 
more 
was aware 
expressed 
violence 
Arabo-Islamic tradition's association of languages with religious communities. Language forms 
with religion "the two great fundamentals": by holding fast to both against Turkey during the five 
centuries of her rule, Serbs, Bulgars, Montenegrins and Rumanians assured their future 
independence120• al-Nadim was particularly conscious of the role that the Christian religion 
played as a basis of personality that made possible Greek independence from Turkish rule. Here 
again, though, the religion and the literary language were one since al-Nadim misconceived the 
Christians' "Gospel" (al-Injil) as, parallel with the Arabic Qur'an, "revealed in the Greek 
language". Although Turkish was not a scriptural language oflslam, al-Nadim thus argued that 
if the Greeks had abandoned their original (religious) language they would have become not 
merely "Turks" but "Muslims by virtue of the language", never to recover independence121 . 
al-Nadim thus depicted languages not as neutral communication instruments but as 
pervaded by the content of the particular religions predominant spoke them. 
His theories about languages, religions national identities paid little regard to Egypt's great 
Coptic minority, integration of which required religion-neutral culture or plural cultures in the 
shared Arabic. al-Nadim's sense of nationality as something that could change with a change of 
language, and that religion or the change of religion could reinforce or disrupt such functions of 
language, offered elements for the racially open-ended, incorporative way that Ahmad Hasan 
al-Zayyat and 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam were to characterize the Arab national community in the 
1930s and 1940s (Chs. 9 and 10). 
119. "Tajadhub al-Jinsiyyat wal-Adyan" al-Ustadh 14 March 1893, pp. 708-709. 
120. Wendell, Evolution p. 157. Given Egypt's historical links to the Turks, al-Nadim was particularly 
conscious of the development of political nationality among marginal European peoples under Ottoman rule. He 
also had a broad awareness of the death, through amalgamation, of various nationalities in West Europe where 
conflict had been linguistic without the religious polarization between Christianity and Islam of the first category. 
The assimilation of the originally Germanic Normans when they learnt French was one such warning to Egyptians. 
"Tarbiyat al-Abna' "(Educating New Generations), al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 p. 204. 
121. "Bab al-Lughah", al-Ustadh 30 January 1893, pp. 470-L al-Nadim generalized about dispersal of the 
nations (umam) in the lands and length of severance of relations, and every nation's "developing a specific language 
and religion" that produced independent peoples (jins). "Tajadhub", p. 705. 
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Classical Arabic: Focus for Resistance Against the British 
al-Nadim and al-Ustadh were the prototype for the galvanizing psychosis about the 
survival of classical Arabic to be whipped up by the acculturated independence movement of 
Mustafa Kamil (1874 - 1908). Kamil in formative first youth was al-Nadim's disciple122. 
There was certainly a wide gap between the language of literature that the Arabic Qur'an 
had defined a thousand years before and the grammatically simplified dialects that al-Nadim's 
countrymen spoke in their daily lives. He thought that the British and other imperialistic 
Christians singled out the vulnerable crucial standard Arabic for attack, in order to destroy the 
Egyptians' nationality and religion, and thus incapacitate them from further resistance123 . The 
use of French, English etc as mediums of education and government, and the influx of European 
terms for the objects of modern life into everyday colloquial Arabic, threatened Islam's survival. 
Because it was impossible to translate the God-revealed Qur' an, Egyptians could retain access to 
it only if all areas of their lives maintained their general grasp of classical Arabic. The 
miraculous Arabic Qur'an was "the target of everyone fighting the language and endeavoring to 
destroy it". Even if circumstances and the needs of modernization forced them to use European 
languages widely, Egyptians should still maintain Arabic as the medium of their own dealings 
122. al-Nadim, while striving to politicize the semi-literate urban poor and women with some colloquial 
dialogues in al-Ustadh, alertly courted the new generation of Muslim Egyptian youth now receiving higher 
education under the Occupation. al-Ustadh in early 1893 noted Kamil's editorship of the school magazine 
al-Madrasah and his production of student plays, mainly on ancient non-Egyptian Arab subjects; al-Nadim became_ 
the responsive young nationalist's mentor and instructor. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 213, 217; al-Ustadh 28 · 
February 1893 p. 666 and 28 March 1893 pp. 759 - 760. He advised Kamil to avoid conflict with the Khedive, 
which had so contributed to his own and the 'Urabists' downfall and to the post-1882 British rule. Arthur 
Goldschmidt Jr, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party: 1892-1919" in P.M. Holt (ed), Political and Social Change in 
Modern Egypt: Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic, (London, Oxford 
University press, 1968), pp. 311 - 312. At its inception, Karnil recognized his new movement's continuity with the 
preceding generations of West-aware but non-acculturated pan-Islamists. In 1894, while in Paris to activate the 
Egyptian community and to lobby Europeans to make Britain evacuate the Nile Valley as promised, Kamil 
telegraphed a report to the now old Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, languishing in forced retirement in Istanbul under 
'Abdul-Hamid. Fritz Steppat, Nationalismus und Islam Bei Mustafa Kamil in Welt des Islams IV, 1956, p. 247 fn. 
Wendell saw the emotionalist vehemence of Kamil's denunciations of the British imperialist enemy as a 
continuation of al-Afghani's outlook and style. Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 245. 
123. Expressed eg. in cautious terms by al-Nadim in an article assailing the proposal by Sir William 
Willcocks to make colloquial Egyptian Arabic Egypt's literary language, in place of the classical. This proposal to 
"achieve the death of the language of the Qur'an" revealed to all Egyptians "a secret of the secrets of Europe" 
previously known only to "those concerned with the study of Europe's aims in the East". al-Nadim was concerned 
in the article to present al-Ustadh as a "scholarly/scientific" ('ilmiyyah) rather than political journal. "Bab 
al-Lughah" (Language Section), al-Ustadh 30 January 1893 pp. 475-477. Sir William Willcocks (1852-1932), the 
British civil engineer who designed the first Aswan dam completed in 1902, had come to Egypt from India in 1883 
to work in the Egyptian Public Works Department. EB (15 ed) Mic. 
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and literature --- and restore it as the medium for West-patterned modern education --- "for the 
survival of the religion and race [or nationality: jins]"124• The influx of loan-words conveying 
chemistry and other modern sciences from European languages into Arabic was producing a 
younger generation, neither Egyptian nor foreigners, who were concocting a bizarre new 
composite language without grammatical rules. If this became dominant "it would be hard for 
the future generations of descendants of [today's] Muslims to know their religion or their 
Scripture because of the need of a translator to translate the Arabic in that case" 125• 
al-Nadim proposed that leading Azharite ulama' and teachers conversant with foreign 
languages form a society to invent Arabic equivalents of the Western medical, chemical and 
engineering terms entering the elite's spoken Arabic126• He conducted an acrimonious 
controversy with the Syrian-Christian al-Hilal which refused to accept proposed Arabic-Semitic 
coinings to replace such European loan-words as "advocate", "numero", "telephone" and 
"balcony"127• 
The monolingual al-Nadim hoped to enlist in the enterprise to extend Arabic out to 
convey and cover all modern life precisely those educated classes with the best knowledge of the 
European languages to be replaced. 
124. Ibid p. 469-470. Very old Islamic emotions fed al-Nadim's sense that "language is the emblem that 
makes nationality cohere and preserves it", and that a society accordingly should be established to revive and extend 
Arabic. But the imposition of totalistic national languages in European states also fueled his demands that classical 
Arabic cover all modernity: "they bring out all textbooks in the language used in their homeland: you find no 
Frenchman who learns through English, or Greek in German or Austrian who learns in Russian". The exception to 
particularity was certain standard Latin and Greek terms used in all those national languages. "Tarbiyat al-Abna' ", 
al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 pp. 203-204. 
125. "al-Lughatu wal-Insha"' pp. 182-183. al-Nadim was equally alert to (a) atomized Western linguistic 
diffusion in broader social interactions and that (b) in a more exclusionist way, the foreign languages were coming 
to monopolize modern specialized structures and functions: those of theoretical and applied sciences most 
strikingly. Thus, he objected that all subjects in the School of Agriculture (except Mathematics) were being taught 
in English. "al-Zira'ah fi Misr" (Agriculture in Egypt), al-Ustadh 21 February 1893, p. 628. He listed over three 
pages of al-Ustadh European loan words for chemical substances: mufin, Oksayd al-Potassium etc. "al-Lughatu 
wal-Insha"' pp. 180-183. On the other hand, he as inventively applied his classicist high culturism to cut out the 
more casual Western linguistic atoms multiplying in the new acculturated elite's off-duty, colloquial socializations. 
al-Nadim argued that bakh should replace "bravo" because "the most eloquent of the eloquent" Muhammad 
exclaimed bakh bakh to express admiration at a Qur' anic verse. He urged Egyptians to replace Bon J our and Bon 
Soir with the ancient pre-Islamic 'Im Sabahan and 'Im Masa'an. "Mujtama' al-Lughat al-' Arabiyyah bi-Misr" (The 
Society for the Arabic Language in Egypt), a1-Ustadh 7 March 1893 p. 678. 
126. "al-Lughatu ... " p. 180. 
127. "Mujtama' ... "pp. 675-680. al-Nadim wanted the school teachers and members of a forthcoming 
Egyptian parliament to propagate the neologisms to be coined by the Arabic Language Society. Ibid. 
as a core sovereignty s registering 
Turkish language's development of an official status Egypt, he was as hostile to the 
Ottoman State as to Europe's imperialism. Before Muhammad' Ali's seizure of power in Egypt 
"the use of the Turkish language official communications" had brought literary Arabic to "its 
death gasp". By imposing Turkish as the language of administration upon "all the Arab lands", 
and appointing Turkish officials, the Ottoman State forced "the native population" to learn the 
Turkish language for dealings with the "rulers". Had it not been for al-Azhar, (literary) Arabic 
would have totally died out128• (al-Nadim's complaints that the Ottoman State suppressed Arabic 
as a medium of even primary school education anticipated similar themes of later, twentieth 
century, Arab nationalists in Ottoman West Asia, the Araboid Jaridist acculturateds before 1914 
[Ch. 6] and the more radical Egyptian pan-Arabs who by the 1940s had led stubbornly 
pan-Islamic Egyptians to finally support the West Asian Arabs' revolt against the Turks) 129. The 
'Alid dynasty's gradual restoration of Arabic as the medium of administration and modernizing 
language 130• 1892, appealed to 
the Ottoman to open primary schools in villages that would teach through the medium of 
either Arabic or Turkish --- whichever was the predominant local vernacular. Some Turks, 
Circassians and Kurds should taught through Arabic to equip them to communicate with the 
populations of Arab provinces to which they would be sent as administrators131 . al-Nadim in 
1891 in exile had interacted with Jaffa's literati and 'ulama,i32: now, in 1892, he depicted Turks 
128. "al-Lughatu ... " p. 176. 
129. For the anger of Muslim Arabs educated in the Ottoman modem-stream schools and colleges of 
Lebanon-Syria see Amin Sa' id, Thawrat al-' Arab fil-Oarn al-'Ishrin (Cairo: Dar al-Bilal n.d. --- 1960?) p. 7 and 
Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, Falsafat al-Ta'rikh al- 'Uthmani: Asbab In hi tat al-Im biraturiyyat al- 'Uthmaniyyah wa 
Zawaliha (Bayrut: Farajallah 1954) p. 188. The Egyptian Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, a pioneer of more unitary 
Egyptian pan-Arabism in the 1930s and 1940s, in 1953 charged that the Ottoman Turks "expelled the Arabic 
language from the offices of state, even from the courts of the Islamic law, and used Turkish in education, even in 
the lessons of [Arabic] grammar". "al-Adab wal-Thawrah" (Literature and [Arab] Revolution), one in a 1953 series 
ofradio talks, in Wahy al-Risalah v. 4 (Cairo: Dar Nahdat Misr 1966) p. 266. 
130. "al-Lughatu ... " p. 176. 
131. Ibid, p. 183. 
132. For al-Nadim's interactions with Islamic 'ulama' and sufi mystics in Jaffa, Nabulus and Jerusalem, 
and his pilgrimages to shrines associated with prophets in Palestine, see Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 76-77. 
al-Nadim kept up his links with the scholars of Jaffa after his return to Egypt. He reported to Egyptians the death of 
al-Sayyid Sa'id al-Daijani al-Husayni, surveying such works of Sa'id as his di wan of verses and his critical 
it was 
to to 
The centrality language al-Nadim's understanding political community could 
have influenced him to stand with early Arab ethnic dissatisfaction in the Ottoman Empire. 
However, the powerlessness and colonization Egyptians were suffering as al-Nadim brought out 
al-Ustadh made him emotionally need to defend any remaining sovereign Muslim state --- and 
Egypt's self-interest ran against any weakening of the Ottoman central government that could 
permit British power to spread out in the region. Resident Europeans were multiplying: he saw 
waning commitment to the Ottoman State as part of the dangerous Europeanization of the new 
Muslim-Egyptian elite developing under British rule. He analyzed the challenges facing the 
Ottoman Empire with empathic realism. It was weak militarily because it lacked rail 
communications and economically because it lacked perennially-flowing rivers: its agriculture 
was thus at mercy of irregular rainfall. Outside Christian powers could exploit the Empire's 
religious and linguistic to destroy Religion, anti-Islamic Christianity, was the motive 
it is Islamic power among fifteen 
Christian states. "The men of Europe" unceasingly promoted unrest and revolt among those 
populations in the Ottoman State with affinity of creed or race to them133 . 
Given the structure of international relations the early 1890s, then, religious and 
anti-imperialist solidarity with the Turks overrode al-Nadim's perceptions that they were 
linguistically non-Arab and constricted the Arabic language of the West Asian Arabs. And in the 
1890s the immemorial identification of Arabic with Islam built an Arabic component into the 
literary languages of Muslim Persians and Turks. At that stage of the development of Muslim 
examination of hadiths about the isra' and mi'raj (night-ascent of the Prophet Muhammad). al-Nadim, "Ritha' wa 
'Aza"' (Elegy and Consolation), al-Ustadh 15 November 1892 pp. 311-312. 
133. al-Ustadh 17 January 1894, quoted Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah 
fil-Adab al-Mu'asir (Bayrut: Dar al-Irshad 1970) pp. 21-22. al-Nadim was alert to signs of modernization under 
'Abdul Hamid: in 1893 he hailed the Sultan's increased provision of modem primary schools in villages as well as 
towns --- no Caliphs before him had attempted his drive to "universalize compulsory education", a precondition to 
develop a modem commerce and agriculture. He also referred to 'Abdul-Hamid's reclamation of long-disused 
lands, especially in such Arab areas as al-Karak and the Hawran: the Ottoman government resettled Cherkis, Kurds 
and Arabs in such underpopulated areas, where it provided them with agricultural implements. "Mahasinu Amir 
al-Mu'minin, Ayyadahullah!" (The Virtues of the Commander of the Faithful, God Strengthen Him!), al-Ustadh 2 
May 1893 pp. 866-9. For the resettlement of the Cherkis refugees by 'Abdul-Hamid, see fn 35. 
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nationalities, commitment to developing Arabic could still seem to Egyptians to be a common 
enterprise that united Arabs, Turks and Persians. al-Nadim thus had the illusion that the rulers of 
"the Eastern nations", generally, would promote the coming Arabic language academy of (a) 
Azhar scholars and (b) educationalists who combined their native Arabic or Turkish with 
European languages. He thought that its pure Arabic neologisms to replace European 
engineering, medical and chemical terms would also be adopted in other Muslim languages ---
(Cf. Ahmad Zaki Pasha even in 1925: B 82-83)134• 
The Turkish language had a real presence in urban Egypt in the 1890s as the minority 
ethnic culture of the Turco-Circassians. Arab Egyptians had a multiple linguistic, aesthetic, 
intellectual and religious relationship with Arab elites under Turkish rule that would be the 
strongest once fully activated. Yet perceived or potential cultural links to Turks, the solidarity of 
religion, and Egypt's political interests and anti-imperialism for the time held Arabist Muslim 
Egyptian political activists in an almost confederal pan-Islamic political community with the 
Turks of the capital Istanbul more than with the Arabs in the Ottoman provinces. For a long time 
this pattern was to hold with the pan-Islamic independence movement of Mustafa Kamil that 
al-Nadim first triggered. 
The Syrian Christians 
For many Egyptians under British rule, then, Islam and international conflicts interwove 
and blurred relations with Ottoman Arabs and Ottoman Turks. The Arabic-speaking Syrian 
Christian minority in Egypt, however, because it was non-Muslim separated Arabic as a 
determinant of community from Islam, and tested how much strength it could command on its 
own in the 1890s. 
Syrian Christians had been migrating into Egypt from the rule of Muhammad Ali. Many 
had been educated through Western languages at missionary institutions in Syria --- access to 
134. "al-Lughatu wal-Insha' ... p. 180. al-Ustadh publicized the Persian magazine Hikmat, edited by Dr 
Muhammad Mahdi al-Tabrizi on behalfoflrano-Egyptians. al-Ustadh 11October1892 p. 191. al-Ustadh was well 
aware of the earlier writings of Ahmad Zaki Pasha (1860-1934), after 1922 the "Shaykh of Arabism", noting that he 
had devoted his youth to bringing out beneficial translations from French. Notice on Zaki's translation Misr 
wal-Jighrafiyyah on geographical activity and works promoted by Egypt's' Alid dynasty: "Taqariz" (Eulogies), 
al-Ustadh 18 )ctober 1892 p. 216. Even Zaki's translations from French were often on classical Arab subjects: list, 
Daghir Masadir p. 424. 
SC 
's 1 
to bring out key 
newspapers 1877) and al-Tijarah (founded 1878) from Alexandria: al-Nadim in his 
early nationalist career published both 135• Pre-1882 constitutionalism focussed parochial 
ethnic sourness and conflict between (a) Turco-Circassians and (b) (Arab) "Egyptians", most 
sharply in the armed forces. Separate languages distinguished the two groups, and common 
Arabic enabled immigrant Christian Syrians to contribute to the still-fluid Egyptian national 
concepts: the Syrian writer Salim al-Naqqash first sloganized "Egypt for the Egyptians". 
The recent collaboration still led al-Afghani and' Abduh in 1884 to bracket such Syrian Ckris.£_'e1 
and Muslim Egyptians within a contemporary Arab entity. When Ishaq died, al-'Urwat 
al-Wuthqa lamented that "Time's inevitable misfortune untimely snatched away the adornment 
of the Arabs and the flower of literature, our close friend Adib Effendi Ishaq" 136. 
As the British consolidated their in Egypt, though, this earlier acceptance came under 
Some Syrian Christians served the British as petty clerks, intelligence agents --- or in 
newspapers 
British-subsidized 
UH'-U'-"'"' ..... for notably Faris Nimr and 
al-Muqattam, launched 1888137. al-Nadim, in al-Ustadh, wavered 
between (a) denial that collaborationist Syrian individuals were representative (other SC 
135. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim p. 140. Although it was Ishaq who set up Misr in 1877 at al-Afghani's 
request, Salim al-Naqqash proceeded to edit it: the two SCs again launched al-Tijarah together. In this pre-British 
period, Adib Ishaq and' Abdallah al-Nadim were both members of the Misr al-Fatat secret society that brought out a 
paper bearing its name from 1879. Dr' Abel al-Latif Hamzah, Adab al-Maqalat al-Suhufiyyah fi Misr v. 2 (Cairo: 
2nd ed. Dar al-Fikr al-' Arab 1957) p. 11. al-Nadim's awarding of status of honorary Egyptian to Ishaq in 1893: fn 
81. For an overview of the West-transformed Ishaq's anti-imperialist and therefore Ottomanist stance, along with 
the proto-pan-Arabism, Hourani, Arabic Thought pp. 195-6. Thomas Philipp extrapolated sectarian tensions 
between al-Nadim and other Muslim Egyptian radicals and SC intellectuals like Adib within pre-1882 Araboid 
Egyptian protest Constitionalism. Philipp, The Syrians in Egypt, 1725 - 1975 (Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag 1985) pp. 
102-4. 
136. al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa p. 240. Adib Ishaq's adaption of old classical forms of the Arabic language for 
his very anti-traditional --- and, indeed, sometimes frankly post-religious --- writings also led Christian 
Lebano-Syrian writers to characterize him and the wider modem community he served in similar Araboid ways. 
Iskandar al-' Azar (1855-1916) elegized him as "the model that inspired us in mannered rhetoric and ... devotion to 
Humanity ... He was the flower of literature in Syria and the sweet-basil of the Arabs in Egypt". Daghir, Masadir v. 
2 p. 113. al-' Azar was on the fringes of Arab ethnicist dissidence in the Ottoman Empire, including that from the 
Hijazi sharifHusayn in the lead-up to his 1916 uprising against the Turks. 
137. al-Nadim in 1893 exploited the post-religious or anti-religious connotations of SC scientism to get at 
al-Muqattam's Cromer-subsidised Syrian Christian editors while sidestepping British attempts to make nationalists 
look anti-Christian: see fn. 81. 
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intellectuals fostered resistance to the British and recovery of the Arab past138) and (b) rejection 
of the Syrian Christian immigrant community. In both stances, though, he affirmed that common 
Arabness prescribed unity between Muslim Egyptians and Syrian Christians 139 • 
Whether or not resident Syrian Christians and Egyptian Muslims united would affect the 
Egyptian territorial nation's interests (decolonization). Unlike such quasi-particularists as 
Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid later, however, al-Nadim did not pursue incorporation of Egypt-resident 
Syrians into an exclusive patriotic Egyptian nation framed by the homeland. For him in 1892 -
1894, more at stake in the tensions was the supra-Egyptian pan-Arab community of common 
language and race that spanned and could negate the territorial units in the (Middle) "East". The 
wide unity of "the Easterners" to beat off Europe and coordinate assimilation of its 
strength-conferring civilization could validate plurality of nations: al-Nadim mentions Indians 
and Afghans as well as Egyptians, Arabians and Turks all in unison facing the West. To argue 
away the division between Egyptians and Syrian Christians in Egypt, however, he virtually 
denied plurality of territorial or racial nationality for the narrower Arabo-Islamic East. "The 
Egyptians and the Syrians (al-Shamiyyin) and al-' Arab [here= "Arabians"] are united by "the 
community of language and [Ottoman] authority for all of them, of religion" (Islam) "for most of 
138. In 1893, al-Nadim counselled Egyptians not to hate this people/race <iins) with which Egyptians had 
mingled from ancient times because of a few traitors or hypocrites: the SC-edited al-Ahram was as "Eastern" 
(anti-British) as al-Ustadhas were the SC al-Ittihad and al-Mahrusah. Ordinary Egyptians should not stop 
subscribing to such SC-edited newspapers merely because one (al-Muqattam) praised the foreigners and attacked 
Egypt's aspirations and leaders (=Khedive 'Abbas). "Hanafi wa Nadim", al-Ustadh 28 February 1893 pp. 663-4. 
al-Ustadh published a tribute on the death of Salim Taqla, one of al-Ahrarri's editors, describing the paper as 
"patriotic" (=anti-British) and loved by Egyptians because it had served "the East". "Ritha'" (Elegy), al-Ustadh 23 
August 1892 pp. 15 - 16. "Our friend" Bisharah Taqla presented al-Nadim with a volume of elegies to his dead 
brother Salim. "Hadiyyah" (A Present) al-Ustadh 30 May 1893 p. 984. al-Nadim publicized the first number of 
al-Hilal, edited by SC Jurji Zaydan, that was to project the wide classical Arab past and apply pan-Arab identity to 
bracket and merge Egypt and Syria, legitimizing the presence of non-Muslim Syro-Egyptians. "al-Hilal", al-Ustadh 
30 August 1892 pp. 42-43. 
139. al-Nadim did not in his tributes to Salim Taqla specify Arabness as the connection. He did, though, 
when the resident Syrian Christian Shibli Shumayyil proposed that the dialects of Arabic be developed into separate 
literary languages: with deep hurt, al-Nadim reminded him that it was his modernist and literary writings in the 
classical that had made him popular among "the Sons of the Arabs" in Egypt and Syria, "his people". "Bab 
al-Lughah" ([Arabic] Language Section), al-Ustadh 3 January 1893 p. 474. In such transitional passages, the 
classical Arabs and their language were getting close to entailing a contemporary Arab community that spans plural 
homelands like Egypt and (Greater) Syria and overrides the Christian-Muslim divide. Even one of al-Nadim's 
angriest denunciations against SC collaborators described the SC collaborators as tasting a morsel dipped in the 
blood of their own race (jins) m very intimate terminology that in that spasm had already "become a kind of 
pan-Arabism" (Wendell). "Law Kuntum Mithlana ... ", al-Ustadh 17 January 1893 pp. 530 - 532; Wendell, Egyptian 
National Image pp. 157 - 158. Such early Arab bonding is minimized in James Jankowski, "Ottomanism and 
Arabism in Egypt, 1860 - 1914", The Muslim World v. LXX (1980) nos 3-4 pp. 249 - 250. 
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them and race for the majority of them, and contiguity which in aggregate render them 
effectively a single homeland". Race could not divide (resident Christian) Syrians and Egyptians 
because the two groups had mixed and lived together and intermarried following mutual 
conquests for so long a time as to virtually make the race Gins) of the two areas' populations 
one140. 
al-Nadim in the earlier 1890s, then, articulated elements for pan-Arab identity strong 
enough to match homeland but which did not yet do so because of situations. 
Religion. al-Nadim did not in al-Ustadh identify religion as a factor influencipg Muslim 
Egyptians' attitudes to Syrian Christians. On the other hand, he showed sensitive awareness of 
the insecurity that any member of a religious minority feels about the survival of his/her religion, 
reassuring the resident Syrians that there was no danger to their Christianity from Egypt's 
Muslim majority. "The community of religion Garni'at al-din) compelled" those Syrian 
Christians who collaborated with the British, although that alliance with the occupiers brings 
only "humiliation" in contrast to the "dignity" (al-izz) that a common patriotic struggle for 
independence offers141. It could be objected here that the Syrian Christians in standing with their 
(imperial) British coreligionists only acted rather naturally in terms of al-Nadim's repeated 
recognition that religion could sustain wide international political solidarities of linguistically 
disparate nations against a nation of another religion so long as it threatened one of their number. 
al-Nadim had interacted in depth with Christian (and Samaritan) as well as Muslim 
Christian 
"Syrians" during his exile in Palestine142. Syrian ma writers blended archaic classicist Arabic 
A.. 
140. "A Tataqallab al-Umam bi-Taqallub al-Ahwal wa Nahnu Nahnu?", al-Ustadh 20 December 1892 p. 
420. Although racially fused, contiguous Arabia, Syria and Egypt were not racially homogeneous: al-Nadim 
referred to some "Arabian lands (al-aradi al-' Arabiyyah) in which racial half-castes have no place". Ibid. The 
meaning "Arabia" for al-aradi al-' Arabiyyah here would anticipate the usage of the party of Mustafa Kamil, 
originally al-Nadim 's disciple: cf. "al-Bilad al-' Arabiyyah" (The Arabian Lands) by "Lover of the [Ottoman] State" 
in al-Liwa' 10 July 1904 p. 1, denouncing Wahhabis in Najd. Both al-Nadim and the Kamilists later, though, also 
used such phrases to indicate the wide-extending Arab lands. including Egypt. al-Nadim: the Ottoman State 
"imposed its authority over all the Arab lands" (al-buldan al-' Arabiyyah). "al-Lughatu wal-Insha"', al-Ustadh 11 
October 1892 p. 176. 
141. "Law Kuntum Mithlana ... " pp. 531-3. 
142. As the relations of Muslim Egyptians and the resident Syrian Christians deteriorated, al-Nadim 
retained fond memories of the hospitality that Christians as well as Muslims had shown him during his period of 
exile in Jerusalem and Jaffa. "A'da' al-Suriyyin" (The Enemies of the Syrians), al-Ustadh 23 May 1893 p. 933. In 
late 1892, al-Nadim published an encomium to his magazine, written in the pseudo-' Abbasid rhymed prose that he 
favored, from Jabali al-Samiri ("the Samaritan") of the Palestinian town of Nabulus. The tribute thanked al-Nadim 
the crude trans-Arab community 
period 
al-N adim and 
to 
political 
Egyptians felt towards 
non-Muslim Fertile Crescent Arabs. al-Nadim's Arab racial-linguistic nationhood transposed 
some motifs about wide classical Arabs into his discussion of the contemporary resident Syrians 
but he usually stopped one step short of terming the latter, or the contemporary Egyptians with 
whom they should rebuild relationship, "Arabs" 144• Only one or two odd passages in al-Ustadh 
objected to sniping against the Ottoman Empire from emigre Syrian Christian journalists: this 
was to alienate acculturated Kamilist pan-Islamists from the minority much more in the twentieth 
century. 
Proto-Particularis t Motifs 
Twentieth century particularism has stressed the homeland, Egypt, as the secular definant 
that under Islam continued to separate an Egyptian from other Muslims and 
Arabic-speakers. the occupation, contrast, al-Afghani, 'Abduh and al-Nadim 
most often solidified the resistance of Egyptians around religious, historic and linguistic themes 
that would foster Arab or Islamic communities extending far beyond Egypt. Proto-particularist 
concerns towards which these older pan-Islamists occasionally lurched, however, included: 
territorial homelands, awareness of the problem of division between the sects in the single 
homeland, and that the homeland-framed nation's Muslims have some continuity with a 
pre-Islamic pagan civilization. 
and the magazine for "diffusing his fields of knowledge among the two peoples, the Egyptian and the Syrian, so as 
to enlighten people's thoughts and bring people who are far removed from each other together in communication 
and to reconcile those who are at odds with one another". The letter of this non-Muslim Samaritan mentioned 
"Eastern Unity", not Arab. al-Nadim noted that he had written an unprecedented book surveying the Samaritans' 
religion, customs and history: he had collected the materials from their priests during his recent exile in Ottoman 
West Asia. The British were not to allow al-Nadim enough time back in Egypt to publish this now lost work, as he 
promised, in al-Ustadh. "Taqariz" (Tributes), al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 p. 216. 
143. al-Ustadh published a defence of the Lebanese Sa' id al-Bustani's novel Samir al-Amir. Set in Mount 
Lebanon, the melodrama condemned "ancient customs", and demanded free marriages across clan and class lines 
against the old jabal feudal aristocracy; however, al-Bustani couched his modernist, West-inspired message in 
archaist, neo-classicist high Arabic. "Riwayat Samir al-Amir" (The Novel Samir al-Amir), al-Ustadh 14 March 
1893 pp. 723 - 727. 
144. For an example of a crudely stated joint Arab nationhood between Muslim Egyptian Egyptian and SC 
intellectuals, see fn 139. 
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In an 1882 Calcutta address to a predominantly Muslim audience, al-Afghani sought to 
motivate them to acquire modern Western sciences by evoking the ancient (pre-Islamic, Hindu) 
Indians --- "the inventors of arithmetic and geometry" from whose vedas and shastras Roman and 
all later Western law derived145• Addressing Egyptians in 1878 from the columns of Misr, 
al-Afghani refuted the arguments of India's British rulers that the native population could not 
govern itself by describing the Indians as "the sons of Brahma and Mahadiv" who founded 
human laws when the British were savages146• Continuity of Indians could reinforce for 
Egyptian audiences odd --- much thinner --- statements by al-Afghani (and the young' Abduh) 
that the ancient Pharaonic Egyptians defined modern Egypt's Muslims. Keddie highlighted an 
appeal by al-Afghani during unrest that finally culminated in 'Urabi's revolt, to take inspiration 
from the ancient Egyptians who built the pyramids, and overthrow tyranny147• 
al-Afghani and 'Abduh occasionally opposed ill-feeling and disunity between Muslims 
and non-Muslims in both India 148 and Egypt. In 1884, they tried to dispel in al- 'Urwat 
al-Wuthqa reports of tension between Muslims and Copts in the town of J arja in Upper Egypt: 
they admitted, here, that communal fighting had occurred during the British conquest149. Keddie 
painted al-Afghani as a precursor of the "composite" Indian nationalism of the early twentieth 
century, and of Egyptian particularism: both used a pagan antiquity to unite two sects150. This is 
somewhat one-eyed in terms of her own data. al-Afghani made clear to readers of Misr in 1878 
that only the extreme rapacity of the British made possible in India the anti-imperialist "alliance 
of sects ... holding such extremely opposite views that, under other circumstances, they would 
have gladly drunk one another's blood" 151 • For him, the incompatibility inherent in Islam and 
Hinduism divided Indians. More than uniting Hindus and Muslim Indians for joint struggle, 
145. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism pp. 58-9. 
146. al-Afghani in Misr in late 1878 quoted in Keddie's Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-"Afghani" p. 105. 
14 7. Keddie, "Pan-Islamism as Protonationalism", The Journal of Modern History March 1969 pp. 22-23. 
148. al-Afghani in 1887 collaborated with the non-Muslim Sikh Dalip Singh, last ruler of the Sikh 
Kingdom of the Punjab, in issuing from Moscow manifestoes calling for uprisings against the British in India. 
Kedourie, Afghani and' Abduh, pp. 56-57. The Punjab's ruling family had already figured in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa 
as victims of British manipulation and tyranny. "al-Lurd Northbrook Hakim Misr al-Jadid", al-'Urwat p. 375. The 
magazine also translated an Urdu letter from Lahore that accused the British of trying to divide Muslims from 
Hindus lest Indians of all creeds, starving, launch a joint uprising. "Lahore", al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa pp. 390-393. 
149. Art. "al-Sudan wa Misr" (The Sudan and Egypt), al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa p. 309. 
150. For Keddie's characterization of al-Afghani as promoting in India a prototype of later 
territorial-linguistic, sects-integrative, "composite" Indian nationalism, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-"Afghani" pp. 
157-160. 
151. 1878 Misr article by al-Afghani, Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din p. 102. 
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al-Afghani's images of a pagan antiquity adapted motifs about India from classical Arab-Islamic 
books to give Indian Muslims racial confidence that they could assimilate Western science and 
modernity to beat back imperialists152• In post-1892 discourses in Istanbul, al-Afghani urged 
Arab Muslims and the Ottoman State to conduct Islamic instruction courses for illiterate 
syncretist Muslims in India to purge beliefs and practices they had borrowed from their 
"idolatrous" Hindu neighbors 153 • 
Nor did al-Afghani evoke Pharaonic antiquity to integrate Copts and Muslims in joint 
resistance to Britain. His 1878 denunciations of immemorial governmental oppression and 
foreign conquerors --- among whom he included the Muslim Arabs --- were meant to incite the 
masses against the Khedivial house of Muhammad 'Ali and were anti-monarchical or 
constitutionalist. Although not directed to the Muslim-Coptic division, such statements of 
al-Afghani --- and by 'Abduh prior to his decision to serve under the British in 1888154 --- did 
suggest that Egyptians were some sort of collectivity continuous since the Pharaohs that had 
absorbed all conquerors in some sense. Neither offered data of Coptic participation in classical 
Arabo-Islamic civilization. 
Considering their awareness that Coptic-Muslim conflict could help Britain strengthen 
her grip, it could not be said that al-Afghani and' Abduh in al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa structured their 
152. 'Aziz Ahmad, "Afghani's Indian Contacts" pp. 476-504. Ahmad suggested as classical Arab sources 
of al-Afghani's respect for classical Hindu-Sanskritic civilization al-Biruni's Tahqiq ma lil-Hind and al-Jahiz' Fakhr 
al-Sudan 'alal-Bidan. Keddie's own quotations identify archaic, classical Arab images that helped precondition 
al-Afghani to voice Sanskritophilia in India: "we can say that the Indians were the inventors of arithmetic and 
geometry", adopted by the Arabs and in turn transferred to Europe (1882 Calcutta speech). Keddie, Sayyid Jamal 
ad-Din p. 160. 
153. al-Maghribi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani pp. 72-73. Garcin de Tassy noted in 1831 "numerous 
pilgrimages" by uneducated Indian Muslims "to the tombs of saintly personages of whom some are not even 
Muslims". Gustave Le Bon in the late nineteenth century noted that among the Indian Muslim common people 
"numerous saints are equally deified and confounded with the old divinities of the Brahmanical pantheon ... 
Mahomet and the Musulman saints are deities of the same rank as the other Hindu deities. The ceremonies are 
mutually borrowed from the rites, and sometimes unite partisans, of diverse creeds." Quoted by Rabindra Narayan 
Ghose, "The Civilization of Northern India: A Contribution to the Study of Hindu-Muslim Relations --- III", Dawn 
Magazine (Calcutta) July 1911 pp. 114-115. Unfavorable images of Hindu caste stratification recurred over decades 
in the circles of al-Afghani's Arab disciples: 'Abduh as Mufti of Egypt argued that Islam made perfection possible 
for all: it is not like Brahminism which divides men into castes, the lim_its of which cannot be overstepped. Adams, 
Islam and Modernism p. 16. 
154. The young Muhammad' Abduh, al-Afghani's disciple, wrote that the ancient "Kingdom of Egypt" 
possessed a "mature civilization when that of others was still in its infancy". Wendell, Egyptian National Image 
p.186. Subsequently, in an 1888 letter to the Shaykh al-Islam in Constantinople,' Abduh described "the people of 
Egypt" as a continuous entity that had racially and culturally absorbed all conquerors over "thousands of years". 
Ibid p. 188. 
two 
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1879156. 
addressed the group fighting 1881 as "sons Egypt": al-' Arab were 
formations in the Egyptian forces recruited from Egypt's nomads although 'Urabi was "the jewel 
in the Arab necklace" 157• al-Nadim thus made his audiences aware of the homeland, Egypt, and 
"the Egyptians" as the inner entity for which they were struggling. al-Nadim in the 1890s 
sometimes betrayed apprehension that the Copts might ally with the British occupier, Christians 
like them. He therefore structured his Egyptian homeland to give them an inherent place: 
al-Ustadh was careful to write in a respectful tone of the Coptic Church and the Coptic 
community158• His young Egyptian disciple Mustafa Kamil took up his integrative concept of 
homeland, extending it in relation to the pan-Islamic and historical Arab identities into which 
al-Nadim had blurred the Egyptians. 
al-Nadim often evoked the current territorial homeland to integrate Copts and Muslims 
against the British not Egypt's particular pagan al-Ustadh did give some publicity 
to ancient in local museums, noting publication an guidebook to 
the Gizah Museum by Ahmad Kamal Pasha159 . However, Kamal's Egyptological publications 
well into the 1940s were to convince many secular-educated Muslim Egyptians that the ancient 
Egyptians were racially and their language (and monotheism!) related to the Semitic Arabians 
(B 439 - 444). 
155. al- 'Urwat al-Wuthqa in 1884 argued the freedom of conscience of non-Muslims in the classical and 
post-classical Muslim states and that they rose unimpeded to the highest positions: this was, however, a side-issue in 
its argument with Europeans as to whether Muslims or Europe had practised "fanaticism". Art. "al-Ta'assub", 
al- 'Urwat al-Wuthqa p. 44. 
156. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 49-50. 
157. Ibid p. 210. 
158. For sympathetic coverage by al-Nadim of the Coptic community, wracked by conflict between (a) the 
patriarchate and (b) some clergy see "Ghibtat Batriyark al-Aqbat" (His Eminence the Patriarch of the Copts), 
al-Ustadh 7 February 1893 pp. 598-599. In further arguing the oneness of the Egyptian people spanning Copts and 
Muslims, al-Nadim called for the setting-up of some bisectarian organization to integrate the two sections under the 
patronage of the Khedive 'Abbas. "al-Muslimuna wal-Aqbat" (The Muslims and Copts) al-Ustadh 21 March 1893 
pp. 749-750. He praised the nine years-old Society for the Peservation of Coptic History in Asyut: it had recorded 
the death of Khedive Tawfiq and the accession of his son' Abbas II. "Tahni'ah" (Congratulation), al-Ustadh 27 
September 1892 p. 143. 
159. "al-Khulasat al-Wajizah wa Dalil al-Mutafarrij 'ala Mathaf al-Jizah", al-Ustadh 28 March 1893, pp. 
756-7. The article's title is that of Ahmad Kamal's book. 
the generations that 
the earlier were the indigenous states that matched 
the religion-focused international strength exemplified by modern Europe. More than the other 
two, al-Nadim evoked the territorial homeland but fused it with a delocalizing literary language: 
Mustafa Karnil and his al-Hizb al-Watani independence movement were to keep the two fused as 
the basis for political independence. al-Afghani and al-Nadim's sense of religion as one key 
instrument with which any society or camp, Muslim or other, integrated itself vis-a-vis rivals 
politicized and relativized religions in a utilitarian way. This deleted much of late-traditional 
Islam160: but could accommodate a nuanced awareness of new secularoid ideologies in "Europe" 
as the long-term pan-Christian enemy camp161 requiring a wide pan-Muslim counter-camp. The 
perception of international relations in terms of religion-glued conflicting camps, 
Eastern-Muslim versus Western-Christian, was long to retard Egypt-centric identifications. 
Particularist publicists the 1920s were to it very hard to wrench the minds 
modern-educated classical or 
160. In 1892, al-Nadim depicted al-Azhar in al-Ustadh as an institution in which students were debilitated 
by sickness or skipped most lectures: its courses did not equip its graduates to read classical Arabic high literature. 
He disliked the unstructured, individualized relationship students had to their shaykh in traditional Sunni Islam and 
urged Egyptians to transform al-Azhar into a (Western-style?) university that would offer the modem mathematical 
and other sciences as well as religion and in which the students would read political newspapers. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah 
al-Nadim pp. 130-132. Cf. Delanoue, loc cit p. 112. Prior to the British conquest, al-Nadim was wont to flay 
traditional Egyptian Islam, categorizing "the charlatans" of the Sufi mystic brotherhoons with such social evils as 
illiteracy, alcoholism and hashish --- the mystics and divines exploited the peasants just like the magicians and 
village usurers. Delanoue, op. cit. p. 88. It is to be noted, though, that Sufis gave al-Nadim shelter during his 
decade underground after the British crushed 'Urabi: he himself belonged to the Khalwatiyyah order. Ibid p. 94. 
161. al-Nadim 's alertness to the centrality of Christianity in the life and policies of European states was not 
unnuanced: his Syrian Christian and European friends had left him well aware of the erosion of traditional religious 
belief in the secularizing Western societies. Ignoring --- perhaps rightly --- militant anti-clericism and rationalism in 
West Europe, al-Nadim portrayed that all "civilized" Europeans had fused religious and secular education: every 
school had a church in which all pupils were required to pray before, and to close, the school day: the mathematics 
and physics textbooks were interspersed with religious principles. Educated Europeans who followed "free thought" 
still, although post-religious (la yadinuna bi-din), participated fully with their families in those Christian rituals that 
Europeans had made compulsory "for children, women, youths and the aged". The European free-thinker was 
careful to close his shop on all Christian holy days, however much he disbelieved in them, scrupulously called in the 
priest as a family member died, and far from criticizing Christianity in any public or elite literary gathering, penned 
vigorous apologetics to defend it against denigration. The Easterners had to duplicate religion as the tool with which 
Europe had achieved the "social unity" that sustained its modernity and power. "Tarbiyat al-Abna"', al-Ustadh 18 
October 1892 p. 203. Cf. fns. 8, 81. al-Nadim advised any Egyptian freethinkers to imitate this participatory respect 
by their European senior brethren for religion as the great social cement. Delanoue, loc cit p. 102. 
1 -
or 
1930s, 
context incessant war between Crusaderist-Western and Arab-Muslim camps throughout 
history, somewhat as al-Afghani and al-Nadim had (Ch. 9: B 153-4; cf. 'Abdallah 'Inan B 55-6). 
al-Nadim's drive to generalize supra-Egyptian neo-classical Arabic was to be carried 
forward more totalistically by Mustafa Kamil's independence movement up to 1914. Some in 
the more insular circle of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid occasionally voiced pragmatic unenthusiasm. 
Nonetheless, in the period of the post-1922 Egyptian particularist state such former youthful 
disciples of Lutfi as Muhammad Husayn Haykal and Taha Husayn would increasingly promote 
extended, modified classical Arabic in the name of the great classical Arab tradition. For them, 
the territorial entity of Egypt retained presence in the face of the definitive wide classical Arabs 
but failed to sustain distinctness on the plane of formal language. The pioneer Islamo-Arab 
nationalist Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in the 1930s and 1940s achieved the apogee of the attitude 
that the Arabs' Arabic must be extended to serve as the medium for all modern 
al-Nadim's stands on language issues would foster Egypt the orientation that the 
classical Arabs' Arabic is the core of the nationhood of Egyptians, that finally led to linguistic 
pan-Arab nationalism, in place of geography-determined Egyptian particularism. 
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CHAPTER 3: BRITISH COLONIAL RULE, AND THE CULTURAL AND POLITICAL FORMATION OF 
MUSTAFA KAMIL'S INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT. 
This chapter sets out features of British rule (1882 - 1922) that constricted the size, the career and political 
opportunities, and the Arab culture of (in particular urban) secularizing-educated Muslim Egyptians. It traces the 
development of the Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) independence movement of Mustafa Kamil as the instrument 
to meet the class and cultural needs of that bullied acculturated Muslim bourgeoisie. Splintered cultural resources 
and connections to other Arabic-educated cultural elites enabled the Kamilists to unevenly develop Arabic culture 
and Islamic ideology in the face of imperial deculturization. From the outset, the Kamilists lobbied support from the 
true liberal West to evict Britain. Instead of instrumentalities, this Chapter focuses the acculturation-inculcated 
emotional needs for humane community with Westerners in such outreach. 
The Kamilist independence movement passed through three rough periods: 
1. 1893 - 1908: Under Kamil's direction, the movement concentrated on organizing the 
acculturating-educated students and professionals, a small but crucial minority in Egypt's population. 
2. 1908 - 1910: Under the leadership of Muhammad Farid, al-Hizb al-Watani, the political party that the 
late Kamil founded, reached out to the urban proletariat and lumpen proletariat by establishing workers' night 
schools, trade unions and to the peasantry through rural cooperatives. The Party was in the process of becoming a 
mass independence movement, a united front of a range of classes. But the British, by closing its newspapers and 
waves of arrests, drove al-Hizb al-Watani's leaders into exile. 
3. The period of exile. 
COLONIALISM AND THE KAMILIST RESPONSE 
The Consolidation of British Rule 
In 1882 a British expeditionary force defeated the first Egyptian proto-nationalist movement at Tai 
al-Kabir. National feeling remained stunned for many years by the shock of defeat and by Britain's military power: 
over a decade passed before a new generation began to develop the organizations necessary to lead independence 
movements. From 1883 to 1907, Egypt was ruled in a "Veiled Protectorate" by Britain's Consul-General Sir Evelyn 
Baring (later Lord Cromer). Cromer left "an appearance of rule" to the Khedives and (mainly Turkish-speaking) 
Egyptian Government ministers1 while flanking the latter with British "advisers" who were the 
administrators in the Ministries. 
Britain's progressive extension of control in the administration threatened the economic 
livelihood and career prospects of the emerging Muslim student and professional class2• 
Lt-Colonel P.G. Elgood observed that by the early twentieth century Cromer had 
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placed Englishmen, Advisers in name, Controllers in fact, at the side .o! Minis:ers ... The 
actual government of the country had passed into the hands of the Bntish Advisers who 
ruled through an increased British Inspectorate. But ... presently E~glishmen in the 
Ministries in Cairo ruled every Department of State. As the Egyptian head of such a 
Department died or was pensioned off, his title and pay would be taken by the 
Englishman, and the latter's place be filled by a newcomer of the same race. . 
This anglicization of the new Central Administration took time to complete ... But ... m 
1914 there were few Egyptians controlling any State business of importance. 
Elgood noted the resentment among students and their parents, the overall "professional 
class", at the influx of British recruits: "no boy attends a Government school in Egypt who is not 
inspired mainly with the ambition of entering later the Civil Service"3. No wonder that Mustafa 
Kamil, from the outset of his career, recruited heavily among city-based students and less 
established professionals and by his death in 1908 had almost completely mobilized the 
secular-stream student class. 
The Larn:er West. Important to understand the relationships of Kamil and other 
Westernizing-educated Muslim intellectuals with the general West is that the main threat to 
Britain's rule in Egypt long came from the reluctance of other European states to accord it 
recognition. France's economic and ed~cational interests and resident nationals in Egypt had 
exceeded Britain's prior to the occupation. An agency representing Egypt's European creditors, 
the Caisse de la Dette Publique, had been set up in May 1876 with control of Egyptian finances 
to ensure payment of Egypt's debt. This international Commission maintained a considerable 
1. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party, 1892-1919" in P.M. Holt (ed.) Political and 
Social Change in Modern Egvpt (London: OUP 1968) p. 308. "Understanding their ambivalent position in the 
Egyptian population, the British chose mostly Turko-Circassian collaborators to sit as figure-heads over the 
ministries. The exceptions to this rule were three Muslim Egyptians" (ie. Arab-Muslim Egyptians) "and three 
minority sect officials of the total twenty-five ministers who held office from 1882 to 1908". Jeffrey Collins, The 
Egyptian Elite Under Cromer 1882 - 1907 (Ann Arbor PhD microfiche nd) p. 223. 
2. During the period of British colonial rule, "religion as well as nationality was highly correlated with rank 
and power within the state apparatus. Non-Muslims were extremely numerous among the government elite, 
constituting 18.84% of the total although they accounted for only 7 .7% of the national population in 1897. 
Non-Muslims were particularly numerous in the ministries of Finance (56.52%), the Mixed Administrations 
(44.76%), Health (43.75%) and Justice (23.59%)". Collins, Egyptian Elite p. 243. 
3. Elgood, Egypt and the Army pp. 10, 17. "The Milner Commission of 1920, sent out to study the causes 
of the nationalist disturbances of 1919, reported that Egyptians occupied less than one-fourth of the higher posts in 
the government bureaucracy". Robert L. Tignor, British Colonial Rule in Egypt 1882 - 1914 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1966) pp. 180-1. In his 1907 assessment of the retiring Lord Cromer, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid noted 
that he extended the sphere of personal freedom in larger society but subordinated Egyptian officials to English 
ones: "many gifted young Egyptians began to shun the government service". Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the 
Egyptian National Image, From its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Savyid (Berkeley: University of California Press 
1972) pp. 295 - 301. 
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say in how Britain directed Egypt's economy under the Occupation. Through her participation in 
the Caisse, and the extraterritorial rights of her foreign residents, France could always obstruct 
Britain's government of Egypt until the 1904 Entente Cordiale. 
In 1892 Britain's puppet Khedive Tawfiq died. He was succeeded by his seventeen-years 
old, Austrian-educated son' Abbas. Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi II (reigned 1892-1914) wanted truly 
to rule in Egypt and thus was in consistent conflict with Egypt's actual ruler Cromer --- an 
adversary relationship crucial for development of nationalist organizations during the Veiled 
Protectorate. In an 1893 ministerial crisis, the Khedive dismissed Mustafa Fahrni, who had 
Cromer' s confidence, from the Prime Ministership. Cromer forced 'Abbas to appoint Riyad 
Pasha as a compromise, and make a formal promise to follow the advice of the British in all 
important matters thenceforth4• In the 1894 "Frontier Incident" Kitchener, Sirdar (Commander) 
of the Egyptian Army, attempted to resign when the Khedive disparaged British officers in the 
Army. Cromer maintained Kitchener in his position and forced' Abbas to express satisfaction 
with the roles of the British officers in the Egyptian army. 
In 1898 a French military expedition, led by Captain Marchand, attempted to establish 
French predominance in the Upp er Nile Valley, bringing France and Britain to the brink of war 
until he surrendered to British forces at Fashoda. Egyptians opposing British rule had hoped to 
win the aid of France to dislodge the British from the Nile Valley. The Anglo-French Entente 
Cordiale of 8 April 1904 ended their lingering hopes that France ever would act as such a third 
force. In return for freedom of action to subjugate Morocco 
the government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct 
the action of Great Britain in that country (Egypt) by asking that a limit of time be fixed 
for the British occupation, or in any other manner5. 
4. Tignor, op cit p. 105. Mustafa Fahrni was perhaps the most compliant of the Turco-Circassian 
politicians whom Cromer hand-picked for high office. Louis Brehier, a contemporary, described him as "un 
Algerien des plus dociles" --- while Cromer called him "a weak man" whose docility and "well-known sympathy 
with English policy" kept him in office as Prime Minister for thirteen unbroken years. Citations Collins, Egyptian 
Elite pp. 225 - 226; cf. ibid p. 224 for other confidential British assessments of other "dummies". The 1894 clash 
between 'Abbas and Cromer over Fahrni remained etched for decades in the mind of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid despite 
his view that the Khedive was despotic. Lutfi (1908: al-Jaridah), Safahat Matwiyyah min Ta'rikh al-Harakat 
al-Istig.Jaliyyah fi Misr (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Misriyyah 1946) p. 145. 
5. Art. "Egypt", Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th ed. 1910-1911) v. ix p. 17. The French recognized 
Britain's predominance in Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco. Some scope remained to the nationalists, 
though, to link up with French interests to obstruct British power. As late as 1909, the French dragged their feet in 
cooperating with Gorst in his enforcement of the 1881 Press Law against nationalist Arabic journals as a tactic to 
extract more British support in tightening French control over Morocco. Peter Mellini, Sir Eldon Gorst. the 
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Cromer retired in May, 1907. His successor, Eldon Garst (British Consul-General 
1907-1911), achieved an alliance with the Khedive against the nationalists. Garst struggled to 
check the annual influx into the Egyptian Government departments of British recruits who would 
take jobs from the educated and professional Egyptians inclined to support nationalism6. While 
conciliating the strata from which the nationalists recruited, Garst cracked down harder than 
Cromer on the organized nationalists themselves. He applied the 1881 Press Law, which Cromer 
had never invoked, to shackle and ban al-Hizb al-Watani's newspapers, and jailed or drove into 
exile its spokesmen and leaders. Gorst's alliance with the Khedive isolated Britain politically by 
driving the constitutionalist al-Ummah/al-Jaridah group, that had collaborated with Cromer to 
some extent, towards the radical nationalists7• 
In November 1908, Garst appointed the Copt Burrus Ghali Pasha as Prime Minister in 
succession to Mustafa Pasha Fahrni, who had held the post (with one interruption in 1893-5) 
under Cromer since 1891. In February 1910, Egypt's quasi-parliamentary General Assembly 
overwhelmingly rejected a measure to extend the Suez Canal concession for forty years beyond 
1968. A few days later, a Muslim militant nationalist, al-Wardani, assassinated Ghali who 
advocated the extension8. The assassination heightened conflict between Coptic and Muslim 
Overshadowed Proconsul (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press 1977) pp. 182, 285. 
6. Gorst wrote of his attempts to encourage "the Egyptian official class" in his autobiographical notes, 
excerpted by Tignor, British Colonial Rule p. 292. 
7. Gorst's rigid and uncompromising rejection of organized nationalist movements was illustrated by his. 
1909 advice to the Foreign Office in London not to receive the moderate Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, associated with the 
Ummah Party, who was warning the British not to apply the Press Law. Lutfi said that he had refused many 
overtures from the Germans. Mellini, Sir Eldon Gorst p. 182. 
8. The assassination of Ghali by al-Tadamun al-Akhawi --- the "Fraternal Brotherhood", one of the militant 
secret societies spun off from the Patriotic Party as its base broadened under Farid --- brought out the (still 
incomplete) transition of some acculturated Muslim Egyptians in al-Hizb al-Watani from a more traditional sectarian 
to a secular-territorialist ideology of political community. Ghali's Muslim assassin Ibrahim al-Wardani, educated as 
a pharmacist in Switzerland, was no pan-Islamist and regarded multi-sectarian territorial political nations as the 
norm. In a private letter predating the killing, he had written that "I had opposed the admission of Copts into our 
[secret] Society, not because they are Copts, the Copts being our brothers and we making up with them the children 
of a single homeland, but because the Copts are a small sect in the land and experience has shown that a small sect 
will seek shelter and protection with the government and fanatically take its part. This the Muslims do in India: they 
align themselves with the English government against the Hindus and sons of their homeland because the Hindus are 
more than they in number". al-Muqattam 4 April 1910. Thus, independence movements should not have any 
sectarian restriction, but temporary sectarianisms in larger society had to so limit them for a time. For the Ghali 
assassination as another motif in tensions between the Jaridist-Siyasahist stream of acculturated nationalism and 
Westerners, B 492 fn. In regard to the growing connections of al-Hizb al-Watani to militantly anti-imperialist Hindu 
rather than Muslim Indians, the noted Indian revolutionary Khrishnavarna offered Egyptians a thousand francs prize 
in memory of "martyr Wardani". Goldschmidt, "The National Party from Spotlight to Shadow", Asian and African 
Studies(Haifa)v.16:1,March 1982p.17. 
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communalists in Egypt. Garst admitted in his report for 1910 that his policies for containing 
discontent in Egypt had failed. 
Sentences of imprisonment against al-Hizb al-Watani leaders and suppression of its 
newspapers forced the party to become an exile movement, operating from Europe and the 
Ottoman State9. Kitchener, however, won the landowner-led Ummah party back into 
collaboration, by reorganizing a new advisory Legislative Assembly with high property 
qualifications that favored landowners involved in the Ummah. He also, however, made modest 
efforts to conciliate the peasantry with agricultural and hydraulic projects, distribution of lands, 
and the first small-scale extension of modern health services to the countryside10. 
Turco-Circassians. The political and social importance of Egypt-resident 
Turco-Circassians culturally linked to the Turkish core of the Ottoman State influenced the turns 
supra-Egyptian identifications took from 1882 to 1922. Until the 1904 Entente Cordiale, the 
young Turkish-speaking Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi II stood at the very head of resistance to 
Britain's ever-tightening control over Egypt's government and institutions. Even after,' Abbas 
fell into intermittent conflicts with the British ending with his deposition in 1914. Abrasive 
attempts by such British figures as Cromer and Kitchener to subject the Khedive would enhance 
Muslim Egyptians' identification of him and his Turco-Circassian family and court as heading 
the Arabic-speaking Egyptian population. The Turkish-speaking 'Abbas declared himself a 
Turkish national after World War 111 and, like many Turco-Circassians, usually went annually to 
Constantinople for the Islamic feast of Bairam12• The British exploited the House of Muhammad 
'Ali's Ottoman State links to wrest the Ministry of Waqfs from' Abbas. Overall, Egypt's 
Turco-Circassian Khedivial royalty and declining landowning aristocracy were one major factor 
that continually involved Arab Egyptians in the Turkish-speaking (more than the 
Arabic-speaking sector) of the Ottoman Empire, although 'Abbas did entangle Egyptians in its 
9. For British actions under Kitchener against the Watani Party and the latter's drift into exile, see 
Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" pp. 327-329. 
10. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 315 - 318. Beaman --- a vitriolic critic of Kitchener familiar with 
Arabic and Muslims --- had the impression that his 1911 "Five Faddans Law" won the Consul-General wide 
popularity among the poorer fallahin: Arden G.H. Beaman, The Dethronement of the Khedive (London: n.p. 1929) 
p. 55. The Law prohibited expropriation for debts of the land. houses or equipment of peasants owning five feddans 
of land or less. It proved unenforceable and "various devices of the moneylenders, short of outright expropriation, 
deprived the peasants of real control over their land". Tignor, OJ) cit pp. 239-240. 
11. Beaman, Dethronement p. 105. 
12. Ibid p. 72. 
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early Arab nationalism as well through his fanning of the "Arab Caliphate" idea (Chs. 5 and 6). 
The Development of Nationalist Parties 
Westernizing-Educated Students. Mustafa Kamil's first major appearance in the history 
of Egyptian nationalism was at eighteen, when he led a demonstration of students in the higher 
schools of Cairo, notably the Egyptian government-run School of Law, before the offices of the 
Syrian-Christian owned pro-British al-Muqattam in 1893. The Khedive subsidized higher law 
studies abroad through which Kamil obtained the licence in law from the University of Toulouse 
in 189413 • 
When Kamil returned to Egypt in that year, the former 'Urabist Latif Salim had founded 
the secret Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani); Kamiljoined and soon was the secret society's 
leader. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid participated with Mustafa Kamil in 1896 in the secret Society for 
the Revival of the Nation (al-Jam'iyyah li' -Ihya' al-Watan) of which 'Abbas was the head14• 
Appeals to Europe. Support by the Khedive was critical for enabling Kamil to commence 
his role as spokesman for Egypt's independence aspirations in Europe. It was with palace funds 
that he sailed to Paris in May 1895 intending to exploit the world-wide colonial rivalry between 
Britain and France to persuade French politicians and public to press Britain to carry out her 
frequently-promised evacuation from the Nile Valley15. In Paris, Kamil in "his first international 
act" presented a petition to the French Chamber of Deputies in the name of the Egyptian people, 
appealing for help from France which had declared the Rights of Man and liberated so many 
peoples16• Kamil also met in Paris the unusually non-imperial French nationalist Juliette Adam 
(1836-1936), with whom he maintained a son-like friendship and political collaboration until his 
death; henceforth her journal La Nouvelle Revue published his articles campaigning for Egypt's 
independence17. According to Robert L. Tignor, "during the 1890s Mustafa Kamil probably 
13. Financial dependence of Kamil on the Khedive in regard to his early student magazine al-Madrasah and 
his legal studies in France speculated by Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 312. 
14. Ibidp. 317. 
15. Ibid p. 313. 
16. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (London OUP paperback 1970) p. 204. 
17. Juliette Adam's Anglophobia was of long standing when the precocious young Kamil met her. During 
Britain's 1881-1882 seizure of Egypt, she had blasted the French minister of Foreign Affairs for recalling France's 
Consul General when he supported Egyptian independence, although France had had the predominant place in Egypl 
since the rise of Muhammad 'Ali. Adam was no French jingo, even though she did on the eve of the British 
conquest stress all the capital that France had sunk into Egypt, that her Suez canal had transformed the country and 
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spent as much time in Europe trying to propagandize the Egyptian question as he did in Egypt" 18. 
However, the failure at Fashoda of Marchand's 1898 expedition made clear to Kamil and his 
comrades (and to the Khedive) that France would not risk war to drive Britain from the Nile 
Valley. 
As the Khedive 'Abbas moved in the wake of France's backdowns to accommodate 
himself somewhat to the strengthening British presence, his relations with Kamil cooled. 
Throughout the 1890's, Kamil and his followers had widened their internal oratory and 
journalism as a means to expand their following in Egypt, and thus develop a basis for action 
against British rule independent of either the Khedive or Europe. Kamil had opened his activity 
as a spellbinding public orator in early 1896 when he addressed two public meetings in 
Alexandria, at which he called for British evacuation19. He had published extensively in the 
anti-British al-Ahram (SC) and al-Mu'ayyad from 1894, and on 2 January 1900 he launched his 
own daily, al-Liwa'. The Khedive "may have subsidized [al-Liwa] for a time to annoy 
Cromer"20• 
An instrument used by Kamil and his colleagues to politicize and organize the strata of 
students and secularizing-educated professionals was the Nadil-Madaris al-'Ulya (Higher 
Schools Club) "which brought together the students and graduates of Egypt's several 
professional schools in a distinctly nationalist milieu"21 . Kamil in 1906, as a development of his 
mobilization of the student element, "organized a strike at the School of Law which began a long 
period of student agitation that only came to an end when political activity itself came to an end 
under the military government of 1952"22• The British authorities obviously found it difficult to 
counter this new weapon of the independence movement. The 
that her citizens there numbered 40,000 compared to a paltry 7,000 resident Britishers. She wanted France to be the 
partner rather than ruler of the Egyptians. In her liberal pan-nationalism, "to be national elevates one's sentiments tc 
active admiration for the patriotism and love of nation that others equally feel": she had supported "the Greek heroe~ 
of 1821, the great Hungarians of 1849, the great Italian unificationists, the Slavs fighting for liberation from 
Germanic tyranny" --- and the brief pre-British nationalist Egyptian parliamentarism, as much directed to loosening 
French as British control. Ella-Rachel Arie, "Juliette Adam et le Nationalisme Egyptien", Orient 1962 pp. 121, 123, 
138. 
18. Tignor, British Colonial Rule p. 268. 
19. One meeting was in Arabic for Egyptians, the other primarily for European residents, whom Kamil 
wanted to conciliate so that the British could not coopt them. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 315. 
20. Ibid p. 319. 
21. Ibid p. 319. 
22. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 208. 
an 
to 
back to 
The Jaridists. While Kamil's independence movement broadened out, a group of 
Arab-Egyptian landlords, prominent government officials and young intellectuals launched in 
March 1907 the daily al-Jaridah around which in September 1907 the Hizb al-Ummah or Party of 
the Nation formed. The national issue was important in the birth of this party. Ahmad Lutfi 
al-Sayyid had originally called the group's first meeting following the outbreak January 1906 
of Britain's territorial dispute with the Ottoman State over Tabah: he accepted Britain's claim to 
be fighting Egypt's legal battle for her, and was furious that the pan-Islamic solidarity with the 
Ottoman State expressed by Kamil's movement, seemed to weaken commitment to Egyptian 
sovereignty in Sinai24 • The class of Arab-Muslim large landowners who sustained al-Jaridah and 
the later Party was somewhat bound by economic interest to the British colonial administration. 
George Lloyd viewed the Ummah Party as the "result of his [Cromer' s] efforts" to group 
"moderate-minded men of influence and standing" into an "active organization" that could 
"check the (Kamilist) Nationalist Party's campaign" to end British rule25 . officialdom, 
near panic before the wide opposition expressed by Egyptians in the wake of the Tabah and 
Dinshaway incidents, thus actively stimulated the formation of al-Jaridah and the Ummah party. 
Yet Cromer' s, and especially Garst' s, restrictive stances towards the development of 
parliamentary institutions made infuriatingly clear how secondary for British policy at that time 
was the possibility of collaboration with this Egyptian group26. 
Writers of the al-Jaridah/Hizb al-Ummah group viewed the political scene at their 
group's emergence much as alarmed British officials did --- that Mustafa Kamil, following 
Tabah and Dinshaway, was reaching out beyond the student and professional classes to "the 
common people" (al- 'ammah) and that a destructive mass independence movement might result. 
23. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations (New York: 
Praeger 1969) p. 169. 
24. Ibid pp. 167 - 168. 
25. George Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer (London: 2 vols, MacMillan 1933-1934) v. l p. 50. 
26. In his final report before retiring, all Cromer would hold out in the way of a prospect of constitutional 
advance was an international Legislative Council in which resident foreigners would have parity with Egyptians ---
enraging for Hizb al-Um mah and the Jaridists who wanted to become political partners. Mellini, Garst p. 132. For 
bitter 1908 criticisms by Lutfi that the British under Gorst allied with the despotic Khedive to constrict the powers of 
the Consultative Assembly to those of a municipal council, sec Lutfi. Safahat Matwiyyah pp. 122-129. 
al-Jaridah in 19 was m 
masses 
to 
limitations of expression (i.e. a crackdown) threatened. parry of the 
notables of the people" (=Arab-Egyptian large landowners) chose Lutfi al-Sayyid, and launched 
al-Jaridah as his forum, to "bring the mood of the people to moderation to enable it to obtain its 
reasonable demands through peaceful ... argument, so that its demands be not discredited before 
European public opinion". Lutfi, representing Hizb al-Ummah, sought dialogue with the British 
instead of organizing resistance to them. He could not, the al-Jaridah writer admitted, hope to 
win to his side the masses, in need of prolonged re-education as preparation for eventual 
independence: 
A nation like the Egyptian, caught in a period of development, still emergent and 
struggling up the stairs of civilization --- still, indeed, in their first stage --- cannot 
possibly be fit to turn moderate principles to use save after the passage of long time. That 
is the reason the common people did not endorse the principles that Lutfi Bey's articles 
expounded, although they were the most eloquent ever written on their subject, modern in 
style, their approach logical and oratorical in a way that the intellectual elite of educated 
f "7 people would pre er~ . 
The bond uniting the people of property and position who headed the Ummah Party was 
that they were all personae non gratae at the Khedive's (Turcophone) palace (al-' Aqqad, 1953)28 . 
Lutfi 1907 advocated that Egypt be led by an enlightened elite of "government officials, 
members of the liberal professions and the a'yan" ([Arab-Egyptian] land-owning gentry/affluent 
people)29 . The elitist Ummah party proved important for Egypt's long-term twentieth century 
political development. It provided leaders for the Wafd and leadership and policies for the Party 
of Liberal Constitutionalists when these fo1med following World War 1. Several 
of the acculturated intellectuals whose post-World War 1 community thought we 
examine -- e.g. Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Mahmud 'Azmi, Taha Husayn, Ahmad Hasan 
al-Zayyat -- were during the British Occupation youthful disciples of Lutfi or published in 
27. Ibrahim Ramzi, "Mudir al-Jaridah wastiqalatuh" (al-Jaridah's Editor and His Resignation), al-Jaridah 14 
December 1914 p. 1. 
28. Wendell's analysis of the composition and following of Hizb al-Um mah in E!Zvptian National fmaQe 
pp. 216 - 217. 
29. Quoted ibid p. 283. 
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objectives of the immediate evacuation troops from Egyptian a 
constitution by the Khedive"30. However, Kamil died prematurely on February 1908. The 
Scots Christian missionary Temple Gairdner, no sympathetic observer of either Islam or the 
institutions in Muslim lands, made clear the mass, universal character of the mourning among 
Muslims. In a few hours, by word of mouth alone, all Cairo "had the news even on the night of 
his death". When Gairdner went to Kamil's house next morning 
many were already in tears, especially young men of the effendi class. Then the coffin, 
borne aloft by bearers and covered with the red Egyptian flag, appeared, swaying slightly 
in the doorway. The whole of the vast assembly in the court beneath burst into tears as 
by one impulse. Neither on that day nor at subsequent great meetings when thousands of 
Muslims were gathered together to hear orations to his memory did I hear insulting or 
revengeful or violent words ... The students, the schoolboys, the younger Government 
officials --- it is they who have made this man their idol and hero, and wept for him as the 
young weep for their heroes31 . 
Gairdner, then, identified effendi class, the youth and the government 
officials as Kamil's core constituency at his death. 
The British-subsidized SC al-Muqattam described organized collective participation by 
the urban student class in the funeral in the midst of the mourning masses: 
At three o'clock in the afternoon the funeral march began to move in a great processiori 
the farthest extent of which the eye could not attain. The march was headed by police 
mounted and on foot and behind them the most enormous number of school students. 
The students of every school participated as a body, marching separately from the others, 
bearing banners draped with black. Marching first were the students of the late leader's 
school, then the students of the prepatory school, then the students of the Victoria 
College, then the students of the Agricultural School bearing a tree hung with black, then 
the students of the Teachers' College, then the Dar al-'Ulum, then those of the Khedivial 
School, then the Medical College, then the Law School. The bier had been wrapped with 
the Egyptian flag and above it had been raised a green banner upon which had been 
written "the proprietor of al-Liwa'" 32 . 
The al-Muqattam conespondent lists as sources of organized groups in Kamil's funeral 
30. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 321. 
31. Constance E. Pad wick, Temple Gairdner of Cairo (London: Society for Promoting Western Knowledge. 
2nd ed 1930) p. 165. 
32. al-Muqattam 12 February 1908 p. 5. 
most 
as an 
was post-traditional al- founded 1 1 to produce teachers 
Islamic subjects and Arabic simultaneously trained modern secular subjects. al-Muqattam 
identified elements of the adult professional classes as present in number: notably professional 
people in the judiciary or law, private or government-employed (rijal al-qada' wal-nivabah)33 for 
admission to whose ranks Kamil had originally been educated. 
At Kamil's death, then, his movement had organizationally covered the whole of the 
Muslim secular-stream students and, less completely, the graduate professionals such as civil 
servants, lawyers and teachers34. al-Hizb al-Watani's anti-imperialism, patriotism and 
pan-Islamism spoke to the needs of this core class-constituency, so constricted in employment 
and culturally assaulted by the British and the resident foreigners. 
The Threat of Deculturation Under the British 
Linguistic Assaults. British educational policies worked to create a small modem 
elite sharply separated class background culture from general. In 
1902, the British spent on education less than 1 % of all Egyptian state expenditure: in response 
to nationalist criticism, the rate increased between 1907-1912, but never exceeded 3.4% of total 
budget35 . Cromer imposed stiff fees to knock the children of the poor and the petty bourgeoisie 
out of the government's secular-stream p1imary and secondary schools. Such restrictions on 
popular education shrank the pool of students for tertiary medical, engineering and law colleges, 
deeply alienating the Jaridist-Ummah paternalists, motivated to collaborate by all that the British 
had done to foster the growth of their land-holding Arab-Egyptian elite36. By 1900 the British 
33. Ibid. 
34. The Jesuit-founded Bayrut Catholic mouthpiece al-Bashir printed a report from Cairo observing that 
Kami! had been given "a rarely-paralleled funeral in which thousands of the leaders, scholars, headmasters, anny 
officers and students of the country walked ... The crowds of people stopped the trams from traveling for about two 
hours". al-Bashir 17 February 1908 p. 5. Ghali characte1izes al-Hizb al-Watani at the death of Mustafa Kami! as "a 
party of youth, students, civil servants, [secular) lawyers", drawing on Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid's contrast of "the 
youth" in Kamil's party to the seasoned mature notables in Hizb al-Ummah. Ibrahim Amin Ghali, L'EQ:vpte 
Nationaliste et Liberale de Moustapha Kamel a Saad Za!:!loul, 1892-1925 (Hague: Martimus Nijhoff 1969) p. 82. 
al-Muqattam stressed the wine-like irrational impact of Kami! on "the Egyptian youth" who followed him "refusing 
to listen to other arguments". al-Muqattam 11 February 1908 p. 6. 
35. Tignor, British Colonial Rule p. 346; Mellini, Garst p. 130. "The Neglect of Education", Peter 
Mansfield, The British in Egypt (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1971) pp. 139-150. 
36. al-J aridah was concerned at the small numbers of Egyptians enrolling in medicine and engineering in 
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had imposed English as the main medium of education in government primary and secondary 
schools, opening teaching positions for despised lower middle class Britishers who might have 
not found jobs at home37. This replacement of classical Arabic by English drew attacks from 
educated Egyptians and from British liberals. As a concessive gesture, Cromer in 1906 had the 
former 'Urabist, Sa'd Zaghlul, associated with the group that was to found al-Ja1idah and the 
gradualist nationalist Hizb al-U mmah in 1907, appointed Minister of Education with permission 
to award more scope to Arabic in the schools. To control Zaghlul, Cromer simultaneously 
promoted as Adviser to the Ministry of Education the ex-missionary Douglas Dunlop, who had 
been associated since the late 1890s with linguistic anglicization campaigns in Egypt's schools38. 
Despite the nationalists' attacks, Dunlop kept conu·ol of education until after the First World 
War39. In a poem of farewell to Cromer on his departure from Egypt in May 1907, Hafiz 
Ibrahim wrote "you destroyed the mother of languages [Arabic] which is our destruction or a 
the relevant tertiary colleges in Egypt, and constriction of career opportunities in those professions by British 
recruits and resident Europeans. "Nazarat al-Ma'arif --- al-Majaniyyah wa Madrasat al-Muhandiskhanah" (The 
Ministry of Education --- Free Instruction and the School of Engineering), al-Jaridah 23 May 1907 p. 3. This article 
deftly rebutted the excuses given by the puppet Ministry of Education for abolishing free education at primary and 
tertiary level, while still allocating P 1,600 to it at the secondary level: "a nation in which no more than 5% can read 
and write is among the nations in direst need of government assistance for [its] primary education". Ibid. Another 
item toyed with a remedial etatism from primary to the conclusion of tertiary education: the governments of 
Muhammad 'Ali and Khedive Isma'il had educated the children of the poor to get a source of recruits for the 
understaffed bureaucracy. Those regimes used to forcibly place such children in boarding-schools and encouraged 
enrolments by providing free food, clothing and even stipends --- the interventionist alternative to British 
tight-fistedness. "al-Ta'lim fi Madaris al-Hukumah" (Education in the Government Schools), al-Jaridah 17 March 
1907 p. 1. 
37. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 326, 328-329. 
38. Mellini, Sir Eldon Garst p. 129. Zaghlul, the third and last Arab Egyptian to get a ministry under 
Cromer, "was appointed Minister of Public Instruction four months after Dinshaway to deflate the growing 
nationalism the incident had aroused" (Collins). Writing to the British Foreign Minister at the time, Cromer termed 
Zaghlul "a competent man from Muhammad' Abduh's gradualist school whose members could be safely put into 
positions of power to replace [Turco-Circassian and Christian Armenian] 'dummies or figureheads'". Collins, 
Egyptian Elite pp. 223-4. Displaying courtesy and resolve, Zaghlul was able to limit some de-Arabizing excesses of 
Dunlop and other British "advisors" in his Ministry. Yet, previously a critic of the British imposition of European 
languages as the core and medium of education, as Minister (October 1906 - February 1910) Zaghlul "became the 
[policy's] defender, although in a limited way". Lois Aroian, Education, Language and Culture in Modem Egypt: 
Dar al-Ulum and its Graduates (University of Michigan: PhD 1978) p. 232. 
39. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 329. Dunlap's stultifying school regulations and curricula, uniform 
down to the minute throughout the length and breadth of Egypt, alienated even some of his better British teachers. 
Ibid pp. 328 - 329. In contrast to Cromer, Gorst had impulses to remove the rigid bureaucrat Dunlop. Mellini, .QD..... 
cit pp. 170, 172-3. Contemptuous of literary Arabic, Dunlop assaulted his pupils with immersion in English more, 
Aroian argued, than with imperial ideology: he did not take up some British Colonial Office proposals to incorporate 
materials on the British Empire in the curricula of government schools. Aroian, op. cit p. 229. The gaps in basic 
knowledge ofislam manifested to the late 1920s by such intellectuals as Haykal, products of Dunlap's schools, do 
not enhance Aroian's contention that Dunlop did not restrict Islamic education. For an example, B 400 - 401. 
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pathway to [encompass] it"40 • Gradually, English became the main second language read and 
spoken by the younger generation of the Muslim petty bourgeois class "who lacked means.for 
private education and the acquisition of culture" and sought careers in a civil service that the 
British were changing over from French to English41 . French held out in the School of Law, 
Kamil's and Lutfi's Alma Mater, where French lecturers strove to transmit not merely the 
elements for specialized legal careers but generalist Enlightenment concepts such as the Rights 
of Man that they relished might destabilize the British in Egypt --- and which had drawn many 
Muslims such as Kamil to the school42• Linguistic Anglicization was meant to provide jobs 
relief for Britishers and to fit some Muslim Egyptians to serve as docile functionaries, not to 
open into fundamental encounters with any Western culture: Cromer tried to prevent any 
Egyptians at all going to study in unsettling Europe, and obstructed the opening of the 
small-scale (old) Egyptian University, which went ahead only under his successor. This 
Arabic-medium core for a University was the joint achievement of a decade-long drive by the 
Kamilists, Muhammad' Abduh and his disciples, the Jaridists, al-Mu'ayyad and the Khedivial 
family, and the SC al-Ahram and al-Muqattam. The foundation of the University drew attacks 
from Le Progress branding such innocuous disciples of' Abduh as Qasim Amin as Kamil's 
fellow-"revolutiona1ies". Lutfi al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah were drawn into religio-political 
polarization of (a) resident Europeans and the B1itish against (b) all Egyptian groups and 
political factions, branded as collectively "fanatical"43 . The French-modelled nature of Egyptian 
law, some scholarly institutions, and the urban private sector because of the resident Europeans, 
40. 'Abd al-Latif Shararah, Hafiz: Dirasah Tahliliyyah (Bayrut: Dar Sadir 1965) p. 111. 
41. Jacques Berque, Egvpt: Imperialism and Revolution tsd Jean Stewart (London: Faber and Faber 1972) 
pp. 204-5. 
42. Berque correctly notes the purely functional contact with English language and culture to which the 
British wanted to confine the Egyptian elite. "It proved a disadvantage to English to be thus limited to these 
practical ends, aiming no higher and no deeper, and thus satisfying neither the Arabs' powerful intellectual 
aspirations nor their ideological interests. which for a long time found champions in the Ecole de Droit". Ibid. 
Upon finishing high school, Mustafa Kami! wrote to his brother of his intention to join the Egyptian Law School 
because it was "the school for writing, oratory and the ascertainment of the rights of individuals and nations". After 
one year there, he concurrently joined the French Law School, which prepared Cairo students for examinations 
given in France. Farhat Ziadeh, Lawyers, the Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern Egvpt (Stanford, California: 
Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University 1968) p. 63. 
43. Lutfi's bitter mid-1907 exchange with Le Progres, Safahat Matwiyyah pp. 170-172. The University 
opened in 1908 with distinguished European Orientalists among its lecturers, although they taught in Arabic: Tignor. 
British Colonial Rule pp. 337-338. "Intellectual members of the Ummah Party were in the lead of those Egyptians 
who in 1908 successfully realized through general subscription the creation of the Egyptian University". Ziadeh, 
Lawyers p. 91. 
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all helped maintain French as an intellectually more prestigious opposition to English and the 
British: yet the alternation of the two languages also increasingly brought home the shared 
anti-Muslimism of Europeans in general. Even for the wealthiest Muslim Egyptians, the utmost 
linguistic Anglicization seldom opened humane interaction: future Liberal Constitutionalist PM 
Muhammad Mahmud was popular at Oxford but on returning home found himself unwelcome in 
the clubs and sporting societies within which Egypt's British had irreversibly segregated 
themselves44 • So often, Jaridist-Siyasahist pan-Islamism, pan-Easternism and pan-Arabism had 
that quasi-intimate fury ignited when an admired group rebuffs and excludes. The Jaridists 
respected the economic and technical skills of Cromer and his colleagues --- the perennialization 
of irrigation and the booms enriched their class --- and even the Kamilists paid tribute to 
Britishers who benefited Egyptians45 • Yet British linguistic depersonalization in education, their 
restriction of primary, secondary and tertiary education and their subjection of what Egyptians 
they recruited into the civil service radicalized the conservative U mmah-J aridists almost as much 
as the less-propertied, more urban-bourgeois Kamilists46 • 
44. William J. Welch, No Country for a Gentleman: British Rule in Egypt 1883 - 1907 (New York: 
Greenwood Press 1988) p. 43. 
45. al-Liwa' approved when a meeting of Egyptian writers decided to send a letter of thanks to the 
Englishman Ernest Cassel for his work to combat eye diseases in Egypt: the remissness of "our rich ones" in 
promoting popular health lost them the respect Cassel. won. "Shukr al-Muhsin" (Thanking a Benefactor), al-Liwa' 
13 January 1903 p. 2. In mid-1908, Lutfi paid tribute to British irrigation works that had restored international 
financial confidence to Egypt. While assailing the political stagnation, Lutfi categorized Cromer as a great 
economist and financier who made Egypt solvent again: "how greatly the area of cultivated land has increased from 
1883 to today [1908]: how much the value of agricultural land and real estate has been raised due to his policy". 
Safahat pp. 142, 71. Lutfi believed that Cromer had striven with success to release the peasants from usurers by 
establishing the Agricultural Bank. Ibid p. 71. In his generally mordant poem farewelling Cromer, Hafiz Ibrahim, 
too, gave him credit for the hydraulic works that made many Egyptians rich, while denouncing his contraction of 
education. Shararah, Hafiz p. 110. 
46. For typical Kamilist denunciations of the British "advisers'" ~ubordination of Egyptian ministers and 
officials, Sayyid 'Ali, "Hadhihi Natijat al-Istislam Ayyuhal-Wuzara' al-Fikham" (This is the Consequence of 
Submission, Honorable Ministers), al-Liwa' 8 April 1908 p. ~~.Mqp~mmad Sadiq' Anbar, "Sawt al-Ummat 
al-Misriyyah fi Asma' Nuzzar al-Hukumah" (The Voice of th~flo~ Resounds in the Ears of the Government 
Ministers), al-Liwa' 21 April 1908. Lutfi's early al-Jaridah articles and his speeches voiced deep if controlled anger 
at the extent to which British "advisers" had taken over the governmental apparatus: Egyptian head engineers had to 
refer technical questions about any given canal to an English "irrigation inspector": Egyptian military officers and 
judges faced the same subordination as Britain filled the judiciary. Safahat pp. 26 - 7. Egyptian ministers had been 
made the subordinates of the "advisers". Ibid pp. 16-17. Cf. ibid pp. 276-277. See also fn 36. 
contemporary British observers and subsequent were 
the influence of European concepts, culture and life --- particular their French variants ---
upon Mustafa Kamil and his colleagues. Nadav Safran (1961) characterized Kamil as "the son of 
an engineer who had been educated in the schools established by [the Westemizer] Muhammad 
'Ali and who had spent all his life in government service. The only traditional [Muslim] 
education ever received by Mustafa was one year of learning the Qur'an between the ages of five 
and six. Following that, Mustafa attended secular primary and secondary schools" and tertiary 
secular law institutions, which made him bilingual in French. "A specimen of the newly arisen 
modern class with no attachment to previous fonns of social organization, Mustafa was 
instinctively orientated towards the modern [=West European] concept of the nation state as the 
basic political-social entity"47 . 
Lord Lloyd in 1933 described Kamil as "opportunistic" preaching pan-Islamism. 
Describing dress and appearance as dandyishly European, wrote "his culture was 
essentially French and as a Moslem he was not devout, not even particularly croyant. Such was 
the leader who became the pioneer of the young nationalism: the older Moslems looked 
somewhat askance at him: but the students followed him eagerly, and, when he died, mourned 
him with real fervor" 48 • However, the Turcophile French writer Pierre Lo ti, a sort of friend of -
Kamil, came to understand his cultural duality. When the two called together on the Rector of 
al-Azhar in 1907, Loti was struck when Kamil engaged with the Rector in an intense discussion 
--- "as if it was a matter of present-day interest" --- about "events which followed the death of the 
Prophet, and the pm1 played by 'Ali". 
In that moment how my good friend Mustafa, whom I had seen so French in France, 
appeared all at once a Muslim to the bottom of his soul! The same thing is true, indeed, 
47. Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1961) p.86. Safran took no account of significant links of Kamil's extended family to al-Azhar, formal traditional 
Islam and extra-Egyptian classical Arabs: for instance, his father had originally intended to become a theologian 
before Muhammad 'Ali made him train as a building engineer; and his mother Hafizah, daughter of Captain 
Muhammad Fahrni, claimed descent through al-Husayn from the Prophet Muhammad. Fritz Steppat, Nationalismus 
und Islam Bei Mustafa Kami! in Die Welt des Islams IV 1956 pp. 242 - 243. 
48. Lloyd, favpt Since Cromer v. l, p. 41. 
have to have been formally grounded much within educational institutions the Qur'an, Islam 
and the literature of the classical Arabs to be influenced by them. The pan-Islamist Kamil's 
interaction with the Rector of al-Azhar had its political functions: it still instances how political 
activism regularly exposed acculturateds to a range of monolingual, non-Westernizing-educated 
Islamic counter-elites who offered them intact sectors of Islam and the Arab past. Ahmad Lutfi 
al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah, and after 1922 the West-steeped Husayn Haykal and al-Siyasah, also 
kept continual exchanges and personal interaction going with Azharite and other Islamic elites at 
which their modernist contributors nonetheless sniped50. 
Kamil and his multilingual colleagues kept up a talking relationship with Muslim learned 
clerical elites who could give the Islamic and Arab knowledge that Dunlop --- and French 
lecturers in the School of Law? --- denied them formal education. Loti was right that 
nationalist acculturateds of Kamil' s pattern came to hold their own with Azharites, but missed 
Kamilists' sense that s curricula and were not enough on own --- not 
restructured enough to function --- in the modern world. Relevant here is a distinction of Tignor 
between (a) the intellectuals of Khedive Isma'il's time who "having been trained in [the] 
institutions" of traditional society "were not ready to admit that the West was superior to the East 
in anything except naked power" and saw the problem as effective resistance to the West's 
expansion, and (b) "the later generation" of students and professional people produced by more 
modern, Western schools. The latter Egyptian generation (Tignor characterized) came to favor 
49. Pierre Loti, Egypt tsd. W.P. Baines (London: T. Werner Laurie Ltd., nd ---1909?) p.66. Kami! over the 
years got himself well and truly associated in the minds of his French sympathisers with Islamic religious revivalism 
and pan-Islam, as well as the Egyptian cause narrowly considered. For instance, the Turcophile Pierre Loti 
dedicated La Mort de Philae to "the memory of my noble and dear friend Moustapha Kamel Pasha who succumbed 
on the 10th February 1908 to the admirable task of re-establishing in Egypt the dignity of the Homeland and of 
Islam". Quoted Ghali, L'Egvpte Nationaliste p. 43. Cf. fn 89. 
50. Lutfi's relaxed access as editor of al-Jaridah to the al-Azhar hierarchy was shown when an impressive 
coalition of the mosque-university's lecturers and students moved to expel Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, Mahmud Zanati 
and Taha Husayn in their iconoclastic late adolescence. Taha might have liked an ultra-public martyrdom, but Lutfi 
only telephoned al-Azhar Rector Hassunah al-Nawawi that the three young men should not be branded apostates for 
life because they had been indulgent to an unconventional classical remark about Muhammad's grave: al-Nawawi at 
once cancelled their expulsion. Dr Mahdi' Allam, "Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat", Majallat Ma'had al-Buhuth 
wal-Dirasat al-'Arabivyah March 1969 p. 156. Sec B 241. 
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wholesale adoption from the modern West of a liberal constitutional regime and laissez faire 
economic system that would assure their own political and economic predominance51 . 
(Certainly, al-Jaridah's interest in private commercial and capitalist possibilities already fostered 
crude pan-Arab impulses even before 1915: Ch. 6). Passages in al-Liwa' by people who 
obviously know Europe, developed al-Nadim's much earlier recognition of the West's 
dominance in the modem world and his call for a pupil-like adoption of the techniques and 
institutions that gave it strength. Such writers in al-Liwa' sometimes demonstrated an 
admiration for the excellence of Western civilization transcending the narrower question of the 
West's power over the East. One 1903 number of al-Liwa', for instance, described European 
civilization as "a light that could not be resisted with darkness"52• Another 1903 article by "Katib 
Majid" was titled "How Can the Nation Progress/Evolve? How can that Objective be Attained?" 
"There is no escape from imitating the West whether the soul desire it or hate it". Relentlessly 
cataloguing the revolution in the environment, in architecture, in clothes, in the forms of life that 
the advance of Western civilization had produced in the East in the past century, the author 
warned that "for a man ... to try to side-step or escape it is to cut himself off from life itself ... In 
short there is no remedy for the sickness of backwardness that backward nations are afflicted 
with in this age other than skilful self-transformation and imitation of the West, the lord of this 
age's life". The only alternative to modernization for Egypt was subjugation: there was no 
longer any refuge to which nations that rejected modernization could flee. 
Behold, the flood of civilization's waters have surged out engulfing even the plains and 
the wilderness. These backward nations with their bare feet run before it as it overtakes 
them from behind and he whom the waters overtake and engulf is dead.53 
In regard to the consistency or inconsistency of Kamil' s statements to varied audiences, 
the section of this chapter examining the international community identifications of his 
movement during lobbying will show that Kamil from the outset presented himself in France as a 
pro-Ottoman pan-Islamist. This is despite his statements in later years identifying French people 
as hostile to Muslims as an international group. 
Arabic communications of members of the paity of Mustafa Kamil --- intended for 
51. Tignor, British Colonial Rule p. 255-256; more generally, pp. 252-264. 
52. al-Liwa', August 17, 1903 
53. "Katib Majid" (pseud.), "Kayfa Tataraqqa 1-Ummah? Kayfa al-Wusul ila dhalik?" (How Can the 
Nation Progress/Develop? How Can that Objective be Attained?), al-Liwa' 9 August 1903. 
was 
to 
the France's specific culture as m s speeches 
writings (Arabic as as French). An article published in al-Liwa' 1908 opposed 
teaching of British history at the Egyptian University, 
opened on a small scale in that year. It cited as grounds that the English had 
no history, literature or philosophy that merited teaching at a tertiary level, but interestingly 
proposed the French Revolution as embodying alongside "the exalted Arab civilization" those 
aspects of humanity's past development that liberal education for Egyptians had to cover. The 
article, with its gross en-ors about the details or socio-political issues of the Wars of the Roses, 
illustrated Britain's continuing low cultural prestige in comparison to France, a much 
longer-standing collaborator in Egypt's modernization and still revered as the pioneer and 
enduring model of liberatory Western civilization. 
\Ve ask the Committee of the Egyptian University what benefit the Egyptian students 
could gain from being taught the history of a nation [England] lacking any history the 
proper sense of the word? advantage will the Egyptians get from instruction the 
history of a nation that --- until a recent age --- was involved with [primitive] passion in 
the pursuit of raids and invasions of every kind, a nation devoid of any ancient 
civilization from which people could learn the process of Man's gradual upward 
development; devoid, too, of any historical work(s) from which the advancement of 
mankind's thought can be understood as is the case, for instance, with the history of the 
great French Revolution and that of the exalted Arab civilization. What have I to gain 
from learning the judgement of the two roses and the outbreak of war between two kings 
among Britain's monarchs occasioned by nothing else than the desire of one of them as 
the bearer of the red rose to gain precedence in functions (hafalat) over the wearer of the 
yellow rose?54. 
The aim that al-Liwa' held up to the Egyptian University was thus a cultivated Egyptian 
equally well read in (a) the literature and histories produced by the classical Arabs' Islamic 
civilization and (b) the modern positivist-secular West initiated by France's Enlightenment and 
Revolution. The concern for a thought and upward development (ruqiv) of mankind extending 
beyond the Arabo-Islamic heritage (which it relativizes), and the consequent assumption that no 
Egyptian is truly educated if not equipped to apprehend the literature and history of the modern 
54. "'A Misriyah hadhihil-Jami 'ah 'am Inkiliziyah?" (Is this University Egyptian or English?), al-Liwa' 9 
May 1908, p.5. 
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secular West, showed how far Kamil's Egyptian quasi-nationalists had moved by 1908 from any 
insular Egyptian Islamic traditionalism. 
This Kamilist formulation that the Arabo-Islamic heritage is an indispensable component 
of a comprehensive humanism was representative. Kamilist communications often instanced the 
tenacious appeal of sectors of the classical Arabo-Islamic tradition to Egyptians far removed 
from it by their formative non-indigenous institutional educations and by prolonged interaction 
with Europe and Europeans. A few ultra-modernizing al-Liwa' items did envisage further, much 
more far-reaching, West-modelled repatterning of Egyptian, Arab and Ottoman education, 
rejected for not having truly duplicated the (lethal) Western dynamism without which the 
Egyptians and Ottomans could never have a true "Renaissance" --- such discussion, though, 
solidifying the sense of some supra-Egyptian community, Ottoman, Arab, Muslim, Eastern, 
facing that West55• Sometimes the Western and high Arabo-Islamic facets alternated in spasms: 
more often, the two blended in unstandardized but often constructive ways. 
The Kamilists' Links to Arabo-Islamic Culture and Thouirht 
al-Hizb al-Watani reconnected Egyptians to the classical Muslim Arabs in two main 
sectors: (a) aesthetic-literary and (b) ideological: ie. Islam should somewhat prescribe in even 
........ 
modern societies. (The Ka~sts thus maintained al-Nadim's two great fundamentals of 
nationhood --- the continuity of the language and the religion). In contrast, al-Jaridah's narrower 
Arabist humanism stressed that West-influenced writers had to read the classical Arabs' works 
and reapply their language patterns within modern literature and discourse (Ch. 6). This 
relativized aesthetic continuity of the Jaridists did not require the classical Arabs to be superior 
55. al-Liwa's pragmatic correspondent in Istanbul grimly set out "all the eternal means --- commerce, 
agriculture, industrial, domination, force, enslavement" --- used by "the West" to effect that subjugation of all 
humanity to which it had dedicated "its whole life". "The East" could examine and strive to duplicate patriotic 
(secular, anti-clerical-DW) education in France --- it was survival "to imitate the Westerner in everything that has 
helped him Progress (raqqahu) and made him a man". The item scathingly derided the educational "renaissance of 
the dead people" brought by the non-religious governmental schools established in Egypt, Syria, 'Iraq and Turkey: 
these inculcated no motivating values and the only aim of those who attended was to win on graduation 
modestly-paid careers in the state bureaucracies and some empty titles and ranks. The item was interesting for its 
proto-pan-Arab perspective within Ottomanism, and probably implied the necessity for a new Muslim modem 
private enterprise and for constitutional limitations on the Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid and other Muslim rulers (=the 
Khedive 'Abbas?). Despite its concern to learn from Westerners to become equal with them, the item understood 
why "Eastern" parents who had to hand their children over to foreign schools in Egypt and the Ottoman State 
("hadhihil-bilad" --- in "these lands") felt "heartbreak":= the irreducible hard Muslim core in Kamilism. "Dar 
al-Sa'adah --- al-Inqilab fil-Ta'lim" (Istanbul --- the Revolution in Education), al-Liwa' 17 January 1903 p. 1. 
1 -
or even to recent some 
or 
Classicoid Aestheticism. The not 
an initial period had a sensitive ear for poetic beauty in old Arabic literature, transmuting the 
Andalusian style anthologized by Ibn Hazm into the vigorous dialogues of his 1893 play Fath 
al-Andalus (The Conquest of Spain), a triumphalist celebration of the early Arab Muslim 
capacity for conquest, therapeutic for the colonized Kamil. International strength and the 
al-Nadim-like clashes and warfare of rival religion-focussed far-extending blocs, already the 
perspective within which Kamil depicted the struggle for Spain, would henceforth always be 
central for the Kamilists. The play was interwoven enough into the parochial ethnic and political 
Egyptian realities of the day: its 'Ab bad, the Chief Minister who had lived all his life among the 
Arabs but was Byzantine-descended, tried to dissuade them from invading Spain: that warned 
Egyptians not to trust the resident Christian Syrians and Armenians, 
liable to collaborate with Cromer. more than just a political-ethnic barb, Fath 
al-Andalus presented 'Abbad, courted by Byzantine emissaries, as an wracked 
specific ways by dual loyalties that can make members of a marginal sect betray a religious 
nation to Christian outsiders56. Kamil could have become a creative writer with nuanced ad hoc 
insights: even as a political organizer and orator, though, he always maintained love for its own 
sake of a classical Arabic that subverted his and his audiences' Egyptian specificities, powerfully 
homogenizing them with past and present Arabs outside Egypt. 
Guidance In Modern Societv. The language and poetry of the classical Arabs kept their 
sometimes integral grip on Kamil, although he selected and restructured their history and social 
56. Mustafa Kamil, Fath al-Anda I us republished Cairo 1973 passim but esp. pp. 25 - 28, 35, and 46. I am 
deeply indebted to Professor Arthur Goldschmidt Jr of Pennsylvania State University who took the time to locate, 
xerox and airmail this edition to me from Cairo while researching two books of his own there. The play's original 
edition was published in Cairo by al-Adab Press and reprinted by 'Ali Fahrni Kami!, Mustafa Kami! fi 34 Rabi'an 
(Cairo: Mitba'at al-Liwa' 9 vols 1908 - 1911) v. 2 pp. 165ff. Dr Michael Carter, an authority on classical Arabic 
literature, assessed that the play's passages of poetry "do capture the medieval ethos, largely because they are so 
entirely within the convention of the love poetry of the period. You can verify this by browsing through Ibn Hazm' s 
Tawq al-Hamamah, which is more or less an anthology of Andalusian love poetry with all the theory added in the 
form of commentary". Personal letter from Dr Carter, at that time Lecturer in Arabic at the Department of Semitic 
Studies, Sydney University, 2 August 1982. The play's figure 'Abbad may be meant to cast doubt on the loyalty of 
such dukhala' (interlopers) as the Egypto-Annenian Nubar Pasha, several times Foreign Minister and Prime 
Minister: fn 112. 
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and political realities to serve the needs of his colonized compatriots. The vehement "superficial 
religiosity" of his highly political Arabo-Islamic past57 would not make SCs or Copts feel !TIOre 
welcome in Egyptian Arabism but, as much or more than aestheticism, recurred in the responses 
of Liwa'ists to classical Arab materials. The Azhar-educated 'Abduh might have published the 
Nahj al-Balaghah (Highroad of Eloquence) ascribed to the fourth Caliph 'Ali, from aestheticism, 
as beautiful high literature decidedly not by that Caliph, but some al-Liwa' acculturateds did turn 
to it for religious-social guidance. A pseudonymous al-Liwa' writer warned that 
those who would nominate themselves to tomorrow become the planners and the 
executors and the spokesmen in the service of this dear homeland EGYPT must give this 
book the thought it deserves, so that, when they have comprehended its secrets and 
understood its aims, they can put its incomparable verses into practice ... to help them 
overcome their illusions and the devils from which they suffer: that it may smash the 
chains and shackles that the party of greed and imperialism have placed around their 
necks, hands and feet58. 
Like al-Nadim, then, this 1908 al-Liwa' writer was alert to the political effects of 
acculturation, which in some respects gave the modern Muslim professional classes more affinity 
with ascendant aliens than to Egyptians in general. There was the sense in the ranks of the 
Kamilists that the dual-cultured elite from which they recruited could swing either way 
politically, as well. Exposure to the primary classical Arab works of, or on, Islam's first period 
of greatness was crucial to morally emancipate the educated elite from the "illusions" as well as 
vested interests that still bound it in collaboration to the masters, hampe1ing it from assuming the 
leadership role it alone could play in the imminent period of decolonization. The article, 
however, also conceived both "the Islamic spirit" and the "Muhammadan Civilization" 
(al-madaniyyat al-Muhammadiyyah) in pai1ially socio-economic terms broader in scope than the 
moral liberation that the Nahj al-Balaghah's "wisdom" offered from imperialism and 
57. This is a translation of Fritz Steppat's concept of "oberflachliche Religiositat" in Nationalismus und 
Islam Bei Mustafa Kami! pp. 269 - 271. The simple Islam-fired conquering Arab superhumans that Kami! depicted 
took scant account of the Prophet Muhammad's warning to victorious followers that they had returned from the 
lesser struggle (al-jihad al-asghar) to the greater struggle (al-jihad al-akbar), that to subdue their own passions. The 
play's Arabo-Muslim heroes are harmoniously one in their ideological drive to expand the realm of the universal 
Caliphate centred in Damascus. Kami! did not mention such personality clashes and jealousies as that the Arab 
governor of North Africa, Musa Ibn Nusayr, at Toledo whipped and put in chains his conquering Berber lieutenant 
Tariq Ibn Ziyad for refusing to obey orders to halt in the early stage of the campaign. Philip K. Hitti, History of the 
Arabs. from the Earliest Times to the Present 10 ed. (London: Macmillan 1970) p. 496. 
58. "Mufakkir" (pseud.), "Hal Sami'tum bimithli hadha min Qabl?" (Have You Heard Anything Like This 
Before?), al-Liwa' 16 May 1908, p.2. 
to be 
to 
must as 
recorded principles socio-economic and 
and keys to happiness both this world and the next world" (mafatih al-sa'adatayn) 
Qur'an and the sunnah contained as further implemented in the statements and actions of the first 
generation of Muslims upon whom the Prophet Muhammad had himself bestowed his personal 
guidance and instruction59 . Beyond personal religious beliefs, worship and morality, Islam was 
thus presented as, in at least its first period of greatness, a comprehensive code impinging in 
detailed ways upon social, economic and political life. 
The impression that a socio-economically prescriptive "Muhammadan Civilization" could 
be implemented in Egypt's present,too, was strengthened by an accompanying item that 
presented a "monumental study on usury" by the Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar60. This 
distinguished Dar al-'Ulum scholar, after World War I, took pan the Young Men's Muslim 
Association (Jam'iyyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin) founded by veteran pan-Islamists from Kamil's 
movement. al-Najjar was to be active in organizing S solidarity 
Palestinians during their clashes with Jewish settlers in 1929 and into 1930s (B 130 fn). 
The acculturated Kamilists encouraged Dar al-'Ulum authors to produce new guiding 
works to the classical Arabs' complex civilization that were modern in an-angement. Dar 
al-'Ulum lecturer Hasan Tawfiq al-Adl (1862 - 1904) published the first modern history of 
Arabic literature in Arabic, Ta'rikh Adab al-Lughat al-'Arabiyyah: Mustafa Kamil along with 
Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh attended al-' Adl's 1904 funeral in Cairo61 . The Dar al-'Ulum 
intellectuals formulated Islam and the old Arab learning in ways that addressed modem 
Europe-developed knowledge and contemporary situations, thus exactly meeting some very 
special needs of the modernity-conscious Kamilists. Tantawi Jawhaii (1870-1939), an Azhar 
graduate and Dar al- 'Ulum lecturer, in encyclopaedic writings amalgamated Qur' anic motifs and 
the West's modem sciences: he voiced activist anti-British nationalism from the pages of 
59. Ibid. 
60. "Bahthun Jalil fil-Riba lil-Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar" (A Superb Study of Usury By the Shaykh 
'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar) in al-Liwa' 16 May 1908. pp.2-3. 
61. Aroian, Dar al- 'Ulum p. 128. 
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al-Liwa' 62 . Before Kamil's death in 1908, Dar al-'Ulum intellectuals were influencing al-Liwa' 
more, for instance through the recruitment of the Tunisian-born 'Abd al-' Aziz Sha wish 
(1867-1929) as editor, in which role he intensified the ethno-sectarian conflicts Muslim 
Egyptians had with Copts and the Syrian Christian residents. Yet as editor of al-Hidayah, 
Shawish, like Jawhari, was striving to document the harmony oflslam with Europe's modern 
scientific theories while answering Christian missionary attacks63 • 
KAMILIST ATTITUDES TO WOMEN 
Islam-Qualified Adjustment to the Urban West 
Changing relations between the sexes measured (a) how far the Kamilists would adjust to 
West European norms, and conversely (b) how seriously they wanted to install Islam as social 
ideology or at least as discourse motifs within the new urban modernity. Some members of the 
movement and its constituency had, or would have when they launched their careers after their 
studies, the economic means to maintain households in which the women could be secluded and 
economically non-productive and perhaps bear the heavy cost of polygamy if they wished. 
Among Egyptian histmians, Salah 'Isa tried to explain away Kamil and al-Liwa's 
"savage" and "prolonged" campaign against Qasim Amin's arguments for the abolition of the 
veil and women's (qualified) right to employment as "political" --- motivated by the intensely 
conservative attitudes of the Egyptian public, or by enmity between Amin and Kamil' s then 
political patron the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi caused by other issues64. Ibrahim Amin Ghali 
claimed that Kamil in the controversies that Qasim's writings triggered "became the prisoner of 
the ideas of his compatriots" --- an argument that maintains intact his presentation of Kamil as 
"l'homrne evolue" who had assimilated, and was committed to implant, the culture of the West. 
Kamil publicly took sides with "a reactionary conception" because of his political need to stand 
62. Jawhari collected his anli-colonialist and patriotic al-Liwa' articles in his 1908 book Nahdat al-Ummah 
wa Hayatuha (The Renaissance of the Nation and its Life). Yusuf As'ad Daghir. Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyyah v. 
2 (Bayrut: Matabi' Lubnan 1956) p. 282. 
63. Ibid p. 250. Many of Shawish's al-Liwa' articles were about "Egyptian Woman" and thus contributed 
to the further Islamization of discussion of that issue in al-Liwa', examined in the next section. Sha wish' s collection 
of his al-Liwa' articles titled Abhath 'an al-Mar' at al-Misriyyah wal-Shu'un al-' Ammah noted Daghir, Masadir p. 
251. 
64. Salah 'Isa, "Mustafa Kami! Mufakkiran Burjwaziyyan" (Mustafa Kami! as a Bourgeois Thinker), 
Oadaya 'Arabiyyah (Bayrut) March 1976 p. 113. 
- A155 -
well with the Khedive and because championing changes to the status of Egyptian women would 
divide the by and large still conservative society that Kamil before everything was intent to unite 
in struggle against impe1ialist rule65 . 
Urban students and professionals made up the core following and constituency of 
Kamil's movement; yet their secular West-modelled educations did not always preclude 
conservative stances towards women shared with other strata and classes. Muhammad Husayn 
Haykal' s memoirs attest that young Egyptians being educated in French or English medium, and 
who generally supported Mustafa Kamil's activities to end British rule, overwhelmingly 
perceived Qasim Amin' s call for the liberation of women as a threat to their religion, Islam. 
Haykal first became aware of the controversy over Amin's writings while a student at the 
Khedivial Secondary School, probably through the pan-Islamic political papers most students 
read66. Around 1906 Haykal entered the School of Law, participating there in the 1906 Law 
School strike organized by Mustafa Kamil: Amin' s writings and the literature of reply forced 
"youth" --- he obviously means the acculturated group receiving West-modelled education --- to 
"think seriously about the issue" of the position of women. "Most of them", though, viewed 
Qasim's call as "an aposta~y from religion paving the way for atheism"67. 
The stance that Islam should limit or direct change was pronounced in a 1908 al-Liwa' 
article assailing increased free mixing between men and women, and titled "Religion Obliges the 
Giving of Good Counsel". The article quoted the Qur'anic verse "and I did not create jinn or 
human beings except for them to serve/worship me"68: worship/service of the Creator had to 
regulate human relations in detail. To assail the growing freedom of movement and repudiation 
of the veil by women, the article in addition to Qur'anic verses mustered supporting quotations 
from genuine and some less assuredly authentic hadiths: "the best mosques for women are the 
rooms of their houses" and "whoever looks at the attractive features of an unrelated woman out 
of lust, his eyes will be afflicted on Resurrection Day". But there is also the muddled "quotation" 
65. Ghali, L'Egypte Nationaliste pp. 45-46. 
66. Haykal, Mudhakkirat fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah (Cairo: 2 vis Mitba'at Misr 1951-3) v. 1, p. 24. Haykal 
mentions Qasim Amin 's Tahrir al-Mar'ah (The Emancipation of Women), first published too early (1899) for 
Haykal, born in 1889, to have read an initial serialization in al-Mu'ayyad as an adolescent, as too, perhaps, was 
Qasim's 1900 al-Mar' at al-Jadidah. But his interest in Qasim Amin 's writings may well have been first aroused by 
continuing controversies around his ideas in the political and pan-Islamic papers. 
67. Haykal, Mudhakkirat v. 1p.24. 
68. "Wa ma khalaqtu 1-jinna wal-insa ilia liya'buduni", Qur'an 51:56. 
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from memory of a hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad is supposed to have said "what has 
the meaning" (ma ma 'nahu) "I am a man who feels jealousy and there is no man who does. not 
feel jealousy unless he has lost self-pride". The quality of £havrah (solicitude, possessiveness, 
jealousy over a spouse) the article saw as having been lost by "some men" who negligently 
allowed their wives to leave their chambers at home and go forth unveiled in the full light of day 
without reason, leading to the corruption of many for "their going forth in this condition is a 
temptation to those men in whose heart is a sickness, and many are they". The article imaged 
widespread change in Egyptian society: "the vulgar unveiled costume has spread widely among 
all the classes, alas! "69 . 
Other al-Liwa' items perceived changes in the life-patterns of women in better-off or 
educated strata, again implying assent from their menfolk. Sayyid 'Ali interlocked contemporary 
patriotism with traditional "religious" regulation of human behaviour to resist increased freedom 
of movement and mixing between them in his May 1908 article titled "Shame and Chastity Cry 
Out for Rescue Before the Free Movement/Unveiledness of the Fair Young Women". Sayyid 
'Ali argued that spreading free movement and disuse of the veil by (urban?) women was an issue 
in which "every person who is sincerely devoted to homeland (watan), his children and to saving 
Egypt's feminine society from pollution is obliged to take an interest". As with most al-Liwa' 
articles on the theme, this was no one-sided criticism of the female younger generation. Men 
69. "al-Din al-Nasihah" (Religion is Advice) al-Liwa' in 9 April 1908, p.2. In our examination of this and 
other al-Liwa' items we translated the root tabarraja roughly as signifying repudiation of the veil and unregulated~ 
movement outside the home on the part of women. al-Liwa' uses tabarruj which in modem standard Arabic means 
makeup in a wider, more inclusive, classical Islamic sense. The Qur'an in Surah al-Nur (24:60) permitted women 
past any prospect of marriage (al-qaw'aid) to take off their outer clothes "ghayra mutabarrijatin bi-zinatin" m 
without flaunting or displaying any ornament. al-Baydawi's interpretation of the "root meaning" of al-tabarruj is "to 
purposely reveal that which would be hidden". Safinatun barijah is thus an uncovered ship; al-baraj is expansion of 
the eyes to show white parts around the iris normally covered. For a woman it thus means "her purposely displaying 
her ornament (zinah) and her physical charms (mahasinaha) to men": al-Baydawi, Anwar al-Tanzi! wa Asrar 
al-Ta'wil (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi. 1955) pt. 2, p. 6. al-Baydawi's gloss of the use of tabarraja in this verse 
thus demonstrates that it could have been applied by al-Liwa' to mean displaying the normally covered face or hand~ 
or other parts of the body with sexual appeal rather than, narrowly, using makeup after eliminating the veil. 
al-Baydawi seems to regard the root as elsewhere also connoting movement by women. The wives of the Prophet 
are instructed in Surah al-Ahzab (33: v .33) "wa qarna fi buyutikunna wa la tabarrajna tabarruj al-jahiliyyat al-ula": 
"stay in your houses and do not flaunt/display your finery (adornments) or physical charms as was done in the first 
paganism". al-Baydawi explains that in "the first paganism", --- the time between Adam and Noah or the period of 
kufr (unbelief) preceding Islam --- "women used to wear pearls and walk in the road exhibiting themselves to men". 
Ibid pt 2, p. 131. Thus the classical Islamic use of the term would cover dispensing by women with the veil and 
their displaying of their ornaments, makeup. or areas of their body. perhaps while moving outside in public, with the 
purpose or effect of arousing male sexual feelings. 
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also must spend more time at home shunning bars, clubs, coffee-shops and houses of ill-fame: 
"Will they do so, then, to protect their honor and the reputation of their families and to wa~d off 
from Egyptian society a danger before which those perils most destructive of societies pale into 
insignificance?"70. Sayyid 'Ali's blending of Islamic and Western elements was typical of 
Kamilist dual-culturedness. In blasting bars, he responded to the effects that European milieus in 
Egyptian cities had upon post-traditional Muslim men and their family life; their apathy to 
unveiled movement in public places by their womenfolk had adjusted to Western patterns. 'Ali's 
demand for veiling and segregation of women as a precondition for close-knit family units drew 
on traditionalist religious pmitanism. On the other hand, equating coffee houses with infidel bars 
and brothels criminalized a normal male Muslim form of leisure: his insistence that Muslim 
Egyptian husbands and wives spend the maximum time together in their homes thus covertly 
ushered in the Europe-patterned bourgeois monogamous family. Kamilist demands that women 
be educated to within sight of the level of men --- not for careers but to equip mothers to educate 
their sons in hyper-patriotism in the home --- further fostered tightened bourgeois soul-mate 
marriages, although not with Qasim Amin' s less blended W estemism. 
Not all items in al-Liwa' identified only changes in the behavior or roles of women as 
threatening the (Muslim) territorial nation. The past or established situation of Egyptian women 
was one cause contributing to the Egyptian nation's backwardness. One 1903 front-page 
al-Liwa' article "What Must be Done by a Nation that has Lacked the School of the Mother?" 
blamed the lack of education of many mothers as responsible for their transmission of grotesque 
superstition, cowardice, servility, cruelty, hatred for education and other anti-social behavior, and 
moral and intellectual damage to their children 71 . This article is aware of a new age and that 
modernization required sharp breaks with features of traditional Egyptian society. The 1903 
article carried forward Qasim Amin's 1899 argument that the relations of mother with child are a 
main source of the social virtues, that the virtues which exist in the family will exist in the 
70. Sayyid 'Ali. "al-Haya'u wal-'Iffah Yastaghithani min Tabanuj al-Ghaniyat" (Shame and Chastity Cry 
Out for Rescue Before the Unveiledness of the Fair Young Women) in al-Liwa 17 May 1908, p. 5. My analysis of 
this and the other al-Liwa' articles on women's issues owes much to two sessions of discussion in 1981 with Ms 
Pam Doherty, an Arabic graduate of the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Melbourne University who has 
done historical research in Egypt and Jordan. She identified these items' incorporation of patterns from the West 
European bourgeois family within assertion of Islamic puritanism, a key aspect I had not noticed. 
71. "Madha Yajibu 'ala Ummatin Faqadat Madrasat al-Umm?" (What must be Done by a Nation that has 
Lacked the School of the Mother?) al-Liwa', 17 August 1903. 
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nation, and that Muslim countries are decaying and backward because neither women nor men 
are educated to create a real family life72 . 
Kamil' sown pronouncements on women sometimes were like moderately 
West-influenced liberal writers of the later al-Jaridah or the less post-religious liberal Arab 
nationalists of the 1930s and 1940s, in adjusting a cherished Islam to the central European 
patterns. In a second category of communications, though, he evoked incongruent sectors of 
Islam almost with relish, to contrast the national collectivity against the West. In the first mode, 
Kamil spoke for his small acculturated Muslim elite, and its adjusted ethos, when he observed 
that "all the educated people in Egypt hate polygamy": the Qur'an had required husbands to treat 
any plural wives with complete equality in order to prevent "custom from distorting heavenly 
religion" --- heading for the standard interpretation of Arab (eg. Jaridist) and Indian 
acculturated-liberal Islam that Qur'an 4:3 recommended monogamy. (Yet Kamil was as 
aggressive as defensive towards the Westerners who repatterned him --- the Ch1istians permitted 
themselves in the name of romantic passion the polygamy that the Muslims permitted with 
Islam). Was Emancipation of Women so needed in Islamic countries in which the Qur' an urged 
believers to respect and obey their mothers 73 . Women had to be given extensive education so 
that they could skilfully inculcate nationalism in their children. In his somewhat more integralist 
Islamic mode, however, Kamil warned that unadapted Western or Western-style education might 
influence Egyptian women who received it to repudiate the veil etc and therein posed "a great 
danger to the future of the nation". The significant point, though, is that in affirming the 
distinctness of Egypt's social patterns in respect to women from the modem West, he closely 
identifies the authenticity of the Egyptian "nation" with the wider non-Western communities of a 
general Islamic "civilization", the world's Muslims, "the East". Kamil in 1899 founded the 
distinct personality of the Egyptian nation threatened by importation of West European female 
education, upon a separate non-Western civilization (madaniyyah) irreconcilable in areas with 
the West's: 
Every nation has its own civilization. It would not become us to be apes blindly imitating 
foreigners. We must preserve our good virtues and take from the West only its virtues. 
Kamil described the veil as "a protection from sin" ('ismah) in the East and advised his 
72. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age p. 164. 
73. 'Isa, "MustafaKamil Mufakkiran Burjwaziyyan" pp. 112-113. 
to 
area 
modern West on dual-cultured nationalists Kamil's type, his tenseness towards Westerners 
as he acknowledged their impact, and his compensating impulse to sectionally differentiate 
Egypt from them with Islam. He strove to reconstruct and unify Western and Islamic concepts in 
the context of dialogue with such French friends as Juliette Adam, who came to accept Islamic 
and Egyptian theory and treatment of women as better than their subordination under French 
custom and law75 . The comparative statuses of women in the West and Islam/"the East" 
continued as a spiritually violent front of reaction by such France-educated Egyptian intellectuals 
as Tawfiq al-Hakim against the West into the 1950s (B 470 - 471). 
In Parochial Partisan Politics 
one (admittedly very factional) context, Kamil in violent language denied the right of a 
woman to choose a maniage partner against her father's wishes. He took the lead of the hostile 
campaign his al-Liwa' waged against the 1904 malTiage of al-Mu'ayyad's now pro-British 
editor Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf to the daughter of the Shaykh al-Sadat (a head of the descendants of 
the Prophet in Egypt) against her father's wishes. "The Khedive supp011ed the malTiage 
although it scandalized Egyptian Muslim public opinion", Kamil publicly breaking with the 
Khedive on the issue76. 
At issue in the savage denunciations by Kamil and colleagues of this marriage is the 
extent to which traditionalism continued to exert a hold over their emotions, thoughts and actions 
in despite of their massive exposure to Western-type education. The left-Arabist Salah 'Isa 
describes the case as presenting two fundamental and far-reaching issues to Egyptian society: 
1. Whether an adult sane (rashidah) woman had the right to maITy herself under Islamic 
Law to someone she chose and who chose her regardless of her guardians' opposition. 
2. Whether social standing derived from inhe1ited (DW:extra-Egyptian, Arabian) lineage 
74. Ibid 
75. Juliette Adam, L'An2leterre en E2vpte (Paris: Imperimerie du Centre 1922) pp. 284-288. 
76. Goldschmidt. "Egyptian National Party" p. 319. 
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or from an individual's efforts to raise himself and serve his homeland77 . 
Goldschmidt characterized that Kamil's sensitivity as a politician to public opinion-, 
overwhelmingly hostile to 'Ali Yusuf's maiTiage, decisively led him to oppose the match78• In 
trying to explain away the non-modernity of Kamil's hostile reaction, Salah 'Isa stresses Kamil's 
ideological-political conflict as an anti-imperialist patriot with 'Ali Yusuf as the latter 
accommodated himself (with the Khedive) to B1itish power in Egypt following the 1904 Entente 
Cordiale79 . Another factor was the journalistic-professional iivalry that had gradually developed 
between the younger Mustafa Kamil and the older Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf. The Shaykh's 
al-Mu'ayyad had provided the pan-Islamic forum for Muslim Egyptian aspirations when Kamil 
launched his nationalist career in the 1890s. Long dependent on al-Mu'ayyad's columns to reach 
Egyptians, Kamil in 1900 launched his own al-Liwa', making himself a newspaper proprietor 
comparable to Shaykh 'Ali80. 
We now directly analyze communications from Kamil's movement on the relationship 
between the Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf and the Shaykh al-Sadat's daughter. Mustafa Kamil's first 
savage article from Devon titled "From Scandal to Scandal" vented long-standing personal 
dislike of' Ali Yusuf. Yet the denunciation entailed emotionalist exaltation of an independent 
Islamic social order out of any control from the broader Westernizing outlook and aims some 
ascribe to Kamil and his acculturated colleagues: 
Which of the two is better: a man of us unpredictable in his principles who makes a 
mockery of Holy Law (yaskharu min al-shaii'ah) and customs and ethics and morals a~d 
makes a trade of personal abuse or a foreigner to us proclaiming open hostility against us 
77. 'Isa, "MustafaKamil...",p.114. 
78. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian National Party" p. 319. 
79. 'Isa, "Mustafa Kami!..." p. 114. 
80. 'Ali Yusuf was the pioneer of native Egyptian political journalism and pan-Islamism who founded 
al-Mu'ayyad in 1889 to voice Egyptian and pan-Islamic views at a time when Syrian Christian editors almost 
monopolized the Arabic press. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 152 - 153; P.J. Vatikiotis, The History ofE!!ypt 
from Muhammad 'Ali to Sadat (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1980) pp. 202-204, 228-229. 'Ali Yusuf was a 
supporter of the Khedive as was the much younger Kami! for a time: for a jaundiced account of Yusuf's 
participation in the Khedive's promotion of Arab proto-nationalism in Ottoman West Asia, his increased 
accommodation to the British along with his royal patron, and of the evolution of Kamil's initially dependent 
relationship with him see Awraq Muhammad Farid v. 1 (al-Hay'at al-Misriyyat al-' Ammah lil-Kitab 1978) pp. 
122-123. In fairness to Shaykh 'Ali, he refused to share some of the Khedive's enemies: "although ... not in 
sympathy with 'Abduh 's progressive religious philosophy, he was never the bitter personal enemy of the man that 
'Abbas became. Indeed, he tried to reconcile the two, and remained on good terms with such friends of the Mufti as 
Hasan 'Asim and Sa'd Zaghlul". Aroian, Dar al- 'Ulum p. 500. The Shaykh 'Ali of course let 'Abduh use 
al-Mu'ayyad as a forum to conduct his fierce 1900 polemic against French Foreign Minister Gabriel Hanotaux. 
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in weal or woe? .... Should not disobedience by daughters against their fathers be 
considered destruction for the Family ... and obliteration of the influence that the pqrified 
Shari'ah Law has on people's souls?81 
At the least, this outburst by Kamil would again constitute his recognition as a percipient 
politician of the continued attachment felt by his Muslim student and white-collar professional 
constituency and the press' general literate readership, to Islamic Law (shari'ah) insofar as it 
would regulate roles and relations of the sexes. 
The Kamilists' denunciation of Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf's match in terms of Islamic religion 
and law put further strain on relations between Muslims and Copts whom Kamil's movement 
was supposed to integrate in a united Egyptian national struggle. The somewhat pro-Occupation 
Coptic al-Watan felt obliged to defend' Ali Yusuf on this occasion also, although with at least 
verbal expression of diffidence because Islam and Islamic law were supposedly involved. 
al-Liwa' in reply described the Christian newspaper as disrespectful of Islam, as "wounding the 
feeling of the masses and elite of the Muslims" and denied al-Watan's right to examine the 
testimony of witnesses that preceded the Shar'i Court's decision against' Ali Yusuf82• Mustafa 
Kamil's followers on al-Liwa' were thus, even during his lifetime, prepared to pursue and 
develop the Islamic religious terms of the attack upon Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf where that accentuated 
the sense of difference between Coptic and Muslim Egyptians, to detriment of multi-sectarian 
territorial Egyptian nation-building. 
The above responses by Karnil and his followers to issues involving male-female 
relations ran against simple Westernization or a pure secular bi-sectarian territorial nationalism. 
The input from a spasmodic and politically selective classical Islam, here, again,underscores that 
the Kamilists were not a simple Westernized or Westernizing but dual-cultured decolonization 
movement. With the blending typical of acculturation, the Kamilists adapted to West Europe's 
monogamous ethos but synthesized radical Islamic restorationism with the close-knit West 
European bourgeois-urban nuclear family. The new family as the basic cell of the territorial 
nation, and their discussions of inter-sex issues, alike resistantly focused classical Arabic and 
classical Islam as definants of the political community. 
81. Mustafa Kami!, "Min Fadihah ila Fadihah: As'ilah Sarihah" (From Scandal to Scandal: Some Frank 
Questions), in al-Liwa', September 6, 1904, p. l. 
82. "Jaridat al-Watan wal-Qada" al-Shar'i" (al-Watan Newspaper and the Application oflslamic Laws), 
al-Liwa 13 August 1904, p.2. 
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OUTREACH TO EUROPE THEN PAN-ISLAMIC WITHDRAW AL 
Acculturation As One Motive in Outreach 
In appealing to France, in particular, to eject Britain, Kamil and similar intellectuals were 
measuring the strength of the international rivalry of these two powers. However, as secular 
lawyers they had been educated both in Egypt and France in French legal and political concepts, 
and in book-myths, that were highly fo1mal and theoretical. Kami! mistook the extent to which 
appeal to these could fmther draw the French to confront B1itain in the Nile Valley. Attaching 
Egypt's need to the Enlightenment, he compared himself to Benjamin Franklin when he asked 
Voltaire to urge French aid for American independence83 • Fueling French rage over British 
pressure on French personnel and French in the School of Law and other Egyptian institutions, 
Kamil sometimes rather manipulatively fused France's interests and Egyptian nationalism84. Yet 
these cultural motifs were more than levers for Egypt's interests: Kami! in his precocious, 
fast-adapting appeals also was testing out French conceptual structures installed by education in 
his --- and his proto-elite's --- provisional personality. Would the French take back their 
liberalism and radicalism from Muslims as real coinage for new wider communities? (His elite 
was sure to swing sharply if the mentors of Progress rebuffed). Outreach was more than cultural 
naivety: independence via Europe would spare Kamil's still fragile elite from having to ally with 
popular classes for a devastating direct showdown with Britain85. Kamil in France sincerely 
praised the French as Egypt's most important instructors in "civilization" before 1882 and 
probably did hope that they could become so again for the long term after evicting Britain. In a 
83. Moustafa Kamel, "L' Absorption par I' Angleterre", La Nouvelle Revue 15 December 1895 p. 823. 
84. In an early Nouvelle Revue article, Kami! welcomed British description of the Egyptian Nationalists as 
"the French party" as recognition "by our enemies" themselves that "our cause and that of France form but one". 
Kamil, "L' Absorption par I' Angleterre" p. 811. Similarly tongue-in-cheek for the long term, greatly though the 
Caisse hindered Cromer, may have been Kamil's 1895 assurance to the French that Egyptians did not want, and 
never had, to manage their country's finances other than under the "international institutions" set up by the powers 
for Egypt's European creditors. Ibid p. 821. 
85. Tignor argued that building up an anti-British movement at home would have meant going outside the 
narrow student and professional sectors supporting Kamil's campaign for independence and that such "broadening 
of the nationalist movement implied concessions .in Mustafa Kami! 's political. social and economic program to other 
groups, such as the urban proletariat". So long as hope of securing Britain's evacuation from Egypt through 
pressure from (in particular) France remained, the Watani movement "preferred to take a try at the easier way of 
obtaining independence" by lobbying in Europe. Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in 
Egypt. 1882-1914 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966) pp. 268-269. 
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courteous but firm way, though, he made clear that his movement sought complete independence 
for Egypt. France had never tried to dominate Egypt before the British conquest86, Arabic· had 
been the medium of teaching in the schools and te11iary colleges Frenchmen helped set up under 
Muhammad' Ali and Khedive Isma'il and was to become so again after the British87 , Britain was 
being ... 
striving to abolish the mixed courts asl\a bar to its complete control but Kamil left little doubt that 
the Egyptian nationalists hoped Europe would dismantle them after independence88. Kamil's 
vulnerability was --- would the French accept that the cultural affinities of his elite entitled Egypt 
to an equal alliance and independence? 
Pan-Muslim Self-Identification Before West 
From his earliest appeals for supp011 to French audiences, Kamil identified himself, his 
independence movement and Egypt as Muslim and allied to the Ottoman State. He reiterated to 
his French audiences that the world's Muslims were a loose political community89. This, and his 
constant characterization of Europeans as Christians, harked back to traditional Muslim habits of 
thought. The very young Kamil, though, wanted to synthesize the traditional wide Muslim 
community with new associations across religions imposed by the modem age. In 1895, he 
proposed, to the French public, an alliance of Turkey with Russia and France against England, 
which would check B1itain' s alleged encouragement of secessionist Christian movements 
to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Kamil's proposal amounted to an association of the two 
European powers with the world's 300,000,000 far-dispersed Muslims against "anti-Muslim" 
Britain. Support by France and Russia for "weak and humiliated Turkey" and Egypt's freedom 
from British rule would put the two European powers on "good terms with the Islamic world" 
86. Ibid p. 812. 
87. Kami! stressed that Arabic, "the national language of the country", was the medium of instruction in the 
numerous schools that Frenchmen helped establish from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. The British had ended 
Arabic's role as the language of instruction. Ibid p. 814. Kamil's French audiences would have understood that the 
nationalists' promotion of Arabic after independence would limit the scope of French while eliminating English. 
88. Ibid p. 812. 
89. As Wendell observed, "Kamil's annual banquets and speeches, generally given in Paris, on the 
anniversary of the Sultan's coronation, were ... not likely to convince anyone that he was not a loyal Ottoman 
subject and a supporter of the pan-Islamic ideology". Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 250. Kamil in 1897 was 
active in organizing appeals among Egyptians resident in France for the Ottoman war effort against the Greeks. 
Ahmad Rashad, Mustafa Kami!: Hayatuhu wa Kifahuhu (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Sa'adah 1958) p. 113. This despite 
Mme Adam's philo-Hellenism! Cf. fn 49. 
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and further "lasting reconciliation between Muslims and Ch1istians"90. Addressing the French 
early in his career, Kamil evoked a new age of open, fluid relations between the Muslim and 
Christian worlds. He foresaw negative alliances by Muslims with European states against 
Britain's imperialism and more long-term associations to realize non-religious "joint interests": 
yet Christianity and Islam would continue to sustain their two distinct political "worlds". Kamil 
rather vividly evoked to his French audience the capacity of religious emotions over distant 
external issues --- not local interests --- to inspire violent action by a Muslim population against 
Europeans. In Paris in 1895, he depicted India's Muslims as ready to make the blood of their 
British masters flow and die themselves because clashes between distant Turks and Armenians 
seemed to them a British action against "the Caliphate"91 . 
Kamil's consistent affirmation down the years to European and Muslim audiences alike 
that Muslims were a "world", a far-flung religio-political community, argues that he always 
sincerely felt some pan-Islamic emotions. 
The fortunes of the Ottoman Turks and those of the Egyptians would remain so 
connected that he had to promote both in Europe, he believed. His French communications 
sometimes were a thinking-aloud that strove to get an analytical grip on his region, rather than 
diplomatic images of it modulated to advance Egypt's interests of that day. Kamil could even 
analyze the revered Caliphate in an alienated way as an instrument that, misapplied, could harm. 
The Ottoman Caliphate had on occasion undermined rather than heightened the Muslims' 
resistance to British imperialism. Karnil thought that the Sultan 'Abdul-Majid's disapproval at 
once quelled all resistance by India's Muslims during the Rebellion ·of 1857 
to the British, his Crimean allies92. Similarly,' Abdul-Hamid's 
declaration that 'Urabi Pasha was a rebel destroyed the will of 
Egypt's soldiers to resist the British conquest93 • Kami! characterized the Turks in unflattering 
terms as dupes of British diplomacy in the events of 1881 and 1882 through which Britain 
conquered Egypt94. He expressly condemned Turkish foreign policy which since the 1877-1878 
90. Mustafa Kami!, "Une Alliance qui s'Impose: Le Sultan et l'Europe", La Nouvelle Revue 15 November 
1895 pp. 377, 383. 
91. Kamil, "L' Angleterre et !'Islam", La Nouvelle Revue, 15 October 1895 p. 835. 
92. Ibid p. 836. 
93. Kamil, "Une Alliance qui s'Impose" p. 379. 
94. Ibid pp. 378-381. 
war it 
must wariness the 
conduct of international relations do to Egypt's national interests. Yet by already 
depicting Egypt's and the Turks' sovereignties as so interdependent, he could not be pursuing 
nationalism of an atomistic kind international relations. Dislike of Turks had deep roots in 
French high culture96. Kamil virulently denounced in La Nouvelle Revue those Christian 
subjects who challenged the authority of the Muslim Turks. Avoiding serious discussion of 
intercommunal relations in the Ottoman State or of Armenian nationalism97 , he instead presented 
the Armenians as an instrument of the British imperialists. Bearing British 
arms and the British flag, the Armenians were the aggressors who 
"provoked" or carried out the massacres throughout the Ottoman Empire. Kamil was aware of 
the "excited support" that they had won Europe, he implied somewhat even in France and 
Russia with he wanted the Ottoman State allied98 . He may, to some extent, have been 
Armenian nationalists sometimes attacks against Muslims Ottoman 
95. Ibid pp. 377, 382. Kami! also had to accommodate to the specifitles of the Anglophobia of his French 
supporters. When Kami! Pasha(1832 - 1913: Ottoman Grand Vezir 1885 - 1891, 1895, 1908-9 and 1912 - 1913) 
was again appointed to the Chief Vezirate in 1895, Juliette Adam described him as "l'homme de l' Angleterre". She 
depicted England and Germany, both detestable to her, as controlling many prominent Ottoman statesmen. Juliette 
Adam, "Lettres sur la Politique Exterieure", La Nouvelle Revue, 15 October 1895 p. 833. 
96: See Clarence Dana Rouillard, The Turk in French History, Thought and Literature 0520 - 1660) (Paris: 
Boivin 1940). Mahomet the Conqueror's career drew from Philippe de Commynes an early instance of the Western 
stereotype of the shrewd, cruel and lascivious rulers of the Turks, dividing their time between wars of conquest and 
the luxury of the seraglio: p. 27. There was "intense popular concern in France upon occasions of some especial 
menace of the Turks, as when public rejoicings followed Christian victories over the Turks at the Siege of Malta 
(1565) and the battle of Lepanto (1571), or when French armies were helping to repulse the Turks in Hungary (1593 
- 1601). !hid p. 357. Francis I took pains to disguise and deny his alliance with Sulayman --- proof enough of 
strong hostile opinion in France against the Turks. !hid. 
97. In an 1895 letter from Paris, Kami! was inclined to seek lessons and organizational patterns for Egypt's 
independence movement from the "Eastern" (sic) Annenians' activism. But he also described the Armenians as 
having "no right entitling them to win their demands whereas your [the Egyptians'] rights are the greatest of rights". 
'Ali Fahrni Kamil, Mustafa Kamil Pasha fi 34 Rabi' an v. 3. p. 65. However, there was a basis in the demographic 
realities for the refusal of the acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals to consider the Armenians' claims for 
independence. H.G. Hogarth pointed out that there was no "geographical unit of the Ottoman [Empire] in which 
Armenians are the majority. If they cluster more thickly in the vilayets of Angora, Sivas, Erzeroum, K.harput, and 
Van, i.e. in easternmost Asia Minor, than elsewhere, ... they are consistently a minority in any large administrative 
district". Where, then, was it possible to constitute an autonomous Armenia? Quoted Sir J.AR. Marriott, Europe 
and Beyond : A Preliminary Survey of World Politics in the Last Half Century. 1870-1920 (London: Methuen 1933) 
p. 253. Juliette Adam had already forseen the demographic impossibility of an Annenian state: La Nouvelle Revue 
January-February 1895 p. 413. There were about 1,500,000 Armenians in the Ottoman Empire around the end of 
the nineteenth century, and 1,000,000 under Russian rule. Art. "Annenia", EB 10th ed. v. xxv. p. 637. The 
populations of Armenians ruled by Tsarist Russia had some importance for Kamilist journalism. These inhabited 
Karabakh (incorporated from the Ottoman Empire in 1813), Erevan and Nakhichevan (taken from the Ottomans in 
1828) and Kars (conquered from the Ottomans in 1878). 
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Empire in the 1890s, triggering off some bloody reprisals --- although to manipulate the British 
more often than the other way around99• 
The French Anglophobes with whom Kamil had linked had little hostility left over for 
Muslims and Turks, but this was already a preliminary fault-line between them and the Egyptian 
nationalists. In remarks preceding Kamil's very first article in La Nouvelle Revue Juliette Adam, 
while accusing Britain of fostering the Armenians' "Christian fanaticism", warned the Sublime 
Porte that "the massacres must stop, Muslim fanaticism must be brought under control at all 
costs" 100. Henry Spont observed in La Nouvelle Revue after a 1903 tour of complex, strife-tom 
Ottoman Macedonia that French public opinion "favors the B ulgars although it knows nothing 
about them" because "they are Christians and that suffices" --- anti-Muslim phobia throughout 
Europe of which the Kamilists were ultra-conscious by then 101 . Kamil' s readiness to identify 
himself and Egypt's independence movement with a not particularly popular Turkey in 
France/Europe does attest to his pan-Islamic impulse. When discussing the Armenian question 
to his French (Christian) audience Kamil --- quite oblivious to the Copts' existence, here, ---
spoke of Egyptians only as an Islamic community. 
98. Kamil's accounts varied somewhat. Annenians, armed with British weapons and bearing the British 
flag, "provoked" massacres in the Ottoman capital itself. "L' Angleterre et l'Islam", loc. cit. p. 836. Or "Armenians 
disguised as Muslims, even 'ulama', with anns furnished by the English [committed] all the excesses and massacres, 
to sow ruin and death in all the Empire. then win as the prize of their misdeeds so much aroused (excited) support! 
France and Russia themselves had to intervene". "Une Alliance qui s'Impose" pp. 376-377. Cf. findings that 
Annenian nationalists provoked the communal clashes to involve the Powers. in Jeremy Salt, Britain and the Cause 
of Ottoman Reform 1876-1896, Australian Middle East Studies Association Working Paper 8 (August 1986) pp. 
17-18 and passim. 
99. Elie Kedourie argues from official British documents of the time that Armenian nationalists in the 
1880s and 1890s mounted armed attacks on Muslims with the deliberate intention to provoke maximum Turkish 
violence against their own Armenian communities. The "clear" aim of Armenian nationalists in such organizations 
as the Dashnakzoution (Armenian Revolutionary Federation established in 1890) "was to create 'incidents', provoke 
the Turks to excesses and thereby bring about the intervention of the Powers" --- who would force the Turks to grant 
autonomy (ultimately independence) to the Armenians. Armenian committees in Erzerum were procuring anns for 
revolt as early as 1882. Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and Other Essavs (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1970) p. 295. Kedourie, a Jewish Iraqi scholar by ethnic origin, opposed all Middle East nationalisms. Cf. 
Salt, op. cit. 
100. Juliette Adam, "Lettres sur la Politique Exterieure", La Nouvelle Revue, v. xcvi 15 October 1895 p. 
833. See fn 95. 
101. Henry Spont, "A Travers La Macedoine", La Nouvelle Revue 1May1903 p. 52. An article titled 
"al-Mas'alat al-Maqduniyyah" (The Macedonian Question), al-Liwa' 16 February 1903, noted that hatred of Turkey 
had reached a peak in general Europe. Gladstone in 1876 had promoted press campaigns to whip up feeling over 
Bulgarian massacres as an excuse to dismember the Ottoman Empire. But even if a major European newspaper took 
Turkey's side now, "the policy of the [European] States toward her would not change for a single instant". Turkey 
had no one to help her in Europe: she could rely only on the sword she had in her hand and on her brave troops. 
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Their acquired French culture conditioned the bilingual Kamilists to seek humane 
relations with a true liberal Europe, against an unrepresentatively predatory Britain. Egyptian 
interests further fostered selective perception of Europe. Kamil' s call that "the Sultan take the 
hand of Russia and France" ignored --- only for the time --- the fate of extensive Muslim 
populations in Central Asia under Russian rule102 and of the North African and sub-Saharan 
Muslim populations conquered, or being conquered, by France. Continuous interaction with 
French culture and France was to confront such anti-imperialist Egyptian intellectuals as Karnil 
and especially Muhammad Farid with French colonialism in Algeria in particular (Chs. 4 and 5). 
Seeking France and Russia's help to dislodge Britain, the anti-colonialist Egyptian 
intellectuals may even in this initial phase have felt, but repressed, reservations about French and 
Russian colonization of Muslims. 
Kamil's presentation of himself to the French as the spokesman of a wider pan-Muslim 
political community as well as of Egypt was consistent throughout his whole nationalist career. 
In one plain-spoken 1903 Le Fi iraro article, he introduced himself as a link of communication 
between two civilizations, "the brilliant, immortal [Islamic] civilization" and that of the West: 
"he who addresses [Frenchmen] now is a Muslim Egyptian who yet received his education from 
French professors and is inclined with all his soul to promote conjunction and lasting peace 
between Muslims and Christians". France had not yet signed the Entente Cordiale, but Kamil by 
1903 voiced a depressed awareness of how far the educated French public shared a general 
European distaste for Muslims and of France as a participant in imperialist conquests and 
colonialism. It was "a false charge" that the Muslims hate "the contemporary sciences" and 
"modern civilization": "if the Muslims hate Europe and its civilization and everything that comes 
from it, that is only because it ... robbed them of their independence" 103 • Kamil was thus 
consistent over a decade that dual culture emotionally pushed him and his small elite to seek an 
alliance with Europe: but the colonialist drive of European powers, including France, against 
102. Russians were engaged in conquering the vast area of the Kazakh steppe from 1730. In the nineteenth 
century, Russia conquered sedentary peasant or urban Muslims in Central Asia. The Russians attacked the Khanate 
ofKokand in 1864 - 1865, conquering Tashkent. In 1868 they invaded Bukhara, reducing its Amir to vassal status. 
The Russians occupied the Turkmen country between 1873 and 1884. Nine million people in the Kazakh steppe and 
Central Asia were under Russian rule by 1881. Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modem History of Soviet Central Asia 
(London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964) p. 65. Captain Alexander de Mayer, a participant narrated Russia's 
bloody conquest of Turkmen and other Muslims in "Les Memoires d'un Blesse", La Nouvelle Revue 
January-February 1895 pp. 85-97, September-October 1895 pp. 266-280, and November-December 1895 pp. 
727-749. 
103. Mustafa Kamil, "Urubba wal-Islam" (Europe and Islam). al-Liwa' 22 September 1903. 
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Muslims had ignited a popular fury against everything at all linked to the West that jeopardized 
, 
even internal modernization by West-orientated Muslim elites like his own. (Haykal and the 
Liberal Constitutionalists in the 1920s, but especially after 1945 as the West imposed Israel, had 
some parallel perceptions: Britain and other Western states were not adequately rewarding 
acculturated incrementalists who wanted to move to equal alliances --- indeed, in inflicting 
Israel, they ignited fundamentalism likely to destroy the dual-cultured elite: B 133 - 135; B 203 -
209). 
Circumstances of international politics and Egypt's interests cannot wholly explicate the 
Watani intellectuals' statements that general Europe did not mean harm to the Ottoman State. 
Years after hopes for alliance with European states to dislodge Britain from Egypt faded, 
Kamilist intellectuals occasionally felt an urge to deny that general Europe was hostile against 
the Ottoman State and the world's Muslims. As late as Ap1il 1908 Sayyid 'Ali in al-Liwa' tried 
to counter the impression that a range of European States were pursuing policies detrimental to 
"our Ottoman State". He advised his Egyptian readers "to look for the English hand in the 
troubles of the Ottoman State": it was England that incited "the States of Europe to draw the 
sword of enmity in the Ottoman State's face". "Were we to scrutinize every event in which a 
State among the States has appeared as hostile to the Caliph we would find that it was the 
English hand which ignited the fire from behind a screen" 104. Sayyid 'Ali's argument might 
pragmatically concentrate Egyptians' hatred of the imperialist, Christian West against the British 
enemy who had to be dislodged from Egypt's chest (internal mobilization). But we view his 
argument that general Europe was fundamentally benign towards the Islamic Ottoman State as 
also determined by culture. It was Sayyid 'Ali's private French self-bilingualization and 
continuing interactions with France105 that made him psychologically unwilling to credit the 
reality that most Europeans disliked Muslims and that this had to affect the policies of their 
governments to the Ottoman State. 
104. Sayyid 'Ali, "Ibhathu 'an al-Yad al-Inkiliziyyah fi Mashaghil al-Daw lat al-' Aliyyah" (Look For the 
English Hand in The Troubles of The Ottoman State), al-Liwa' 22 April 1908. 
105. Sayyid 'Ali (1880-1932) after secondary school studies worked as a translator in al-Liwa'. He studied 
at Cairo's French Law School. When Mustafa Kami! established L'Etendard Egyptien (March 1907) he appointed 
Sayyid 'Ali to translate excerpts from the Arabic press into French for publication, and in 1907 sent him as a 
correspondent of al-Liwa to Pa1is. I am grateful to Professor Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. of the University of 
Pennsylvania for supplying me with this biodata on Sayyid 'Ali. 
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Ottoman State and France-Europe strenuously built to last. To both French/European and 
Egyptian audiences, Kamil long presented himself as representing the chain of acculturated elites 
modernizing the Muslim world. Conditioned by Arabic, he defined the extensively laicist French 
more as Christian (and Egypt more as Muslim) than he need have. His earlier impression that 
French culture could tolerate alliance with a Muslim camp and his later one that France was a 
component in a Christian camp subjugating Muslims both heightened his consciousness of a 
wide pan-Muslim political community. 
Acculturation Could Also Alienate From Other Muslims 
Kamil's early stress to European audiences on Egypt's achieved or prospective 
Europeanization was more than manipulation. Connected with self-image his suggestions that 
Egypt might become a conduit or intermediary for French/European culture and interests to 
to still-traditional peoples, this was a cultures-determined identification. It recur at 
intervals whether appropriate to the political situations these intellectuals face, or not. 
Throughout all the shifts of his attitudes to other Muslims and Westerners, Kamil 
remained consistent that a Europe-derived facet was central to his elite. Statements by Kamil 
1895 (Paris) and 1906 (to the English) voiced with consistency these intellectuals' 
acculturation-created marginality between (a) the general xenophobic Islamic and Afro-Asian 
world and (b) the colonizing West. In 1895, he warned La Nouvelle Revue's readers that around 
half of the world's Muslims believed in the "systematic hostility" of general Europe against 
Islam: in contrast, he represented that "small minority" of "old students of France" now 
struggling to draw a xenophobic Muslim world into alliance and collaboration with the European 
states (minus Britain)106. In 1906, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey justified the 
Dinshawai executions as a response to fanaticism spreading along all northern Africa. Denying 
in a 1906 interview to the Daily Chronicle that Egypt's Muslims were "fanatical" against 
Christians or would politically reamalgamate an independent Egypt in the Islamic Ottoman State 
106. "Un Alliance qui s·rmposc" p. 377. 
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Kamil observed 
We have taken great pride in our schools and in our intellectual movement ... since. the 
days of Muhammad 'Ali because the Egyptian nation is the first Islamic nation to 
embrace the European civilization. However, it seems to us now that the English look 
upon us as though we were the natives of the Congo! It is well known that our young 
men used to be sent from a century back to France and Germany and England to receive 
their education ... in those countries' institutions. The result is that we Egyptians now 
enjoy a higher education in no wise less than that available in the greatest of the 
European countries. It is an error, then, that we be compared to Morocco or to the natives 
of Lake Chad as the majority of the English compare us107• 
He was at risk here of internalizing "civilizing mission" motifs, with which France would 
justify her conquest of Morocco 108 and of (partly Muslim) black West African populations (Lake 
Chad, Zinder), motifs with which the Belgians rationalized their ravaging of the Congo. 
Unconsciously, Kamil was unde1mining political solidarity by Egyptians with major Arab and 
African populations resisting colonization. His humiliation as an acculturated that Britishers 
should associate Egyptians, perceived by him as widely European-educated, with Morocco 
voiced scant regard in this particular context for unmixed traditional Arab-Islamic culture, which 
Morocco had. Indeed, Kamil bracketed traditional-literate Islamic Morocco with the non-literate 
(if until recently Arab-influenced) animist Congo. 
Kamil conceived the black African populations with which he refused to identify Egypt 
in London in 1906 as to a great extent Muslim. Those around Lake Chad (Central Africa) and in 
Zinder (West Africa) mentioned by him included many Muslims with some 
Arabic literacy. Kamil in England specifically connected rejection of sub-Saharan black 
Africans of Lake Chad and Zinder to his rejection of traditional Islamic "fanaticism" which 
fostered hostile acts against Europeans merely because they were non-Muslim: 
No ... Egypt is not at all fanatical, and it would be truly bad faith to compare it to Chad, tc 
107. Interview to (London) Dailv Chronicle, translated in "al-Sultan wal-Islam" (The Sultan and Islam), 
al-Liwa' 28 July 1906 p.l. 
108. France's conquest of Morocco was progressing when Kami! gave his 1906 London interview. In 1902 
the young modernizing Sult an 'Abd al-' Aziz was forced to recognize French authority in the Tuat region of the 
central Sahara. In 1903, the French occupied Colomb, and in 1904 Berguent, on the Algerian frontier. In 1904 
England had given France a free hand to conquer Morocco in return for France's recognition of the pennanency of 
British rule in Egypt. In 1912, Sultan' Abd al-Hafiz signed the Treaty of Fez, establishing a French Protectorate 
over the whole country. Juliette Adam's own Nouvelle Revue published a racist article by Albert de Pouvourville in 
1904 anticipating the extinction of Algeria's Arabs. The article envisaged Morocco as one of the "successive 
annexes" of future French expansion from Algeria. Albert de Pouvourville, "Peuplement Rationnel de I' Afrique du 
Nord", La Nouvelle Revue 15 September 1904 pp. 147, 148, 153. 
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world. He empathized why most Muslims felt as they did about Westerners Egypt's 
Europe-derived facet could never fit into insularist Muslim societies, whether pre-colonial or 
those reacting against colonial rule. Kami! even implied that the Ottoman state had progressed 
less on the spectrum away from those purist Muslim societies than Egypt: he felt some alienation 
in respect to modernization from the Turks, also. In this type of spasm, he wanted to limit 
Egypt's reintegration with the Ottoman Turks and certainly with pre-modern Muslim societies 
whose xenophobia clashed with the acculturative functions of his class. He wanted to direct 
some time and energy away from other Muslims into building new relationships with Western 
societies. 
Gradual Equation of all Europeans as Fanatical Against Muslims 
Not facile or slick, Kamil made clear to Europeans that he was working for a new 
extension relationship not just between Egypt and France but between an and 
European communities. The compound architecture could fail and could endanger his elite. 
New secular nexuses between Muslims and Europeans --- common interests, liberal-progressive 
ideology, French culture --- initially subordinated, but for Kamil never eliminated, Islamic and 
Christian impulses and identities. There was little reason why he had to raise Armenians and 
Turks at all in France from the angle of Egypt's nairow interest: yet Kamil thought the new 
energies and bases for relationship that had opened in the European mind gave him leeway to 
address points of Muslim-Christian antagonism. He was banking that most Europeans were 
unfired by the anti-Islamism that B1itain whipped up, that there was religiously neutral liberalism 
as well as impe1ialists in Europe. 
He early had doubts that the British might not be so unrepresentative. To a French 
109. Mustafa Kamil's press conference on 26 July 1906 at Carlton Hotel, London, in Juliette Adam, 
L' Angleterre en E\:ypt p. 161. In denying that Europe-dyed Egypt was "fanatical" like pre-modern Morocco etc, 
Kami! was refuting British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey. In order to justify the executions of peasants at 
Dinshaway, Grey rambled in Parliament that "all this year a fanatical feeling in Egypt has been on the increase. It 
has not been confined to Egypt, it has been stretching along the north of Africa generally. It is for that reason a little 
time ago that the garrison had to be increased". The Times 6 July 1906 p. 7c. 
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audience in 1895 Kamil made the barbed observation that "the European powers have seized the 
countries of the Orient under the pretext of civilizing them". But "Egypt has been civilized" (had 
Europeanized itself of its own will) "without having to be subjected to any power" (force ---
puissance). There was incipient scepticism here about the motives of most Europeans in 
international relations. Stronger, though, is Kamil's hope that Europe will treat Egypt, because it 
had modernized itself, differently from non-self-modernizing peoples it colonized .. Europe 
should free Egypt, given its record of self-modernization, "to prove that Europe works 
disinterestedly for the happiness of all men" 110. 
Differences of religion and race were possible barriers to sympathy from Europeans. 
Already in 1895 Kamil sensed a racial orientation in the French whom he addressed. Appealing 
for Europe's aid to free Egypt from British rule, he rhetorically asked whether the same rights 
did not apply to the man of Africa as to the man of Europe111 ? Kamil ultimately came to 
consider Western religious hostility to Islam the reason why Europeans refused to treat the 
Muslim Egyptians as they treated other Europeans. In his initial optimistic appeals to Europe, 
however, he obviously thought prejudices against Islam secondary in the personality of the 
French: he would not otherwise have repeatedly mentioned Egypt's Muslimness. 
He had, of course, been aware that B1itish politicians took account of the Islam of 
Egyptians. As Prime Minister, the Liberal leader Gladstone presided over Britain's conquest of 
Egypt in 1882. Yet, as Kamil grew to manhood, Gladstone in violent language demanded 
autonomy or independence for Ch1istian nationalities in the Ottoman Empire. Kamil at first 
thought in terms of nations foiming relations across religious lines as interests dictated, but then 
circumstances entangled Egypt's independence with European pan-Christianism and conflicts 
between Muslims and Christian nationalities in the Ottoman Empire, in his mind. Kamil in 
1896, in two letters, asked Gladstone to call for British evacuation from Egypt. But Gladstone, 
who had recently championed the rights of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, did not raise 
his voice for the liberation of Egypt. Steppat presents this incident as a turning-point in Kamil's 
attitude to the general West, rather than to Britain al~ne. Gladstone's contrasting attitudes to 
llO. "L' Absorption par L' Angleterre" p. 822. Kamil's choice of words associated British imperialism and 
that of the other European countries whose aid he sought (France in the first place). The European countries "se son 
emparees de" (have seized) the countries of the Orient. Britain's great aim was "s'emparer definitivement de 
l'Egypte". Ibid p. 820. 
111. "L' Absorption par I' Angleterrc" p. 823. 
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Christian Armenians and (predominantly) Muslim Egyptians opened up a chasm between the 
, 
Christian West and the Muslim Orient in the young Kamil's mind, and he generalized from the 
individual Gladstone's inconsistency that a religious fanaticism was the driving force of general 
European politics112. 
Kamil had been already hostile to Gladstone in his communications to the French in the 
previous year, in which he identified him as incarnating British forces acting from Christian 
drives against Muslims, especially "les Tures" and the Egyptians. Kamil vitriolically assailed 
Gladstone's pretensions to "have only humanity in view", to "have no bias against the Turks", to 
be "the liberal man" 113• The British distorted Europe's secular humanitarianism to cloak their 
anti-Muslim expansionist dlive. Could they thereby corrupt even the French, whose aid Kamil 
sought? Even in 1895, he had a stab of apprehension. He characterized B1itain as endeavoring 
to create "a profound abyss between Islam and Chlistianity in its own interest and only in its own 
interest" 114• Kamil defensively mentioned to the French alleged British charges that Egyptians 
opposed the Occupation out of religious fanaticism 115 : he probably feared that such British 
charges might activate Christian anti-Muslim feelings in even the more secularized French and 
other Europeans --- making them legalize British control. He sometimes revealed considerable 
apprehension that any incident could involve France in joint political action with Britain against 
Muslim interests. Thus, he tried to convince French readers that Britain organized "the 
disturbance at Jeddah in which were wounded the consuls of England" (sic) "of Russia and of 
France", to involve the two latter powers more deeply in Ottoman Armenia116. 
At the time of the early 1895 appeals to Europe, Kamil wanted to believe that "there is no 
prejudice against Islam" in general Europe. France and Russia had intervened in the Armenian 
question as mediators, not like Britain as the Ottoman State's enemy117 . Kamil's Arabic 
112. Steppat, National ism us p. 307-308. Kami! saw the Annenian Nubar Pasha, at various times Egypt's 
Foreign Affairs minister and Prime Minister under the British. as collaborating with them in the expectation that 
they might help his people carve an independent homeland out in the Ottoman Empire. The young Kamil's sense 
that Armenians were collaborative "interlopers" (dukhala') comparable to certain subsidized SCs was fueled by 
praise of Nubar by Colonel Baring. brother of Cromer, with whom Kami! conversed on a steamer en route to Paris 
for a lobbying session. Letter by Kami! lo Khedivial official Ahmad Shafiq Pasha, cited Muhammad Muhammad 
Husayn, al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyvah fil-Adab al-Mu'asir (Bayrut: 2 vols Dar al-lrshad 1970) v. 1 pp. 222 - 223. 
113. "L' Angleterre et !'Islam" p. 836. 
114. "Une Alliance que s'Impose" p. 377. 
115. "L'Absorption par I' Angleterre" pp. 821-822; "L'Angleterre et l'Islam" pp. 836-837. 
116. "L · Angleterre et I 'Islam" p. 837. 
117. "Une Alliance qui s'Impose" p.377. Yet Russia always was much more manipulative than Britain, and 
1 
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speeches suggest that his interactions with Europe very quickly convinced him that Europeans in 
general were religiously hostile to Ottoman Turks: this sharpening perception worked to alienate 
him from non-British Europeans quite independently of their attitudes to Egypt's independence. 
Kamil lost hope that European powers would intervene to expel Britain from the Nile Valley 
when Britain intimidated France to back down at Fashoda in 1898. Even in the previous year, 
though, he was speaking of the European states in general as hostile to the Ottoman State out of 
animosity to Muslims in general. Resident foreigners criticized Egyptians for sending aid to the 
Ottoman State in the 1897 - 1898 Greco-Turkish War. In a speech of 7 June 1897, he replied: 
From the religious viewpoint no intelligent person could blame Egypt for the aid she 
gives to the Khilafah (Caliphate), for the govern~ts of Europe have openly proclaimed 
that the basis of their policy in the East is to assis~Christians by all means. This is a 
principle to which they have clung tenaciously and carried far118• 
Kamil in that speech did not name France, which claimed to protect Ottoman Syria and 
'Iraq's Catholics, and sought a special status in Syria119• Even at that rather early date, however, 
he clearly perceived that religious sectarianism dete1mined the foreign policies of the European 
states in the Muslim East: they were banding together to harm the Muslims' interests. 
Responding in self-defence, Muslims were banding together on the international stage on a basis 
of shared religion as well as shared interests. Two hostile religious international blocs were 
forming. The situation is becoming like the classical dar al-Harb vs dar al-Islam paradigm. 
Kamil's recent dream of secular alliances between Muslim nations and Christian European states 
was already collapsing. 
The most secular Western concepts may have pulled the very young Kamil towards the 
attitude that religions need not define either atomistic nations or their international relations at 
all. His and his colleagues' pan-Islamism, though, is not to be viewed nan-owly as a resurgence 
of Arabo-Islamic cultural survivals (that culture, anyway, always remained vital under pounding 
and resource-starvation) when Europe's anti-Muslimism so strongly worked to pan-Islamize the 
even subtly hostile, to an Armenian nationalism that she was determined would never loosen her grip over her own 
Armenian subjects. Kedourie, Chatham House Version p. 443. al-Liwa' bitterly accused Westerners of anti-Muslim 
prejudice in denouncing "our Ottoman State" over the Armenians, while turning a blind eye to sweeping 
confiscations by the Tsarist authorities of the church properties and lands of the Armenians living within their 
territories. "al-Ard fil-Rusiya" (Land Issues in Russia), al-Liwa· 21September1903 p. 1. 
118. Rashad, Mustafa Kami!, p. 116. 
119. Steppat. National ism us pp. 309-310, cites Ka.mil's awareness of competition between the European 
powers to take over the Holy Cities of Palestine. This would cover French ambitions in Syria. 
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Egyptians in most contact. The anti-Muslim texture of French high culture trickled over into the 
conceptualization of international affairs by the journalistic and political opinion leaders whom 
Kamil had to draw into support for Egypt's independence. The anti-Islamic phobia many 
Europeans had against the Turks constantly jan-ed his nerves as he propagandized for Muslim 
Egypt, uphill enough a venture in itself. Kamil cited solidarity with Armenians and Bulgars by 
such British Christianist Turcophobes as Gladstone to bring home to Europeans how normally 
Europeanoid was his own movement's s'mmetrical --- but similarly limited --- counter-solidarity 
with the Turks120. But it was the Fr~to 1>'.1ii:k'h'e opened himself with least reservations, that 
showed how pervasively Christianity defined European nations both internally and in world 
affairs. Kamil repeatedly encountered in France anti-Semitism sparked by the drawn-out 
Dreyfus affair, which dragged on from 1894 through 1906: such mainly French anti-Semitism 
was one more phenomenon chiving home to him that "religious fanaticism" was after all the 
fundamental force in European politics121 . 
Given their cultural and emotional vulnerability during pre-1919 outreaches to 
Europeans, the incon-igible Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in all Western states had to bulk 
somewhat out of perspective for Kamil and other acculturated intellectuals. They did not, 
though, dream up these lethal heritages that mutated more than they guessed for post-Christian 
settings. Europe's example could sectarianize as well as secularize the Egyptian polity and its 
120. Kamil's London Chronicle interview, tsd "al-Sultan wal-Islam", al-Liwa' 28 July 1906 p. 1. If . 
Gladstone could call the Armenians his "Christian Brothers", the Egyptians had the same right to a parallel "inherent 
natural sympathy" for the Turkish cause. They would not, however, be reincorporating Egypt into the Ottoman 
Empire. Ibid. For the accusations of "fanaticism" that Kami! was answering from Sir Edward Grey, see fn 109. 
121. Steppat, National ism us p. 310. Edouard Drumont, the anti-Semite who edited La Libre Parole and 
wrote La France Juive was one of the rightist literati to whom Mme Juliette Adam introduced Kamil and who helped 
open the pages of leading Paris newspapers to him. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" Joe. cit pp. 314-315. 
Drumont branded French Jews as disloyal in his newspaper following Captain Dreyfus' conviction for treason in 
1894. Drumont's paper was among a few far-right organs that kept up attacks on Britain in Egypt after the Entente 
Cordiale detatched mainstream French conservatives from Egyptian nationalism. Arie, "Juliette Adam" pp. 135-6. 
Kami!, though, at last let slip what he thought of such continental elements at a 1906 press conference in London. 
Egyptians were not religiously fanatical (as Sir Edward Grey was charging), he told the British --- "it is impossible 
that there could exist in Egypt parties like the anti-Semitic parties or the extreme political parties or the religious 
parties found in Europe now". London Dailv Chronicle interview translated in "al-Sultan wal-Islam" (The Sultan 
and Islam), al-Liwa · 28 July, 1906, p. 1. This stance was traditional among Egyptian pan-Islamists: 'Abdallah 
al-Nadim's paper had argued that eruptions by Russians against Jews showed Europe's Enlightenment and 
philosophers had not overcome the persecutory fanaticism almost inherent in its brand of Christianity. "La Ikraha 
fil-Din" (No Compulsion in Religion), al-Ustadh 27 December 1892, pp. 442-443. For European anti-Semitism as a 
motif in acculturated Muslim Egyptian anri-Coptism at the close of the 1920s B 38-39. Cf. Stephen Wilson, 
Ideology and Experience: Anti-Semitism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair (Rutherford, New Jersey: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press 1982). 
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Assessment 
The Kamilists were much more a movement of youth --- specifically, of that youth 
minority receiving the most Westernizing educations --- than was any other political current in 
British-ruled Egypt. The age-category of the bulk of members and followers, and the cultural 
deprivations amid which they grappled with two civilizations, had to entail some half-baked 
episodism. Yet, for all the gaps that the British enemies mocked, Kamil and his collaborators got 
a great body of data about both Islamic and Western civilization and societies across to an 
emerging, shaky Muslim Egyptian elite --- and were already often able to relate and interweave 
those two worlds. Egypt between 1882-1922 did not encounter either Britishers or British 
culture at their best and the Kamilists did not attempt some younger Jaridists' engagement with 
the purple poetry as well as thought of Britain and English-speaking America. Nonetheless, they 
gave at least French liberal secularoidism reetment hearings and, their lobbying outreach, 
recycled and tested it as the basis for a new equalized world order. colleagues 
could selectively highlight exactly those sectors of the Arabo-Islamic past of most use to focus 
current resistance to imperialism, but they did not concoct the slabs they presented. For many 
Muslim teenagers whom Dunlop otherwise could have cut off in his secular-stream schools, 
al-Liwa' offered continuous access to Islam and its classical Arab history --- as it did many busy 
professionals who read and heard mainly French and English in Alexandria and Cairo. Islam anc 
the classical Arabs fitted vividly with the modern West in symbiosis or dichotomized, but the 
Kamilists need not have kept them that central. The British had phased standard Arabic out of 
modern institutions but the Kamilists would never leave it alone in the mosques to die. It could 
have made good sense for instantly mobilizing all classes of Egyptians had they orated or even 
written in the colloquial. Instead, al-Hizb al-Watani with never-ceasing classical-medium plays, 
mass oratory, indoor functions, lectures, anti-Blitish poetry --- and an al-Liwa' each of whose 
40,000 copies was read by and intoned to multiple individuals --- obliged at least educated 
Egyptians to daily follow standardizing pan-Arabic in their most topical concerns. 
There were always some tensions between the Kamilists' Islamic-Arab and Western 
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components but at all stages they held the two in gradually-changing mixes. It was in regard to 
the allocation of roles between the sexes that Islam made Kamil and his colleagues (including 
Muhammad Farid122) significantly diverge from even their France, yet we showed that the 
Liwa'ists' ostensible restorationism was really a covert synthesis with West Europe's urban 
bourgeois nuclear family. Outreaches to Europeans engaged the Watanists more deeply with 
Western secularoid ideologies. Yet, the very young Kamil made clear from the start to the 
French he courted that his aim was a completely independent Egypt with standard Arabic as its 
official and educational language: the French would have roles only as allies and advisers. From 
the outset, Kamil strove to build a lasting association with European states: accordingly, he 
urged, notably, the French to fit an adjusted relationship with the Ottoman Turks into the coming 
alliance with Egypt, given that relations with one of these two Muslim peoples entailed a 
relationship with the other. He sincerely, not diplomatically, admired a French language and 
thought that were a component of his and his colleagues' psyche, and the early tensions in his 
outreach sprang less from Arabo-Islamic incongruence with more secularoid French liberalism 
and nationalism than from from his doubts that the French or other Europeans would live up to 
the leeway for foendship with Muslims that their formal ideologies offered. 
Their earlier exposure to modernist European thought and languages significantly 
alienated Kamil and his comrades from monocultural, traditional Muslim populations, Arab or 
black African. Later, their progressively heightening sense that Westerners and 
Muslims/Easterners were becoming two warring blocs was to make them feel more like Muslim 
populations (and Congolese) that had not self-Westernized with the resolve of Egypt since 
Muhammad' Ali. Nonetheless, their initial pursuit of the West permanently marked the 
Kamilists. They always kept their sense that Egypt and Muslims had to duplicate not just the 
West's technologies and patterns of strength but its internal liberal-parliamentary order. The firs 
thrust for independence of these Francophone secular lawyers had been water-tight legal briefs 
presented to the true Europe: and even after Gorst and Kitchener drove them out of Egypt, such 
al-Hizb al-Watani leaders as Muhammad Farid would remain very reluctant to take the road of 
122. In 1913, Muhammad Farid in his diaries rapped the defeatism of Rifa'at Pasha, Ottoman ambassador 
to Geneva, who accepted that "the Muslim Woman" in Turkey would have to give up the veil. Farid in contrast 
wanted women to be educated at all levels including the tertiary, but could not but "deeply disapprove any proposal 
to make the Muslim woman like the European woman in morals, after the moral corruption we see here [in Europe] 
among all classes as a result of free-mixing". Farid, A wraq p. 118. 
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counter-terrorism. Their liberal Western culture and legal-professional functions and their class 
interests in tandem long delayed the uprising to which the class-broadening of the Party after 
Kamil was a preliminary. Yet, in so many ways, it had been the intimacies and broad-scatter 
courting of such a range of Europeans that pulled together Kamilisnfs longer-term image of the 
West as one enemy entity and fueled its counter-integration of the Arabo-Islamic camp (Ch. 4). 
The Europe-bound Kamilists of the 1890s were the archetype for all subsequent 
predoomed, radicalizing outreach by other groups of Muslim Egyptian acculturateds up to the 
1952 coup. Despite repeated rebuffs, the later Kamilists, the Jaridists and post-1922 
al-Siyasah/Liberal Constitutionalist intellectuals and politicians clung to the cultural illusion that 
appeals to the West's formal liberal ideologies --- after 1922 its literary aestheticisms also figure 
more --- would convince Westerners that they owed Egyptians concessions or aid. The 
languages and journalistic and intellectual discourses in the West had become a part of their 
make-up. Through their outreaches, Egyptian intellectuals repeatedly set themselves up for 
sweeping reaction against Westerners or things Western when too many rebuffs came. 
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CHAPTER 4: PAN-ISLAMISM AS A MODERN IDEOLOGY IN THE PARTY OF 
MUSTAFA KAMIL 
ATTITUDES TO OTTOMAN TURKS 
Egyptianist and Islamic-Campist Dualities in the Kamilists' Relations with the Ottoman State 
Mustafa Kamil and his comrades tirelessly strove to achieve Egypt's independence. The; 
also devoted much effort, however, to relating their movement to the Ottoman Empire and its 
cause. Educated Egyptians have naturally differed about the ultimate meaning of the movement 
launched by Kamil. Was it primarily Egypt-centred, ushering in a self-contained Egyptian 
nationalism? Or did Kamil's movement unleash Islamic community emotions of strength that 
might: 
(a) Abort the growing consciousness of an Egyptian territorial nation of Copts and 
Muslims. 
(b) In the long term reamalgamate Egypt as a political entity with another Islamic state 
(the Ottoman State). 
In the period of British colonial rule, Kamil' s colleagues put about equal weight upon his 
promotion of pan-Islamic community and his contribution to the growth of specifically Egyptian 
national consciousness. Such dual characterization spoke to the pan-Islamic orientation of 
Kamil's urban efendi constituency. The 1908 evaluation of Kamil published soon after his death 
by his successor Muhammad Farid balanced in this fashion Kamil's pan-Islamism with his 
promotion of specific Egyptian interests and identity: 
Has he [Kamil] not played the main role in calling on people to adhere to the most 
illustrious throne of the Caliphate, to be devoted subjects of His Highness our Lord the 
Commander of the Believers and to ward off the evil designs of the invader authorities 
from the legal Khedivial authority? Has he not been a long-standing advocate of the 
Egyptian national university and the strengthening of the Islamic fleet and aid for the 
project of the Hamidian Hijaz Railway and ... with his two strong hands smashed in the 
doors of prison, releasing the Dinshawai prisoners?1 
However, in an oration at Kamil's grave, Farid hailed Mustafa Kamil as having by his sacrifice 
1. Farid's tribute was printed in Ali Fahrni Kami!, Mustafa Kami! fi Arba'a wa Thalathina Rabi'an (Cairo: 
Mitba'at al-Liwa, 1908 -1911) vol. 1. pp. 50-51. 
1 
one 
consciousness. It was on belonging to directed to 
political action to achieve that homeland's independence3. 
contrast, a former member of al-Hizb al-Watani, the historian' Abd al-Rahman 
al-Rafi'i, in 1939 argued that Kamil's affirmations of a relationship with the Ottoman State were 
a mere tactic. Kamil limited his patriotic struggle to the British occupation because he "rightly" 
saw that their withdrawal would in itself give Egypt full independence. With the British gone, 
getting free from Ottoman suzerainty would be easy, for the Turks' suzerainty "had long been 
getting looser and looser, nothing remaining of its visible manifestations save the jizyah" m 
which Egypt in any case paid to Turkey's European creditors until 1935. Kamil's lip-service to 
Ottoman suzerainty al-Rafi'i called "a wise national stand" that enabled him to disingenuously 
ask the British to end their ostensibly "temporary" occupation of Egypt and thereby fulfil the 
international treaties to which they were signatory: especially the 1840 Treaty of London in 
which the Great Powers recognized Egypt's independence under the family of Muhammad 
with a nominal was the abolition of Ottoman 
sovereignty and a British evacuation simultaneously"4• 
al-Rafi'i's thesis that Kamil's relationship to the Ottoman State was nothing but an 
international legal expedient to achieve Egypt's independence has become almost an orthodoxy 
among secularist Egyptian historians, including pan-Arabist ones5• Such post-World War I 
accounts of Kamil sometimes rather blatantly rewrote history --- including, on occasion, the 
2. Ibraham Ghali, L'Egypte Nationaliste et Liberale de Moustapha Kamel a Saad Zaghlul, 1892-1927 (The 
Hague: Martimus Nijhoff 1969) pp. 76-77. 
3. Farid's full formulation ran that Kamil "was the first Egyptian whose voice resounded in the East and the 
West. He was the first Egyptian to finnly and consistently demand evacuation and the end of the occupation. He 
was the first Egyptian who raised his head with an open pride in declaring that he belonged to the Egyptian 
homeland and in mounting a public campaign to defend its reputation and dignity; he was the first Egyptian who 
saw that national anniversaries and indigenous occasions were observed --- using them to remind, alert, and warn 
and also to give hope of the future". 'Ali Fahrni Kamil, op. cit., pp. 50-51. 
4. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, Mustafa KamiL Ba'ith al-Barakat al-Wataniyyah (Cairo: np. 1939), p. 341. 
5. Among pan-Arabs, Salah 'Isa in a 1974 seminar on the centenary of Mustafa Kamil's birth organized by 
the Egyptian Society for Historical Studies, argued that Kamil only used to "appear an Ottoman sometimes" under 
compulsion of "alliances"; much the same thesis was argued there by Muhammad 'Imarah in his paper "Mustafa 
Kamil and Ottoman Community". Salah Isa, "Mustafa Kamil Mufakkiran Burjwaziyan" (Mustafa Kami! as a 
Bourgeois Thinker) Oadava Arabiyah (Bayrut) March 1976 p. 105. 
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biographical record of the authors themselves6 --- to make him and his party more attractive in 
the era of the Egyptian nation state and Arab nationalism. 
The fact remains that the Kamilists did regularly adopt positions liable to motivate a 
tightening of Egypt's bonds with the Ottoman Empire, rather than the steady loosening 
visualized by al-Rafi'i in 1939. Under Farid' s leadership, the Hizb al-Watani responded to the 
Committee of Union and Progess' 1908 restoration in Turkey of constitutional politics with the 
request that representatives of Egypt be admitted to the new Ottoman parliament. This demand 
was also directed against the Khedive 'Abbas, adverse to a constitution for Egypt, and Farid's 
personal enemy7• Parochial-factional and adventitious dimensions, though, cannot detract from 
the avant-garde grip the rebirth of its parliamentarism gave Turkey on the psyche of Egyptians. 
Farid, like his predecessor Kamil, had a sense of an (Arab) Egyptian homeland and nation that 
was to make trouble for the young Turks later: yet achievement of modernity and strength by the 
Ottoman State could downgrade and dilute it. Lutfi al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah in 1908 feared, 
perhaps rightly, that the attraction of an Ottoman State now both modern-parliamentarist and 
Muslim could draw Egypt into a federation incompatible with the discrete nationhood Egypt had 
been developing since Muhammad' Ali8• By trying to enter the restored Ottoman parliament, the 
6. Muhammad Husayn Haykal in his 1951 memoirs remembered "my friend" 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i as 
in the British-Ottoman period "an enthusiast, since he was a student at the Law School, for the principles of the 
Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) ... intense of belief in the Caliphate of the Ottoman ruling family". Haykal, 
Mudhakkirat fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah (Cairo : Maktabat Nahdat Misr 1951), v.l, p. 63. If Haykal recalled accurately, 
al-Rafi'i's 1939 non-Ottomanist characterization ofKamil's career was one more adaption by an Egyptian 
intellectual formed before 1918 to post-World War 1 Egyptianist and Arabist ideological fashions. 
7. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party: 1892-1919" in P.M. Holt (ed.) Political and 
Social Change in Modern Egypt : Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic 
(London: O.U.P. 1968) p. 324. Bayyumi reconstructed that Muhammad Farid initially resisted proposals in al-Hizb 
al-Watani to work for representation of Egypt in the new Parliament of Committee of Union and Progress-led 
Turkey. Zakariya Sulayman Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani wa Dawruhu fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah. 1907-1953 (Cairo: 
Wikalat Fabrant 1981) p. 197. The atmosphere and motivation were very Islamic: some members of the Party's 
Executive Committee suggested that Egypt send the deputies to the Majlis-i-Mab'uthan in Istanbul in order to unify 
"the Islamic element" with "the Turkish element". 'Isam Diya' al-Din, "al-Hizb al-Watani fi Misr wa 'Alaqatuhu 
bi-Turkiya 1-Fatat" (The Patriotic Party in Egypt and its Relationship with Young Turkey), al-Afaq al-' Arabiyyah 
(Baghdad) September 1976 pp. 13-14. 
8. "Some of us think that it is in Egypt's interest for us to have deputies in the Majlis al-Mab'uthan 
(Parliament in Constantinople), ... that that will not lose us our right of independence and our internal sovereignty 
(autonomy). Indeed, they almost say that our Government remains despotic, and that a sovereignty that has no resul 
or serves no interest of the nation is meaningless and that it is better then for the nation to forego that autonomy and 
join the Ottoman State so long as it be constitutional ... [They believe] that the privileges given to Egypt [under the 
rule of Muhammad Ali by the Otoman Sultan] were given to the royal family alone, not to the whole Egyptian 
nation as an entity". Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Safahat Matwiyyah min Ta'rikh al-Harakat al-Istiqlaliyyah (Cairo: 
Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Misriyyah 1946) p.37. 
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Kamilists were attempting a confederal first step. The residual sense that Egypt was a part or 
extension of the Ottoman State sometimes had consequences for nationalism's educational and 
cultural policies. al-Liwa' assailed the British-directed Egyptian Government's Education 
Department for describing Turkish as optional and failing to allocate it fixed periods in the 
schools9• While Turkish was a prerequirement of any serious relationship with the Ottoman 
Empire, it was a side issue here to restoration of Islam's classicist Arabic in Egyptian education 
and life. 
That Egyptians and outside Turks should remain politically apart in two separate states, 
despite shared belief in Islam, was strongly argued by Ahmad Hilmi in al-Liwa' of 19 August 
1906. After waging so hard a struggle to wrest independence from Britain, Hilmi argued, 
Egyptians would not open the doors of Egypt to the Turks because they are Muslims ... If 
you have an ornate --- or perhaps a not quite so fancy --- house and someone had usurped 
it, and you dispute with this usurper until you regain your house, it certainly goes very 
hard for you to leave it for your brother who is of your mother and father. But this does 
not exclude your being independent in your house and loving your brother at the same 
time, simultaneously10• 
Hilmi's primary political unit is thus Egypt. His affirmation here that the Egyptian independence 
movement of his party was separate from --- and yet so lovingly related to or aligned with ... ! ---
9. Mudarris ("Teacher"), "Dusturun am Istibdad?" (Constitution or Despotism?) al-Liwa', 8 January, 1903, 
p.1. The religious motivations of this article must be stressed, although French and other European linguistic 
nationalisms structured his detailed programatic vision of the extensions to Arabic and to published works in it, 
needed to make it cover all modem education and life. Qur'an-defined standard Arabic must be made the standard 
medium of instruction in Egypt's schools because it is the tongue of the Egyptian' s "religion and prophet" --- a 
formulation that did not much perceive the Copts and Syrian Christians in the Egyptian landscape. Restoration of 
Arabic is motivated by devotion to Islam and to "your [Ottoman] Sultan" (the pan-Muslim Ottoman link) --- could 
there be anyone who would deny (='Abbas? British-fostered SC journalists?) that Egypt was a possession among the 
possessions of the Ottoman State? This modernity-addressing pan-Muslim, if proto-Arabist, article showed the 
seriousness of its quest for religious political community by its drive to ground Egyptians in the Turkish of the other 
party. Ibid. 
10. Ahmad Hilmi, "al-Istiqlal! al-Istiqlal!" (Independence! Independence!), al-Liwa 9 August 1906. 
Ahmad Hilmi (1875-1963) seems to have been senior staff writer for al-Liwa' up to 1908. His articles often had a 
secularist thrust which he wove into the period's Islamic community emotions. Hilmi would have absorbed Westen 
nationalism's secular outlook from the acculturated milieu of the journalistic-oratorical intelligentsia and through 
self-education. He did not receive acculturating formal education. His father, a Cairo (Khan al-Khalili) bazaar 
merchant named Hasan' Ali al-Mahdi, died before he was born. "Hilmi was then raised by his mother's brother, a 
government clerk in the Irrigation Department, who seems to have expected that Hilmi would follow in his 
footsteps. Accordingly, he sent the boy to a maktab called Khan Ja'far in the Husayni quarter of Cairo. Hilmi 
learned French by working for a private company in Alexandria, and gained further knowledge of Islam and Arabic 
from an Imam in an Alexandria mosque. He became a government clerk. But he never received more than a 
primary certificate". Private letter from Professor Arthur Goldschmidt Jr utilizing Ahmad Ahmad Badawi, Ma'a 
al-Suhufi al-Mukafih. Ahmad Hilmi (Cairo, n.d.). 
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the Ottoman State may, though, have been partly to fend off Egyptian circles enraged by the 
Kamilists' support for Turkey's territorial position in Sinai during the May 1906 Tabah crisis. 
Yet, in November 1907, al-Liwa' voiced apprehension that Turkey, legally Egypt's suzerain, 
might conclude an agreement with Britain in which it would sacrifice Egypt11 • 
A discrete Arabo-Egyptianist nationalism had from the outset been solidifying in the 
movement Karnil launched in 1893. In reply to a foreign journalist who had depicted him as an 
instrument of Turkish policy, Kamil denied (1907) that "we want freedom for Egypt only to 
restore it to the rule of the Turks". The aim "Egypt for the Egyptians", "unequivocally stated 
thousands of times" by the watani movement was the chief principle guiding "our life and 
actions" 12• In a 1906 interview to the London Chronicle he depicted Egypt's national political 
community and her religion-founded international relationship with the Ottoman State as two 
separate planes of association. Kamil exalted the papacy-like "religous influence" that the 
Ottoman State's Sultan exerted as Caliph over all Muslims in the world including the Egyptians 
regardless of the plural state structures. This in effect whited-out the specific political suzerainty 
that the Sultan traditionally had over Egypt, once. Kamil denied that a single state would in 
future unite Egypt and the Ottoman State. The English were wrong to suppose that the Egyptian~ 
would again enter under the protection and rule of Turkey upon withdrawal by Britain of her 
garrison. The Ottoman Sultan as Caliph exerted over the Egyptians as Muslims a religious 
authority like that which the Papacy exerted over the world's Catholics, but nothing suggested 
that "Turkey" (sic) intended to intervene politically in Egypt's affairs. "Turkey" had always 
respected "internal independence" ("autonomy" --- al-istiqlal al-dakhili) which it granted Egypt 
in 1840 in the Treaty of London, resisting the European States' pressure upon her to send troops 
to Egypt at the time of 'Urabi's revolt. And Egypt had all the means to defend herself in the 
twentieth century13• 
The role allocated to the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph of the world's Muslims, here, kept 
him at arm's length as far as Egypt's administration was concerned. Kamilist pan-Islarnism had 
made Egyptians like remote Indonesians whom Turkey had never ruled: the Sultan could lead ---
11. On 14 November 1907, al-Liwa' published an article voicing apprehension that an agreement could be 
concluded between Turkey and Britain at Egypt's expense. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani p. 31. 
12. al-Rafi'i, Mustafa Kamil p. 345. 
13. Mustafa Kamil, "al-Sultan wal-Islam" (The Sultan and Islam), al-Liwa' 28 July 1906, p.1. 
to s out over 
s to 
Kamil Europe have muted his movement's real Islamic commitment to the 
Ottoman State, as by 1906 the Kamilists well understood the antipathy towards the Muslim 
Turks existing everywhere in Europe14• The Egyptians, Kamil told the British, did hope that 
"Turkey" --- post-Ottomanist terminology! --- would modernize and become an internationally 
strong state like Japan. He reassured his English audience, however, that neither Egyptians nor 
"Turks" intended to merge in one state again "because we know very well that that would unite 
Europe together in opposition against us" 15• By now, Kamil saw mainstream or official France 
as having much the same attitudes to Muslims, including Egyptians, as his nation's British 
enemy. The interconnected Islamophobic discourses of the British and French spurred him to 
tighten pan-Islamic relationship with the Ottoman State beyond his common sense about the 
weakness of all Muslims. In September 1906, Kamil responded with hurt and anger when the 
establishment Le Temps readily echoed a French journalist Cairo that his movement wanted 
Turkish to order to restore to by 
Temps soon stereotyped, made "L'Egypte vilayet turc" his followers' guiding slogan16. 
14. Ahmad Hilmi noted that "there exists in England a large party opposed to further colonial expansion. 
However, this party does not incline to Turkey to the extent that it does not wish to even hear her name, such is its 
extreme hatred". "Quwwat al-Wataniyyah" (The Power of Patriotism), al-Liwa' 7 August 1906, p. 1. 
15. Kamil, "al-Sultan wal-Islam" (1906). Kamil did not dream up --- although he overrated --- the capac~ity 
fear of pan-Islam had to bring together European nations that usually loathed each other. French diplomats learned 
in 1881 that exiles contributed from Istanbul to the Algerian rebellion of 1871, with modest facilities from Ottoman 
officials, and were fanning preparations for another uprising (shortly to break out in Wahran). The French greatly 
feared this rising tide of "Muslim fanaticism", and kept the British informed of all they learned about the world-wide 
agitation --- implying that the two powers, despite their differences, had a common interest in controlling 
pan-Islamic anti-imperialism together. Kemal H. Karpat, "Pan-Islamism: Imperial Plot or Muslim Popular 
Resistance to Imperialism?" (preliminary paper prepared for ICOPS conference on Ottoman studies, June 30-July 4 
1981, Madrid) pp. 14-15. One French ambassador to Istanbul, though, had enough common sense to assess in 1880 
that the pan-Islamic "conspiracy" existed mostly in the minds of the French and English: all the Porte actually 
wanted in establishing closer relations with far-off Muslim leaders was to strengthen its position at home and to hav1 
the help of Muslims in case of a war between the Ottomans and Europe. Ibid pp. 16-17. 
16. Kamil, "Le Patriotisme et Pan-Islamisme", Le Temps 8 September 1906 pp. 1-2. Kamil wrote this 
article to refute a denunciation of him and his movement by an anonymous French journalist resident in, or at least 
writing from, Cairo: "Le Pan-Islamisme en Egypte", Le Temps 22 August 1906. This writer charged that the 
al-Liwa' nationalists were hostile to all European powers, including to France and her control in North Africa, and 
that this "fanaticism" had turned all French-language newspapers in Egypt against Kamil. Significantly, Kamil did 
not in his reply claim to have any friends left in Egypt's French press, nor did he much localize that press and its 
criticisms as promoting the communalist self-interest of resident Europeans more Francophone than French. Rather 
Kamil accepted its increased support for the British Occupation as a reflection of the convergence of metropolitan 
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Kamil mocked the joint paranoia of the French and British that "the peoples of Islam" would 
either want or be able to band together to wage war on Europe. The never-ending uprisings of 
peninsular Arabian insurgents against the Porte cast doubt on Turkey's capacity, as well as will, 
to lead other Muslim peoples into any such conflict. "Pan-Islamism as understood in Europe has 
no existence" because "the Muslims, Turkey at their head, have understood for a long time that 
no nation can live isolated" --- to be cut off from the West's modernity was to be "condemned to 
death" for his cultures-incorporating "enlightened" elite. The other side of Kamil, though, 
ignited that "Europe intervenes in Turkey for the Christians and in the name of humanity" ---
"anti-Muslim actions" that made him defiantly defendpan-Islarnism as the natural 
counter-measure17• Here, Kamil perceived anti-pan-Islam as a culture-motif with which British 
leaders like Sir Edward Grey --- reinforcing joint interests from the 1904 Entente --- could well 
win the assent of France about Egypt. 
Discrete "Interest of the Homeland". To Egyptian audiences, Kamil did defend alliance 
with the Ottoman State as in Egypt's interest. He was Egyptianist enough to carefully try to keep 
space between the two political units, but failed to award Egypt the self-contained history and 
freedom of action vis-a-vis the neighboring nation that West European nationalisms stipulated. 
Thus, in an 1897 speech in Alexandria, Kamil defended his party's support for the Ottoman State 
in its current war with Greece in t~rms of Egypt's interests: "what would have been the political 
fate of Egypt had --- God forbid! --- the Ottoman troops been defeated?" The defeat and 
partition of the Ottoman State, Egypt's legal suzerain, would have led to "Egypt being lost 
forever in the hand of the occupiers". To the argument of his critics that Egypt had under 
Muhammad 'Ali fought the Ottoman State, Kamil rhetorically replied: 
France's interests with those of Britain since the Entente Cordiale. "Le Patriotisme ... " His opponent was very 
French in his defence of his British co-imperialists: they had eliminated previous tyranny and almost doubled 
Egypt's trade: the flaw was their arrogant self-segregation from natives who wanted to self-Europeanize under their 
direction(= versus France's gregarious missionary assimilationism in Tunisia and Algeria). Le Temps accepted his 
claim that Kamil wanted the Turks to take Egypt in "Le Pan-Islamisme en Afrique", Le Temps 23 August 1906 p. 1, 
and in "L'Effervescence Musulman en Asie" ibid 24 August 1906 p. 1. 
17. Kamil, "Le Patriotisme ... " Despite his clear sense by 1906 that all European powers, including even 
more laicist France, were very susceptible to pan-Christian anti-Ottoman, anti-Muslim emotions and appeals, Kamil 
yet again refused to move away from the ideologies of large religious supra-national camps or political communities 
that turned Frenchmen against Egyptian independence. As he had in 1895, he yet again offered an alliance of 
pan-Muslim and pan-Christian camps: "as Muslims, we are for an entente between the Islamic World and the 
Christian World". His reply in Le Temps once more amounted to making Egyptian "patriotism" take responsibility 
before French opinion for the Ottoman Turks' conflicts with the Christian nationalities they had ruled or continued 
to govern --- as if winning some sympathy for Egypt was not a big enough task! Ibid. Cf A 171-175. 
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Yet are Egypt's hostilities with the Ottoman State in 1840 inherently fated to last forever? 
Are not nations, like individuals, brought together by interest and common benefit? Did 
France not fight Russia in 1854 yet today they have become united? Did not Germany 
fight Austria and Austria fight Italy, and yet these three states united and remain united? 
Was not England a friend of Turkey, yet today has become her greatest enemy?18 
Here Kamil for the while disregarded traditional Islamic political concepts. These had 
considered the political unity of the Muslims to be prescribed by religion, and disunity as a 
reproach. Kamil in this passage formally argued that Egypt and the Ottoman State were two 
discrete political units. These would adopt friendly or hostile relations towards each other, in the 
same way that independent nation-units in Europe alternately warred and allied as their shifting 
discrete interests decreed. Moreover, Kamil' s observations about change in relations between 
England and Turkey implied that the same fluid alliances of interests could also occur between a 
Muslim and a Christian-European state. 
Kamil's ingrained assumption of the inherent (if non-unitary) political community of all 
Muslims left him unable to duplicate the atomistic nationalism that Europe patterned, even in the 
same speech: 
Yes, Egypt was against the Ottoman State in 1840 and was in grievous error to be so, 
Yes, Muhammad 'Ali was wrong and he knew before his death that he had been misled 
and erred. Politically, Egypt's hostility with the Ottoman State was a great error; a 
mistake, too, in terms of Egypt's J\d the Ottoman State's interests alike19• 
Under the surface of the words and arguments exchanged with the European enemies of his 
movement, Kamil maintained intact key attitudes from traditional Islam. He never genuinely 
considered the possibility that a clash of fundamental interests between two Muslim political 
units could lead to a true antagonistic relation, of which war would be the natural resolution. N01 
that a Muslim population or polity might in pursuit of its interests ally with a European State 
against a Muslim enemy. For Kamil, Muslim nations had no absolute right to pursue their 
external interests at the expense of other nations in Islam's international bloc-community. He 
could not bring himself to be cold-blooded about the Turks or other Muslim nations in the way 
that a secular Egyptianist nationalist could be. 
al-Rafi'i and later Egyptian historians were right, then, that Mustafa Kamil wanted to 
keep Egypt a separate state. Kamil was no reunificatory neo-Ottomanist and, as Steppat 
18. Ahmad Rashad, Mustafa Kamil: Hayatuhu wa Kifahuh (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Sa'adah 1958) p. 183. 
19. Ibid. 
- A187 -
assessed, was not striving to construct a unitary universal Islamic theocracy20• On the other 
hand, his multi-faceted relationships with the Ottoman State cannot be reduced to a legalistic 
device to obstruct the consolidation of British rule. The Kamilists, repeatedly rebuffed by an 
expansionist Europe prone to parallel ·anti-Muslim discourses, came to view international 
relations as between broad antagonistic blocs or camps (Christian Europe and Islam) rather than 
atomistic nations. To beat back the West, they wanted to solidify and more tightly integrate the 
far-flung Muslim world. Most of it was now colonized --- with the enfeebled Ottoman State its 
residual core for sovereignty. The world's Muslims had to strengthen it so that one day it could 
become a strong modern state, and not just militarily --- a rallying-point for Muslims to recover 
strength against the colonialist Europeans. 
Although it was not a drive to reincorporate Egypt into the Ottoman State, West-activated 
Kamilist pan-Islam so identified the Ottoman "Caliph" 
with Islam as to irreversibly restrict the policy options that the leaders could consider. 
The enraging Islamophobe discourses of most Europeans and the slivers from traditional Islam 
locked together in an almost fated way, here. And in a 1903 La Figaro article, Kamil finally 
almost assented to become something akin to what the French (of whom he had despaired) 
insisted he and all Muslims could only be: 
There is a lot of talk in Europe about Muslims uniting. They consider it a great danger to 
peace and more evidence of Islam's mythical fanaticism. We must place everything in its 
context forcefully to refute this charge, since ... Islam has prescribed mutual assistance 
by Muslims as a pre-condition for their strength and military preparedness --- although 
the stupidity of some [local] princes/rulers (umara') and the ignorance of the rabble have 
undone the bonds of unity between the Islamic nations for past centuries, tempting 
Europe to enslave them one after the other. But the covert Crusader Wars that Europe 
wages against Islam have alerted the Muslims to [the necessity for] mutual love and 
maintaining interest in each other's affairs and for rallying around the banner of the 
Sultan, who is at once the Commander of the Faithful (Amir al-Mu'minin) and their 
Khalifah (Caliph), that is to say the religious and political head of the whole Islamic 
World21 • 
However uneven his acquaintance with classical Islamic terminology, Kamil's 1903 cri 
20. Fritz Steppat, Nationalismus und Islam Bei Mustafa Kamil in Die Welt des Islams v. iv (1956) pp. 
287-289. Kamil once stated that to return Egypt to the status of an ordinary Ottoman province would be at variance 
with the age of civilization and international law. At most, he was at odd times prepared to include Egypt among the 
"Ottoman nations" in the plural, but never in a single "Ottoman nation" (al-Ummat al-'Uthmaniyyah). Ibid p. 288. 
21. Mustafa Kamil, "Urubba wal-Islam" (Europe and Islam). al-Liwa' 22 September 1903. 
l 
an uncommon most 
perceived Arabic's memory of grand 
Arabo-Muslim empires (already adapted by al-Afghani and Kamil's mentor al-Nadim). 
Conceivably, had enough such Western and Arab culture pressures coincided with masterly 
Ottoman self-modernization, Kamil might have accepted some kind of reincorporation. As 
Egypto-Arab history proceeded to develop, though, the communication is most significant as a 
view of indigenous history that for decades was to sap and obstruct particularist evocation after 
1922 of a separate Egyptian history under Islam. Here, early Arabo-Islamic united empire was 
the golden age and later break-up barbarization. After Egypt obtained independence in 1922, 
however, secularish writers such as Ahmad Amin, Taha Husayn, Tawfiq al-Hakim and' Abbas 
Mahmud al-' Aqqad seized on the breakdown of the political unity of the 'Abbasid Muslim 
empire through the ambition of various usurpers as asserting a discrete Egyptian nation's will to 
independence22. the 1930s, poetry classical Arabs resident Egypt was scanned for 
expression of a separate Egyptian nationality 179-184). more 
quasi-unitary pan-Muslim statements by Kamil and colleagues before 1918, prefigured how 
persistently classical Arab culture would continue to condition Egyptians to lament the later 
pluralization of power centres and state units Islam as decline and dangerous weakness before 
the West --- not the particularoids' restoration of normality. This negativity would be crucial to 
the triumph of the pan-Arab ethnic national identification in the 1930s and 1940s. Kamil's 1903 
and 1906 remarks to the two Paris papers, though, show how semi-unitary periodization of 
Arabo-Muslim history (he just maintained umam, plural Muslim nations) could get heightened 
through self-definition against the discourses of an imperialist Europe. One needed the foreign 
languages, though, to hear the Western voices that Islamized. 
22. Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 
1961) p. 143. Ahmad Amin in 1929 and 1945 cited Ibn Tulun's ninth century secession from the Baghdad-centred 
'Abbasid Empire, the establishment of the anti-' Abbasid Fatimid state in Cairo, and the later Mamluks. Amin 
admitted that the partition of the 'Abbasid Empire weakened Islam internationally, but argued that the multiplication 
of Muslim political centres improved local administration, kept each country's wealth at home, and furthered local 
development of culture. Ibid pp. 143-144 and 162. 
1 
anew 
sense not go it would have to economic 
and political as well as military strength with a Muslim bloc centred around the Ottoman State, 
was structured as a response to the global scope of Western nation-states the era of 
imperialism. 
Classical and post-classical theories of Islamic Caliphate varied: all preferred one united 
Islamic state, but some offered leeway for plural Muslim state-units23• The journalists and 
orators of Kamil' s movement synthesized emotional motifs from universal Caliphate with 
modern technologies and ventures, to put together a quite new relationship with "the Turks". 
Their pan-Islam did have some nostalgia for early Ottoman prowess against Europe, but usually 
did not seek to reincorporate Egypt into the Ottoman Empire it helped restrengthen. 
The modern West's own pan-Christianism in international relations fueled and 
legitimized the symmetrical community the Kamilists early constructed around 
the State. Chapter 3 showed during the 1897-1898 Greco-Turkish 
already defended his movement's fund-raising the Ottoman Army --- "religious" --- as 
a response to the aid a range of European states (not just Britain) gave Christian nationalities 
in "the East" to revolt against, or attack, the Ottoman Empire (A 174). Kamilist writers depicted 
the drive to strengthen the Ottoman State to the followers as a religious duty imposed by Islam, 
comparable to the duty to win independence for Egypt. Ahmad al-Badawi in an al-Liwa' article 
on "Islam and Independence" defined the lifting of the yoke of occupation as "our first demand" 
23. According to H.A.R. Gibb, "even in the Sunni community, there was no one universally accepted 
doctrine of the Caliphate". Gibb, "Some Considerations on the Sunni Theory of the Caliphate", Studies on the 
Civilization of Islam (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1962) p. 148. al-Mawardi (d. 1058) denied that there could 
be two Caliphs at one time --- although' Abd al-Qahir Ibn Tahir al-Baghdadi (d. 1037) already accepted the legality 
of the existence of two Caliphs in widely separate lands. "al-Mawardi's Theory of the Caliphate'', in ibid. p. 153. 
The Caliph Harun al-Rashid in 800 AD had recognised the hereditary amirate of the Aghlabites (theoretically 
vassals) over North Africa, although al-Mawardi tried to centralize every function of state upon the 'Abbasid Caliph. 
Ibid pp. 162, 153. Later theories held that rulers who enforced the shari 'ah won title to be termed caliphs in their 
own domain without any expectation that any would come to rule all Muslims: figures like the Grand Moghul 
Awrangzeb in India and the Ottoman Sultan were accepted as simultaneous caliphs, although they lacked any 
blood-link to the Prophet. " ... Sunni Theory of the Caliphate", ibid pp. 144-147. It looks a contradiction that Kami! 
(a) exalted the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph oflslam and sought to make and tighten a host of novel linkages with his 
State, while (b) not raising or sidestepping political reincorporation. Yet he may not have been so unconnected with 
Muslim tradition given the diversification in Sunni thought that Gibb uncovered. 
- A190 -
but "our first duty" as "to hold fast to the Holy Caliphate". By giving material "support for the 
Commander of the Believers" in Istanbul, in "expending generously and unstintingly of what the 
Khalifah has commanded us to give" "we [Egyptians] would be discharging a religious 
obligation". al-Badawi thus readily accepted the title of' Abdul-Hamid as Caliph to command 
outside Muslims to undertake specific international acts designed to help him defend his state. 
The colonialist West's power made al-Badawi think in terms of all Islam, of the early Arab 
Caliphs' Islamic universal empires, of the need of the world's modern Muslim nations for a 
successor international power centre: 
Islam was established only through the aid men gave it [the Caliphate], had strength only 
through preservation of its [the Caliphate's] entity ... [and] can have glory only through 
the sacrifice of martyrs and property when the time comes to defend it [the Caliphate]; 
Islam has no boast except through the Caliphate's independence and repelling all enemies 
who try to touch even a span of its [the Caliphate's] land24• 
A 1903 article titled "The Ottoman State's Need of a Fleet" likewise conveys the 
Kamilists' intense involvement in the survival and strength of the Ottoman State. The Ottoman 
Sultan, and the interests of his state, are closely identified with universal Islam. M. 'Izzat 
identifies with the Ottoman State from Egypt's (and the general Islamic world's) condition of 
colonial rule. Powerless, subjugated Muslims desperately yearn for Islam's world power-centre, 
the Ottoman State, to achieve strength on their behalf: 
The recent war between the Ottoman State and the.Greeks had hardly broken out ... 
before all Islamic nations were craning their neck ... to find out how much resistance [the 
State] could mount ... The Muslims now, in all areas of the earth are not forgetful of the 
promise the Khalifah made to them to continue his efforts to restore Islamic naval 
strength to its previous might and past glory, that the [Ottoman] State may gain capacity 
to resist all adversities and demonstrate before the European world a might that will win 
respect ... Ah, it is as if I can see all the Muslims who have veritably flocked to the 
Residence of the Caliphate (Dar al-Khilafah: Constantinople) from every side and corner 
and have lined up before the Yildiz palace ... all begging with a single voice 'O 
Commander of the Believers ... Can you not bestow one piercing glance on the Islamic 
fleet and resurrect it anew ... that you may revive the hopes of the Muslims ... all devoted 
to you, be they your subjects or non-subjects, alike?'25• 
This sense of the Ottoman State's Sultan as international Islam's "Caliph" perpetuated some 
24. Ahmad al-Badawi "al-Islamu wal-Istiqlal" (Islam and Independence) al-Liwa', 23 August 1903. We die 
not find any biodata about Ahmad al-Badawi. 
25. M. Izzat, "Hajat al-Dawlah li-Ustul" (The Ottoman State's Need of a Fleet), al-Liwa' 8 August 1903 
p.1. I found no biodata about M. 'Izzat. 
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archaic attitudes. The Ottoman bureaucracy and ministers have been slow to effect the refo1ms 
and modernization necessary, for instance, to build naval might. M. 'Izzat proposed an illusory 
solution: direct appeal in spirit by the world's Muslims to the charismatic individual, the 
Sultan-Caliph, who heads Islam's universal faith as well as the Ottoman State. This Leader then 
activates his semi-magical power to instantaneously make "the broken inert wood" of the Islamic 
fleet "throb with the blood of new life". This in part late-traditional messianic Muslim outlook 
could, in spasms, obscure the engineering and detail of administrative institutions and processes. 
The Sultan-"Caliph" 'Abdul-Hamid's very religion-justified autocracy might have hampered 
initiative and increased specialization in the bureaucracy. More complex, diffused government 
was a prerequisite for constructing modern armed forces, navies and merchant fleets. 'Izzat 
vividly evoked the military greatness of the Ottoman State's early past: "that happy age in which 
the Ottoman family had a fleet that was a byword for invincibility and people titled their Sultan 
'Sultan of the two Continents and Emperor of the two Seas' "26• Pan-Muslim restoration of the 
Empire as a centre of military and economic strength for the globe's Muslims had to renew, and 
was inspired by, the Ottoman Sultans' early internationally feared might. Only, when the 
Ottoman Sultans were strongest, their rule over Egypt, then a province of their Empire, was 
tightest. Working in the other direction, "non-subjects" could be members in the pan-Muslim 
political community with the "Caliph" along with "the subjects". 
'Izzat and al-Badawi pervasively connected the Ottoman State's Sultan, as "Caliph", to 
Islam. This religious definition would not orientate the constituency to a pragmatic, reversible~ 
alliance with the Ottoman State. Both writers gave the Ottoman State's Sultan-Caliph an 
international religio-political standing that would entitle him to command Egyptians to undertake 
specific measures to strengthen his State. Moreover, 'Izzat' s priority that Muslims achieve 
international strength, and nostalgia for the might of the Ottoman State (when it firmly ruled 
Egypt), might have assented to reamalgamation with it had it really managed to modernize itself. 
Both, though, knew that any such happy outcome could be in the distant future: like 
Kamil sometimes, they saw the current Ottoman State as ramshackle and vulnerable, and bound 
to remain so for some time at the least. 
Kamilist pan-Islam ran gripping, vivid, primary motifs from traditional Islam as a 
26. Ibid. 
a out to 
sectors 
to a 
Ottoman could a strong state like 
number of al-Liwa' carried an account of the •n,-,,mc•n Imperial factory at Herkeh, so productive 
that the Sultan ordered installation of electric lighting to make night shifts possible28. But 
al-Liwa's Istanbul correspondent on the same page saw the lack of practical education in "the 
East" as the great stumbling-block to the development of indigenous manufactures and 
commerce that the pan-Muslims craved29• With its usual reflex, acculturation viewed 
self-Westernization by Turkey as carrying forward the dynamic of classical Arab Islam. In 1893, 
the youthful Kamil hailed "the Commander of the Faithful" 'Abdul-Hamid's construction of 
numerous Europe-modelled government schools throughout his State as restoring to "the 
Easterners" the educational endeavor of the first Caliphs: that "the quality of education offered" 
was "no less than in comparable schools Europe ... promises a bright future" to "us 
Ottomans"30• the Ottoman State truly developed modernity able to contend with the West's, it 
assent to Egypt --- the CUP enough 
interest and courage to press that. colleagues, though, to his death learned 
from the Ottoman State as another self-modernizing entity comparable with Egypt, rather than a 
more advanced model. However, collective modernization could unprecedentedly integrate a 
widening pan-Muslim community extending far beyond any borders the Ottoman Turks had ever 
governed, making memories of past political unity between Egypt and the Ottoman State less 
pertinent. The Kamilists sought West-like commercial and economic means --- not an 
amalgamation of states --- to unprecedentedly integrate the far-flung international Islamic 
community. 
A case in point is a 1903 al-Liwa' article titled "A Great Islamic Project" detailing 
discussion in Constantinople among "the major Muslim traders" of plans to expand trade 
27. Kamil, "al-Sultan wal-Islam", al-Liwa' 28 July 1906 p. 1. 
28. al-Liwa' 17 February 1903. 
29. "al-Hayat al-Wahiyah wal-Hayat al-Mu'abbadah" (Insubstantial Life and Eternal Life), al-Liwa' 17 
February 1903 p. 2. 
30. 'Ali Fahrni Kamil, Mustafa Kamil fi Arba'a wa Thalathina Rabi'an 10 vls (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Liwa' 
1908-1911) v. 2 p. 9. 
was to 
to a 
Muslim-owned fleet of steamers to transport from as rah Baghdad and salt from 
other Ottoman territories to India; from China the steamers would bring silk and tea; from Java 
and Sumatra tea and spices and other products from the tropics; from Rangoon rice, from 
Calcutta jute and indigo, and so forth31 • 
al-Liwa' gave an enthusiastic front-page welcome to this ambitious project to 
economically integrate geographically very far-flung regions inhabited by Muslims --- in some, 
such as China, only as a minority. Once more, the desired Muslim political community was 
being expanded out far beyond Egypt's historical Ottoman political community. The item 
instanced how (a) the Kamilists' Islamic ideology and (b) their perceptions of current 
international activities and realities still controlled by the West, structured each other and 
inter-penetrated. The item on the Islamic Fleet is like al-Liwa's coverage of the Hijaz railway 
project, discussed below. both categories, the paper and fused Islam as a ritual 
religion religion, geo-political economics are 
synthesized. ritual of is a common element present the two ventures that points the 
Kamilists' adroit acculturated unification of (a) immemorial religious rituals and (b) the modern 
and secular sector. During hajj season, the forthcoming Company's steamers would transport 
the pilgrims. Like the Hijaz railway, the project to economically mesh the Ottoman Empire, 
India and Burma, China and Indonesia would thus "facilitate the hajj for the pilg1ims to God's 
Sacred House in all the Islamic lands". Somewhat as for the Ottoman Empire's construction of 
the network of railroads for heavily military-strategic --- although, to a lesser extent, also 
economic --- purposes, a connection with the pilgrimage to Mecca thus heightened the 
description of the economic venture of trade between Constantinople and the Far East as 
"Islamic". As with communications calling for aid to the Ottoman State itself, including its 
gee-political Hijaz railway project, vocabulary and assertions were applied to inject Islamic 
religious content into what would seem to non-Muslims not particularly religious --- economic or 
military --- phenomena. Constantinople was, in accordance with consistent Kamilist practice, 
3 L "Mashru' Islami 'Azim" (A Great Islamic Project), al-Liwa' 18 February 1903 p. 1. 
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termed Dar al-Khilafah ("the Abode of the Caliphate"). The proposed commercial fleet was 
termed "Islamic" although some places with which it would have dealings --- Rangoon, East and 
West India, China, and (less markedly because there were Bengali Muslim elements) Calcutta ---
could not accurately be described as predominantly Muslim. al-Liwa' still categorized them 
among "the Islamic lands"32• However, Sumatra did have solid orthodox Muslim populations. 
The Ottoman Turks had supplied artillery, munitions and military advisers to Acheh's Muslims 
during their sixteenth century wars with the Portuguese in Malacca. Acheh appealed to Turkey 
in 1873 for protection against the invading Dutch; there consequently was consciousness of this 
past relationship with Sumatra among the Middle East's Turks33 • 
The Islamic fleet project stemmed from some Ottoman Turks' history and interests, but 
the Egyptian intellectuals' acculturation motivated the enthusiastic welcome they gave this 
non-Egyptian project. These Western-cultured intellectuals knew too well Europe's modern 
instruments of military and economic strength --- which they wanted Muslims to duplicate as 
tools with which to integrate Islam's global sovereign community. The economic scope of 
British power --- spanning homelands and continents and through trade present in lands Britain 
did not administer --- imposed the new comprehensive world Muslim counter-community or 
bloc. Modern imperialism-fostered communications patterned means to pull together the widest 
Muslim community in new integrations that would not require a single state. Kamilist ideology 
exalted and applied the Caliphate in new ways that could restore meaningful leadership over the 
Muslim nations to the Ottoman Sultan: a future strong Ottoman State could help colonized 
Muslim peoples, near and far, rebuild sovereignty. The Islamic Fleet project made the Kamilists 
expect that a resurgent Ottoman State would direct economic resources and instruments it 
achieved out to Islam's most far-scattered peoples, to mutual benefit. With no individual 
Muslim nation viable alone in the age of global imperialisms, the scope of pan-Islamic 
community and interactions, cultural, political and economic, had to expand further and further 
32. Ibid. 
33. The Ottoman Turks' relationship with the Muslims of Acheh was surveyed by Anthony Reid, 
"Sixteenth Century Turkish Influence in Western Indonesia", Journal of Southeast Asian History (Singapore), v. x 
(1969) pp. 395-414. The Turks mainly supplied arms in the sixteenth century to the Achehnese Sultan' Ala' al-Din 
Ri'ayat Shah al-Qahhar (1537-1571). Descendants of Turkish and Syrian advisers and artisans lived in the village o 
Bitay named after Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem). Ibid p. 398. Dr Reid mentioned a semi-scholarly article on the 
historical Ottoman relationship with the Achehnese --- a 1912 article by the naval historian Saffet Bey in the 
historical magazine Tarihi Osmani Encumeni Mecmuasi. However, that was nine years after our al-Liwa' item. 
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out from the Ottoman State and Arab lands it still ruled or once had. Kamilist ideology 
demanded that the Caliph lead Muslims, rather than govern them. With peoples whom the 
Ottoman State never governed being integrated into this supra-statal pan-Islamic community, 
Egypt's separate statehood would not look un-Islarnic. 
The Hijaz Railway 
Known in Arabic as al-Sikkat al-Hamidiyyah, the Railway of' Abdul-Hamid, this was to 
link Arabia to the main arteries of Turkish railways in Anatolia and 'Iraq. The section from 
Damascus to Medinah was completed in 1908 but the extension from Medinah to Mecca never 
was. 'Abdul-Hamid adopted a project of a railway to Arabia in response to an 1898 insurrection 
headed by the Imam of Yemen and defeats that Wahhabis led by 'Abd al-' Aziz Ibn Sa'ud 
inflicted upon the Turks in Eastern Arabia. "The main reasons for initiating the Hejaz Railway 
were ... military and political, to strengthen the Sultan's authority in the Arabian Peninsula, 
chiefly in the Hijaz and Red Sea area"34• However, the Ottoman Sultan' Abdul-Hamid stressed 
in communications to the world's Muslims that the railway would facilitate pilgrimage to Mecca. 
This religious characterization made outside Muslims generously donate towards its construction 
costs. We shall see that the Kamilists were to appeal to Egyptians to contribute towards the 
railway on grounds that it would tighten Ottoman control over Arabia, not just facili~+"­
pilgrimage. The Karnilists also repeated to Egyptian audiences justifications of the railway as a 
means to bring economic development to nomadic and semi-nomadic Arabs, made to Arab 
populations under Ottoman rule. ·. 
The Karnilists had to knit together a range of classes to aid this life-and-death Ottoman 
enterprise. Kamil' s, and the other Kamilist leaders', mobilization propaganda addressed to their 
widest Egyptian audiences identified' Abdul-Hamid as Caliph and therefore entitled by 
divine-revealed Islam to command believers resident in any state to contribute. In a 1903 Arabic 
article, Kamil wove references to Islamic congregational prayers into his plea for Egyptians, 
especially the wealthy, to help finance the railway. Every Friday the Muslims gather in mosques 
in the furthermost Eastern and Western reaches of the earth to call for aid to the Commander of 
34. Jacob M. Landau, The Hijaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage : A Case of Ottoman Political 
Propaganda (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1971) pp. 12-13. 
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the Faithful and the strengthening of his State --- "a call necessitating the uniting of these nations 
(umam) and peoples (shu'ub) around the banner of the Caliphate"35• The item thus identified 
political support for the Ottoman Sultan's cause as a religious duty of Islam, as binding as its 
prayer-rituals. It inextricably wove Turkey's Middle East power interests and instruments into 
the ritual life of the world religion that the Sultan headed. In Kamil's presentation, Islam is of 
wider scope than ritual devotions linking the individual believer to God. Islam's religious rituals 
galvanize the believers once more into collective participants in contemporary international 
political history, still controlled by the West: 
The whole world has its eyes on the Muslims in these days and is asking: Are they so 
weak and their resolution so dead that they are incapable of helping the Ottoman State 
extend a railway when the most insignificant of companies in Europe construct numerous 
railways on the initiative and efforts of a few individuals?36 
Westerners made history at that point of time. Yet this selective ultra-political Islam could 
motivate the Muslims, including Egyptians, to construct the modern economic and strategic 
instruments to beat them off. This reformulated Islam, polarized as the antithesis of the West, 
would build up the will and structures among Muslims to economically as well as militarily 
become like --- as well as dislodge --- those enemies. 
Kamil to Egyptians pervasively alternated, juxtaposed and identified the Ottoman State's 
instruments of political power with international Islam and its survival in the world. Egyptians 
who do not help the Caliph in Constantinople extend the Baghdad railway to Mecca and 
Medinah, whatever their intentions might be, in reality offer "support for the sentence of eternal 
death and extinction that Westerners pronounce on Muslims" as a whole. "Muslims in all 
corners of the world" know that the religion's and their own survival depends on the survival of 
the Ottoman state that maintains the Caliphate37• 
Islam was a unifying trans-class and trans-elite bond. The Kamilists might materially aid 
geo-political instruments to integrate and defend the Ottoman State in other provinces. Yet the 
Hijaz was religiously very special for Muslim Egyptians --- the land into which God sent down 
his Qur'anic revelation to the last Prophet, Muhammad. Pilgrimage to Mecca was also a central 
religious obligation prescribed by Islam for every able Muslim: pilgrims to Mecca usually then 
35. Mustafa Kami!, "Quwwat al-Khalifah" (The Caliph's Strength), al-Liwa, 20 August 1903, p. 1. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid. 
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visited Medinah, 225 miles north-west, where Muhammad lived for ten years and was buried, 
and then often the Masjid al-Aqsa in Jerusalem38• Responding to the frustated religious drives of 
the bourgeois constituency, some of the first numbers of al-Liwa' attacked the Egyptian 
ministers for placing restrictions upon the pilgrimage to Mecca39• Educated Egyptians' religious 
needs would strongly motivate the Kamilists to support the new railway, which would offer 
swift, comfortable transport to Mecca. Egyptian pilgrims had suffered hardships and 
maltreatment by nomads in journeying on foot and camel to Mecca. 
Religion and its shrines were again fused with regional politics in a speech delivered by 
Mustafa Kamil's brother' Ali Bey Kamil at an open-air meeting in the provincial township of 
al-Zaqaziq in 190340• 'Ali Fahrni applied the idiom of religious fervor to raise donations for the 
the Hijaz railway from an audience possibly more popular and less sophisticated or 
secularizing-educated --- less urban --- than the movement's usual Cairo constituency. 
'Ali Kamil was acculturated41 --- but not the less sensitively attuned for that to the 
Islamic religious needs of the Egyptians whom he addressed at al-Zaqaziq. He hammered home 
to them that the railway would make it easy for Egyptians to make combined pilgrimages to 
Mecca, Medinah and Jerusalem42• 'Ali Kamil knew that this religious consideration would win 
generous donations. 
God: 
Like Mustafa, he identified the Sultan and his geo-political requirements with Islam and 
My dear brothers, the person ordering the Railway's construction is His Highness the 
Commander of the Faithful, the Khalifah (Successor) of the Prophet of the Lord of 
38. Charis Waddy, The Muslim Mind (London: Longman 1976) p. 30. 
39. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 318. Cf. the demands that more facilities be granted 
Egyptians to make the hajj pilgrimage in the front-page spread "al-Haij! al-Hajj!", al-Liwa' 10 January 1903 pp. 1-2. 
40. For al-Zaqaziq ("Zagazig"), capital of al-Sharqiyyah province, see The Statesman's Year Book of 1903 
(London: MacMillan & Co 1903) p. 1195 and EB 11th ed 1911. It contained large cotton factories and offices of 
numerous European merchants: its population in 1907 was 34,999, including 1,355 Greeks. Ibid. 
41. 'Ali Fahrni Kamil's career as an officer in the Egyptian army proved abortive. His nationalism brought 
him into collision with the British, who stripped him of his rank and interned him. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian 
Nationalist Party" p. 316. 'Ali Fahrni translated into Arabic (1909) Juliette Adam's collection of letters from the lat( 
Mustafa: Lettres Egyptiennes-Francaises actresses a Mme Juliette Adam. 1895-1908; and also her 1922 L' Angletem 
en Egypte --- transmuted into Injilitarra fi Misr (Cairo: 1922). Among 'Ali's own French writings that explained 
Egypt's cause to Europeans was his "La Question d'Egypte", Orient et Occident May 1922 pp. 5-20. Thus, 'Ali 
Fahrni Kamil was acculturated to a degree with some active bilingualism in French. Data supplied by Dr Arthur 
Goldschmidt Jr of Pennsylvania State University, in part drawing on al-Zirikli's al-A'lam. 
42. Khutbah bil-Zaqaziq fi-htifalin lil-Sikkat al-Hijaziyyah" (A Speech at al-Zaqaziq in a Meeting on the 
Hijaz Railway), al-Liwa' 9 August 1903 p. 1. 
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Worlds, the Sultan our Lord' Abdul-Hamid Khan, may Allah aid and support him! ... If 
we want to be Muslims who hold on to our Islam we have no choice but to follow the 
path of true guidance and to gather around the banner of the Sultan. 
'Ali Kamil' s cry was "Come, 0 Ye Muslims". Certain of his words and phrases suggest that the 
Sultan's authority or commands derived from or were the authority or commands of God 
Himself. For instance, he reproaches the Egyptians because they still lack "the Arab initiative, 
the religious zeal and the Islamic fervor the bearer of which knows nothing but obedience to the 
command/authority (amr) of Allah and so obeys him who has charge of authority (waliy 
al-amr) "43 • 
Pan-Arabism Subsumed Under Ottomanism. The railway would facilitate commerce 
between regions (aqtar) of the Ottoman Empire. It would also "develop agriculture in those 
golden lands" (Transjordan and peninsular Arabia). Contribution by Egyptians to the Hijaz 
railway was "charity" (al-ihsan) that would "bring prosperity to your Arab brothers". It was "the 
relieving of the sufferings of orphans and the poor, righteousness, commanded by religion44• 
Religion in such Egyptian pan-Islamic communications had economic and social life as a sphere. 
As ever in Kamilism, religion and political power, too, were closely connected in' Ali 
Kamil' s speech, intensified by the religious Hijaz context. 'Ali was well aware that this "purely 
religious project" of the Hijaz railway was, among other aspects, an instrument to redistribute 
regional political power. Once completed, it would enable the Ottomans to stop Britain from 
further expanding her influence among the tribes from the coastal colonies and trucial states that 
she already held in the peninsula: it would strengthen the Ottoman State's authority in Arabia. 
The Railway would make possible swift Ottoman troop movements not just to quell lawlessness 
by nomads affecting the movement of pilgrims but "to resist the hidden hands that work in the 
dark to rob this vast glory from the ummah"45 (=here the Muslim world community or nation). 
43. Ibid 
44. Ibid. 'Ali Kamil's justifications of the Hijaz railway to Egyptians recall earlier ones that the Ottoman 
establishments argued to convince that Empire's Arabs. Thamarat al-Funun, a Sunni Muslim paper in Bayrut, had 
predicted in 1900 that the railway would help repopulate southeastern Syria, pacifying the nomadic tribes and 
halting their raids. It would stimulate agriculture and the exploitation of natural resources, help the Sultan impose 
his authority and enable Muslims from all over the world to make the pilgrimage. Landau, Hijaz Railway p. 20. 
Muhammad' Ariflbn al-Sayyid al-Munir al-Husayni al-Dimashqi, a Damascus educationalist, wrote a book in 
Arabic championing the railway. Like' Ali Fahrni Kamil and Thamarat, he, too, stressed its economic as well as 
purely religious advantages: for instance, it would facilitate the introduction of civilization among "savage 
populations" --- Arab desert nomads, towards whom the Kamilists, too, had their ambivalences. Ibid p. 196 
(Arabic). 
as a 
and 
the Day" could anything to s Calculating 
al-Liwa's modern-stream student readers for religious reasons supported the Hijaz railway, this 
writer tried to discredit al-Mu'ayyad editor 'Ali Yusuf --- =the Khedive 'Abbas who financed tha 
paper and had turned against the increasingly populist Kamil --- by charging that he refused to aid 
"this great Islamic project"46• Muhammad Farid in his tributes to Mustafa Kamil upon his death 
assumed that Kamil's support for the Hijaz railway would see}Pcreditable to the educated 
followers. 
The audiences addressed by Kamil and by coleaders even during his life-time perhaps wer 
already starting to widen out into groups beyond the attached acculturated core-constituency ---
reaching urban workers and even some peasants47• But modernizing-educated Egyptians were as 
readily mobilized into aiding the Hijaz railway by identification of it with religion as Muslim 
Egyptians in general. Indeed, the drives to extend ritual religion into contemporary international 
relations economics, to make Europe-developed of economic or political power 
(railways, steamers) serve a religion-founded international political community, were the product 
of the conjunction of the two traditions, Islamic and Western, through acculturation. It was the 
religious duty of Egyptians to obey' Abdul-Hamid's geopolitical commands. The scope that the 
45. 'Ali Fahrni Kamil at al-Zaqaziq, loc. cit. 
46. "Nahnu wal-Mu'ayyad" (VVe and al-Mu'ayyad), al-Liwa' 3 August 1904. Yet' Ali Yusuf's pan-Islamic 
pro-Ottoman zeal had cooled as the Khedive moved from 1904 towards rapprochement with the British presence in 
Egypt. Wendell documented from a 1907 al-Mu'ayvad article the convergence of his later positions with the --- at 
least in formal argumentation --- more systematic and ideologized Egyptianist particularism of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyi 
and the Jaridists who (at least on the plane of verbalization) called for pan-Islamism and the link with Ottoman Turks 
to be phased out, ignoring their own deep bonds to that Empire's Turks and Arabs. Lutfi-like, 'Ali Yusuf denied int 
1907 piece that al-Jami'at al-Islamiyyah --- ambiguously, either wider Islamic community or pan-Islarnism --- ever 
had had, or ever could have, a political expression. Yusuf now argued that a political pan-Islamism by "the Muslim 
nations" would band European states together against the Muslims in a countering "Christian league" (jami'ah 
Masihiyyah). Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From Its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi 
al-Sayyid (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972) p. 229. 
47. George Young, writing in retrospect after World War I and Egypt's recovery of limited independence, 
characterized that the pre-1914 nationalist movement's "spokesmen were journalists, its thinkers ... lawyers". Yet his 
impression was that al-Hizb al-Watani at some point came to reach out beyond its urban efendiyyat constituency to 
rural audiences: nationalism's "main activity became a vituperative anti-British agitation in French and Arabic journ: 
which were discussed in the town cafes and declaimed aloud in the villages". Young, Egypt 2nd ed. (London: Emes 
Benn 1930) p. 179. Haykal recalled that the rural population was already being reached by Kamil's death, since eve1 
people from far-flung comers of the countryside came to his 1908 funeral in Cairo: B 394-5 fn 57. 
to to 
matters. 
to materially the State too deeply to open a reversible alliance 
of convenience. Religiosity would not equip any Egyptian group to critically assess the Ottoman 
State's policies and needs from the viewpoint of Egypt's interests. However, the British 
Arabophile Wilfrid Scawen Blunt in 1906 characterized Kainil as allied with the Ottoman State 
out of fear lest' Abdul-Hamid barter away Egypt's independence to Britain "for some personal 
interest or fear" --- a perspective perpetuated by such West-resident scholars as Wendell and 'Afa 
Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot48 . Aid to the Ottoman Empire's judicious railway projects would make it 
less ramshackle before Western powers. 
There were individuals or groups Istanbul, both officials and private merchants, who 
called for construction of a modern Ottoman navy and also merchant fleet that could command 
military and economic respect And the Ottoman Turks had some historical linkages with even 
such faraway Muslim countries as 
officialdom was not getting enough done 
Nonetheless, 'Izzat' s perception that Ottoman 
enough towards making the Islamic fleet a 
reality, and that pressure to get the project moving came from the Caliph's non-subject Muslims 
beyond his Empire as much as from the subjects he administered within it, was lucid. Kemal 
Karp at' s researches indicate more ambitious international pan-Islamism to checkmate or sap 
or confront the expansionist West and centred around the Ottoman core, was not of much interest 
to the cautious, practical 'Abdul-Hamid II: rather, "the idea belonged to the outside or peripheral 
Muslims who were seeking a rallying-force" (colonized or threatened Muslims in Egypt and Nort 
48. Wilfred Scawen Blunt, My Diaries (London: Martin Secker, 1919-1920) v. 2 p. 156. Blunt wrote this 
mid-1906 entry immediately after he met Kamil for the first time. He had the impression that Kamil "like all educat( 
Egyptians hates and distrusts 'Abdul-Hamid as a tyrant and a dangerous man": his hope lay in the Sultan's death and 
"a liberal and refonning successor to the Caliphate". It is to be noted, though, that Blunt was a Turcophobe: 
Gladstone-like, he penned a pamphlet against' Abdul-Hamid over the 1894-1896 "Armenian massacres". Ibid p. 45~ 
It is a fact that Kamil's September 1906 communication on pan-Islamism to Le Temps showed some acquaintance 
with the writings of liberal-secularoid Young Turkey exiles in Europe opposed to 'Abdul-Hamid. "Le Patriotisme et 
Pan-Islamisme" loc cit; cf. Steppat, Nationalismus pp. 290-291. Karpat assessed Sultan' Abdul-Hamid II as quite 
prepared to sacrifice or cede attached lands or peripheral areas of the Ottoman Empire to expansionist Christian 
powers as part of his strategy to buy peace and time for the Ottoman core that he was intent to preserve. 
"Pan-Islamism ... " pp. 5-6, 27. 'AfafLutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, too, assessed nationalists such as Kamil as afraid that a 
treaty with Turkey might win Britain a legitimate sanction to remain in Egypt pennanently. al-Sayyid-Marsot, E!:~vp 
and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations (New York: Praeger 1969) pp. 47, 130. 
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Africa, "Russia" and India)49• From opposition to revolutionary movements and change, 
'Abdul-Hamid shifted to passive acquiescence to rising Muslim resistance to Westerners. '"He die 
not seek leadership of the awakening in the Islamic World but was forced by pressure from both 
Europeans and Muslims --- who had entirely opposite reasons for wanting him to take part in the 
movement --- to accept an important role" as Caliph-symbol. The global Pan-Islamic movement 
needed that central emblemic authority-figure "to achieve the degree of unity necessary for 
resistance". The Sultan-"Caliph" evoked pan-Islamism in order to manipulate colonial powers 
fearful of its appeal to their Muslims --- Britain, France and Russia --- into acquiescence with the 
continued "integrity of his realm, rather than actually to oppose European imperialism". Some 
"high Ottoman officials such as Sa'id Pasha, Khayruddin Pasha and several generals --- not to 
speak of religious leaders --- developed elaborate projects for organizing an Islamic Union", but 
'Abdul-Hamid adroitly kept them only paper schemes50• 
'Abdul-Hamid had manipulated the Kamilists, like other colonized Muslim groups, into 
strengthening his realm by contributing to the Railway. He had met their minimum requirement 
by not legalizing Britain's Occupation of Egypt, which would have ended his own 
bargaining-power as well. Yet Kamil and his colleagues --- more modern as well as more 
religious in their supra-statal concept of sovereignty than either 'Abdul-Hamid or post-World Wa 
II orientalists --- wanted much more. 
Anti-Turkish Christian Nationalisms 
Kamilist solidarity with Turkey against Christian nations she had once ruled, or which 
were still fighting her for independence, perceived those nationalities vividly from a number of 
acculturated angles. Like the Jaridists (Ch. 6), the Kamilists imaged Armenians, Greeks, Bulgars 
etc almost as intimately as they characterized Turks --- making their pan-Islamism very different 
from the simpler variant of monolingual Egyptians. Kamilist opposition to these Christian 
nationalisms was diverse and inconsistent, the more emotionally involved because of multiple 
angles and ambivalences. It was unpredictable and out of control of calculated pursuit of Egypt'! 
49. Private letter from Professor Kemal H. Karpat, Department of History, University of Wisconsin-Madise 
dated 2 November 1981. 
50. Karpat, "Pan-Islam ism: Imperial Plot or Muslim Popular Resistance to Imperialism?" pp. 6-7, 28-29. 
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international interests that required a strong Ottoman State. 
Early in the Nasir period, the Egyptian pan-Arab journalist-analyst Ahmad Baha' al-Din 
faulted Kamil for identifying his independence movement so closely with the cause of the 
Ottoman regime: it could only harm his lobbying of European support to evict Britain, given that 
such "European peoples" as the Greeks were "revolting against Turkish imperialism"51 • Althougl: 
not so much as would have been the case had he mainly addressed the British public, Kamil 
undoubtedly found his support for' Abdul-Hamid against Greek, Armenian and other Christian 
nationalisms a PR problem when appealing to the French. Mme Juliette Adam and associated 
French nationalists may have sometimes even gone so far as to credit British manipulation of 
Greek and Armenian insurgencies against the Turks for expansion, but it was delicate chemistry i 
even La Nouvelle Revue might not lapse into Turcophobia when serious blood-letting got 
underway52• It would be inadequate, though, to view Kamil' s posture of opposition to those · 
insurgent Christian nationalisms only as a residual traditionalist dysfunction in his psyche that 
resurges against requirements in the Francophone milieus he had to court. Greeks and Armenian 
51. Ahmad Baha' al-Din, under Nasir an incisive pan-Arab columnist in al-Ahram and the weekly 
al-Musawwar, felt that the Kamilists' vocal apologetics for Turkey lost the cause of Egyptian independence support 
from Europeans sympathetic to the Christian nationalities fighting for independence, and also, to a degree, even to 
Turks working to replace 'Abdul-Hamid's despotism with constitutional government. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani J 
30. Did Mustafa Kamil know Egypt's interest, Baha' al-Din queried, given that the Sultan' Abdul-Hamid had issuec 
the famous statement that 'Urabi was an apostate rebel, as the British attacked? --- to which we saw (Ch. 3) the 
youthful Kamil's eyes were well open as he put together his intial Pan-Islamic-Egyptianist position in Europe: A 
164. 
SL.. The chemistry of La Nouvelle Revue could ignite either way, although it usually scorched Britain arour 
the time of Kamil's conjunction. The extreme of anti-Britishism was Juliette Adam's 1895 formulation that "the 
terrifying [British] octopus is fastening its tentacles around the bodies of all the nations": it was Britain that was 
inciting the Cretans as well as Armenians to dismember the Ottoman Empire in order to occupy 'Iraq and make 
Armenia its route to India. La Nouvelle Revue November-December 1895 pp. 387-389, 166-167. Classicist literar) 
Graecism and their residual but durable identification with all Christians, in combination made La Nouvelle Revue 
contributors open to Hellenic nationalism --- more than to Armenian insurrectionism. The 1897 struggle and war O\ 
Crete won 'Abdul-Hamid and the Turks unfriendly notices in La Nouvelle Revue. The Greek nationalists had an or 
forum, presenting images of "les massacres de nos freres Cretois", sanitizing out the latters' pogroms against the 
Muslim-Cretan minority: "S.L." (Athens), "La diplomatie Europeane dans le conflit Greco-Turc", La Nouvelle Revl 
July-August 1897 pp. 618-627; cf Jean Pischari, "Les Armeniens, les Cretois et l'Europe", La Nouvelle Revue 
May-June 1897 pp. 54-70 and Comte de Chalo, "En Yacht au Pays de la Guerre Greco-Turque", La Nouvelle Revm 
September-October 1897 pp. 480-497, 694-713. Juliette Adam, too, responded with comparatively moderate and 
judicious sympathy for the "wise'; Orthodox Cretans --- voicing the hope that they would win from the Powers, 
without whose duress 'Abdul-Hamid would not budge, an autonomy that foresaw something very like what they we 
in fact to be granted. Adam's item had a sharp, cherishing awareness of contemporaneous Greek royalty. La Nouv1 
Revue May-June 1896 p. 716. Massacres against Christian nationalities in the Ottoman Empire and despotic 
repression by 'Abdul-Hamid --- although with some sympathy for his constitutionalist Turkish as well as Armenian 
victims, also --- were flayed by Joseph Denais in "Le Sultan", La Nouvelle Revue March-April 1897 and his "Les 
victim es du Sultan: la demission de Fouad Pac ha", ibid May-June pp. 71-78. 
were 
to 
consciousness he to cope and sour 
perceptions of the disparity between (a) Muslim Egyptians and (b) minority Christian Greeks or 
Armenians in Egypt who linked out into distant anti-Ottoman nationalisms. Kamil voiced 
considerable awareness to the French of Egyptian PM Nubar' s Christianity and that he was 
racially non-Egyptian, a member of an Armenian nation centred outside who pursued its interests 
within Egypt. To dispel impressions in France that (Muslim) Egyptians were religiously fanatical 
Kamil in 1895 observed that "Nubar Pasha, who is Christian, presided last year in the Khedive's 
name over our most important [Islamic] ceremony, the ceremony of the sacred cloth [mahmal], 
and that to the applause of the crowd"53 • Elsewhere, though, Kamil argued to his French readers 
that Nubar's non-Egyptian origin made him readier to betray Egypt's interests than Muslim 
ministers, themselves often Turco-Circassian, who collaborated the British occupation. 
Following the 1882 conquest, the Sudanese revolted, and 
to renounce its over The 
British pressed the Egyptian 
Minister Sharif Pasha resigned 
comply. Nubar, the Armenian, taking power, accepted that which so outraged his 
predecessor and renounced the Egyptian Sudan"54• In Kamil's mind, Nubar sacrificed Egypt's 
Sudan because his supreme political loyalty was extraterritorial, to the Armenian nation: Colonel 
Baring, Cramer's brother, told him that Nubar had asked the British to work for Armenia's 
national independence from the Ottoman State to reward his services to Britain's policies in Egyp 
and the Sudan55• 
Bad parochial relations with an immigrant Christian minority also fed his solidarity with 
the Turks before Europeans in regard to Greek nationalism. The Kamilists' support for the 
Ottoman State in the 1897 war brought tensions with Egypt's resident Greeks near flash-point. 
53. Mustafa Kamil, "L' Absorption par I' Angleterre", La Nouvelle Revue 15 December 1895 p. 821. 
54. Kamil, "Une Alliance qui s'Impose", La Nouvelle Revue 15 November 1895 p. 380. Tignor notes that 
Sharif, although Turco-Circassian, had, prior to the British conquest, won some popularity among nationalist 
Egyptians because he favored constitutionalism as Prime Minister. Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British 
Colonial Rule in Egypt. 1882-1914 (Princeton University Press 1966) pp. 63, 175. 
55. Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu'asir (Bayrut, 2 vols: Dar 
al-Irshad 1970) v. 1 p. 223. 
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Kamil hastily returned to Egypt from Paris in 1897 (as he wrote to Juliette Adam) to head off 
near-successful attempts by the British to incite resident Greeks to rise up and attack "the 
Muslims"56• Kamil's statements in Egypt worsened Greek-Muslim relations. He publicly 
proposed to the victorious Ottoman Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid that Turkey not withdraw from Thessal: 
until Britain withdrew from Egypt. The proposal triggered off an accusation by the Greek-owned 
Phare d' Alexandrie that Kamil was anti-Greek57• Kamil's perceptions of Greeks in Egypt were 
very much religious. In 1895 he told the French that the Greeks living among the non-fanatical 
fallahs in Egypt's villages "traffic in alcohol and take interest, both prohibited in the Muslim 
religion"58• 
Although parochial sourness was important, Kamil and fellow acculturated Muslim 
Egyptian intellectuals had also been exposed from formative adolescence to articulations of Gree1 
nationalist ideology by resident Greek journalists. Those local French newspapers and such 
Hellenophile metropolitan French organs as La Nouvelle Revue built up a substantial feel for the 
historical view of Greek Nationalism among Kamilists --- who evoked it to mollify Egypt's 
Greeks to the extent possible while supporting Turkey against Greece. An instance was Mustafa 
Kamil's reply, published in Alexandria's French-language La Reforme in mid-1897, to attacks by 
the Greek John Haicalis in his Phare d' Alexandrie upon Kamil's proposal that the Ottoman State 
withdraw from Thessaly only when Britain withdrew from Egypt. Kamil urged Egypt's Greeks ti 
respect our views as we respect yours. You see things from the angle of the interest of the 
Greeks while we see them from the vantage-point of Egypt's interests. It is only just that 
each of usShould be sincere in devotion to his homeland ... Regardless of all these politic<: 
considerations, and the sensitivities of our ummah (nation), we do appreciate the patriotis1 
of the Greeks, for any Egyptian cannot but respect all who defend their homeland whatev< 
their nationality might be59• 
It was not only when conducting intercommunal diplomacy for Egypt's independence tha 
Kamil expressed interest in the ideologies motivating the struggles of Christian nationalities 
against the Islamic Ottoman State. He showed in communications to his Egyptian followers a 
genuine analytical interest in more secular aspects of these anti-Turkish, anti-Muslim movement~ 
Kamil early recognized that these Christian nationalities had a more advanced stage of 
56. Rashad, Mustafa Kam ii p. 113. 
57. Ibid pp. 113-114. 
58. Kamil, "L'Absorption ... " p. 821. 
59. Rashad, Mustafa Kamil p. 114. 
as to 
own 
applied to very positive tern~ 
"Easterners" (sharqiyyina) and held up their nationalist activism for emulation: 
Do you not have in some Eastern races like the Serbs, Bulgarians and others a tremendous 
lesson? Remember now the Armenians who do not flag one instant founding societies 
and delivering speeches although they have never before known the meaning of 
independence, and who to date have never tasted the sweetness of unity of action and 
freedom from the dead hand of foreign [rule] over their country in the way that you 
yourselves tasted their sweetness in the age of the noble Khedivial dynasty. Besides that, 
they have no right entitling them to win their demands, whereas your rights are the greate~ 
of rights. You have no way to recover them except through publicizing the facts in Europ 
and seeking her help60• 
In at least this formulation, Kamil demonstrated some preparedness, then, to view the Ottoman 
government like the Armenian nationalists, as "foreign" rule by one nation over another in 
Armenian-populated areas. Kamil did take a stride in this 1895 letter towards a true nationalist 
which would accept secession nationalities from the Ottoman Empir1 
as as as s --- more 
rule. 
Contact with anti-Ottoman Greek nationalism helped Ahmad Hilmi to develop towards 
such an atomistic secular-nationalist world-view. a 1906 al-Liwa' article, Hilmi denied the 
reality of supposed supra-national communities, pan-Christian or pan-Muslim, inspired by 
emotions. He argued Egyptians would not when they regained independence from Britain 
reamalgamate Egypt in the Ottoman State merely because Turks were fellow Muslims. Cultural 
factors, or common European identity, played no role at all in the support that Russia gave to the 
early struggle of the Greeks for independence from the Turks' rule. European states were 
motivated by cold self-interest; they therefore still would give the same support to an effective 
Egyptian independence movement that Russia gave to the Greeks' original independence strnggl( 
Hilmi's latter thesis had an acculturated impulse to keep up the fruitless lobbying of Europe, and 
to negate the growing sense in the Kamilist movement that European states, as a virtual camp, 
60. 'Ali Fahrni Kamil, Mustafa Kamil Basha fi Arba'a wa Thalathina Rabi'an v. 3 p. 65. 
as 
or 
was on nature of the Band") 
"terrorist" organization founded in 1814 at Odessa to the liberation of Ottoman-occupied 
Greece from the sanctuary of Russian soil. The Russian Tsar Alexander I's patronage of, and 
material support for, the Greek uprising for independence Hilmi interpreted not as due to the Tsar 
being "a lover of the ancient Greeks" (or to common Orthodox Christianity?) but a tactic in 
power-politics --- an attempt by the Russian to weaken his great antagonist, the Ottoman Sultan 
Mahmud. Despite his obvious dislike for the Philiki Etaireia terrorists, Hilmi added that like then 
the Egyptians could also get the European powers' support against occupying B1itain "if we get u 
and act"61 • 
This article was another example of the Kamilists seeking to learn about the ideology and 
techniques of all nationalist groups, even the most anti-Ottoman and anti-Islamic, with the purpos 
of adapting methods where suited to Egypt's own struggle for independence. Muhammad 
Farid late 1908 similarly expressed respect energy and the Bulgaiians 
and wrested independence, while voicing al-Watani's ongoing support 
for the Ottoman State's suzerain rights over Bulgaria62 . The Kamilists' inherent pan-Muslim 
connection Turks, and the genocidal lack of pity which insurgent Slavs, Bulgaria ar 
Greece slaughtered and drove out Muslim populations resident in Macedonia, assured that 
61. Ahmad Hilmi, "al-Istiqlal! al-Istiqlal!" (Independence! Independence!), al-Liwa' 9 August 1906. 
Leadership of the Greek independence movement was taken in 1820 by the Prince Alexandros Ypsilantis. Ypsilanti: 
came of a family of Phanariot Greeks; he became an officer in the Czar's Imperial Guard and had the Czar's approv~ 
when he crossed the Prut river with an armed band on 6 March 1821: however, Russia disavowed Ypsilantis when h1 
was defeated by the Turks and the native Rumanian population deserted him. On March 25 the sporadic uprisings in 
the Morea, which Egyptian troops were to fight, broke out. As previously stated (fn 10), Ahmad Hilmi did not recei' 
fonnal education beyond primary level: his basic grounding in French and in Greek nationalism would thus have cor 
both from Greek colleagues when he worked in a private company in cosmopolitan Alexandria, and from perusing a 
the French newspapers and magazines that Egypt-resident Greeks brought out. While Hilmi's articles often presente 
secularoid analyses of modem Muslim history, like all dual-cultured Muslim Egyptian intellectuals he had 
non-Western Islamic spasms at least. Thus, he participated in the Kamilists' denunciation of' Ali Yusufs elopemen 
(al-Liwa' 27 July 1904 pp. 1, 2); and Hilmi's insistence that children not be sent to government or private schools 
controlled by Britishers or residents --- that the nationalists had to build schools of their own --- may have had an 
Islamic as well as its "patriotic" motive: "al-Sha'b al-Misri" (The Egyptian People), al-Liwa' 26 February 1903. 
Westernization: the latter item wanted to educate "the Egyptian People" to become a Boer people or a Polish people: 
and if Hilmi was hitting 'Ali Yusuf to strike Khedive 'Abbas, his constitutionalist "true patriotism" held up Victor 
Hugo's resistance to the Emperor of France who persecuted the liberals --- Hilmi, "Quwwat al-Wataniyyah" ( 1906). 
62. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani p. 196. 
to 
as 0 
conversions to, or progress and alienated such more secular and open 
Copts as Salamah Musa from Kamil's independence movement64 • Although more diverse than 
usually imaged in the literature, Kamilist pan-Islamic solidarity with the Ottoman Turks did 
hamper the non-sectarian territorial nationalism Kamil professed, and thus a united independence 
movement, from getting off the ground. Yet the Kamilists kept it up because they cared about tht 
Turks and Muslims in the Balkans, as well as Coptic fellow-Egyptians. 
The ill-controlled and unpredictable character of Kamilist responses to anti-Ottoman 
63. Traumatized by the mass killings of Muslims, al-Liwa' in 1903 condemned the refusal of Bulgar 
independence fighters to collaborate with the Ottoman reforms conducted by Governor Husayn Hilmi in Macedonia. 
"Those are the evil souls which blew up houses and castles and assassinated pure men, made orphans of children and 
devastated their land. They claim that the Ottoman State (may Allah protect it!) treats them with a constant oppressi1 
and injustice that are incompatible with any code, so that they have sought independence through threat and menace" 
"Lima Qataluhum wa Hum Abriya'?" (Why Have They Killed Them When They Are Innocent?), al-Liwa' 15 Augm 
1903 p. 1. The complex, prolonged Macedonian problem, including the religious and ethnic diversity of its 
population, and the subversion by rivals Bulgaria and Greece that intensified the slaughter, are surveyed by Stanford 
and Ezel Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press 1976-1977) v. 2 pp. 207-211. Macedonia contained Turkish-speaking and Slavic Muslims, 
outnumbered by Bulgars, Serbs, Greeks and Vlachs. This degree of diversity had no equivalent in Egypt; and Husay 
Hilmi (to become Ottoman Grand Vezir in 1909) no doubt carried out his reforms in the "excellent" manner al-Liwa· 
imaged. The fact remains that al-Liwa' advised the Macedonian Orthodox to accept Ottoman status and an Ottoman 
military presence while denouncing Egyptian Ministers who worked with British "advisers". "Had our ministers 
shared our nation's patriotic feelings ... not a single [British] soldier would remain to ... make the hearts [of Egyptians 
bleed with his sight". Sayyid 'Ali, "Hadhihi Natijat al-Istislam Ayyuhal-Wuzara' al-Fikham" (This is the Consequer 
of Surrender 0 Proud Ministers), al-Liwa' 8 April 1908. 
64. 'Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot assessed that Kamil's "support for Turkey on religious grounds ... frighten< 
away" from his movement many prominent or gifted Copts attracted by its drive for independence and Egypt-centrer 
motifs. al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt and Cromer p. 160. Salamah Musa's social radicalism, marked even from his yout 
before World War 1, was rare in his sect, but he did faithfully illustrate some perceptions --- and misunderstandings 
about --- Muslim Egyptian pro-Ottoman pan-Islam that alienated from Kami! Copts who might otherwise have joine 
up. In his 1927 al-Yawm wal-Ghad, Musa depicted the Khedive 'Abbas, al-Mu'avvad and Mustafa Kami! as 
responsible for "an apostasy from the patriotic idea": all "returned to Islam as the community bond (jami'at al-Islam; 
saying that Egypt was a possession of the Ottoman State. Musa vehemently assailed al-Mu'avvad and al-Liwa' for 
claiming that Egyptians were "Ottoman [subjects] obliged to fight the Macedonians to defend' Abdul-Hamid and his 
subjects, that' Abdul-Hamid was the Caliph of the Muslims whom every Egyptian was duty-bound to obey. Mustaf~ 
Kamil and the editors of his paper almost caused a communal clash among [the Muslims and] Copts through this 
stupidity and raving". Musa's al-Yawm wal-Ghad cited Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2 p. 225. In hi 
1947 autobiography, Musa again wrote that the collective Coptic minority shunned the nationalism articulated by 
al-Liwa' and al-Mu'ayyad because it mingled recognition of Ottoman suzerainty with demands for Egypt's 
independence. The Education of Salama Musa tsd L.O. Schuman (Leiden: F.J. Brill 1961) pp. 42-44. Musa took at 
face value, as a dangerously unitary Ottomanism, al-Mu'ayyad editor 'Ali Yusuf s call for Egyptians to send 
representatives to the CUP-restored Ottoman Parliament: ibid p. 34. This missed Khedive 'Abbas' "Arab Caliphate' 
undermining of all Istanbul regimes --- and that Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid assessed Yusuf's call as only' Abbas' ploy ti 
block an Egyptian constitution or parliament: Ch. 6, fn 53 (A 304). 
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Christian nationalisms has to be stressed. The Kamilists were not able to synthesize together the 
sectors of the world-view they evoked. The availability of multiple perspectives in al-Liw'a', sorr 
of them relatively open or cold-blooded, fleshed out the Serbs, Greeks, Armenians and Bulgars tc 
Egyptians, making their voices heard with that immediacy enemies have in modern multi-lingual 
nationalisms. Moreover, as each people in a string of Christian nations is concretized, the oppose 
Christian camp takes form. French and British publications and politicians had made the threat tc 
the Ottoman Empire of those Christian nationalisms central in the minds of the Kamilists. 
Kamilist counter-solidarity with the Turks (pan-Islam) --- modern and acculturated --- had many 
features symmetrically patterned by the pan-Christianism underlaying British and French support 
for Greeks and Armenians. Kamil was surely correct that Europeans had no right to deny him hi~ 
mirror-retort as atavistic "fanaticism" --- although it was precisely this charge in Western 
languages that could spiritually fuse the Kamilists with threatened Turkish and Slavic Muslims65 . 
THE WIDER PAN-MUSLIM WORLD 
The present section analyses later, 20th-century communications of the Kamilists 
denouncing subjugation or mistreatment by Europeans other than the British of Muslim 
populations outside Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. We choose Kamilist views of European 
imperialism in the later period in which they reacted against general Europe. 
The section will trace the intellectuals' mounting sense, as they reject the West, that 
religions determined international political actions and associations. 
Steppat underscores the campicizing comprehensiveness of Kamil's reaction against 
Europe when it did not respond to his early appeals on Egypt's behalf. Europe never freed a sing 
Muslim nation. The Dutch tyrannized the Javanese, Austria confiscated the religious properties c 
the Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina (detached from the Ottoman Empire after the 
Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878), Russia the wealth of Kazan's Muslims. Europeans oppressed 
Muslims in the Caucasus, the Crimea, Algeria, Tunisia, India and Zanzibar66• In his earlier hopef 
approaches to Europe, Kamil's concern was concentrated upon narrower segments of the world'5 
65. Lashing back at European writers and journalists who depicted Turks as murderous fanatics, al-Liwa's 
Istanbul correspondent in 1903 estimated that 1,250,000 Muslims had fled from the Russian Empire, Serbia, Ruman 
and Bulgaria in the preceding 25 years. "Man Hum al-Muta'assibun?: Hijrat al-Muslim wa Hijrat al-Masihi" (Who 
Are The Fanatics?: The Flight of the Muslim and That of The Christian), al-Liwa' 24 February 1903 pp. 1-2. 
66. Steppat, "Nationalismus" p. 311. 
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Muslims: upon his Egyptian nation and the Muslims of the contiguous Ottoman state. He 
initially pursued in Europe Egypt's and the Ottoman State's interests with talk of a vague wide 
"Muslim world". Smarting from Europe's indifference to Egypt's cause, Kamil then developed a 
sharp Muslim internationalist consciousness. He frequently denounced European governments 
that had done Egypt no harm, for ill-treating around the globe distant Muslim populations with 
which Egypt had few contacts or common secular interests. Steppat credits Kamil with 
popularizing consciousness of a far-flung "Muslim world" in Egypt: al-Liwa had a Muslim 
correspondent in Calcutta and was distributed as far as Singapore67• 
The Problem of "Fanaticism" 
The Muslim intellectuals' treatment of European imperialism in the Muslim world was 
given direction by their acculturation. Thus, they addressed the Europeans' concept of "religious 
fanaticism" almost as much as real military, administrative and economic phenomena of 
imperialism in Muslim lands. The intellectuals' attempts, even in Arabic, to harmonize their 
promotion of the causes of Muslim populations with modernist repudiation of religious 
fanaticism show that they continued to hear the criteria evoked in liberal European 
intellectualism. 
Wendell has outlined the appearance of the problem of "fanaticism" among Muslim 
intellectuals in the nineteenth century. He argues that pious Muslims, and even the in some 
respects non-traditional Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, found difficulty in understanding "the nature·of 
the accusation" of fanaticism made against Muslim populations by expansionist Westerners68• 
Wendell shows the affinity of (a) Kamil's argument that fanaticism in Egypt was due to 
ignorance of true Islam and would disappear when the Muslims were adequately educated in 
their religion with (b) similar early argumentation by' Abduh69 • The use of the charge to screen 
Britain's record in Egypt from scrutiny enraged Egyptians as never before in the wake of 
Dinshawai. al-Liwa' in 1906 quoted British Foreign Affairs Secretary Sir Edward Grey's 
dismissal of Egyptians' reactions to Dinshawai as "fanatical". Grey predicted that as their 
67. Ibid p. 282 fn 4. 
68. Wendell, Egyptian National Image pp. 196-199. 
69. Kamil's view ibid p. 253; 'Abduh's p. 199. 
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political thinking advanced they would become disillusioned with pan-Islamism70• Kamil, in 
England around that time, tried hard to refute credence there that Egyptians opposed the 
Occupation out of atavistic "religious fanaticism" against Christians. 
Grey's argument that the fanaticism of the Egyptians was linked to related Muslim 
fanaticism against France in North Africa was granted a hearing among colonialist-expansionist 
circles in France71 • A Catholic Syrian friend of Kamil, Shukri Ghanim, tried to reassure the 
French from Eclair that there was no "fanaticism" in Egypt against Christians in general: writing 
from Cairo, a French journalist replied in Le Temps that Kamil fitted Grey's analysis, and that 
his pan-Islamic movement was indeed out to subvert French authority in Tunisia and Algeria72. 
Rising to its imperial responsibilities, Le Temps assessed that elite Algerians and Tunisians were 
reading Egyptian pan-Islamic journals and that 100 --- "far too many" --- were studying at 
al-Azhar. But North Africans were necessarily accepting irreversible French settlement and· 
municipal elections, forgetting Islam: it was in French sub-Saharan Africa (eg. Zinder) that 
pan-Islamic fanaticism fanned from Egypt still might harm73• However, the anti-Muslim, 
imperialistic Louis Bertrand (1866-1941) heightened French fears of the effects that Kamil's 
70. Summary of Sir Edward Grey's speech and an Egyptian reply in "al-Jami' at al-Islamiyyah wal-Siyasat 
al-Injiliziyyah" (Pan-Islamism and British Policy), al-Liwa' 8 July 1906. Grey's bracketing of Egyptian and North 
African discontent as "fanaticism" caught French attention, and also ignited even the fury of Cop ts like Salamah 
Musa when the British-subsidized al-Muqattam used the motif to justify Dinshawai executions. Musa, Education 
pp. 31-33. "Although Grey defended the policy [of the British in Egypt following Dinshawai] and contended that 
severe action was warranted in the light of the growing Muslim fanaticism in Egypt, his defence was only lukewarm 
The private correspondence of Liberal-imperialists like Grey reveals that they, too, were extremely embarrassed by 
the harshness of the British policy". Tignor, British Colonial Rule p. 283. 
71. Andre Servier, Islam and the Psychology of the Musulman tsd A.S. Moss-Blundell (London: Chapman 
and Hall 1924) p. 260. Servier was a shadowy but spasmodically well-briefed writer who may well have worked in 
some French agency; his book was in gestation in the pre-War years. He characterized al-Liwa', al-Mu'avyad and 
(sic) al-Jaridah as "tribunes oflslam" that threatened French rule in North Africa. Ibid. Servier's tenth chapter, "The 
Nationalist Movement in Egypt", described Mustafa Kamil Pasha as the "the leading spirit" of a new, more 
dangerous form of pan-Islamism. Although not as primary as alarmist French operatives feared, Lutfi and the 
Jaridists did have their pan-Muslim and proto-pan-Arab twinges that made them sympathetic to North African 
Muslims under French rule: A 259-260. 
72. Anon (from Egypt), "Le Pan-Islamisme en Egypte", 22 August 1906. 
73. "Le Pan-Islamisme en Afrique", Le Temps 23 August 1906 p. 1. Although somewhat concerned at the 
possibility of coordinated resistance by widely separated populations, Le Temps --- and the French ruling class for 
which it spoke --- could also rein in its fears. An editorial perceiving Muslim ferment throughout the whole of Asia, 
portrayed Muslims attacking Armenians and Russians in the Caucasus, identified the mullahs as the crucial group 
responsible for the Shah's conceding of an Iranian National Assembly, and saw Mustafa Kamil as a sinister agent of 
Istanbul --- yet, against British paranoia, assessed that few Indian Muslims, whatever their respect for the (Ottoman) 
"Caliph", wanted to give him any political authority over them. "L'Effervescence Musulman en Asie", Le Temps 2L 
August 1906 p. 1. 
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movement might have on Muslim Algeria74• 
By 1906, Kamil and his colleagues saw "fanaticism" and linked motifs as a common 
European imperialist ethos able to band Christian European states together as a broad bloc 
against the Muslim populations that they colonized. The article of attack from Cairo 
contemptuously crushed Kamil's claim that he led an enlightened elite intent to bridge Western 
civilization and Islam: modem-educated Egyptians were an insignificant handful and Islam and 
the West's humanism irreconcilable75• In reply, Kamil defended al-Liwa's printing of letters 
from Algerians and Tunisians --- their only way to get their "suffering" and the arbitrary 
"asphyxiation" and "enslavement of human beings" across to France: "Egypt's Muslim 
newspapers" were "criticizing" France for her own self-reform, not "attacking". Unlike 
Muhammad Farid's attacks on France, Kamil did not, at least here, evoke shared Arabness while 
bracketing (a) Egypt and (b) Algeria and Tunisia as all Muslim. His response was pan-Muslim, 
rather than Arabist. Kamil retained a residue of his old attitude that France could be better than 
Britain: al-Liwa' had praised more well-intentioned governors such as Jonnart who honor France 
in Algeria --- but then he distinguished two Frances, the political and the scientific-literary. 
France had long before abandoned Egypt, whose nationalists now relied on themselves76• 
Kamil, then, kept on addressing the French even after Egypt's short-term interest had less 
to hope, given that they had become Britain's "best friends and auxiliaries"77• His 
ultra-acculturated elite retained some emotional cultural bonds with France that kept them 
talking, and some sense of difference from non-Westernized North Africans whom 
splendidly-endowed France could have uplifted with a different approach. It showed the 
widening of the Kamilists' delimitation of inner indigenous community that he tried to get how 
"the Muslims" of Algeria felt across to a French establishment that drew calm satisfaction from 
all its achievements there. France, universal as ever, will continue to print your Parisian 
cadences, Moustafa, although haven't you fully worked out yet that only Gaul-like Aryanoid 
Berbers who have the blue eyes and renounce Islam can have scope to prosper, in their station, in 
74. Ghali, L'Egwte Nationaliste p. 43. This, though, would have been mainly in Le Mirage Oriental, 
published after Kamil's death in 1909. 
75. "Le Pan-Islamisme en Egypte" loc. cit. 
76. Kami!, "Le Patriotisme et Pan-Islamisme", Le Temps 8 September 1906 pp. 1-2. 
77. Ibid. 
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our new 
s was 
her fusing Algeria now intensely Kamilists. 
Crude Secular Explication of Colonialism and Muslim Resistance: Zinder, West Africa. 
The previous Chapter excerpted 1906 London press statements in which Kamil disdained 
the sub-Saharan Black African Muslims of Zinder as (along with traditional, illiterate 
Moroccans) a separate category from the sectionally self-Westernizing Egyptians. A side of him 
was inclined to accept French claims that anachronistic Islamic "religious fanaticism" motivated 
discontent against colonial rule there. 
A few days after its account of Grey's "fanaticism" speech, al-Liwa' printed a front page 
item ironically headlined "Islamic Fanaticism" ("al-Ta'assub al-Islami") on a supposed attempted 
revolt in what had since 1899 been the French-occupied town of Zinder79 • Zinder is situated on 
the northern margin of the West African Soudan and had importance in the early twentieth 
century as an across the Sahara between the 
78. In 1906, Le Temps brushed aside with statistics any misgivings that the European settlement and 
agricultural development of Algeria had been at the expense of the natives, or would seriously harm them in future. 
The colons had developed much of their fertile agricultural lands from previously uncultivated waste-land. 
Europeans had had to confiscate some very fertile lands from Algerians, yet although the lands that remained in the 
hands of Algerian farmers now were poor for the most part, their adoption of some European techniques had more 
than compensated by raising yields. The Algerian peasants and landowners were learning the value of the 
market-place: it would draw them into a mutually profitable community with Europeans in which Islam would be 
forgotten. The fair-haired, blue-eyed Berbers were predestined to flourish in partnership with the French community 
in the new Algeria: in this process, though, "the Arab element which refuses to adapt to our way of life necessarily 
will be eliminated". "Une Enquete Sur La Colonisation en Algerie: Les Effets de la Colonisation Sur La Societe 
Indigine", Le Temps 24 August 1906 p. 1. In a 1904 call for "rational [European] settlement of North Africa", 
Albert de Pouvourville sharply distinguished the Berber race, stable or increasing in number, from the Arabs in 
Algeria. That conquering race, in Algeria only to prey on and enslave the country "following the method of 
Mahomet", lost its reason to exist when the French wrested away its power: "the old [Arab] ruling race is 
diminishing day by day, and the time is not distant when it will completely disappear". Albert de Pourvourville, 
"Peuplement Rationnel de l' Afrique du Nord", La Nouvelle Revue 15 September 1904 pp. 147-8, 153. Ageron has 
synthesized a grim survey of massive land confiscations, the pauperization and deliteratization of the rural Algerian 
population, responding savagely-suppressed revolts, and routine French political repression, throughout the 
nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries. Charles-Robert Ageron, Modem Algeria: A History From 1830 to the 
Present (London: C. Hurst 1991). The contribution of the colons to Algeria's economic development, and the 
prejudice they faced because of Spanish or Italian origins from the real French, has been stressed by Prochaska, but 
he, too, documented the destruction of indigenous Algerian institutions and society. David Prochaska, Making 
Algeria French (Cambridge University Press 1990). 
79. "al-Ta'assub al-Islami" (Islamic Fanaticism), al-Liwa' 29 July 1906 p. 1. 
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states 
a 
al-Liwa rejected the claims of Temps that the motive of 1906 unrest in Zinder was 
religious fanaticism 
when incidents more violent and terrible than that are undertaken against Christian 
governments by their Christian subjects seeking freedom, justice and equality. Why do 
the French say that the motive of the population of Zinder is religious, not political, when 
the misdeeds that the rulers commit against the subjugated force the latter finally to 
sacrifice their blood for liberty and independence?82 . 
The formal argument of the al-Liwa' item on Zinder --- as Ahmad Hilmi argued about the 
Ottoman Empire, Greece and Russia --- thus marginalized religion in international politics. 
Secular political and socio-economic interests mainly, motivated the French to conquer and fired 
the (Muslim) West Africans to revolt against them. The item equates violent resistance by 
Zinder's Muslims against non-Muslims with social, economic and political uprisings by 
oppressed Christian social groups Christians Europe. It is strikingly 
secular to award the same inevitablity to both. These African populations are 
Muslim. political independence or sovereignty for which they revolt is not motivated by 
either their or their oppressors' sect. The same violence would automatically break out when any 
nation deprived another of its natural political sovereignty even if both had one faith. 
However, an article's emotional impact can be different from its formal argument. In 
answering French arguments, al-Liwa took up the Islam-versus-Christianity perspective of 
France's colonial Governor-General Roume and of a conservative and sometimes jingoistic 
French newspaper. Le Temps' perceptions did (qualifiedly) prod the Liwa'ists to connect 
Muslim discontent in French West Africa, unrest against French rule in North Africa, Egypt's 
80. Art. "Zinder", EB (MCMII) v. 33 p. 927. From the French exploration and geographical literature, 
especially the 1899 account ofFeureau, this article described tum-of-century Zinder as "a large and fine town 
surrounded with high earthen walls, very thick at the base and pierced with seven gates. It covers a large area, and 
its houses, in part built of clay, in part of straw, are interspersed with trees, which give the place a pleasing aspect". 
Ibid. Zinder is today situated in South Central Niger and is the town centre of an important peanut-producing regior 
of Africa. The town served as the capital of French West Africa until 1926: unrest in 1906 could threaten France's 
hold over the region. 
81. "Zinder" EB (MCMII). 
82. "al-Ta'assub al-Islami", Joe. cit. 
an 
was one bond with sub-Saharan Africans under French rule. 
Secular-Islamic Duality. Robert Tignor has drawn attention to duality Mustafa 
Karnil's accounts of the West's imperialism. On the one hand there was his neo-traditionalist 
"emphasis on the anti-Muslim drives in European civilization". On the other hand, notes Tignor, 
Kamil was indebted to European leftist thinkers for concepts of imperialism as "economically 
motivated, undertaken for the purpose of exploiting Egypt's resources" 84 . This powerfully 
supra-Egyptianizing synthesis of religious and left-secular perspectives was present in 
Muhammad Farid's 1903 account of French rule in Tunisia and Algeria. Before the 1904 
Entente ended the last hopes that France might break ranks with England and take Egypt's side, 
Farid already in 1903 lamented the "ill-fate" that brought Tunisia and Algeria "under French 
colonialism". the one hand Farid stressed agrarian dispossession, "the unjust laws that France 
issued in Algeria and had others issue Tunisia to rob the lands of the tribes" and hand them 
over to colons. viewed colonialism as material-economic 
drives to seize property, natural resources and wealth the indigenous inhabitants. On the 
other hand, however, Farid described French actions in Algeria and Tunisia as also motivated by 
religious-confessional fanaticism or ta'assub: "the fanaticism of the French against the Arab". 
Basing himself on Muhammad Abduh's impressions during a 1902 visit to Algeria, Farid 
stressed the damage that agrarian dispossession by the French did to the religious-charitable 
83. Le Temps had described the Zinder incidents as "of a local nature": it nonetheless related the Zinder 
unrest to other "sporadic" wider "effervescence" in West Africa "mainly due to religious fanaticism" --- although 
therefore "devoid of political importance" according to M. Roume, Governor General of French West Africa. 
Among manifestations of Muslim fanaticism, Roume mentioned the assassination of Lieutenant Fabre at Nyame, 
and the murder of two guards at Kokobitanda. "Les Incidents de Zinder", Le Temps 20 July 1906 p. 1. The "Zinder 
plot" was one symptom of a "religious fanaticism that is manifesting itself at various points, widely separated from 
each other, in our African territories". "Le Complot de Zinder", al-Liwa' 23 August 1906 p. 2; directly above this 
appeared the item "Arrestation d'un Agitateur en Algerie". Aware of the volatility of Zinder and other possessions 
in the Soudan, Le Temps elsewhere advocated that France maintain its prestige by occupying the two oases of 
Djanet and Bilma, over which the Ottoman State claimed jurisdiction from Tripoli. With insulting ominousness, it 
warned the Ottoman State not to foolhardily assert any claim. "Djanet et Bilma", Le Temps 3 August 1906 p. 1. In 
November, Le Temps charged that riders driven off with heavy loss of life from a French post at Bilma had come 
from Tibesti at the instigation of Turkish authorities in the Fezzan. "Affaires Coloniales: un Incident a Bilma", Le 
Temps 10 November 1906 p. 1. 
84. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 264-265. 
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Islamic awg_af85. While Farid perceived economic drives in French colonialism, he thus 
additionally popularized that anti-Muslim, Christian hostility to Islam also motivated its 
"oppression" of the Algerians and Tunisians. 
More secular analyses of imperialism and resistance from Kamilist acculturateds could 
draw on those already installed in the Afghanist- 'Abduhist classicoid view of overall indigenous 
history. 'Abduh had earlier alternated non-religious, cold-blooded responses to French 
imperialism with Islamist ones in various tum-of-century replies to Gabriel Hanotaux, French 
historian and a former Foreign Minister (1894-1896). From al-Mu'ayyad, 'Abduh described 
France as cynically manipulating Catholic missionary activity and education abroad to gain 
control over the Islamic lands, notably the Ottoman Empire --- in particular Lebanon/Syria, 
which he had viewed as an exile. In France itself, he derided, the very same laicist French 
governments expelled Jesuits and limited the Church's authority86• 'Abduh characterized that 
differences of religions did not much motivate either French colonial policies or resistance by the 
Algerians to the French: "if the entire French nation embraced Islam, with M. Hanotaux at the 
fore, but still treated non-French people in the fashion familiar in Algeria and Madagascar, could 
it hope that the populations of its colonies would ... not seize any opportunity to revolt?"87• This 
is like the Zinder item's affirmation that the colonized fight imperialists over secular sovereignty, 
not religion --- and states that a single religion cannot on its own impose or define a humane 
political community. But could the parallel struggles of Muslim Algerians and non-Muslim 
Madagascans against the same enemy open into some loose anti-imperialist political community 
or alliance that would span Afro-Asian sects? 
Deep emotional hostility could narrow perceptions of imperialism by acculturated 
Egyptian writers: yet the 'Abduh-Manarist, Kamilist and Jaridist schools built up a diverse 
85. Muhammad Farid, "Halat al-Jaza'ir wa Tunus" (The Condition of Algeria and Tunisia), al-Liwa' 29 
September 1903. Farid wrote up his impressions of his repeated journeys to Algeria, Tunisia, (Ottoman) 
Tripolitania and --- in the best acculturated Arab-ethnicizing pattern --- Andalusia, in his 298-page book Rahalatu 
Muhammad Farid: Yusuf As'ad Daghir, Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyyah v. 2 (Bayrut: Matabi' Lubnan 1956) p. 
635. 'Abduh had made his visit to Algeria in 1902, the year before Farid's al-Liwa' article. Advance notice of the 
visit in al-Manar had assured 'Abduh a good reception from local followers of his unusually liberal salafi Islamic 
revivalism, notably Shaykh 'Abd al-Halim Bin Simayah and Muhammad Ibn Mustafa Khojah. Muhammad Burj, 
"al-Jaza'ir fi Kitabat Muhammad' Abduh" (Algeria in the Writings of Muhammad' Abduh), al-Asalah (Algiers) 
December 1977 p. 23. 
86. Burj, "al-Jaza'ir" p. 23. 
87. Ibid p. 21. 
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enough shared stock of angles on Western behavior to discipline their Islamic anger and help 
them sidestep simplicism. 'Abduh' s ability in 1900 to take some of Islam's lenses off and · 
scrutinize the French anew to figure out what really drove them was to persist in Egypt's 
Arabo-Islamic community tradition. The Young Men's Muslim Association was to ascribe the 
drive of the French to detach the Berbers from Arabic, Arabs and Islam through the mid-1930 
dahir to the secular power drives that 'Abduh had considered thirty years before. Accepting that 
the French political establishment was truly laicist and anti-clerical, the YMMA analysed that 
France was trying to break Islam in Morocco for the pragmatic motive that it was an obstacle to 
the strengthening of her control. The non-Christian French ruling class promoted French 
missionary activity as a catspaw for its imperial expansion: B 71-72 fn. Condemnations of 
France in North Africa by Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and his journal al-Risalah (from 1933), 
developed the Kamilists' and Jaridists' interest and concern. However, despite his excellent 
French and acquaintance with even some classical French works, al-Zayyat --- like Kamil and 
Farid more than 'Abduh --- was, in his denunciations, fixated on Christian, Islamophobic drives 
in French misdeeds in the Arab West (B 259, 337). 
Remote Muslim Populations Oppressed by Europeans: Russia's Muslims, Indonesia 
Other al-Liwa' items lack such quasi-secular explanations of conflicts between Muslims 
and Westerners in history. The Kamilists sometimes projected their religion-determined Muslim 
international community identification out onto European colonialists almost mechanically, 
without seeking the latters' real motives. al-Liwa' conveyed to Egyptians images of violence 
and murder around the world by the most diverse range of Europeans against Muslims ---
explicating the attacks in terms of Christian "religious fanaticism": it was in these terms that it 
reported such remote massacres as an alleged 1906 Cossack pogrom against Muslim Ingush in 
the Caucasus88• A failure to have a direct source that could provide facts from the area may be at 
issue in an item about Indonesia carried by al-Liwa' in August 1904. This consisted of a report 
from its correspondent in Java ("limukatibina") dated 21July1904 claiming a massacre of 100 
innocent Muslim villagers by Dutch troops at Surabaya but headlined (as it seems by al-Liwa') 
88. "Barid al-Islam", al-Liwa' 25 July 1906. 
was 
not 
seem to at 
despite not truly have a correspondent 
--- yet the Kamilists really may been disinformed by tawdrier pan-Islamists from there91 . 
The Zinder item dismissed religious antagonisms as a false issue evoked to disguise from 
French public opinion the sordid politics of the subjugation of a West African population. The 
Surabaya item presents a more traditional, Islamoid conception of Europeans. Rather than 
alternation, though, bl endings of selected old Islamic motifs with radical-modernist patterns 
enabled the Kamilists to integrate some unprecedented pan-Muslim relationships. The 
Kamilists' expanding links with Russia's faraway Muslims were an example. The Kamilists 
chose to evolve these not with traditionalist Islamic leaderships in Russia and Central Asia but 
with the opposedjadid movement, launched by the great Tatar educationalist Isma'il Gaspirali 
(1851-1914). This current wanted to lance out whole sectors of Sunni late-traditionalism and 
synthesize those heightened Islamic elements maintained with modem Western patterns. In 
s though, could be no individual outside a 
unified and regenerated world of Islam: came to Egypt 1908 tried to initiate a Universa: 
Islamic Congress to be held Cairo. Excited by jadid attempts to perpetuate Islam within a 
modernization of Muslims, al-Liwa' declared November 1907 that the Islamic world could 
achieve a renaissance, this would be due to the efforts of the Russian Muslims so brilliantly 
represented by Gaspirali92 . By 1916 the jadidists were to have built 5,000 schools throughout the 
Tsarist Empire93 • al-Liwa' publicized, and took sides with, the vulnerable jadidists' efforts for a 
Reformation of Islam in all the still very medieval Central Asian statelets ruled from Russia: a 
1904 item titled "Education in Bukhara" printed an inside jadidist view of the movement's 
89. "Ta'assub al-Urubiyyin Didd al-Muslimin: Jawah fi 21 Yulyu li-Mukatibina" (The Fanaticism of the 
Europeans Against the Muslims: Java on 21 July from Our Correspondent), al-Liwa' 16 August 1904. 
90. I am indebted to Dr Anthony Reid of the Australian National University for his observations on this 
matter. 
91. Steppat, "Nationalism us" p. 282. Dr Reid has described misleading propaganda diffused over the 
Middle East, charging Dutch mistreatment of Indonesian Muslims, by Kiamil Bey, Turkish Consul-General in 
Batavia from 1897-9. There were attempts to define Indonesians, especially those of Arab descent, as Ottoman 
subjects. Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia", Journal of Asian Studies v. 
26:2 (February 1987) pp. 267-283, esp. pp. 280-282. 
92. C.W. Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets (London: Allen & Unwin 1957) p. 125. 
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educational endeavors in that ultra-hostile traditionalist city, a centre of immemorial religious 
schools and colleges94• al-Liwa's coverage of Russia's Muslims placed emphasis upon 
educational matters95• 
The Kamilists got material aid through to Russia's Muslims where needed. In 1907, 
Kamil organized throughout Egypt the collection of a fund for the relief of famine-stricken 
Muslims in Nukha96 in Adharbayjan. The money was conveyed to them through the Ramiev 
brothers, editors of the Ohrenburg Tatar journal Waqt (Vakit). A letter of thanks to Kamil was 
published immediately after his death in an Arabic daily al-Nahdah, which Gaspirali briefly 
edited from Cairo in early 190897• Pro-jadid Islamic theology students in Egypt were a 
bridge-elite with active command of classical Arabic. They and Gaspirali could not sustain the 
Arabic al-N ahdah, the hoped-for forum for a much more far-reaching conjunction of the Tsarist 
Empire's self-Westernizing Reformedjadid Islam with the politically more vocal, but likewise 
acculturation-stimulated, Kamilist pan-Islam. Yet, the Kamilist press published both Arabic and 
French versions of Gaspirali's addresses in Cairo98• Translated extracts from Waqt articles also 
appeared in Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid's al-Jaridah as well as the Kamilist media: these denounced 
the drive of Russian chauvinism to stop Muslims from taking part in the Tsarist Empire's 
abortive post-1905 parliamentary politics (A 296 fn 36) --- also raised by Gaspirali in 
al-Nahdah. In his communications to Egyptians, Gaspirali (like al-Liwa') condemned the 
93. Thomas Kuttner, "Russian Jadidism and the Islamic World: Isma'il Gasprinskii in Cairo --- 1906", 
Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietigue v. xvi: 3-4 (July-December) 1975 p. 389. For all the movement's reverence 
for the West's modernity, instruction in Arabic and in religious sciences with Arabic texts still took 53% of 
teaching-time in jadid-influenced schools on the eve of the 1917 revolution. Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and 
Islam in Russia (Harvard University Press 1960) p. 289. 
94. "al-'Ulum fi Bukhara" (Education in Bukhara), al-Liwa' 20 August 1904. Gaspirali's account to his 
Egyptian readers of his 1893 visit to Bukhara, indicated that its Amir received him with official respect and 
munificent facilities. Gaspirali, though, voiced to Egyptians many criticisms of social decay and ignorance in that 
traditionalist Amirate. Kuttner, "Gasprinskii in Cairo" pp. 399-400. 
95. al-Liwa' on 11 July 1906 (pp. 1-2) published accounts of the Association of Teachers at Baku, a 
petition by Crimean (Tatar) Muslims to the Duma, and the foundation by Muslims in Ashkabad of a 
scientific-industrial school. al-Liwa' also carried a lengthy front-page round-up of news about Russian-ruled 
Muslims in its issue of 1 April 1908. 
96. Nukha is in the Northern part of the Adharbayjan Republic, on the south of the Greater Caucasus. The 
Russians conquered this former Khanate in 1806. Nukha is in a fruit-, rice- and silk-producing area: the city had 
37 ,000 inhabitants in 1932. The Columbia Lippincott Gazetteer of the World (New York: Columbia University 
Press 1962). 
97. Kuttner, "Gasprinskii in Cairo" pp. 407-8. 
98. For some examples, ibid p. 421 fn 37. 
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Egyptian ruling classes' ill-treatment of the peasantry99: like the Kamilists, he sniped at 
late-Sunni scholastic education as the reason for Muslim backwardness, demanding new 
education that would incorporate the West's strength. Paralleling the Kamilists, he argued from 
al-Nahdah that Muslim women had to be almost equally educated so as to effectively rear 
children in the home: he went beyond Kamil, however, by advocating deveiling and the right of 
women to work, for instance as government-school teachers, as the completely Westernized 
Polish Muslim women did100• 
The encounters and exchanges between (a) Kamilist Egyptian pan-Muslims and (b) 
Turkic jadidists artistically repressed by the Russians, illustrate that small Muslim elites alienated 
from late Sunni Islam, rather than traditional clerics, have the strong Islamic commmunity drive 
to link up across very great distances. The Kamilists and J adidists both drew energy from 
combining (a) energetic borrowing of modernity from Westerners with (b) a sense of the same 
Westerners as malevolent subjugators and excluders of Muslims, with a camp or bloc the retort. 
Watanist Egyptians and Russia's Jadid intelligentsia did effectively use their media to exchange 
thought and experiences. The Kamilists showed that they cared for their distant coreligionists by 
delivering the aid required for their survival. 
POTENTIALITY FOR SECULAR MULTI-SECTARIAN AFRO-ASIAN COMMUNITY 
The section tests potentiality for multi-sectarian Afro-Asian community in Kamilist 
communications. The data, though, again underscores Islam's at least short-term ability to 
pervasively tint and determine the conceptualization of communities in this acculturated party. 
99. For a denunciation by Gaspirali from his Arabic al-Nahdah of the Egyptian ruling class' ill-treatment, 
exploitation and neglect of the ignorant Egyptian peasantry, ibid pp. 406-407. The outburst may have been 
influenced by Russian populism as Kuttner speculates: he is wrong, though, that the Tatar modernist was introducin! 
educated Egyptians to a more radical social consciousness. Kamil's al-Liwa' had, years before in 1903, mordantly 
advised the Egyptian government and the British "advisers" who directed it to supply hygienic drinking-water to the 
Egyptian countryside, not just Cairo and Alexandria --- after all, epidemics that broke out in the villages would read 
them, too, in the end! "Miyah al-Sharb" (Drinking Water), al-Liwa' 7 January 1903. al-Liwa' thanked the 
Anglo-Jewish international financier and philanthropist Ernest Cassel (1852-1921) for his work to combat eye 
diseases in Egypt, such a contrast to the "remissness" of rich Egyptians. "Shukr al-Muhsin" (Thanking a Benefactor) 
al-Liwa' 13 January 1903 p. 2. Cassel had organized Egypt's modern banking system and the financing of the 
construction of the Aswan dam, and was a close collaborator with Cromer. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 368-9, 
222 and 373. 
100. Kuttner, "Gasprinskii" p. 392. 
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1. Kamilist Responses to the Emergence of New Japan 
The new self-modernizing, militarily powerlul Japan made a more powerlul impression 
upon the Kamilists than any other non-Muslim Afro-Asian group. Her defeat of Russia in the 
1904-1905 war came at a time when France was coming to terms with her former enemy 
England and Egyptian nationalists had lost hope of aid from Europe. In a period when 
Westerners seemed to be drawing together against the East, Japan's victory showed that Eastern 
peoples could achieve sovereignty and strength by their own efforts. Kamil's reaction against 
general Europe was clear in a statement to French friends. "Are not the Japanese the only 
Oriental people which has put Europe in its place? How could I possibly not love them?" 101• 
As Kamil responded to Japan's victory, his sense of a Muslim international community 
widened out to an Afro-Asian sphere of solidarity. Steppat analyses this as natural: the 
neo-traditional "Islam-Christianity antithesis" had been dormant at first in the young Kamil's 
initially rather secularoid thought. It was the circumstances of the clash with the imperialist 
West that activated it, so that the dichotomy of Islam versus Christianity now "symbolizes" for 
Mustafa Kamil the opposition between the Orient and Occident. When Japan's victory over 
Russia in the 1904-5 war suggested a new source of hope for Egypt against imperialism, Kamil' s 
feelings of pan-Islamic solidarity readily got "overlaid" with the broader Oriental 
solidarity-feeling102• 
Before we analyse Kamilist responses to victorious Japan, it might be noted that Japan,.s 
self-modernization had impressed Middle Eastern Muslims even earlier, in the nineteenth 
century. Such interest was shown by both Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and by the Ottoman Sultan 
'Abdul-Hamid. 'Abdul-Hamid had in 1890 sent the screw training-ship Ertogrul to Japan: 
however, that wooden vessel went down within sight of the Japanese coast (25 November 
1890)103 • The attempts by pan-Islamic Turkey to link up with the new, militarily 
self-strengthening Japanese, however, were in conjunction with an impulse to Islamize them. 
101. Steppat, "Nationalismus" p. 283 fn 4. Kamil's French friends, who had hitherto mainly seen his 
Francophile motifs, were disconcerted by his exultation at the downfall of Russia, an ally on which France 
depended. The article "al-Yabaniyyuna fi Biladihim" (The Japanese in their Land), al-Liwa' 24 July 1904, spoke 
with scathing contempt not merely of Russia, but also of its ally France. 
102. Steppat, "Nationalismus" p. 283. 
103. Art. "'Abd al-Hamid II", EI2 v. 1p.64. 
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al-Afghani disagreed. Muslims from Islam so it is 
most likely that they will tum unbelievers against My view is that you should send some 
presents to the Emperor with a letter which you shall promise him to meet his request, and that 
we then work hard to graduate/produce a group of 'ulama' fit to convey Islam's message and 
able to approach missionary activity a rational way" 104• 
Jamal al-Din had been alienated by rational sectors in the Islamic heritage, and by contact 
with the West's thought, from traditional Islam and its clergy. Yet Islam still held as a basis for 
all positive international communities in his thought. 
The Kamilists' responses to the new Japan tested how much connection they kept up with 
Islamic tradition. Their preparedness to accept non-Muslim Japan, following its victory over 
Russia, as a model for reorganization and modernization of Muslim countries retreated from 
Islam as a comprehensive socio-economic order. advertised Mustafa 
the source from which Egyptians understand Japan's progress and development, 
the secrets of her power and greatness and the devotion that her leaders show her 
service ... the most momentous lessons for the nations of the Orient that have been 
ignorant of patriotic sentiment so that they became disunited ... giving the foreigner sway 
over them105• 
The non-Muslim Japanese had found answers to the challenges of life in the modern world that 
were independent of Islam. They provided an effective model for Muslim Egyptians' own 
achievement of sovereign nationhood. The advertisement indicated that Kamil meant to provide 
Egyptians with detailed accounts of Japanese society, politics and geography. 
Kamil himself planned to visit Japan. Such direct contact would certainly have been an 
important step towards establishing a real reciprocal relationship with the "Eastern" Japanese. 
104. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Maghribi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani --- Dhikrayat wa Ahadith (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif 
1948) p. 31. 
105. "al-Shams al-Mushriqah" (The Rising Sun), al-Liwa' 9 August 1904. "al-Yabaniyyuna fi Biladihim" 
(The Japanese in their Land), al-Liwa' 24 July 1904, almost endorsed inhuman fanaticism antithetical to Islam. The 
article printed the report of a European traveller that a Japanese whose wife had died, and who found no one to care 
for his two children save himself, killed them in order to serve in the army. "The Homeland is dearer than these 
two" he cried, as he plunged in the knife. 
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He was, however, unable to make the visit106• 
Paradoxically, one al-Liwa' writer manifested his alienation from Egyptian traditionalist 
Islam while anticipating that Islam could be made a common element in relationship through 
conversion by the Japanese. The 1906 item was occasioned by a conference on world religions 
in Tokyo. The writer thought that the activity of Chinese, Indian, Tatar and British Muslims 
attending or in correspondence with the Conference had led theJapanese scholars present to 
show "some leaning towards us". The Conference had been convened in order to "make an 
overall review of the beliefs of the human race and choose from among them what would most 
suit their [Japanese] scientific and social-economic advancement". The Japanese might adopt 
Islam as they had adopted wholesale the West's scientific and industrial knowledge: hence, 
al-Liwa' alerted, preparations should be made for Egypt, as a centre of Islamic learning, to 
receive future delegations of Japanese scholars. They would want to join the al-Azhar university 
for instruction in Islam's traditional sciences (al-'ulum al-naqliyyah/07 , to return back to Japan 
after graduation to transmit their new knowledge to their people. This article clearly indicated 
the ambivalence of the modern-educated but believing Kamilists towards Arabo-Egyptian 
traditionalist Islamic learning. Bitingly, the al-Liwa' writer commented that al-Azhar should be 
radically reformed well in advance if the modem-minded Japanese were to master Arabic and 
Islam "since the Arab who speaks Arabic cannot after spending twenty years at learning Arabic 
in the Azharite fashion ... correctly understand an eloquent maqal (article/essay)" 108• 
The writer's contempt for the ineffectiveness of al-Azhar's timeworn methods in 
transmitting Islam and its "sciences" manifested the European-type education received by many 
in al-Hizb al-Watani. Maintaining continuity with the traditionally-educated pan-Islamic school 
of al-Afghani, however, the writer wanted to cull and upgrade the ancient Sunni religious 
learning, and its clerical elite, and incorporate them in international modernity, not eliminate 
106. Steppat, "Nationalismus" p. 283 fn 4. 
107. "al-'ulum al-naqliyyah". Wendell gives a list of these traditional subjects of Sunni scholasticism. 
They included jurisprudence (fiqh), theology (tawhid), traditions of the Prophet (hadith), Qur'anic exegesis (tafsir), 
Qur'anic recitation and such "sciences" of language as semantics and expression (ma'ani), rhetoric (bayan), stylistic 
embellishment (badi'), logic (mantiq), syntax (nahw), and prosody ('arud). Wendell, Egyptian National Image pp. 
205-206. The al-Liwa' writer thought the Japanese students and scholars who would come to Egypt should be 
instructed in the "pith" or "quintessence" Cill.hiili) of all these sciences, rather than exhaustively master them. 
108. al-Liwa' 17 July 1906, p. 1; cf. report on Muhammad Sadiq Fakhr al-Islam, the Persian da'i (Islamic 
preacher-missionary) who attended the religious conference in Tokyo: al-Liwa' 29 July 1906 p. 1. 
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them. The acculturated Arabo-Islamism of al-Jaridah before 1915 and of Ahmad Hasan 
al-Zayyat after 1930 would develop this impulse to take over and restructure Islamic learning 
and its clergy elite to then reapply them in Islamizing activity around the globe (A :2.t1-2q g ; B 
300-302). 
The contraction of the modem world, and the shared interest that far-flung Eastern 
populations now had unitedly to beat back the West's power, might bring widely-separated 
Egyptians and Japanese into relationship. It would be founded upon radically different bases 
from preceding international communities of Egyptians that had been determined by contiguity 
and religion. Some Kamilists, however, refused to accept the terms of a novel secular situation. 
They wanted to make the Japanese "pillars of [the Muslims'] community/league (jami'atihim) 
and guardians of their unity". The Japanese would still have leadership as the model for 
self-strengthening modernization but within the constraints of membership in Islam's 'ummah109. 
For attraction to become community, the Japanese would have to embrace Islam. 
2. Kamilist Attitudes to Non-Muslim Negroes 
As late as 1906, the acculturated Kamil had a reflex when addressing Europeans to 
dissociate Egypt from black Africans (Muslim as well as pagan) stereotyped as primitive in 
Europe (along with pre-colonial Moroccans). But as their all-embracing repudiation of the 
whole West gained momentum, the acculturated intellectuals whom Kamil headed declared their 
identification with powerless groups that Westerners despised and ill-treated the most. Met are 
condemnations, for instance, of Belgian atrocities in the Congo, committed to force the Blacks to 
grow rubber there110'. al-Liwa' expressed sympathy for Negroes facing discrimination and 
violence in the United States in two articles bitingly headlined "Hamajiyyat al-Mutamaddinin" 
(The Barbarism of the Civilized People)m. 
Neither Belgians nor Christian Americans had politically harmed Egypt or the Ottoman 
109. al-Liwa' 17 July 1906 p. 1. 
110. "Mas'alat al-Kunghu" (The Congo Question), al-Liwa' 26 July 1904, p. 1. 
111. One of these articles (al-Liwa' 8 March 1903, p. 1) assailed bigoted reaction among "both the elite anc 
the masses of Americans" to President Theodore Roosevelt's gestures of inviting a black lecturer (Booker T. 
Washington) to dinner, or appointing an American black as head of a post office. The whites' reactions included 
threats from the Southern states to have Roosevelt assassinated as Lincoln had been. The other article under this 
heading (al-Liwa' 25 July 1904, p. 1) detailed violation by whites of black women in the USA's Southern states, 
lynchings and torture of a black man and his wife who fled from Doddsville, Mississippi, after being falsely accused 
of killing a white farmer. 
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Muslim minorities. The Kamilists' channel of,..,....,.,,.,,.,,..,,, areas would 
tend to be the Muslim minority: they therefore imbibed diffused those distant minorities' 
viewpoints about non-Muslim neighbors. Propagating such viewpoints might hamper Muslim 
Egyptians' development of a sense of affinity and community with non-Muslim Afro-Asians. 
The Kamilists' perceptions of black Africans demonstrate the problem. On one hand, 
al-Liwa' berated mistreatment by white Belgians and Americans of Negroes. But in 1903 it also 
diffused in Egypt rejection by Indian Muslims in South Africa of community with the country's 
Africans. al-Liwa printed an article from its correspondent in Pretoria condemning racist 
treatment by the British of South Africa's Indians of whom a section was Muslim. However, the 
Muslim Indian writer did not absolutely oppose British racial segregation of public facilities etc: 
his objection was rather the British were treating South Africa's Indians on the same level as 
Negroes '""""--""-'~ --- "the slaves") "although we are as the Europeans in education, 
knowledge perception". accepted as the political leader of all sects 
Indians in the country, he manifested the same sense of social distance from Hindu Indians. The 
British forced the Muslim Indians to use, along with Hindu Indians and the Bantu, segregated 
post-offices with the sign "Hindu Post Office". This phrase infuriated 
"because the Hindus are the idol-worshippong pagans" 112• 
(Indian) Muslims 
3. Kamilist Images of Mixed (Muslim-Pagan) Populations: India and China. 
(a) Anti-Imperialist Territorial Patriotism. al-Liwa' approved the non-communal nature 
of mourning in Calcutta and Sylhet where Hindus and Muslims joined to express their sympath~ 
to the Egyptian people at their loss of "Mustafa Kamil Pasha the great leader of the Egyptian 
patriots". The atmosphere evoked here is of bi-sectarian nations, the Indian and the Egyptian, 
determined by secular factors of territorial homeland, perhaps race, and history. These factors 
112. "Pretoria, fi 15 Shawwal li-Hadrati Mukatibina" (Pretoria, on 15 Shawwal from Our Esteemed 
Correspondent There), al-Liwa' 16 February 1903 p. 1. Cf. text of petition denouncing residential segregation 
submitted by Gandhi to Colonial Affairs Secretary Chamberlain during his visit to South Africa. al-Liwa' 1 Marc 
1903, pp. 1, 2. Although unfriendly to Hinduism, the correspondent was prepared to accept Gandhi as the 
representative of Indians as a general entity including Muslims. 
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would distinguish Egyptian Muslims from Indian Muslims, while uniting Muslim Indians with 
Hindu Indians, and Muslim Egyptians with Copts. However, Kamil's followers were made 
aware of Islam as a bond between Egypt and the Bengal populations in question113• By his death, 
Kamil really had caught the attention of some up-and-coming young nationalist Hindu leaders in 
Bengal and other areas of India--- his impact was not an illusion of al-Liwa's Cairo head office. 
Already, Hindu communalism dogged the Indian nationalism of Sri Aurobindo Ghose 
(1872-1950), editor of the Calcutta Bande Mataram: Ghose was well aware in his 1908 tribute 
that "the religious solidarity of Islam" had been pursued by Kamil alongside appeals to Europe to 
advance Egyptian independence --- "but he never suffered it for a moment to interfere with the 
distinct existence of Egyptian Nationality". Thus, Kamil' s similar territorial-Egyptianist 
"patriotism" and the harm he did the common occupier outweighed his perhaps instrumental 
pro-Ottoman pan-Islam for Bengali Hindu Anglophobes114• 
The relationship with Indian militants deepened after Kamil's death. In August 1909, 
al-Liwa' even praised Madha Lao Dhingra, a 25 year-old Hindu from the Panjab who on 1 July 
1909 had assassinated Lt. Col. Sir W.H. Curzon Whyllie, Political Aide-de-Camp to the 
Secretary of State for India, in London115• Explosive members of al-Hizb al-Watani came to 
prefer militant nationalist Hindus over Muslim Indians whom --- so Ibrahim al-Wardani, assassin 
of PM Ghali, perceived --- collaborated with the British out of minority insecurity116• The Indian 
revolutionary Khrishnavarna encouraged the exiled Watanis to proceed along the path of 
terrorism and insurrection: established lawyer-leaders such as Muhammad Farid were not 
113. al-Liwa' 14 April 1908. The deeply religious --- but bi-sectarian --- character of Bengal society was 
conveyed to Arab readers by the item. The meeting of mourning in Sylhet consisted of teachers and students: the 
headmaster chairing the gathering concluded his speech by urging the Muslim and Hindu students to go to their 
respective houses of worship to pray for God's mercy for Mustafa Kamil's spirit. The Calcutta meeting was chaired 
by Mawlana Sayyid Shams al-Ruda "and was attended by a great gathering of leading Hindus and Muslims". Those 
presiding announced that they would send condolences to Muhammad Farid, the successor as President of al-Hizb 
al-Watani and to Kamil's family: the Bengali sympathisers thus had correspondence contact with Egypt's 
pan-Islamic independence movement. Ibid. 
114. Aurobindo Ghose, "Mustafa Kamil Pasha", Bande Mataram 3 March 1908; reprinted in Sri 
Aurobindo, Bande Mataram: Early Political Writings --- 1 (Pondicherry: Birth Centenary Library 1972) pp. 
722-723. 
115. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 325. 
116. For text A 135 fn 8. The Jaridists, too, tended to image that India's Muslims were more liable to 
collaborate with the British than the Hindus, the pace-setters of the movement for Indian independence: eg. Lutfi 
al-Sayyid, October 1911 A '3i7. 
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enthusiastic117• 
(b) Sectarianizing, Divisive Islamist Drive. The Kamilists' recognition of bi-sectarian 
nationalities such as the Indian or Egyptian, each integrated by its struggle against British rule, 
anticipated key assumptions about the national and the Afro-Asian communities later developed 
in Nasirism. But al-Liwa's non-pragmatic commitment to Islam's propagation as a necessity for 
itself ran against such secularization of national and wider community. al-Liwa in 1906 in its 
"Barid al-Islam" (Muslim World Reports) section reported that "four virtuous Brahmans have 
embraced the upright religion of Islam in the town of Lahore ... This results from India's 'Ulama' 
carrying out their religious duties as regards the propagation of Islam according to the Quran' s 
precepts". It was time, al-Liwa' bitingly commented, that "all the 'ulama' of Islam fulfil their 
religious function" and convey the Quran to those non-Muslims from whom its teachings "are 
covered even today": would al-Liwa' even support a missionary movement to Islamize 
Christians in Egypt, as well?118• al-Liwa' presented China's Muslims as prosperous and 
flourishing: "as a result, the pagans there incline to them, entering into the religion of Allah in 
great multitudes" 119• Such Islamist coverage of China and India by al-Liwa' convinced such 
Copts as Salamah Musa that Kamil's independence movement was not for non-Muslims120• 
In covering India and China, then, al-Liwa' manifested two contradictory attitudes to the 
world. On one hand, it viewed multi-sectarian nations, each welded by a territorial homeland 
from diverse sects, as humanity's main community units. Territorial nationalism would direct 
energies very much to temporal politics, immediately to achieving the nation's independence 
117. Arthur Goldschmidt, "The National Party from Spotlight To Shadow", Asian and African Studies 
(Hayfa) v. 16: March 1982 p. 17. 
118. "Barid al-Islam" (Muslim World Reports), al-Liwa' 11 July 1906. It is to be noted that unfulfilled 
plans by Kamil to travel to India were specifically to visit "Islamic India". Steppat, "Nationalismus" p.282 fn 4. 
Kamil's early images of Indian Muslims were --- perhaps quite acutely --- of their pan-Islamism: their preparedness 
to almost suicidally attack the British to defend the Ottoman State's Caliphate, without mentioning Indian 
independence as their goal. Kami!, "L' Angleterre et !'Islam", La Nouvelle Revue 15 October 1895 p. 835. 
Haphazard pan-Islam: the Francophone Kami! won access to this Indian Muslim mood only because he had recently 
met an Englishman who translated for him the substance of an article in a Madras journal. Ibid. 
119. "al-Muslimuna fil-Sin" (The Muslims in China), 7 July 1906 p. 1. The phrase "entering into the 
religion of Allah in great multitudes" is a quotation from the Qur'an, surah 110 "al-Nasr" (Victory), describing the 
mass conversions of Arabia following the Prophet Muhammad's final triumph. 
120. Salamah in his 1927 al-Yawm wal-Ghad: "Mustafa Kamil out of his ignorance of our age's spirit used 
to inform us --- as the remnants of the editorial staffs of al-Mu'ayyad and al-Hizb al-Watani continue to inform us 
Egyptians --- about Islam in China under the heading 'Islamic World News'". Quoted Muhammad Muhammad 
Husayn, al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu'asir v. 2 p. 225. 
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Attitudes of towards each other's disparate religious beliefs would be 
crucial to (a) the viability of individual territorial multi-sectarian nationalities and (b) 
international alliances between them. But the Kamilists' religious side wanted Islam to advance 
sweepingly around the world at the expense of other faiths. Such rapid mass conversions to 
Islam in countries like India and China could not but activate communal tensions disruptive of 
territorial political nationalisms. Involvement by the Kamilist movement itself in Islamic 
missionary activity abroad would rule out alliance on the basis of secular common interests 
(anti-colonialism, modernization) with predominantly non-Muslim nationalisms, such as the 
Indian. 
The tensions and dilemma about the wide East caused by the Liwa'ists' mix of elements 
unfolded over the next few decades in acculturated Egyptian Arabo-Islamism. Joint interests 
such as achieving independence the same colonizer, cultural exchanges with Hindu Indians, 
as tended to facilitate an 
Egyptian conjunction with Indian nationalism from 1922. Paradoxically, though, the 
ultra-acculturateds' very preoccupation with modern international realities and transformations, 
their Westernized knowledge of new means to connect continents, simultaneously equipped them 
to become the directors of an international modernist Islamism that disrupts multi-sectarian 
nationalisms or Afro-Asianism. The balance in these intellectuals between (a) Arab-centric and 
modernizing dislike of the decidedly non-classical Islam of ordinary Indian Muslims and (b) 
religious gulf vis-a-vis non-Muslim Afro-Asians whom joint interests link to Egypt, was always 
very delicate. These Egyptian intellectuals could swing either way in regard to the wide 
multi-religious "East", in the 1930s and 1940s as in the time of Mustafa Kamil (eg. vis-a-vis 
Indians: B 60-4, B 90-3; B 170-176). 
KAMILIST PAN-ISLAM: ASSESSMENT 
The literature in Arabic as well as Western languages has tended to view the 
Ottoman-centred pan-Islamism of the party of Mustafa Kamil in terms of a modest carry-over or 
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residue from Islam: the Ottoman Empire was dwindling away, Egypt's links with it progressively 
attenuating, and even the Kamilists were rigorous about an Egyptian nation and its need for a 
discrete state. Yet the Islamic Ottoman Empire as so habitual a part of the conceptual universe 
of Egyptians would continue to bulk large until World War I smashed it. 
Our communications sampling highlighted more the experimental potency of Kamilist 
pan-Islam as a novel synthesis of (a) functional segments selected from Islam with (b) elements 
and patterns from the West. Scholarly discussion around whether the Kamilists would or would 
not have reincorpated (or confederated) Egypt into the Ottoman State has overlooked the 
unprecedented character of pan-Islam as a drive to effect with the West's technologies a 
supra-statal camp-community to hold back the West Kamilist pan-Islam alternated an 
impressive range of themes --- grippingly simple Islamic rituals, classical Arabs, contemporary 
holy war against Christian incursions, new crusades, the titanic contest for survival between two 
wide camps --- to galvanize Egyptians into modernizing behavior and enterprises modelled from 
the West, internally and regionally. The Kamilist bracketing of old Islamic motifs with even 
economic modernity today might look half-baked or preposterous or manipulative or transitional 
--- but may have affinities to some supra-nationalist rightist-Christian or pan-Latin ideas that 
after 1945 were to foster West European and pan-American counter-integrations against the 
communist camp. 
For a colonized country, the Kamilists often effectively integrated their new, wide 
Muslim community. Their media did achieve patchy or selective exchanges of ideas and 
experiences with comparable West-tinged elites in the Ottoman Empire, India and even Muslim 
populations ruled by Russia. Nor did the exchanges stay cultural: they got not just Arabic books 
but some food to far-off hungry non-Arab Muslims. In their narrower supra-Arab region, they 
mobilized diverse Egyptian strata to help the Ottoman State build railways by which it could stor 
Britain expanding from Egypt. The Hijaz Railway was an effective instrument of regional powe1 
that did tighten the Ottoman Empire's hold on the Arabian peninsula and proved hard for the 
Britsh to destroy during World War 1. Although Karnilist pan-Islam had rational, instrumental 
enterprises patterned by the model enemy West's capitalism, the West's racist, Islamophobic and 
high literary discourses also ignited or inflamed other of its more subjective and emotionalist 
aspects. On the whole, Kamilist pan-Islamism was pervasively tinted and structured by a West 
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perpetually overheard through acculturation. 
The Kamilists' ideological and political exchanges with Ottoman Turks were not 
superficial. In aesthetic matters the relationship could not match the knitting of Egyptian with 
other Arabs that the Kamilists fed by their promotion of a single standard language. 
Pro-Ottoman pan-Islamism politically retarded the evolution of an Egyptian-led pan-Arabism 
before 1919 to the extent that it led the Kamilists to stand with the Turks against autonomist or 
nationalist protests from Ottoman Arabs (Ch. 5). Yet Kamilist pan-Islam left long-term legacies 
to post-1922 Egyptian political pan-Arabism. Although sometimes only perceiving other 
Muslims, it increased interest in Algerian and other North African Arabs. It started the flow of 
Egyptian foodstuffs, guns and fighters to Libyans resisting Italy. And the Kamilists' attitude that 
sovereignty was larger than Egypt or any single Muslim state-unit, and their ceaseless discussion· 
of modern economic instruments for integrating that camp, fostered a frame of mind that after 
1922 was to try to integrate the Arabs with steamers, cross-investment and regional companies.· 
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CHAPTER 5: ELEMENTS FOR ARAB NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION IN 
BRITISH-OCCUPIED EGYPT. 
Chapter 2 presented ethnicizing stress by traditionally-educated pan-Islamists upon 
Islam's Arab-led earlier conquests, wide empires and urban intellectual centers. This Chapter 
traces contemporary applications by the Kamilists of such Arab classicist motifs: to the parochial 
struggle between Arabic and Western languages, the definition of self in the face of imperialism, 
in internal Egyptian ethnicites, and to the regional relations with Ottoman Arabs and Turks. 
Chapter 4 showed that Europe's expansionism made the acculturated Kamilists close·ranks with 
the Ottoman central government: we now see how long they stayed hostile to efforts by Ottoman 
Arabs to wrest powers or independence from Istanbul's Turks. The pan-Islamic Kamilists urged 
Egyptians to donate to the Hijaz railway in order to tighten the Turks' hold over their Arabian 
territories against Britain --- if also to help modernize "Arab brothers". This Chapter sets out 
countering Arab ethno-linguistic affinities that finally even led some Kamilists to cheer the 
Sharif Husayn's 1916 Arab Revolt. 
Two potential types of Arab identity or community are suggested by formulations to be 
examined in this Chapter. One is an identity combining Arabic wit~ Islam --- a pan-Arab nation 
within Islam's belief-community. But the present chapter also examines relations of Muslim 
Egyptians with resident Syrian Christians and Copts to test if the Arabic language and images of 
the classical Arabs' past can detach from Islam to thread together divergent Arab sects and 
homelands of origin. 
Accumulating Parochial Arab Ethnicity in Egypt 
Nineteenth century Muslim Egyptians were conscious of at least partial descent from 
Arabians who had moved into Egypt during or following the Islamic conquest. Egyptian 
peasants expressed their sense of being Arab in distinction from the other Muslim ethnic groups 
by applying the proverb "the oppression of the Turks rather than the justice of the Arabs" to 
oppressive Arabic-speaking Egyptians appointed by Muhammad 'Ali as district governors, 
previously generally appointed from the Turks1• al-' Arab, however, also meant in spoken Arabic 
1. E.W. Lane, The Manners and Customs of the Modem Egyptians (London: Evermans 1908) p. 293. 
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the Arab nomads of the desert by this period and Lane referred to a term aw lad al-' Arab or sons 
of the Arabs with which Arabs living in houses described themselves2• The terms aw lad 
al-'Arab and abna' al-'Arab (sons/children of the Arabs) was applied to Egypt's general 
sedentary Arabic-speaking population in the second half of the nineteenth century to mark them 
off from other ethnic-linguistic groups. The Khedive Sa'id, in trying to replace Turks in (mainly 
lower ranks of) the administration in the 1850s addressed the Egyptians appointed as abna' 
al-' Arab "making them responsible, in case of failure, for perpetuating the rule of abna' 
al-Turk"3• 
Arabness: Possibility for Christians?. 'Abdallah al-Nadim and' Ali Mubarak (Ch. 2) 
located Egyptians' "forefathers" in "the Arab Nation" (al-Ummat al-' Arabiyyah), viewed as a 
non-current Islamic ideological community. al-Nadim's one-time constitutionalist comrade the 
Jewish Egyptian-nationalist journalist and playwright Ya'qub Sanu' (1839 - 1912) in his 19th 
century play al-' Alil applied the term awlad al-' Arab to Arabic-speaking non-Muslim Egyptians, 
also. The true love of the man Mitri is about to be married off by her father against her will to a 
Monsieur Hunayn: when the beloved protests to Mitri that she will never accept such a match, he 
observes ruefully that 
such talk would be in place with European families, but as regards us, children of the 
Arabs (awlad al-' Arab), a girl has no say, even though we have started getting civilized 
[al-tamaddun: wordplay "settling down in towns"?] and it is allowed for us to enter and 
go out among each other4 
The term awlad al-' Arab is here used by non-Muslim Arabic-speaking Egyptians to 
distinguish a multi-sectarian ethnic group from the resident Europeans. Arabness was evoked as 
a means of identifying with Muslim Egyptians by Syrian Christians, also, in the circle of 
al-Afghani. The Muslim al-Nadim was seen in Chapter 2 to have in 1892 used ibn 'Arab and ibn 
2.Ibid,p.27,fn. 1. 
3. Gabriel Baer, "Social Change in Egypt: 1800-1914" in P.M. Holt (ed.), Political and Social Change in 
Modem Egypt: Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conguest to the United Arab Republic (London: OUP 1968) p. 
148. 
4. Quoted in Sa'd al-Din Hasan Daghman, al-Usul al-Tarikhiyyah li-Nash'at al-Drama fil-Adab al-' Arabi 
(Arab University of Bayrut: Dar al-Ahad Press 1973), p. 123. In his play Moliere Misr wa ma Yugasihi (Egypt's 
Moliere and all he Suffers), Sanu' bracketed the two terms awlad al-' Arab and awlad biladi (the Sons of my 
Country) to designate the community for which he was creating an "Arab Theatre" . .Illlil p. 194. From Paris exile 
following Britain's 1882 Occupation of Egypt, Sanu' in 1888, 1901and1907 celebrated the (classical?) Arabs' 
generosity, honesty and treatment of women. Irene L. Gendzier, The Practical Visions of Ya'gub Sanu' 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966) pp. 131, 174. An account of Sanu's pioneering contribution to 
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Turk to distinguish native ethnic groups from Europeans in context of the groups' educated 
youth adopting European languages in place of indigenous Arabic and Turkish5. al-Nadim let 
Syrian Christians evoke Arabness as a joint community with Egyptians and himself did so even 
towards SC residents who collaborated with the British occupiers. On the other hand, we 
encountered no communication in which he termed Copts Arabs. As well as first language, some 
racial-kinship link with Muslim classical Arab "forefathers" was another determinant of 
Arabness, leading al-Nadim sometimes to use "Arabs" and Copts as mutually exclusive ethnic 
categories in the Egyptian context despite the Copts' Arabic speech. 
Multi-Elite Restoration of Classical Arabs 
The period of British colonial rule saw an accelerating, increasingly documented and 
original, restoration of the classical Arabs within intellectual life and high literature. The 
mutually-reinforcing efforts of a range of culturally divergent elites in Egypt --- but also from 
other Arab countries --- by 1919 had built up a diverse body_of Arabist motifs and elements: 
acculturated Muslims could pick what met their needs. The power of the West was on the mind 
of all elites that contributed, even representatives of traditional monolingual Sunni Muslim 
learning. 
'Ali Mubarak published his translation of Sedillot' s 1854 Histoire des Arabes in 1892. In 
that same year, the rather more acculturated Ahmad Zaki Pasha (1867 - 1934), a graduate in the 
French-derived secular law (1887), a professional Egyptian government French-Arabic translator 
and Arabist who extensively interacted with orientalists in Egypt and in European conferences, 
made his first journey to Spain. Ahmad Zaki viewed himself as "the Arab Muslim" during an 
audience with the Regent Queen Christina6, toured the Arab sites in the main Spanish towns and 
commenced forthwith in al-Ahram his forty-year-long Egyptian press popularization of Arab 
Spain as "the Lost Islamic Paradise"7• Zaki represents tense, ambivalent stances towards the 
West manifested by some acculturated intellectuals. Colonized, these intellectuals must 
the Arab theatre is Matti Moosa, "Ya'qub Sanu' and the Rise of Arab Drama in Egypt", UMES, 5 (1974) pp. 
401-433. 
5. "Madrasat al-Banat", al-Ustadh 10 November 1892 p. 247. 
6. Anwar al-J undi, Ahmad Zaki al-Mulaililab bi-Shaykh al- 'Urubah (Ministry of Culture and National 
Guidance, Cairo: Mak:tabat Misr c. 1964)(series "A'lam al-' Arab"; no. 29) pp. 103-104. 
7. Ibid, pp. 15, 39. 
to 
to 
to 
fluttered Andalusia, its peoples 
spreading ... civilization ... the days when the Western Caliphate surpassed its Eastern rival 
luxury, grandeur and intellectual life to the extent that the Kings of Europe curried favor with the 
Caliphs, seeking their patronage and protection"8• Even more in the twentieth century, 
acculturated Egyptian intellectuals were apt to connect the modem Egyptians to the Arabs 
Spain when arguing the political relationship between Egyptians and the occupying British. The 
highly acculturated, racially sensitive Duse Mohamed, in 1911 flung back at Britishers who were 
disdainful of Egypt's Westernizing-educated intellectuals, the Arab capability witnessed "by 
those who have visited Spain, gazing admiringly on the Alhambra and other remnants of 
Moorish architecture wrought by the forebears of that very Arab stock who at present inhabit the 
[Nile] anti-Muslim Bertrand observed that it 
to to 
on defunct 
to ascribe to Europe's modem civilization an Islamic Saracenic origin, 
France to Morocco" 10• 
become the fashion 
or 
Egyptians tended 
total annexation of 
Contributions from very diverse Arab --- not just Egyptian --- elites fed the rise of 
acculturated Arab historical consciousness. The Khedive 'Abbas' mouthpiece al-Mu'ayyad 
publicized research works on the classical Arabs published by traditional scholars in the whole 
Arab world. In 1905 it gave a general account of the three-volume work Bulugh al-Arab fi 
Ma'rifat Ahwal al-' Arab published in 1899 in Baghdad by the 'Iraqi Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi 
(1857 - 1924), identifying the Cairo bookshop selling it. Most of the work was an account of the 
peninsular Arabians in their pre-Islamic period. In assessing this work's potential to promote a 
non-religious sect-integrative Arab national identity in Egypt, the religious orientation of both 
8. Ibid, p. 99. 
9. Duse Mohamed, In the Land of the Pharaohs: A Short History of Egypt (London: Stanley Paul & Co., 
1911), p. 5. 
10. L. Bertrand, Le Mirage Oriental (Paris 1910) quoted by Lothrop Stoddard, The New World of Islam 
(London: Chapman and Hall 1922) pp. 98-99. 
came 
were 
tracts on 
was to explicate meanings the 's 
religious impulse is mentioned by al-Mu'ayyad as inspiring al-Alusi to write his work, but 
conjunction with his national identification with even pre-Islamic Arabians. The (1889) 
International Congress of Orientalists, held in Stockholm, called on the East's scholars to write 
about the history of the (classical) "Arab nation". Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi "moved by Arab zeal 
and the racial link and the religious community" thereupon penned his monumental work on the 
classical, chiefly pre-Islamic, Arabians. Hailing it, al-Mu'ayyad, saw the early Arabs as 
providing (a) the model for Arabic language usage and (b) for cultivating such virtues "as 
magnanimity and courage in battle/readiness to aid the hard-pressed (al-najdah) and chivalry and 
compulsion to take the side of any distress (al-hamiyyah) and group spirit and preservation 
family attention to the rights neighbors and honor shown to guests sacrifice of 
sown IS 
developed model virtues before --- independently --- revealed Islam. s 
work, al-Mu'ayyad informed its Egyptian readership, "began from the first [pre-Islamic] 
emergence the Arab nation" (al-Ummat al-' Arabiyyah). It gave a detailed account of the 
customs and tribal genealogies of the Arabian peninsula's pre-Islamic racially unmixed 
"authentic Arabs" who spoke the original pure Arabic (al-' Arab al-' Ariba'), "their fine ethics", 
"their poets, their sages and their religion of worship before Islam and the tactful way in which 
the Prophet Muhammad changed their inherited mores and the traditions that they had zealously 
handed down" 13. The Prophet Muhammad and Islam modified but harnessed and fulfilled rather 
than replaced the characteristics that the Arabians had already developed. 
al-Mu'ayyad in the al-Alusi item speaks of "the Arab nation" as a bygone entity which on 
11. Account of the Wahhabi-leaning al-Alusi family in Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 
1798 - 1939 (London: OUP paperback 1970) p. 222. The religious works of Mahmud Shihab al-Din al-Alusi and 
Nu'man al-Alusi were published in Cairo from 1880: ibid p. 375. 
12. See Yusuf As'ad Daghir, Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyyah pt. 2 (Bayrut: Matabi' Lubnan 1956) pp. 
41-45. 
13. "Bulugh al-Arab fi Ma'rifat Ahwal al-' Arab", al-Mu'ayyad 23 July 1905. 
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the strength of its unique virtues gained pre-eminent glory over all other "states and nations" in 
"the ancient ages". It nonetheless provided the "origin" (uss) in which the contemporary 
successor entities of "the sons of the Arabs" (abna' al-' Arab) and "the East" can command 
"honor" before the West14• The non-Egyptian al-Alusi's work, through subsequent Cairo 
editions, conveyed authentic data about the early Arabians to Westernizing-educated Muslim 
Egyptians in the isolationist-particularist 1920s and during the 1930s (Arabo-Islamic reaction 
against the West)15• Its non-Muslim classical Arabs could validate Arab political community 
with Christians. 
al-Mu'ayyad also publicized contributions by local Egyptian authors to the literature 
about the classical Arabs. In 1905 it hailed the Ta'rikh Duwal al-' Arab wal-Islam (The History 
of the States of the Arabs and Islam) by Muhammad Tala'at Harb, the pioneering Egyptian 
businessman, financier and industrialist (d. 1941)16 --- who was to be a pioneer of economic 
pan-Arabism in the 1920s and 1930s (B 45 - 51). Harb had links to 
Mustafa Kamil's al-Hizb al-Watani but was closer to al-Jaridah and the less anti-British 
al-Ummah Party17• 
al-Mu'ayyad presented the classical Arabs, conceived as ethically formed before Islam, 
as a behavioral model to reform contemporary Egyptians. One article ruefully accepted the 
charge of the English-owned Cairo Morning News that Egyptians were congenital perjurors, 
made to present them as unfit to rule their own country. Yet "falsehood is not of the inherent 
nature of either the Arab or the Easterner. Rather truthfulness was the adornment of the Arab, 
more than with any other race, in a number of ages before Islam and after it". In assessing the 
secular community potential in this sense of "the Arabs" as independent in origin of Islam sight, 
once more, must not be lost of the symbiotic Islamic function of the virtue in question, here 
truthfulness. True testimony is crucial to the functioning of Islamic religious law (shari' ah): 
14. IJllil, 
·15. Details of a 1924 Cairo edition, a 1925 review by SC-owned al-MuQtataf calling the modernist 
intelligentsia's attention to the work, and of a 1935 abridged Cairo edition in Daghir, Ql2...ci.t, p. 42. 
16. "Ta'rikh Duwal al-'Arab wal-Islam" al-Mu'ayyad 17 July 1905. Harb's Islamic conservation was 
illustrated when in 1323H (1905 AD) he published a 199 page reply titled Tarbiyyat al-Mar' ah wal-Hijab ~ 
E<Iucation of Women and the veil) to Qasim Amin' s call for the emancipati~n of women. 
17. Muhammad Farid, who succeeded Kamil as leader in 1908, felt that Tala' at Harb was using financial 
connections with al-Hizb al-Watani to try to take over its press and twist al-Liwa's militant opposition to the British 
to the perceivedly pro-Occupation line of al-Hizb al-Ummah and al-Jaridah. AWl1lQ Muhammad Farid v. 1, (Cairo: 
al-Hay'at al-Misriyyah al-' Ammah lil-Kitab 1978) pp. 70-71. 
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intentional perjury is in consequence termed al-yamin al-ghamus, "the plunger oath", because "it 
plunges he who commits it into sin or into hell-fire as though complete belief (iman) is 
synonymous with complete truthfulness". Islam deepened the Arabs' innate truthfulness, which 
made them the most tenaciously truthful of the nations "in the days of their first power/glory"18• 
Important is the article's implicit periodization of Islamic history. "Muslims whether in 
Egypt or elsewhere" are dishonest today because, after the end of the Arabs' "days of first 
power/glory" long ago, Muslim governments inflicted oppression and ignorance upon "these 
nations" 19• The periodizing low esteem for post-classical --- largely non-Arab --- Muslim 
governments is akin to the al-Alusi review's concept that latter day "ages [dahr] of corruption 
and pressure of the kings of despotism" threatened with extinction the Arabic works that alone 
can preserve the history, virtues and language of the classical Arabs20• 
All the writers thus far examined were Muslims who always saw the classical Arabs in 
relation to the entity of Islam. But Syrian Christians resident in Egypt also exalted the 
prescriptive virtues of the sects-neutral, pagan pre-Islamic Arabians. An instance is the 1909 
play al-Samaw'al aw Wafa' al-Arab (al-Samaw'al or the Faithfulness of the Arabs) by Antun 
al-Jumayyil (1887 - 1948). Editor of the Catholic-Jesuit al-Bashir while in Bayrut, in Egypt he 
became an editor of the (from 1930 pan-Arab) al-Ahram and later a member of the Egyptian 
parliament. al-Jumayyil's play illustrated the pre-Islamic Arabs' prescriptive faithfulness to 
trust: it depicted the Jewish pre-Islamic Arabian al-Samaw'al Ibn 'Adiya's choice, rather than 
hand over to enemies of Imra' al-Qays the daughter whom Qays left in safe-keeping, to see them 
murder his own captured son before his castle's walls21• (For al-Jumayyil and al-Ahram and 
pan-Arab Egyptians 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in the 1930s and 
1940s: B 229, B 334). 
THE KAMILISTS 
The West's Presence. The modern West's broader creativity as well as might is very 
18. "al-Inkaru wa Shahadat al-Zur" (Denial and False Witness), al-Mu'ayyad 30 July 1905. 
19. Ibid. 
20. "Bulugh al-Arab fi Ma'rifat Ahwal al-' Arab",~-
21. Antun al-Jumayyil published al-Samaw'al aw Wafa' al-Arab in Cairo (the al-Abram press) in 1909. An 
account of the play is given by Daghman, al-Usul p. 136. 
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often a context of restoration of the classical Arabs. Muslim Spain's past military superiority 
over Christian Europe perhaps offered hope for future decolonization. That Spanish and other 
Arab Muslims stimulated the birth of modern European civilization, made borrowing from the 
latter psychologically tolerable for Egyptian Muslims. The West was present in one or another 
capacity in the al-Mu'ayyad items on perjury and the book that al-Alusi wrote in response to a 
scholarly institution in the West. 
As a movement dedicated to wresting political sovereignty back from imperialist 
Christians, the Kamilists identified more with the wide conquests and organized, internationally 
powerful state empires of the Muslim classical Arabs, than with pre-Islamic Arabia. 
S teppat pointed out Kamil' s youthful pride in the achievements of the classical Arabs, 
which he expressed in a vivid play he wrote titled The Conquest of Spain22• Often performed, 
the verisimilitude of its recreation of the Andalusian Arabs' poetic idiom diffused pan-Arab 
historical identifications and the ability to read classical Arab sources, over decades, in Morocco 
as well as Egypt23• Kamil's play celebrated the wide Arabs' demonstration of Muslim capacity 
to match or surpass Europeans' military strength, an aspect of al-Nadim's and Ahmad Zaki 
Pasha's attraction to Muslim Spain in the early 1890s. However, Kamil also was prepared to 
somewhat identify himself and Egypt with the pre-Islamic pagan Arabians in the eyes of Europe 
(secular Arab virtues). Thus, he was the one whose urging motivated the Syrian poet Shukri 
Ghanim to compose his French play 'Antarah in order to acquaint the European public with the 
22. Fritz Steppat, Nationalismus und Islam bei Mustafa Kamil, Welt des Islams, iv (1956) p. 252. I am 
shortly to publish a full literary and political study of Kamil' s play. 
23. Halstead equated Kamil's play and his books on Egyptian and pan-Islamic issues with Jurji Zaydan's 
magazine al-Hilal and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat's al-Risalah as all crucial stimulants of the development of an 
urban-centered Moroccan nationalism. Kamil's Congyest of Spain was frequently acted in Morocco in the 1920s, 
1930s and 1940s and thus helped bring the growing urban Muslim middle classes and workers into a form of 
Moroccan nationalism with significant wider pan-Arab connections and historical consciousness. John P. Halstead, 
Rebirth of a Nation: the Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism. 1912-1944 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press 1967) pp. 130-131. The odds against standard Arabic becoming the language of a modem 
successor-collectivity were much more severe in French-occupied Morocco than in British-occupied Egypt. In 
1952, while in Marrakish, AJ. Arberry found that even reciters of the Thousand and One Nights were dependent on 
editions of individual tales imported from distant Tunis: "for in Morocco itself, that ancient Moslem land of 
once-brilliant culture, no books, or virtually none, are being printed in Arabic". Arberry, Scheherez.ade: Tales From 
the Thousand and One Nights (London: Allen & Unwin 1953) pp. 21-22. Moroccan youth were dependent for 
modem forms of Arabic culture on the dribble of publications that the French could not stop getting through from 
Egypt. In the Moroccan context, the classical language was becoming confined and moribund within mosques: 
Kamil's play helped extend it into a new public politicizing sphere, giving wider classes of Moroccans the bases to 
understand classical Arabic literature. 
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heroism of the Arabs24• 
Ultra-Islamic Classical Arabs. Like his master al-Afghani before him, Kamil defined 
Arab greatness in history as having been due to "the light of Islam" which had transformed the 
initially nomadic Arab nation from a state of "total ignorance" into the conquerors and educators 
of the world: "a degree of knowledge not witnessed [today] and which never will be 
witnessed"25• In such explications of history, Kamil falls into a traditional commitment to Islam: 
a divinely-revealed religion is the transforming factor enabling a people incapable in their human 
resources, not just to conquer but to sustain a long-term literate-intellectual civilization. Kamil 
stereotyped the Arabs at Islam's revelation as nomadic despite the Qur' an' s criticisms of the 
mercantile urban life of Mecca, immediate milieu of Muhammad's message. 
As with al-Afghani earlier, Kamil's movement worked for the construction of 
modernized Muslim states with the strength to maintain or wrest back political sovereignty in 
face of the West's dynamism. The classical Arabs became a source of confidence for 
strength-building, self-Westernizing endeavors in the aspect of the educational dynamic and 
intellectualism in their organized wide states under the Arab Caliphs. In an early (1893) essay, 
Kamil attributed the first Arab conquests and the Arab Empire's success in popularizing Arabic 
and Islam, and thereby maintaining itself, to Islam-prescribed "universalization of education"26• 
Sultan' Abdul-Hamid's construction of West-modelled schools in his empire, Kamil thought in 
1893, restored this educational dynamic of "the Easterners" under "the first Caliphs"27• The 
Umayyad and 'Abbasid states presented a prototype of organized Islamic states with interventive 
24. According to 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, Ghanim was a personal friend of Kamil. Kamil was the one 
whose urging first prompted Ghanim to write his French play 'Antarah, which was performed in Egypt as well. 
Kamil paid eloquent tribute to Ghanim's poetry at a Cairo reception held for him in January 1906. al-Rafi'i, 
Mustafa Kamil: Ba'ith al-Harakat al-Wataniyyah (Cairo: np. 1939) p. 390. Shukri Ghanim in collaboration with 
Georges Samne, expounded Syrianist rather than Lebanonist national ideas from Paris, although they, too, had some 
encouragement from the Quai d'Orsay. They were committed to the classical Arabic language and its "memories" 
as a basis for identity in Syria. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 286. Ghanim's criticisms from Paris triggered a 
high-point of ethnic tension between Turks and Ottoman Arabs in 1910: fn 77. After the Sharif Husayn launched 
the 1916 Arab Revolt, Samne called for France to impose a protectorate on a united Syria so that it would not come 
under the rule of a more nomadic population liable to impose Islamic religious law at the expense of liberal, 
Europe-oriented Christian minorities in Syria. "Sharif Makkah wal-Wahdat al-Suriyyah" (The Sharif of Mecca and 
Syrian Unity), Fikr (Bayrut) April 1982, reprinted al-Nahdah (Sydney) 6 January 1983 pp. 5, 7-8. 
25. "Nur al-Islam fil-Afaq" (Islam's Light Fills the Horizons [=World]), in Ali Fahrni Kamil, Mustafa 
Kamil Basha fi 34 Rabi'an (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Liwa' 1908-1911), v. 1, pp. 271-273. 
26. Ibid v. 2, p. 4. 
27. Ibid v. 2, p. 9. 
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bureaucracies able to direct society's development. In contrast, pre-Islamic Arabia lacked 
organized government or educational institutions: it was the Arab period of least use to the · 
Kamilists. 
The Kamilists' preference for wide, at least nominally Islamic, classical Arab states made 
future Arab nationalism less likely to be secular and worked against the narrower Egyptian 
homeland framing political community. 
It is revealing to compare Kamil' s Arabizing conceptions of the race and culture of 
Egypt's peasantry to those of true particularist nationalists. Of course, in certain situations, to 
make Muslim Egyptians and Copts feel closer during sectarian polemics, Kamil and his 
followers did evoke the Egyptian population's partial Pharaonic racial origin across sect 
differences. Yet they did not on that account develop theories parallel to those tangentially 
suggested by Lutfi al-Sayyid under the British occupation and elaborated after World War I by 
Muhammad Husayn Haykal, 'Abdallah 'Inan and Tawfiq al-Hakim: that the Egyptian peasantry 
as a cultural and to some extent racial Pharaonic core had preserved Egypt's eternal self from the 
impact of the Arabs and other alien conquerors and immigrants. The peasantry in Kamil's 
thought, too, was a repository of Egypt's authentic identity, but unlike Lutfi al-Sayyid's or 
Tawfiq al-Hakim's Pharaonic core, owed its nobility and the characteristics it prescribed to its 
Arabization in blood and values: 
Arab generosity A.s still intact in the Egyptian peasant in all its expressions. Wherever 
you go you will find the doors open to the guest, the tables set up and loaded, and a joy 
general whenever any stranger comes, without regard to his religion or race. The reason 
why this custom is so deeply rooted or innate among the Egyptians after they were famed 
from a thousand years for miserliness and greed for money is that Arab blood mingled 
with theirs and its nobility of ethics became predominant among them, to the extent that a 
man will give his own life as ransom for yours if you seek refuge with him or invoke the 
protection of his standing --- and so with other renowned and exalted Arab 
characteristic s28• 
When comparing this 1898 passage to Kamil's observations upon the relation between 
28. Excerpts from a study by Kamil on the Egyptian Peasant first published in an Italian agricultural journal 
on 1April1898: excerpts ibid v. 6 pp. 211-212. Sometimes in affirming that the wide classical Arabs are definitive 
of modem Egyptians, Kamil rather attempted to relate and synthesize the separate Pharaonic and Arab motifs in his 
nationalist communications. He once argued that Egyptians merited political independence because they were "the 
heirs to two great civilizations --- the Pharaonic and the Arab --- and it is our right and our duty to sit among the 
civilized nations". Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image. from Its Origins to Ahmad 
Lutfi al-Sayyid (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972) p. 248. 
one is nature 
as virtues 
been one of 
Kamil's main forums before he founded his al-Liwa' in 1900. The Arab readiness of Egyptians 
to give their lives as ransom for any who seek protection is akin to the hamiyyah --- the flaming 
compulsion to go to the aid of those trouble --- ascribed by al-Mu'ayyad to the classical Arabs. 
Westernizing-educated anti-imperialist intellectuals typified by Kamil, and traditionally-cultured 
Arab Muslims with Islamic formal education projected from al-Mu'ayyad, were both developing 
related basic concepts. 
Mustafa Kamil in 1898 depicted the incoming Arabs' blood and social virtues as having 
transformed Egyptian social mores and behavioral patterns for the better --- running against 
particularist theses of of Egyptian national personality down the ages. He was 
prepared to view the Egyptians' established pre-Islamic ethical norms as incompatible with 
rejected the 
and greed 1,000 years 
the latter. It was left uu•~n,.cu 
phrase Egyptians were miserliness 
to the Arab advent might rhetorically characterize all Egypt's 
pre-Islamic past. If precise, the time-span for which Egyptians were bereft of basic ethics 
be mainly covered by foreign Persian, Macedonian, Ptolemaic, Roman and Byzantine rule. 
Kamil's remark ultimately derived from Josephus and possibly other late classical and 
early post-classical writers in Greek. Josephus (37 AD - c. 93 AD), in a communalist apologetic, 
ascribed persecution of the prosperous Jews in Egypt following the death of Joseph, to the 
Egyptians' "love of lucre"29• Josephus' anti-Egyptian stereotypes could have passed into 
Byzantine and modern Greek Christian literature, and thence into such Greek-edited Egyptian 
29. Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, tsd by H. St. J. Thackery (London: Heinemann, 1930) v. II, p. 251. 
Josephus' most sustained abuse of the Egyptians occurs in his Against Apion: this refuted the anti-Semitism of, 
among other writers of Greek, Apion, Alexandria-educated grammarian and historian who, however, was born in 
Upper Egypt, and the Egyptian priest Manetho. A Latin letter of Hadrian in Ammianus Marcellinus described the 
Egyptians as long-celebrated for their love of money and their hatred of paying taxes. Art. "Kibt", Ell p. 999. In 
regard to Kamil's image that the pre-Islamic Egyptians were miserly, Smith in A Dictionary of the Bible (London: 
John Murray, 1863, p. 501) described the ancient Egyptians as "frugal'', although without specifying the classical or 
Christian source. 
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French-language newspapers as Le Phare d' Alexandrie. Kamil in 1897 engaged in polemics in 
Egypt's French press with John Haicalis, Greek editor of Le Phare d' Alexandrie, when he · 
accused Kamil of expressing hostility to Greeks --- including Egypt's Greeks --- over the 1897 
war between Greece and Turkey3°. Kamil's homogenizing Arab-centrism may have made hini 
take up the slur from a Francophone Greek or from classical Arab sources, with their abundant 
Hellenistic materials. 
Persistent Kamilist Arabism. Kamil's brother,' Ali Fahrni Kamil, printed the Arabic 
translation of the 1898 article, originally published in an Italian journal, in the collection of 
Kamil's speeches and writings edited by him following Kamil's death in 1908, giving it its 
widest, most authoritative impact on the mourning secular-educated constituency. Although 
Egypt's ancient Pharaonic period was also being internalized more, the Arabness of Egyptians 
recurred in wide circles associated with Kamil' s independence movement, up to World War I. 
Thus, al-Liwa's senior staff writer Ahmad Hilmi in August 1906, still approved when Egyptian 
secondary school students justified Egypt's independence by simultaneously claiming the 
supra-Egyptian classical Arabs and the ancient Pharaonic Egyptians as ancestors: 
We have received a letter from the Khedivial School informing us that the teacher of 
history said that 'the European states were solely inspired to help the Greeks win 
independence from the Turks because they were the descendants of the heroes of the past 
ages'. This teacher (I do not know what I should call him) had hardly finished delivering 
this sentence before the brighter of his students began to ask 'If this is the reason, why, 
then, does Europe not help us win independence, when we Egyptians are either the 
descendants of the ancient Egyptians who created sciences and civilizations, or 
descendants of the Arabs who conquered (all) lands and establishedjustice between 
(God's) servants (humanity) and were distinguished by the noblest qualities and became 
the spring from which Europe drank deep of science and philosophy?'. Such comments 
show that the seeds of the love of independence have begun to grow in the souls of 
Egyptian students31 • 
Ironically, post-World War I particularists would have condemned this (qualified racial) 
identification of an Egyptian political nation with the classical Arabs as --- in contrast to the link 
of descent affirmed with the Pharaonic Egyptians --- more a false than a nationalist 
30. Ahmad Rashad, Mustafa Kamil, Hayatuhu wa Kifahuhu (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Sa'adah 1958) pp. 113-114. 
31. Ahmad Hilmi, "al-Istiqlal! al-Istiqlal!" (Independence! Independence!), al-Liwa' 9 August 1906. The 
secularist Copt Salamah Musa had grim memories of impersonal repression and sadism by British teachers in early 
twentieth century primary and secondary schools, including the Khedivial College. Musa, The Education of 
Salamah Musa tsd. L.O. Schuman (Leiden: FJ. Brill 1961) pp. 11-12, 27-28. 
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consciousness. The school students represented a new politicized, anti-imperialist generation, 
and yet there had not been much advance towards particularist Egyptian nationality independent 
of the Arabs from when Kamil and his peers had been in school. Ahmad Hilmi, a member of the 
older founding generation of acculturated nationalists (he was born in 1875, the year after 
Kamil), endorsed the adolescent students' 1906 identification of Egypt's political nationality 
with wide classical Arabs centered outside Egypt. 
The Khedivial College students in 1906 carried forward al-Alusi's, al-Mu'ayyad's, 
Kamil's --- and disliked (post?)-Christian Egypto-Syrians'! --- sense that the classical Arabs are 
the source of prescriptive virtues. They also developed the religion-inspired 1893 motif of the 
West-steeped educationalist 'Ali Mubarak that the Arabs conquered in order to give humanity 
justice under law, offering access to Qur'anic divine revelation. 
Arabic and Education 
Islam the religion and the classical Arabs were among the motives of an al-Nadim-level 
commitment to Arabic in the party of Mustafa Kamil. The Kamilists and the more pragmatic 
proto-particularists around Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid/al-Jaridah diverged on language issues. 
al-Jaridah's coverage showed that public feeling ran with the Kamilists' vehement drive to 
establish classical Arabic's primacy in education and public life. Both (a} some Jaridists' 
contrasting pragmatic pursuit of modernization, which subordinated their commitment to Arabic 
and (b) the depth and extent of the public feeling developing for Arabic, were caught by the tone 
of an anonymous 1907 writer on the language issue in Lutfi's al-Jaridah. Moderate, neutral, 
giving both sides of the argument and disposed to propose two linguistic streams, Arabic and 
foreign-language, in education, the writer yet found in 1907 "the question of instruction in 
Arabic medium the talk of the meeting-places". Its supporters, he noted, argued that "rejection of 
this proposal would pain the whole nation without exception: never in this country has there been 
such unanimous approval for anything as for this demand". Shortage of Arabic-medium teachers 
and the inadequacy of Arabic for expressing modern sciences was al-Jaridah's argument for a 
linguistic duality in education. This writer apparently viewed the Egyptian education system's 
urgent task as to import and diffuse the modern West's sciences in backward Egypt: promoting 
Arabic for its own sake was a secondary luxury. Arabic had never been the medium of a true 
not not 
AAAF,HVA stages 
In contrast to the utilitarian pro-Western stance a group was 
Kamilists' and al-Liwa's fierce ideological commitment to (classical) Arabic as the only 
acceptable medium for all education in Egypt. Mustafa Kamil and his followers manifest an 
attitude in which promoting standard Arabic for its own sake has priority in nationalist activities 
of education and political mobilization. Steppat points out that Kamil, while still a student, "in 
al-Madrasah expressly rejects al-lughat al-darijah (colloquial Egyptian Arabic) on grounds that 
--- a considerable error --- almost everybody understands al-lughat al-fusha"33 . Kamil's use of an 
uncomplicated classical style to mobilize Egyptians is contrasted by Steppat to 'Abdallah 
al-Nadim 's preparedness to write sometimes in colloquial to reach the widest popular audience34• 
The Kamilists' tightened-up use classical Arabic broke with al-Nadim's practice, 
implemented his ideological drive to make the classical Arabs' tongue again current35• 
to diffuse 
as for the renaissance. through '"'""'A'"'"'"'-'"'''" to 
be combined with the overriding aim imparting mastery of classical Arabic by imposing the 
language as the standard medium instruction. 
al-Liwa's stance was partly influenced by ethnic-linguistic European nationalisms as well 
the struggles of the Maltese, the Bohemians in the Hapsburg empire and the Poles to preserve 
32. Ahad al-Kuttab ("a Writer"), "al-Ta'lim bil-Lughat al-' Arabiyyah" (Education in the Arabic Language), 
al-Jaridah 11 March 1907, p. 4. The writer tended to identify as model for possible linguistic duality of education in 
Egypt the experience of Turkey. There the Dar al-Funun (the Muslim' World's first indigenous university, opened 
in Constantinople in 1900) used Turkish in teaching --- while the Maktab-i-Sultani used purely French medium to 
teach modem subjects. 
33. Steppat, Nationalismus p. 253 fn. l. 
34. Ibid. 
35. al-Nadim masterfully used the colloquial in al-Ustadh's written dialogues to raise Egyptians' national 
and social consciousness. Sight must, however, not be lost of his attitude, resulting from the classical Arabs 
providing the language nonn, that the colloquial was a temporary evil for communicating. al-Ustadh's short 
colloquial section was al-Nadim 's means to "lead the ignorant common man from a hatred of hearing books to love 
of books ... Then there will be no need to write other than correct [language]". "Bab al-Lughah", al-Ustadh, 30 
January 1893, p. 468. 
overseas 
language the country, of religion and the indigenous population properly possesses 
it as is the norm in all countries". The article was written, (as it seems by a teacher since the 
author uses the pseudonym "Mudarris ") context of pressure in the Egyptian parliament that 
had "sought from the Education Ministry of this Arab(ic) land that its language get its due 
position" as the medium for teaching "the contemporary sciences". But the Egyptian Ministry of 
Education "looked with no kindly eye on the proposals of the representatives" of the Egyptians 
--- as though nothing remained of Arab zeal (al-hamas al-' Arabi) in this Arab(ic) department". 
Egyptians should take a leaf from the book of the foreigners in Egypt who "faithfully served their 
land, their nation and their kingdom" by reducing use of Arabic to one fourth of the 
teaching-time at secondary level. The 1903 denunciation of education under the 
Occupation identified the survival of standard Arabic with that Islam. The "spokesman" the 
Ministry is calling to I recite to 
sacred foreign languages to make you religion, repudiate your language, 
forget the feats of your ancient forefathers ... ". The European languages and Arabic thus 
additionally represent two warring religions, Christianity and Islam --- developing Abdallah 
al-Nadim 's themes of the early 1890s. To eliminate or disestablish Arabic is to attack the Islam. 
to which the language gives the Egyptian nation (ummah) access. Elsewhere, the writer defines 
Arabic as "the tongue of the Egyptian's forefathers, of his religion and his prophet"36• 
Emotionalistic commitment to Islam and its de-particularizing language could make Egyptians 
accept as their definitive forefathers the Arabian people who conveyed the Qur'an to the world 
--- not the Pharaonic Egyptians. In this very much West-stimulated Kamilist vision of history, 
Arabic had a dual character: it provided the Egyptian nation's means of access to a divine 
religion, but also to the "feats" of the historical classical Arab human community ("ancestors"). 
Both Kamilists and J aridists celebrated the physical land or watan of Egypt, but standard 
Arabic, too, was crucial and central in nationality for each. Kamilist definitions of what was 
36. "Mudarris", "Dusturun am Istibdad?" (Constitution or Despotism?), al-Liwa', 8 January 1903, p. 1. 
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"national" language were oftener incompatible with Egyptian particularity. Mudarris' 
identification of the student's national language as the classical standardized --- not the spoken 
Egyptian --- form was categorical and uncompromising: "some sciences such as arithmetic are 
taught at primary level in Arabic" but "what type of Arabic is that? They are taught in the 
colloquial Arabic that pupils know from their earliest childhood (leading to) ignorance of their 
language and the tongue of their forefathers"37• This position rejects the distinctive everyday 
usage of contemporary Egyptians as a corruption or deviation from the norm of their linguistic 
identity established a millennium before by Islam and early Arabs, mainly outside Egypt. 
Extensions of this attitude long were to inhibit development in creative literature of even a 
distinctive Egyptian style, let alone literary language. 
Many highly Westernizing-educated Egyptians associated with Kamil's independence 
movement strove like Mudarris to combine (a) maintaining continuity of language with --- and 
thus access to --- extraterritorial classical Arabs and (b) propagating the West's contemporary 
sciences in Egypt. An instance is a 1907 article by Dr 'Uthman Ghalib in l'Etendard Egyptien 
opposing the Occupation-period contraction of government education and imposition of foreign 
languages. In reply to those who accused Arabic of "sterility" as an instrument to express 
scientific thought (some Jaridists as well as Britishers?) Ghalib described Arabic as "the 
scientific language par excellence under the civilizations of Spain and Baghdad". He viewed the 
development of Arabic as the medium of instruction in the tertiary colleges, many scientific or 
technical in nature, initiated by Muhammad 'Ali as the achievement of the Egyptian scholars 
who "recovered from oblivion the scientific nomenclature of the Arab savants of Spain and 
Baghdad". Pan-Arabizing: Ghalib argued that restoration of the Arabic-medium secular higher 
education suppressed by the British would serve not Egypt alone "but all the lands of Arabic 
speech"38• 
Like the Jaridists, Ghalib denounced the occupying British for dismantling previous mass 
37. Ibid. 
38. Dr. Osman Ghalleb, "Le Mouvement National et la Question de l 'Instruction", l'Etenclard Egyptien 5 
March 1907; reprinted Juliette Adam, L'Angleterre en Egypte (Paris: Imprimerie du Centre 1922) pp. 101-107. 
Ghalib was a lecturer in Medicine at the Qasr al-' Ayni Medical College, and an old friend of Muhammad 'Abduh. 
Ibid p. 168. Duse Muhammad was acculturated beyond most of al-Hizb al-Watani's leadership by continuous 
residence in the colonizing West's very heart, London. Nonetheless, here again he closely follows the Kamilists' 
stances. The Arab science and culture in the Middle Ages give the lie to the British administrators' excuse that there 
were no textbooks with which to teach sciences in Arabic. In The Land of the Pharaohs p. 278. 
to 
form Arabic as essential --- an extended form of high 
developed by the 'Abbasid Empire's and Islamic Spain's scholars and scientists. Ghalib 
probably had at the back of his mind some idea that instruction of Egyptians in modern 
knowledge through that Arabic would simultaneously build their linguistic access to the classical 
Arabs' sciences and literature. Juliette Adam characterized Mustafa Kamil as attempting to 
modernize Egypt by engrafting "modern science upon ancient Pharaonic traditions and upon the 
old Arab science which dominated the world over centuries ... thereby safeguarding the pride of 
his race which would not accept in this hour anything but the return of that which it presented to 
Europe in another time"39• Colonialism and the very extent of the Westernization which these 
intellectuals had to undergo activates a reflex where their dignity can naturalize the West's 
modernizing sciences only on an affirmed basis of some indigenous tradition. The Pharaonic 
tradition would further Egypt's self-containedness. The supra-Egypt classical Arabs would not 
yet their rational thought sciences could portrayed as originating Europe's science and 
modernity more detail and with more centrality than the remoter Pharaonic civilization. And 
Arabic was the language of Islam. The Kamilists wanted that standard Arabic to pervade 
education, government and public life in Egypt. 
The Watanists' drive to establish classical Arabic in all sectors of Egypt's life would tend 
to assimilate Egyptians to the historical consciousness and culture of the classical Arabs, without 
regard to Egypt's borders. 
A few more pragmatic J aridists had, in comparison to the Kamilists, a more urgent 
modernizing drive that might not balk at outright Westernization. A few days after Dr. Ghalib 
exalted the classical Arabs' science and Egypt's nineteenth-century Arabic-medium tertiary 
education as renewing it, al-Jaridah's "Writer" contemptuously brushed aside notions that either 
classical Arabs or nineteenth-century Egyptians developed true science in Arabic40• He voiced 
39. Adam, L'Angleterre p. 150. 
40. al-Jaridah's "Writer" sarcastically described glorification of the age "when sciences were translated 
from the tongues of the nations to that of the Arabs" (denigrating Arabs' science as derivative?) as "either 
magnification of minute things or giving existence to the non-existent. Some European writers started this vogue for 
some wisdom unclear to us, and those ignorant of history among us followed them". Neither the classical Arabs nor 
concern 
to tum menace 
access to the 
THE SYRIAN CHRISTIANS 
Resident Syrian Christians and Supra-Egypt Communities of Acculturated Muslim Egyptian 
Intellectuals 
Egypt's resident SC intellectuals were readier than some Copts to develop with Egyptian 
Muslims a positive historical view of the classical Arabs. They depicted them more as tolerant 
and as having offered abundant scope for the economic, cultural and intellectual endeavors of 
Arabic-speaking Christians. The supra-Egyptian, classical Arabs might validate SC attempts to 
keep up simultaneous relationships with Egypt and the Syrian homeland of origin. They did not 
share Islam or Egyptian dialect, but fused their and the Egyptian Muslims' pasts standard 
Arabic and a single classical Arab culture. 
Conflict Between anti-British Acculturated Muslim Egyptians and Resident Syrian Christians 
The Syrian Christians' very presence in British-ruled Egypt was an important early 
test-case for "pan-Arab" integration or amalgamation of two populations that were 
Arabic-speaking but from separate homelands. In the short-term relationship between Syrian 
Christians and Kamilist anti-imperialists, common Arabic could not stand as a community bond 
before the two groups' political and economic conflicts and supra-Egyptian communities 
alternative to Arabism. 
The immigrant Syrian Christians in Egypt were a numerically tiny minority of about 
30,000. However, they were concentrated in the cities where they were entrenched in 
publishing, journalism, commerce and the civil service. When the British occupied Egypt in 
1882 they found Syrian Christians educated at Bayrut's Syrian Protestant College a "godsend" 
nineteenth century Egypt had contributed a single invention acceptable to true modem science. The Egyptians were 
still in the cradle or crawling on hands and knees in relation to the scientific knowledge of which the West was the 
custodian. "al-Ta'lim bil-Lughat al-' Arabiyyah", al-Jaridah 11 March 1907 p. 4. 
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for recruitment as physicians, pharmacists, clerks and intelligence agents to help them control 
and administer Egypt41 • The acculturated Muslim intellectuals' very modernizing education 
equipped them to compete for specialized functions in the bureaucracy that traditionally had been 
left to Copts and other Christians such as Syrians, sharpening communalist ill-feeling between 
the Arabic-speaking sects. 
Some Christian Syrian individuals also harmed or challenged Egypt's vital political 
interests. Mustafa Kamil's first political operation was to head in 1893 a student demonstration 
at the offices of the pro-British, Syrian Christian-owned al-Muqattam. Serving its British 
subsidizers, al-Muqattam brutally brushed aside the political aspirations of the whole class of 
modem-educated Muslim Egyptians, and constriction of their economic and professional 
livelihood caused by reservation of the powerful, best paying positions in the Egyptian civil 
service for British officials42• 
Chapter 4 presented as the main enterprise of the Kamilists' pan-Islamism the alliance 
they built up with the Ottoman Empire. Syrian Christians tended to be alienated from that State 
by' Abdul-Hamid's continued identification of it with its Muslim element and internationally 
with verbal pan-Islamism. Prior to the 1908 CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) coup and 
restoration of constitutional politics in the Ottoman Empire, one SC mused in 1910, the 
Kamilists "used to accuse us of apostaiY from Ottomanism and betrayal of the State because we 
strove to overthrow the government of despotism while they were glorifying it". The 
secularizing CUP revolution launched from Macedonia fulfilled the long endeavors of Syrians 
(although also Armenians and even Turks and Albanians) to destroy "religious and racial 
' 
fanaticisms"43• In assessing the hatred among Kamilists for resident Syrian Christians, the 
extreme virulence of the assaults of their papers upon the Sultan and his Muslim State must be 
41. Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in Histo:iy: From the Earliest Times to the Present (London: MacMillan 1957) 
p.474. 
42. One tongue-in-cheeck 1910 al-Mugattam article held out as the appropriate response to Egyptian 
demands for self-rule (1) long-term implementation of Cromer's oft-reiterated plan for a "mixed"(in distinction from 
the demanded "national") "representative council ... representing all races with interests in this land after the ratio of 
their respective interests" or (2) more immediate grant of "a representative assembly which would have no control 
over government finances". As though British needs to find work for sons of their governing classes played no part 
in the annual despatch of British recruits to the "Egyptian government", al-Mugattam advised native Egyptian 
officials to diligently perform the tasks allotted them. When Egyptians eventually demonstrated they were the more 
hardworking and efficient, the British would favor them in appointments and promotions over Europeans! 
al-Mugattam 1 April 1910, in polemical reply to al-Liwa'. 
43. SC letter in al-Jaridah 19 April 1910 p. 5. 
..,,.,,~~·u~··· to ""''"""LLlU 
their own country45 . 
Kamilist denunciations specified statements acts of collaboration by SC 
individuals sometimes implied rejection of the whole group. Throughout his career as a 
nationalist leader, Kamil denounced some Syrian Christians as "intruders" or "aliens" (dukhala), 
Egypt's "real enemy"46• A 1903 al-Liwa' item on "Aliens in Egypt" opened by saying that some 
migrants to Egypt were an asset to their country of adoption. Others, however, were "evil in 
their origin and unclean in their branch ... poison that courses through a healthy body changing 
its strength into weakness". The article mentioned al-Muqattam and its criticisms of the 
Khedivial farnily47• A party of resident Syrians went to the also SC-owned al-Ahram, and 
persuaded it to print an appeal to al-Muqattam to moderate its pro-British propaganda campaign 
against al-Hizb al-Watani "lest [the resident Syrians'] Egyptian brothers conceive that 
al-Muqattarn' s error is theirs "48• 
44. "Hifzu Karamatal-Dawlah" (Preserving the State's Dignity), al-Muqattam 23 August 1901. 
al-Muqattam lampooned the weakness and disorganization of the Ottoman Empire, the last remaining substantial 
independent Muslim State, specifically to ridicule the Egyptian Muslim intelligentsia's demands for British 
withdrawal. "Many Egyptians pine and yearn to be independent after the Ottoman fashion [but] there is no reason to 
regret an independence in which he who is independent is a feather whipped between the winds of the conflicting 
ambitions and policies of [the Powers of] an aroused Europe". al-Muqattam l July 1901, p. 2. al-Muqattam in 1901 
snapped up the vituperations of Western Turcophobes and dubious fugitives from 'Abdul-Hamid's court to depict 
him as cynically presiding over a non-government of corrupt, subservient, incompetents as the Empire decayed --- . 
yet looking to the Turkish architects of the 1876 Ottoman Constitution and the later liberal Young Turkey opposition 
to 'Abdul-Hamid rather than evoking ethnicist Arabs who would want to secede. "Wuzara' al-Sultan wa 
Hashiyatuh" (The Ministers of the Sultan and his Entourage), al-Muqattam l April 1901 p. 1. 
45. Mustafa Kamil in his 1906 Egyptiens et anglais: "They have repudiated their homeland and have repaid 
Egypt's generosity and hospitality only with ingratitude and hatred". Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 208. Cf. the thesis 
of Ahmad Hilmi that the migration of "some peoples among our Eastern brothers" was evidence that education not 
designed to arouse patriotic feelings --- ie. the sectarian educational system of the Ottoman Empire's Christians, in 
which European missionaries participated --- "distances man from the love of the homeland". Ahmad Hilmi, 
"al-Sha'b al-Misri" (The Egyptian People), al-Liwa', 26 February 1903. 
46. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 264. 'Abdallah al-Nadim had coined the term dukhala' (sing.: Qillillill. 
Resident Christian Syrians regarded dakhil as a Muslim religious communalist term. The radical Syrian Christian 
secularist Dr. Shibli Shumayyil in 1908 equated press attacks against Syrian immigrants as dakhil with sectarian 
campaigns in the press about Copt-Muslim divisions. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 253. Jurji Zaydan wrote in 
al-Hilal that "some Egyptians consider Muslim immigrants as Egyptians, but not Christians or Jews" --- a view 
contadicting modern civilization's separation of religion from patriotism. Thomas Philipp, "Language, History and 
Arab National Consciousness in the Thought of Jurji Zaidan (1861-1914)", IJMES (1973) p. 13. 
47. "al-Ghuraba'u fi Misr" (Aliens in Egypt), al-Liwa' 15 February 1903 p. 1. 
48. "al-Ahram w al-Muqattam wa Mutatarrifi 1-Hizb al-Watani" (al-Ahram, al-Muqattam and the Patriotic 
Party's Extremists) al-Muqattam 7 May 1910 p. 4. 
outset career, 
even never 
to Egypt to become collaborators. his first sea-voyage to Europe (1893), obviously 
considered the Syrians foreigners like the French, Italian and British passengers. The Syrians' 
poverty repelled rather than moved him: 
As for the Syrians, most of them were passengers of the fourth class where people must 
sleep on the sea-deck, suffering hardships to gain a subsistence. The most that the Syrian 
desires is to get money and drink wine. As regards their ethics, what stands out is the 
most dense stupidity. Most of those who were with us had the aim of going to the 
Chicago Fair49 • 
The Syrian passengers' public wine-drinking may have been a marker for Kamil that they 
were Christians. It is not the case that the Kamilists thought of Syrians as one religiously 
undifferentiated collectivity. They were conscious of communal conflict between Muslims and 
Christians in Ottoman-administered Syria --- al-Liwa' in September 1903 reported communal 
clashes which left fifty-one persons dead in Bayrut. Interestingly, its correspondent there blamed 
the outbreak on the incitative newspapers brought out by the whole class of Bayrut's Christian 
journalists50• 
The virulent attacks by some Syrian Christian newspapers from Egyptian soil upon the 
Ottoman State's Islamic system made anti-imperialist Muslim Egyptians view the minority in the 
worst regional context. In the Kamilists' mind, European powers working to subject or 
disintegrate the Ottoman Empire fostered unrest among its Christian populations. Parochial SC 
publicization of the Ottoman Muslim Arabs' grievances thus associated early West Asian Arab 
nationalism with imperialist subversion, for a time. 
SC Cultural Arabism. 
Antun al-Jumayyil's 1909 play on the virtue of the pre-Islamic Arabian Jew al-Samaw'al 
was an instance of Syrian Christian portrayal of a sects-neutral ancient Arab past: Shukri 
Ghanim' s 'Antarah thrilled Kamil. 
Jurji Zaydan (1861 - 1914), resident from the early 1880s, developed a crude, still heavily 
cultural, pan-Arab national identification to integrate his Christian Egypto-Syrians with Muslim 
49. 'Ali Fahrni Kamil, op. cit v. 1pp.267-268. 
50. al-Liwa' 23 September 1903 p. 2. 
1 -
to 
the long term, published 21 best-selling 
"Islamic history" as he studies such as 
novels covering all classical Arab 
Ta'rikh al-Tamaddun al-Islami (History 
Islamic Civilization). The Arabs first conquered under Islam's formal banner. Thenceforth, 
though, Christian merchants and farmers and Christian Syrian translators of Greek philosophy 
into Arabic, as well as Muslim rulers and scholars, helped build classical Islamo-Arabic 
civilization --- Zaydan secularized.51 • 
Shared standard Arabic provided Zaydan's ground for community with Muslim 
Egyptians. He identified language as the core crucial to the survival of any nationality, and like 
the Kamilists, demanded that classical Arabic therefore be made almost exclusively the medium 
for all national education52. Zaydan opposed making divisive Arabic dialects written literary 
languages, because restricting the classical link language might disintegrate the contemporary 
community of the populations that used Arabic: "the Arabs" or "the Arab nation" (al-ummat 
=-~='++-~of 'Iraq, Syria, the Arabian peninsula, Egypt, Sudan the Maghrib53 • The 
Kamilists opposed the use of colloquial Egyptian Arabic in schools because the 
standardized classical Arabic gave access to works of classical Arabs and to Islam --- a 
Muslim ethos to which the post-Christian freemason Zaydan attuned his own promotion of the 
classical54• 
The following, sixth, chapter examines criticism by the youthful Muhammad Husayn 
Haykal of Zaydan's conception of the Arab nation as formed before an Islam imaged to have 
only lightly tinted its Umayyad and 'Abbasid literary creativity. Haykal reacted against 
Zaydan's presentation of the pre-Islamic Arabians as a partial ethical model for new social 
organization 
51. Philipp, "Language, History, ... Thought of Jurji Zaidan", IJMES 4 (1973) pp. 3-22. 
52. Ibid p. 15. 
53. Ibid p. 14. To amalgamate Syria and Egypt, ending his marginality as a Syrian in Egypt. Zaydan 
described Egypt and Syria as one country (balad wahid) since no natural boundaries such as mountains, deserts or 
seas separate them. Ibid p. 53. 
54. al-Nadim hailed from al-Ustadh (1892 pp. 42-43) the first publication of al-Hilal: he was at that time a 
fonnative influence on the young Mustafa Kamil. Zaydan tried to relate his advocacy of standard Arabic to the 
Islamic worldview of his Muslim Egyptian readers. From its very first year, al-Hilal identified the Qur'an as the 
agent that preserved the standard Arabic down the centuries --- which would mobilize Egyptian Muslims' religious 
emotions in defence of the standard language. Wendell, Egyptian National Image pp. 21-22. 
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and practices by modernizing Arabic-speakers. 
The Syrian Christians and the Jaridists 
Among acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals, the Jaridists were more prepared than 
the Kamilists to give a hearing to SC arguments of Arab affinities between Syrians and 
Egyptians. At the level of principle, Lutfi al-Sayyid occasionally equated SC links with their 
Arab homeland of origin outside Egypt as threatening Egyptian nationalism like extraterritorial 
consciousness among such European communities as the Greeks55• Lutfi's 1913 rejection of 
pan-Arabism (al-Ittihad al-' Arabi), not only pan-Islamism,56 would cover the evocation by 
resident Syrian Christians of a supra-watan Arab community between Egyptians and Syrians. 
However, the Jaridists' secularoid-particularist ideology offered Syrian Christian groups 
more opportunity than any other Egyptian Muslim group's for integration with Egyptians. A 
1907 essay by Lutfi argued that patriotism was able to foster a sense of a "general interest" that 
would integrate the followers of even sharply different religions living in the same land57• For 
Lutfi, territoriality could integrate into the Egyptian nation individuals of extra-Egyptian origin 
diverging in their race, language and creed, provided they gave loyalty58• But the Jaridists 
clearly thought such assimilation most practical with immigrants from other Ottoman lands who 
already had something --- Islam or language --- in common with the Egyptians59• 
al-Jaridah, radically secularist, was intent to combat sectarian hatreds in Egypt. It also 
wanted to hit at its Kamilist foes. It published replies by resident Syrian Christians to Kamilist · 
campaigns. One such 1910 reply published in al-Jaridah, gestured towards its editor's (Lutfi's) 
integrative territorial patriotism60• The writer did not truly, however, attempt to persuade 
55. "Our Egypt", al-Jaridah 9, 16January 1913, excerpted Anouar Abdel Malek (Anwar 'Abd al-Malik), 
Anthologie de la litterature arabe contemporaine (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1965) p. 115. 
56. Lutfi in al-Jaridah 2 March 1913 quoted Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 230. 
57. "al-Wataniyyah fi Misr --- ma huwa 1-Watan" (Patriotism in Egypt --- What is the Homeland?)[2], 
al-Jaridah 11 March 1907. 
58. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 177. 
59. A 1907 al-Jaridah discussion ofwataniyyah (patriotism) approvingly quoted an Egyptian electoral law, 
which in the case of Ottoman immigrants awarded rights of Egyptian citizenship on condition of extended residence 
rather than pure Egyptian race. "al-Wataniyyah fi Misr" - 2, al-Jaridah 11March1907. 
60. "The first duty of patriotism is to strive to reconcile the hearts of the elements from which the state is 
made up". By inciting hatred against immigrant Syrians, the Kamilists thus violated Egyptian patriotism. The 
anonymous Syrian Christian writer in al-Jaridah countered charges that the immigrants came poor, hungry and 
naked to Egypt to grow rich at its expense, by exalting all their achievements in commerce, industry, agriculture, 
journalism and intellectual life. The immigrant Syrian Christians' contributions to Egypt entitle them to acceptance 
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secularized Egyptian Muslims that resident Syrian Christians wanted to give exclusive loyalty to 
Egypt, as Lutfi's ideology demanded. Rather, he argued Arabness as Egypt and Syria's common 
denominator, to give Syrians resident in Egypt the right to maintain simultaneous relationship 
with both homelands for generations. The writer is as concerned to defend his birthland as the 
honor of his own "Syrian" community within Egypt. "Is not Egypt an Arab land like Syria?". 
The writer condemns those (the Kamilists) who spread false reports that Syrians in Egypt would 
hate their Egyptian brothers to be given the constitution for "attempting to divide against each 
other two noble Arab races/communities (unsurayni 'Arabiyyayni karimayni) united by bonds of 
common Ottoman loyalty, coresidence, unity of language and of interests"61 • 
The writer's constant stress that Syrian Christians are Ottomanists in harmony with the 
constitutional Ottoman regime tapped the appeal that the post-Hamidian, 
"liberal-parliamentarist" Empire now had for the Jaridists too, who had long sniped the 
Kamilists' pro-Ottomanism. 
0-
al-Jaridah on its own account projecte91special relationship between Egypt and Syria, 
integrating with Egyptians those Syrian Christians who through migration to Egypt had 
transcended watan or qutr in the exclusive sense. Sometimes shared Arabness and the specific 
migrations are affirmed to bind Egyptians also to Syrians (Christians included) resident in Syria 
itself. An instance was al-Jaridah's detailed coverage of the Khedivial Prince Muhammad' Ali's 
1910 tour of Syria62• The declarations by Christians as well as Muslims there that Arab identity 
in her society and life. Anonymous Syrian Christian's long letter of reply to al-Hizb al-Watani' s anti-Syrian 
campaigns, published al-Jaridah 19 April 1910, p. 5. Cf fn 61 seq. 
61. Syria is not inherently poor as hostile Egyptians imagined: only' Abdul-Hamid's despotism held it 
back. The "noble Arab qualities", intelligence and energy of its people would assure rapid development of Syria's 
rich resources under the Ottoman post-Hamidian constitutional regime . .Thid. There was a secular 
territorial-regional dimension in the long SC-Egyptian conflict apart from the sectarian difference. The 
Egypto-Syrian salafist Muslim Rashid Rida, main popularizer of' Abduh, in 1904 and 1907 interpreted that the 
pro-Khedive al-Mu'ayyad, Mustafa Kamil and Muhammad Farid, despite their disclaimers, really directed their 
accusations and attacks --- and applied their abuse-term dukhala' --- against all from Syria including Muslims like 
himself. SCs in al-Muq;lttam were not the sole target! He ridiculed the Egyptian stereotype that the Syrians came 
poor to Egypt and enriched themselves at its expense or without loyalty. Rida defended SC-edited newspapers and 
magazines as the most successful simply because they were better. Thomas Philipp, The Syrians in Egypt 1725 -
1975 (Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag 1985) pp. 113-114. 
62. Dr. Kamil Efendi Tuma, speaking for a welcoming delegation of twelve Orthodox Homs notables 
· headed by the city's Archbishop, in 1910 told the visiting Prince Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, brother of the Khedive, 
that "I greet an Egyptian Ottoman Prince; I salute you in welcome upon your happily safe arrival from Egyptian 
Ottoman Arab lands to Syrian Ottoman Arab lands". Dr. Tuma was also speaking on behalf of "the Homs Christians 
residing in the Egyptian lands ... those Ottomans ... who have been investing their capitals and their labors in those 
happy lands for fifty years" and the few thousand Homs people who exported their locally-manufactured textiles to 
as as to 
territorialist Egyptian stances. 
al-Jaridah, then, was prepared to amplify resident Syrian Christians who advocated an 
explicitly Arab contemporary community between Syrians and Egyptians. These 
communications flew in the face of Lutfi's ideological position that anyone in Egypt who 
publicly declared that he belonged to another land committed a "crime" and menaced Egypt's 
"progress"63• al-Jaridah's coverage of Prince Muhammad' Ali's visit to Syria, however, 
conveyed a wider community of Egypt and Syria as two Arab homelands bound by language, 
and economic and human exchanges. It ran against Lutfi's more proto-particularist formulations 
that Egypt had natural borders which decisively separated the Egyptians from adjoining 
populations64• al-Jaridah accommodated SC pan-Arab identity elements not just as a means at 
hand to integrate the sects in the homeland but because its Egyptian contributors had deep Arab 
identity of their own. 
Muslim Egyptian Acceptance of Arab Community With Syrian Christians: Hafiz 
Our sampling turned up no formal ideological assent from acculturated Egyptian Muslim 
intellectuals in the Kamilist movement or around al-Jaridah to Syrian Christians proposals of 
pan-Arab joint community. 
However, a stylistically classicist Muslim Egyptian poet, Hafiz Ibrahim (c. 1870 - 1932) 
did express, under Britain's colonial occupation, a close Arab identification with Syrians 
including Christians, possibly in hope of payments from rich Egypto-Syrians. Arabic can detach 
itself from Islam and support a multi-sectarian Arab community. 
Hafiz' desultory education and employment in secular law placed him on the margin of 
the strata of acculturated Muslim intellectuals and professionals65• His public, topical political 
Egypt. "al-Amir Muhammad' Ali Pasha fi Madinat Hims" (Prince Muhammad 'Ali in the City of Homs), al-Jaridah 
16 April 1910 p. 5. Cf. coverage of Muhammad 'Ali's visit to Bayrut, al-Jaridah 7 April 1910 p. 4. Fn 89 for the 
subversive nature of Prince Muhammad's contacts with Ottoman Arabs. 
63. Malek, Anthologie p. 116. 
64. Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 238. Lutfi's full fonnulation was: "We have our own peculiar 
color, our own peculiar tastes, and a single, universal language ... Our fatherland has clearly defined natural 
boundaries which separate us from everyone else. [These are] not imaginary borders such as exist in so many 
countries but natural boundaries which practically cut us off from all others". Versus Zaydan fn 53. 
65. A general account of Hafiz' life was given by Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, Wahy al-Risalah v. 1 (Cairo: 
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verse long diffused the modernizing endeavors, anti-British themes, and attachment to the 
Ottoman Turks of the Kamilist independence movement66• Hafiz also greatly stimulated the 
development of the young intellectuals around al-Jaridah, who reacted to his pan-Islamic world 
view and homogenizing neo-classicist Arabic style, which they were to criticize for obstructing 
development of a distinct Egyptian national culture (B 385). Hafiz must also be regarded as an 
ongoing element ~ter World War I in the cultural makeup of acculturated intellectuals as Ahmad 
Hasan al-Zayyat and Taha Husayn who promoted cultural pan-Arab integration in the 1930s and 
1940s67• 
For Hafiz Ibrahim, language --- more than territoriality --- was central as a human bond. 
Thus, in 1913 he described Egypt and Syria as two brothers or two plants sprung from one root 
(sinwani), inseparable because Arabic was their common mother68• For Hafiz, shared language 
and race links resulting from past migrations from Arabia over the whole region (the classical 
Arabs) could almost obliterate separate territoriality of Syria and Egypt: "the Arabs" are 
"forefathers" of both Egypt and Syria69• To a 1913 gathering of resident Syrians, Hafiz Ibrahim 
stated a crude unitary Arab nationhood bracketing Egyptians and non-Muslim Syrians: 
Dar Nahdat Misr 1953), pp. 255-258. Hafiz' father died when he was two years old. After completing primary 
education he worked in the offices of several secular lawyers for some years (ibid p. 255) and thus got on the fringe 
of the Westernizing-educated professional classes at that time. Hafiz learnt a limited amount of French and 
translated Victor Hugo's Les Miserables from French into Arabic. 
66. Hafiz recited verse extolling Mustafa Kamil's educative endeavors at the 1906 distribution of prizes at 
Kamil's secondary school. He recited an elegy to Kamil at a religious ceremony of mourning following the leader's 
death. Texts "Madrasat Mustafa Kamil" (Mustafa Kamil's School) in 'Abd al-Latif Shararah, Hafiz: Dirasah 
Tayliliyyah (Bayrut: Dar Sadir 1965) pp. 67-71, and "Ritha' Mustafa Kamil" in ibid pp. 217-225. Hafiz' verse often 
had very similar world-view and interests to the pro-Ottoman Kamilists'. An instance is Hafiz' painful, engaged 
attempt in 1908 at a judgement of the fallen 'Abdul Hamid and the new political era that the Ottoman State was 
entering following the CUP coup. "al-Inqilab al-'Uthmani" (The Ottoman Revolution): Shararah, Hafiz pp. 
126-133. Like the Kamilists, Hafiz hailed the new Japan that vanquished Russia in 1904: "Shabbat al-Yaban" (The 
Japanese Maiden), ibid pp. 98-104. 
67. Taha Husayn described Hafiz and Ahmad Shawqi on their death in quick succession in 1932 as "the 
two tongues expressing [Egypt's] aspirations" Qisanayha n-natigavn) and "the two great poets" of "the Arab East" in 
his article "Hafiz wa Shawqi", al-Hilal, 1December1932 pp. 161-165. This is an Arab-centric article viewing 
modem Egyptian culture as a synthesis of the secular West with the high unitary Arab classical literature of which 
Egypt was a late guardian: Napoleon meeting al-Azhar. In youth, Taha was, if anything, more committed to 
continuity of style with the classical Arabs than Hafiz or Shawqi: in 1911, in al-Jaridah, he criticized both poets for 
language errors. The Anglophone Romantic poet' Abd al-Rahman Shukri published a reply. Tarek A. 
Fakhrel-Deen, 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri 0886 - 1958): An Egyptian Writer in the Age of Imoerialism and 
Nationalism (Ph.D: New York University Press 1972) pp. 141-142. 
68. 1913 poem of tribute by Hafiz to the Christian Egypto-Lebanese poet Khalil Mutran in Shararah, Hafiz 
p. 189. 
69. Hafiz' 1913 "Suriya wa Misr" recited at Shepherd's Hotel. Shararah, Hafiz, p. 72. 
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This is my hand which shakes with you on behalf of the sons of Egypt. Take it then so it 
may pass that the Arabs shake each others' hands. al-Kinanah [ie. Egypt] is nought but 
very Syria at whose reaches noble-born gentlemen of [Syria's] sons stopped/alighted70• 
Hafiz also saw migration of overwhelmingly Christian Syrians even to the Americas as 
gain for "the Mother of Languages" because they spread and promoted Arabic in new lands71 • 
Jurji Zaydan highlighted in al-Hilal Syrian promotion of Arabic in the Americas through their 
schools and newspapers, to forestall demands by Islamist Egyptians that the revival of Arabic 
serve Islam and the Muslim sect only72• 
For Hafiz Ibrahim, too, the classical Arabs' Arabic can become a relatively secular nexus 
for a current Arab community with both Christians and Muslims. This ran against application by 
such Kamilists as 'Abd al-' Aziz Sha wish of Islam and pro-Ottoman pan-Islamism to exclude 
Syrian Christians from integration in Egyptian society73• His conceptual fusion of the Muslim 
Egyptians with the Syrian Christians realized those Arab identity elements that the Kamilists 
had, but subordinated within pan-Islamic community with all(Muslim) Ottomans. 
Resident Christian and Muslim Syrians and Egyptian Muslims' Development of Pan-Arabism 
Pursuing their supraterritorial ethnicity, Syrian Christian intellectuals in Egypt under 
British rule viewed the Ottoman State from its Arabic-speaking provinces, rather than 
Turcophone Istanbul, the seat of the Caliphate for Egyptian pan-Islamists. Egypt's SC 
journalists publicized the Ottoman Turks' maladministration in the Arabic provinces. 
al-Mugattam's editor, Faris Nimr, had been a pioneer Arab nationalist. Ya'qub Sarruf 
(1852 - 1927), Faris Nimr (1856 - 1951) and Shahin Makariyus, who founded al-Mugattam in 
1889, had earlier been members of a Bayrut secret society which attempted to unite Christian and 
Muslim Arabs against the Turks. In Nimr's handwriting was the famous anonymous placard that 
70. Ibid p. 77. 
71. Ibid p. 76. 
72. Philipp, "Language, History ... Thought of Jurji Zaydan". loc. cit p. 16. 
73. Hafiz blamed as creating the communal ill-will "men among us [the Egyptians] and among them [the 
resident Syrian Christians] who have gone to extremes in their politics". "Misr wa Suri ya", ibid p. 77. This must 
mean al-Muqattaro and some --- parochially anti-Christian --- Kamilistjournalists. 'Abel al-' Aziz Shawish often 
assailed Copts and SCs as editor of al-Liwa' after Kamil's death; some of the more cultivated Kamilists may have 
become embarrassed by his vituperation against the Syrians, which did not enhance the dignity of the post-Kamil 
Hizb al-Watani. al-Liwa' 31 March 1910 quoted al-Muqattam 1 April 1910. Cf. the discreet disdain for Shawish's 
anti-Coptism of 'Uthman Sabri, brother-in-law to Mustafa Kamil, when subsequently editor of al-Liwa'. Musa, 
Education pp. 127-128. 
-A257 -
the society distributed in Bayrut in 1881, calling on "the Arabs" to expel "the Turks" from Arab 
lands74• 
However, Kamil, from the inception of his career as an anti-imperialist nationalist, 
expressed violent hatred against Nimr and al-Muqattam for serving the occupying British. 
Publicization by al-Muqattam of Ottoman Arab discontent might not recommend it to the 
Kamilists, but did early bring the problem home. 
Numerous articles in al-Muqattam depicted maladministration and murder by Turkish 
officials in its Arab provinces (eg. in Yemen in 1910) but were not necessarily secessionist75• 
For a while following the CUP'S 1908 coup, Christian and Muslim Syrians in Egypt worked 
together for reform rather than break-up of the Empire. But al-Muqattam relayed mounting 
national antagonisms between Turks and Arabs to Egyptian Muslim readers 76• These ethnicizing 
articles helped prepare Egyptians to accept the Arabs' 1916 uprising for independence, for 
instance, as natural. al-Muqattam highlighted issues of language that would distinguish Muslim 
Turks from Muslim Arabs, but associate Muslim with Christian Arabs: 
It appears from these statements which I have translated for my readers that the Turkish 
newspapers are ignorant of the conditions of the Ottoman lands. The Constitution makes 
it compulsory for primary teaching to be in the local, that is indigenous, language. If this 
is the case, then why has the Turkish language not been replaced in the Bayrut 
Government Primary School, for instance, by the Arabic language? Arithmetic, 
Geography, even the grammar and declension of Arabic are taught in Turkish medium77• 
al-Jaridah spoke for secularized Arabic-speaking Egyptian intellectuals, some opposed to 
74. Cf B 74 and B 336 (incl. fns). Lebanese historiography in the 1980s stressed that this masonic 
Arab-ethnicist society was responding to' Abdul-Hamid's suspension of the Ottoman constitution and 
parliamentarism, and that the placards innovated political appeals to "the Syrian homeland" as well as "Arab pride" 
as rallying-points against "the Turks"(= mainly' Abdul-Hamid's specific regime?). Dr Wajih Kawtharani, 
al-Ittijahat al-Ijtim'iyyah wal-Siyasiyyah fi Jabal Lubnan wal-Mashriq al-' Arabi min al-Mutasarrifiyyat 
al-U!hmaniyyah ila Dawlat Lubnan al-Kabir (Bayrut Manshurat Dahsun al-Thaqafiyyah 1986) p. 111. 
75. 'Uthmani ("An Ottoman") in "al-Islah fil-Yaman" (Reform in Yemen), al-Muqattam 28 April 1910, 
detailed such practices of Turkish administrators there as beheading chiefs of restive villages. However, the writer 
argued that "the Turks" as a group had not oppressed "the Arabs" in the Yemen: he still hoped that "reform", 
including the despatch of more conciliatory Turkish officials, might yet reintegrate the Yemen into the Ottoman 
State. See fns 78 and 94. 
76. 'Izzat al-Jundi's article "Damad Farid Pasha Calls His People to Confine Authority in their Own 
Hands", al-Muqattam 10 March 1910 p. 1, was pervaded by a sense of conflict between Turks and Arabs in the 
Ottoman Empire. al-Jundi denied any positive contributions by Turks to the development of the Ottoman State. 
Even the soldiers who carried out the Ottoman conquest had been non-Turks, among them Arabs --- already one 
argument in 1905 by the secessionist Arab nationalist Najib 'Azuri (Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 278). Unlike 
'Azuri, al-J undi did not openly call for abolition of the Ottoman State. 
77. "Bayn al-Turk wal-'Arab: Baqiyyah fil-Zawiyah" (The Turks and the Arabs: The Conflict Unfolds), 
al-Muqattam 20 April 1910 p. 1. The Istanbul press discussion of Arab-Turkish disaccord that this and other 
al-Muqattam items took up in April 1910 had been sparked off by a critical letter to Le Temps from the Paris Syrian 
sown to to 
April 1910 that the Istanbul Turkish newspaper Iqdam was briefly suspended and fined 
because of the reaction of the Arab community in the capital to its regular attacks on Arab 
culture and its demand that the Turkish language be purified of Arabic words 78• 
Muslim Egypto-Syrians. Perception of the Young Turks as first neglecting Islam and 
Arabic, and then attempting to replace Islam's Arabic with Turkish, finally led Muhammad 
'Abduh's Syrian disciple Rashid Rida (1865 - 1935) during World War I to support Arab 
independence from the Islamic, Ottoman State. With al-Hizb al-Watani leaders concerned that 
he was serving British expansionism, Rida agonized over Arab-Turkish conflict in his religious 
magazine al-Manar79, widely read by reformist-minded religious Egyptian Muslims such as the 
then youthful Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat (1885 - 1968). Charges that al-Zayyat directed 
throughout his life against the Ottoman State correspond as well to the materials that 
al-Muqattam carried the period of British colonial rule. Somewhat like al-Muqattam 
in 1953 charged that Ottoman Turks expelled Arabic government 
administration, and used Turkish in education "even in the lessons of [Arabic] grammar"80• 
MUSLIM EGYPTIAN PERCEPTIONS OF WEST ASIAN ARABS 
Muslim Egyptian writers under British colonial rule felt special affinity with 
emigre Shukri Ghanim. 
78. al-Jaridah 4 April 1910 p. 4. Some Arab students who took part in protests against Ig_dam were 
interrogated by a Constantinople military court. The Arab deputies sent four of their number to the Chief Vezir, 
threatening to boycott parliament if the Arab students were in any way harrassed: they demanded that the proprietor 
ofiqdam be punished under law. Lisan al-Hal (Bayrut) 19 April 1910 p. 2. Ig_dam was edited by 'Ali Kemal (1867 -
1922), a politician of the opposition Liberal Union to which elite Arabs tended to gravitate against the centralizing 
CUP. al-Mug_attam ascribed the demonstration by forty young Arab students to an Ig_dam article on Yemen by 
Khalil Hamid: this had argued that the way for the Ottoman State to weaken Yemen's imamate, the obstacle to its 
authority, was money --- "the Arabs, by nature and custom, will cast themselves to destruction in their greed for 
money, they will even sell their honors/women for love of money". "Abna' al-' Arab wa Jaridat Iqdam" (The Sons 
of the Arabs and the Newspaper Ig_dam), al-Muqattam 15 March 1910. 
79. Hourani, Arabic Thought, pp. 302-303. For an account ofRida's gradual development of Arab 
nationalist ideas, and his mounting alienation from the Turks and their State, in al-Manar, see Sylvia Haim, Arab 
Nationalism: an Anthology (Berkeley: University of California Press 1962) pp. 19-25. 
80. al-Zayyat (1953), "al-Adab wal-Thawrah", Wahy al-Risalah v. 4 p. 266. 
seen as 
the Kamilists' and even the Jaridists' overriding sense of the multi-ethnic community of Muslims 
before the European states' expansionist colonizing drives. Fears of these aroused strong support 
for the territorial integrity of the multi-national Ottoman Empire. 
Egypt's separateness of statehood since Muhammad 'Ali limited the capacity of literature 
to integrate Egyptians with outside Arabs. Kamil and his followers often voiced a sense of 
tajanus, a relatedness or homogenization that grouped Egyptians, Syrians and the inhabitants of 
the Arabian peninsula, a product of past unity under the common government of the 
internationally powerful classical Islamic states. Kamil sometimes spoke of an "Arab nation" 
that was the ruling people of those Islamic states of the Caliphs. However, Steppat concludes 
that Kamil did not conceive of that nation as a contemporary entity81 • 
Narrower Arab affinity interwove with the sense of Christian Europe's religious hostility 
to Muslims in general to shape Egyptian perceptions of French colonization of North Africans. 
literary or images of the Arabs sharpened the Egyptians' Arab 
perception of North Africa's Muslims, conjunction with contemporary shared language. Very 
much as Kamil's successor Muhammad Farid had done 1903, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid in a 
1908 article equated French occupation forces in Algeria and the British imperialist figures of 
Gladstone and Lord Cromer as representing Europeans' general dislike of Islam. In an 1897 
Geneva gathering "in which I was the only Muslim", he took issue with a young French comte, 
who had done military service in Algeria and claimed that Islam commanded its adherents to 
murder and plunder any non-Muslim in a desert. Lutfi in reply described Islam as a religion not 
of treachery but of brotherhood and equality, the religion of the [classical] Arabs, of naid_g.h (aid 
to those in distress) and muru'ah (chivalry). Najdah and muru'ah were among the list of 
stereotyped virtues of the classical Arabs given by al-Mu'ayyad in its notice on al-Alusi's book. 
Clearly, Lutfi viewed the classical Arabs and their human virtues as having played the central 
role in the historical configuration of Islam. Like pro-Kamil Muhammad Farid in 1903, Lutfi in 
81. Steppat, Nationalismus, pp. 252, 253. 
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the 1908 article described Algeria's native inhabitants as "the Arabs"82• In this traditional layer 
of Lutfi's consciousness, the classical Arabs and the contemporary ethnic traits (virtues) they 
bequeathed are almost inextricably woven into Islam. Defence of Islam meant exaltation of the 
classical Arabs and vice versa. Arabness so tightly interlinked with Islam seems to offer little 
common ground for contemporary Arabic-speaking Christians and Muslims. It was to take time 
to detach such Arabness from the dynamic of Islamic communities integrating different 
(Muslim) linguistic groups. 
Perceptions of Arabia 
The Kamilists thought of pursuing a special relationship with the Arabian peninsula and 
its inhabitants as a subordinated component in their pan-Islamic support for the Ottoman State. 
Like Lutfi's and Farid's identification with North Africa's "Arabs" a context was expansionist 
imperialism. Intimate relationship with the Arabians was ascribed to both Islam and Arabness. 
'Ali Fahrni Kamil, brother of Mustafa Kamil, expected in 1903 that an appeal to his al-Zaqaziq 
audience's own "Arab initiative/energy" (al-himmat al-'Arabiyyah) would motivate them to aid 
the Hijaz railway, the means to "bring prosperity to your Arab brothers"83• al-Liwa's interest in 
the Arabian peninsula's politics voiced romantic cultural elements, like the motifs that led Lutfi 
to view colonized Algerians as heirs to the classical Arabs' virtues. The writer Muhibb 
al-Dawlah repeatedly gave partisan support to the Amir Ibn Rashid of Najd in his struggle 
against Ibn Sa'ud. His idealization of peninsular Arabians dismissed Arabic press reports that 
the Hanbali Sa'udis were finally about to topple the Rashid amirs, for him Islam's and the 
Ottoman State's bulwark against Britain's expansion in the penisula. This was on grounds of the 
Arab characteristics exemplified by the al-Rashid ruling family: 
Anyone with the slightest acquaintance with Arabia [al-bilad al-' Arabiyyah] knows that 
the Arab [Arabian?] whether great or small, an Amir or base person, is not easy to get the 
82. "al-Inkiliz fi Misr" (The English in Egypt), al-Jaridah 14 April 1908; Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyyah min 
Ta'rikh al-Harakat al-Istiqlaliyyah ed. Isma'il Mazhar (Cairo: Mak:tabat al-Nahdat al-Misriyyah 1946) pp. 109-110. 
For Muhammad Farid's sympathy for Algerians under French rule see fn 136. Ahmad Zaki Pasha in a 1928 
al-Ahram, outraged at an Austrian traveller's charge that a Saharan chief gave him poisoned food, was to perceive 
the Berbers involved in terms of Arab virtues and as Arabs, or Arab-like successors of long-bygone North African 
Islamic states in which Berbers and Arabs had been partners (bookish classicism): al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki pp. 
136-137. 
83. "Khutbah bil-Zaqaziq fihtifal lil-Sikkat al-Hijaziyyah" (A Speech in Zagazig During a Meeting for the 
Hijaz Railway), al-Liwa' 11 August 1903, p. 1. 
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better of. The possibility that he will take some revenge is not to be neglected; wrong 
cannot be done his neighbor in his house without argument, a struggle and fighting by 
heroic warriors ensuing. 
"Muhibb al-Dawlah's" perception of the Najdis here is similar to Mustafa Kamil's sense 
of the Egyptian peasant as Arabized and thus ready to give his own life in ransom for whoever 
seeks his protection. The Najdis, however, were (half-prescriptively) differentiated from the now 
more sedentary Egyptians, more subject to strong central governments, in the observation that 
the end of the Rashidi state cannot be near when "these people are Arabs in their pristine 
nomadism who refuse to recognize the rule of any state over them, who, indeed, as we hear, do 
not much savor the word' Amirate"'84• 
For Kamilist oratory and journalism, then, language, a certain amount of Arab blood, 
Arab characteristics and Islam connected Egyptians to the Arabians. However, the contact 
Egyptians had with predatory, lawless nomads during the pilgrimage to Mecca sometimes 
produced hostility towards some Arabians85• 
Mustafa Kamil himself, not just writers in his al-Liwa', was interested in developing 
relations with the Shammar chieftain Ibn al-Rashid, and planned to make a journey to central 
Arabia to meet him86• Kamil was early aware that bilateral contacts between Egyptians --- or at 
least Egypt's Khedivial family --- and Ibn al-Rashid were regarded as subversive in 
Constantinople87• 
Some items in al-Liwa', however, had affinities to the Khedive 'Abbas' attempts to build 
a special relationship with restive Ottoman Arabs at the expense, 'Abdul-Hamid feared, of the . 
Ottoman State's authority. al-Liwa' in 1908 exalted Ibrahim Pasha's conquest of the Wahhabis 
(1816- 1818) as a religious endeavor by Egyptians to make the road of pilgrimage safe for God's 
84. Muhibb al-Dawlah ("Lover of the Ottoman State"), from Suez, "al-Bilad al-' Arabiyyah" ("The Arabian 
Lands" [or, Arabia]) al-Liwa' 10 July 1904, p. 1. 
85. One important ground on which one 1904 al-Liwa' item justified contributions by Egyptians to the 
financing of the Ottoman Hijaz railway was that the railway, when completed, would end "the sufferings that 
pilgrims must undergo to reach Allah's sacred house and the grave of His Prophet, on whom be blessings and peace, 
because of the barbarous treatment of the nomads" --- the .'...irb.fill, not al-' Arab. "Nahnu wal-Mu'ayyad", al-Liwa' 3 
August 1904, p. 2. 
86. Steppat, Nationalismus p. 282 fn 4. 
87. Mustafa Kamil noted that reports of a visit by Prince 'Aziz Bey, cousin of 'Abbas Hilmi, to Ibn 
al-Rashid prompted' Abdul-Hamid to suspect that the Khedive was conspiring with that Amir against the Porte. Ibid. 
Steppat here cites 'Ali Fahrni Kamil's collection of Mustafa's writings and speeches (v. 4 pp. 124f.): I could not 
check up these observations from Australia --- but the collection abruptly cuts out at 1900. 
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creatures. The al-Liwa' writer supposed that this campaign in Muhammad 'Ali's expansion into 
the Arabian peninsula had won for Egyptians an enduring pre-eminent standing in the area 
between Mecca and Medinah, recognized by all Muslims of the world88• The Kamilists may not 
have envisaged that Egypt would again become guardian of the Hijaz' holy places, the Ottoman 
State's role, but' Abbas presented himself to Ottoman-ruled Arabs as taking up the relations 
which the House of Muhammad 'Ali had established with Arab populations in West Asia 
through Ibrahim Pasha's conquests. 
Various concepts of the Kamilists might have led Egyptian nationalism in other 
circumstances to assert roles for Egypt in Arabia competitive with the Ottoman Turks'. One 
such idea was that the sacrifice of the forefathers' blood to make the pilgrimage safe for all 
Muslims entitled Egypt to a special position in the Hijaz. Still, the secularizing-educated 
Kamilists identified with the Turkish government's attempts to economically modernize and 
integrate Arabia through, notably, the Hijaz railway. The Arabians' own interest was to become 
part of the economy that the Turks directed. The expansionist presence of the British in Aden, 
'Uman and the Shaykhdoms of the Gulf led the Kamilists to support strongly the Ottoman State's 
drive to establish effective rule over the peninsula, through the railway. For the time, Egypt's 
interests checked sympathy for West Asian Arab discontent against the ruling Turks. A strong, 
cohesive Ottoman State would continue to legally block outright British annexation of Egypt. 
Khedivial "Arab Caliphate" Subversion 
Egypt's Turkish-speaking royal house maintained multiple, intimate bonds with the 
Ottoman Empire and its ruling Turkish element: these drew them into the Ottoman State's 
politics, while equally facilitating interventions by the Sublime Porte in Egypt's affairs. Figures 
of Egypt's royal house fell repeatedly into bad relations with the suzerain Ottoman Sultan or 
governments in Constantinople. Members of Egypt's 
'Alid royal family were proud of past military expansion under 
Muhammad' Ali into Ottoman West Asia, mainly in Arab areas: they never let the Ottoman 
88. "Madha hum qa'ilun", al-Liwa' 21 February 1903 p. 1. Despite its arguments about Egypt's 
preeminent position in Islam's Arabian holy places, the al-Liwa' article was in reponse to a fall of the numbers of 
Egyptian pilgrims in the most recent lliill to 28 as a result of an "Egyptian government" tax. 
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Empire's Arabs and Turks forget. Touring Syria in 1910, the' Alid Prince Muhammad' Ali 
declared at Ba'labakka that the aims of his journey were to choose Arab thoroughbred horses and 
see the sites of the conquests of his great forefathers89. 
The ex-Khedive Isma'il had resented that' Abdul-Hamid deposed him under pressure 
from the Powers. He financed the London al-Nahlah (published from 1877) and al-Khilafah 
(The Caliphate --- published from Naples from 1877) which questioned' Abdul-Hamid's title to 
the Caliphate. The Sharif of Mecca might be made an Arab Caliph under the temporal protection 
of an Egyptian Sultan90• Marmaduke Pickthall found 
propagandists sent by 'Abbas Hilmi preaching such an "Arab 
Caliphate", an Arab Empire, in Palestine in the mid-1890s91 • Cromer confidentially reported to 
Prime Minister Salisbury in 1897 that 'Abbas was sending emissaries to the Hijaz and the Amir 
of Najd, Ibn al-Rashid92• Constantinople in 1899 cabled its governor in Basrah to arrest 
emissaries sent by 'Abbas and by the Amir of Najd with "dangerous advice" that might concern 
Mecca93• Towards the end of' Abdul-Hamid's reign, the Khedive's dogged supporter Shaykh 
'Ali Yusuf called in al-Mu'ayyad for a constitution for Egypt with the Khedive as an 
independent ruler "with a hint that an Arab Caliphate might be instituted and thus be transferred 
from Turkey to Egypt". The Ottoman government banned al-Mu'ayyad from the Ottoman 
territories in which it previously circulated widely94• The official British observer Ronald Storrs 
89. "al-Brins Muhammad 'Ali fi Suriya" (Prince Muhammad 'Ali in Syria) al-Mugattarn 14 April 1910 p. 
4. Cf. fn. 62. al-Hizb al-Watani's second leader Muhammad Farid readily credited the charge of the pro-CUP 
Syrian Rashid Mutran (Christian) that Prince Muhammad during tours of Syria was acting as 'Abbas' agent to fan -
Arab discontent against the Turks. Farid, A wrag p. 116. 
90. Hourani, Arabic Thought pp. 269-270. The Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid, or some faction at his court, paid the 
Khedives back in kind. a1-Mugattam, hostile to both the Sultan and the Khedive 'Abbas, in 1902 noted the 
publication by Ibrahim Haqqi Bey of a magazine Islamic Echo, from Liverpool in English and French. It praised the 
Sultan and al-Sayyid Abul-Huda (ethnic Arab sufi leader originally from Aleppo), while assailing' Abbas and the 
elements in the Ottoman establishment favorably disposed to him, such as 'Izzat Pasha al-' Abid. "Sada al-Islam" 
(The Echo of Islam), al-Mugattam 31October1902 p. 3. 
91. Ibid, p. 270; cf. Sylvia Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley: University of California 
Press 1952) p. 28. 
92. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, 'Abbas Hilmi II: The Khedive and Egypt's Struggle for Independence (PhD 
thesis, University of Michigan 1978) p. 349. 
93. I!lli! p. 350. 
94. Duse Mohamed, In the Land of the Pharaohs p. 325. al-Mu'ayyad offered its pages as a hospitable 
forum for angry Ottoman Arabs. In mid-1905, it published a collage of criticisms and condemnations of 
misgovernment by Turkish governors and officials in the Yemen from, for instance, a wisely anonymous "rich 
notable from the wealthy of al-Hudaydah", and from the famous traveller Sayf al-Din al-Yamani in Singapore. 
Although unflinching, such West Asian Arab scrutiny of Turkish officials was not yet secessionist if the Ottoman 
State sent the Yemenis "just, moderate governors" instead (cf fns 75-77), "the Arabs" there would calm down, 
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assessed the July 1914 attempt on 'Abbas' life in Constantinople as managed by the Young 
Turks for "removal of the Khedive as possible head of an anti-Turkish Arab Confederation''.95• 
Hourani, Sylvia Haim and Ann Elizabeth Mayer all speculate about a possible connection 
between Khedive 'Abbas and his court and the Aleppan Syrian 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi 
(1849 - 1902) who published Umm al-Oura (The Mother of Cities) from exile in Cairo96• This 
work called for a shift of leadership in the community of believers of Islam from the Turks back 
to the Arabs, and advocated an Arabian Caliph, in the line of Quraysh, who would have authority 
in spiritual questions throughout the Muslim world, but also exercise temporal authority in the 
Hijaz97• 
'Abbas' extra-Egyptian activities and his circle prefigure the post-World War I 
pan-Islamic/pan-Arab current running counter to self-containedness of the Egyptian particularist 
polity. Egypt's post-World War I "Eastern League" (al-Rabitat al-Sharqiyyah) was to involve 
Egyptians in the West Asian Arabs' affairs. A former employee of 'Abbas active in the League 
was Ahmad Shafiq Pasha (1860 - 1940), of Turco-Circassian ethnic origin, who had studied law 
and political science in France, published books in French as well as Arabic, and was chief of the 
Khedivial cabinet under 'Abbas Hilmi. Another acculturated intellectual later active in the 
League was Ahmad Zaki Pasha, to become interbellum "Shaykh of Arabism". In the period of 
British rule, he occupied various positions in the Council of Ministers (Mailis al-Nuzzar) over 
"submitting completely to the great Caliph". Those Yemenis excerpted from al-Mu'ayyad's extensive mail on the 
subject, called for the Porte to send them not mediocrities but officials of international calibre such as those it 
despatched to reform its Balkans territories: men like Husayn Hilmi Pasha (Inspector-General ofRumelia 
1903-1908) who won the confidence of Europe. Nonetheless, such al-Mu'ayyad items did raise the possibility that 
the Ottoman State could one day conceivably lose such an Arab province as Yemen, bracketed with the seceding 
Christian nationalities. "Zalamat al-' Arab" (The Grievances of the Arabs), al-Mu'ayyad 17 July 1905. Muhammad 
Farid considered al-Mu'ayyad editor al-Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf perhaps the Khedive 'Abbas' most active collaborator in 
the Arab Caliphate subversion: he knew so much that 'Abbas never dared withdraw his patronage up to his death in 
1913. Farid, Awraq pp. 122-123. 
95. Sir Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson 1937) p. 145. Muhammad Farid 
stated that the Turks did not want 'Abbas Hilmi to accompany their armies moving through Syria towards Egypt: 
there was too much support in Syria for 'Abbas' plan for an Arab Sultanate of Egypt, Syria and Arabia. Mayer, 
'Abbas Hilmi II p. 563. 'Abbas probably collaborated with Turkish political opponents of the CUP. The Anglophile 
former Grand Vezir Mehmed Kamil Pasha (1832-1913) left to exile in Egypt in February 1913. From Cairo, Kamil 
continued to intrigue against the CUP. The CUP regime viewed the Khedive as hostile and as supporting the 
activities of Kamil Pasha and other Turkish exiles in Cairo. Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of 
Union and Progress in Turkish Politics. 1908-1914 (London: OUP 1969) pp. 126-129. 
96. Hourani, Arabic Thought pp 271-273; Haim, Arab Nationalism pp. 28-29; Mayer,' Abbas Hilmi II p. 
409. 
97. Haim, Arab Nationalism pp. 26-27. 
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thirty years, and from 1906 was' Abbas' Master of Ceremonies. Also to prove active in the 
Eastern League was the Egypt-born Ottoman army officer' Aziz' Ali al-Misri, an early 
insurrectionist Arab nationalist. al-Misri acted on 'Abbas' behalf to induce the Sanusi to make 
peace with Italy following her defeat of Turkey in the 1911-1912 Tripolitanian W ar98• 
Ahmad Zaki was an intimate of Ahmad Shafiq. During thirty years of secretarial duties 
in the Council of Ministers (Majlis al-Nuzzar) Zaki systematically replaced Turkish words used 
in official correspondence with pure Arabic terms, as energetically as he eliminated current 
European loan-words99• When visiting Palestine, Syria and Lebanon in 1904 and 1924, Zaki 
made a point of visiting Marj Dabiq where the Ottoman Turks under Salim the Grim crushed 
Egypt's Mamlukes in 1516, initiating the period of Ottoman rule of Egypt, and Nisibin where 
Ibrahim Pasha defeated the Turkish army in 1839100 (cf. B 82-5). 'Abbas' Arab Caliphate 
activities are not to be atomized as only the instrument of his personal ambition vis-a-vis 
Istanbul: they accorded with the historical memory and blended Turco-Arab ethnicity of the 
tri-lingual acculturated elite that had built up around his dynasty. 
The Later Kamilists: From the Pro-Ottoman Pan-Islamic Political Community Towards 
Pan-Arabism 
Kamil early knew about' Abbas' approaches in the 1890s to such Ottoman Arabs as Ibn 
al-Rashid, and that' Abdul-Hamid perceived these as challenging his authority. Kamil was 
financed by, and worked in close conjunction with, the Khedive 'Abbas from around 1892. Ann 
Elizabeth Mayer fixes 1898 as the year in which the Khedive's relations with' Abdul-Hamid 
took their decisive turn for the worse and 'Abbas became more conciliatory to the British 
presence101 • 'Abbas' recurring involvement in Arab affairs was well underway by 1898, the year 
in which Mustafa Kamil published his al-Mas'alat al-Sharqiyyah (The Eastern Question). In that 
book Kamil disingenuously referred to an Arab caliphate to be headed by Khedive 'Abbas II as 
98. Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks p. 139. 
99. Anwar al-Jundi, Ahmad Zaki pp. 74-76. 
100. Ibid p. 89. From 1889 when they accompanied each other to Paris, Ahmad Shafiq Pasha and Zaki 
often travelled together outside Egypt. Ibid p. 87. Shafiq denied in his memoirs that he was privy to promotion by 
'Abbas of any movement for an Arab Caliphate. Mayer, .Q1lQ1 p. 354. He was, certainly, close to Rashid Rida, the 
Arab-centric salafist religious revivalist who articulated increasingly anti-Turkish views of Arab history in al-Manar, 
and came to support secession from the Ottoman Empire. 
101. Mayer,' Abbas Hilmi II pp. 156-7. 
an 
was 
denounced the idea as the a 
successor as leader of al-Hizb al-Watani, Muhammad Farid, in 1912 virulently denounced 
'Abbas in a French paper for plotting against the Ottoman Empire in order to establish himself as 
head of an Arab caliph under British auspices104• Farid in 1911 attacked Rashid Rida for 
working for Arab independence: Rida's British-backed puppet "Arab caliphate" threatened the 
Ottoman Empire105. 
The Kamilist movement is argued to have diffused among the Egyptian public a 
long-term dislike of Asian pan-Arabism that endured into the 1920s. Colombe concluded that 
"guided by [Mustafa Kamil], Egyptian nationalism remained clearly distinct from Arab 
nationalism which mounted first as a reaction against Hamidian absolutism and, after the 
revolution of 1908, against the dictatorship of the Young Turks "106• Yet the supreme value 
placed on the Arabic language Mustafa Kamil' s independence movement recurred in later 
support his followers gave to the Ottoman Empire's Arabs in conflicts ruling Turks. 
Muhammad Farid was elected leader of the Patriotic Party ( al-Hizb al-Watani) 
after Kamil's premature death in February 1908. He was an acculturated 
professional-intellectual who had graduated in Egypt's France-derived secular law; he spoke 
French well and travelled, orated and lobbied extensively in Europe. His view of the Ottoman 
Empire's ruling Turks was long tinctured by his consciousness that his family had originally 
been Turkish, although it had come to Egypt long ago, shortly after the Ottoman conquest; 
Farid's father had served three Khedives, finally as director of the Khedivial estates 107, and thus 
had lived in culturally Turkish milieus. In his early Ta'rikh al-Dawlat al-' Aliyyah (History of 
102. Safran, Egypt in Search pp. 291-2. 
103. Kamil, Egyptiens et Anglais (Paris: 2nd ed 1906) quoted Marcel Colombe, L'evolution de l'Egypte. 
1924-1950 (Paris: G.P. Maisonneuve 1951) p. 165. 
104. Farid, "La Lutte du Khedive contre le Sultan pour le Khalifa", La Siecle (Paris) 14 August 1912: 
summarized Goldschmidt, "Egyptian National Party" p. 328; Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1961) p. 292. 
105. Haim, Arab Nationalism p. 47. 
106. Colombe, L'Evolution p. 166. 
107. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party: 1892-1919" in Holt (ed.) Political and Social 
Change p. 322. 
1 as 
parliamentarism developed 
a while made it a model for political modernization, even to proto-particularist Egyptianists like 
Lutfi al-Sayyid. As the new leader of al-Hizb al-Watani, Muhammad Farid and other figures in 
the Party quickly proposed that Egypt send representatives to the new Ottoman parliament 
(Majlis-i-Mab'uthan). No such reconfederation of Egypt with the Empire materialized because 
the insecure Young Turks praised Britain's work in Egypt and denied ties with the Kamilists 108• 
As the Patriotic Party grew and mobilized a wider and wider range of social classes after 
1908, the British progressively drove its leaders into exile: many henceforth had to interact with 
Turks on a day-to-day basis for months at a time. Farid entered the Turkish milieu innocently 
vulnerable to culture shock, and consequent reaction against anything Turkish: he combined 
romantic identification with his family's ancestral Turkishness with a cultural Arabness 
profoundly ignorant of Turkish language culture109• Farid did not have the same 
over Patriotic Party as founder A~u ...... &. consequently, at the time exile to 
Ottoman Empire Europe it also factionalized. officials might 
attempt to win control over 'Abdul Hamid had not allowed coherent Arab ethnic opposition to 
develop in his Empire; in the more fluid and plural, sometimes genuinely parliamentarist, politics 
after 1908, ethnic polarization took place between the Ottoman Turks and the elite Arab resident 
minority that Farid encountered in Istanbul. In the period 1908 .: 1914, Farid's increasing 
interactions in Constantinople chipped away his party's traditional reflex to explain away the 
Ottoman Empire's structural ethnic discords as subversion from outsiders. 
During the transitional period of uncertainty about relations between (a) the CUP/new 
post-Hamidian order in Constantinople and (b) the Egyptian nationalists, Ottoman-ruled Arab 
108. Ibid pp. 324-325. 
109. Farid seems to have had no Turkish. In his Arabic diary, he spelt a Turkish journal Tasfir-i-Afkar, his 
rendition of the sound of the Turks' pronounciation Tasvir-i-Afkar. Awraq v. l p. 190. Had he read the Turkish 
journal he would have written the Arabic orthography Taswir Afkar. (He did give this correct spelling in !hill p. 
345). Farid made no attempt to address Turkish audiences in Istanbul in their language: he delivered a pan-Islamic 
speech in Arabic and a Hizb al-Watani editor who knew Turkish then read out a translation. Awraq v. 1p.190. 
Javed Bey of the CUP corresponded with Farid in French (facsimile of card, Awraq v. l p. 336) which does not 
indicate that Farid was known as someone who read the (much Arabicized) literary Ottoman Turkish. Farid's earlier 
references to his family's remote Turkishness seem romantic; we ethnically categorize him as Arab Egyptian. 
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quasi-nationalists made a strong bid to win Farid's (and his party's) support for some transfer of 
power from Turks to Arabs. The Cairo-born Ottoman Army officer,' Aziz' Ali al-Misri (c. _1879 
- 1959)110 put out the feelers during a visit to Cairo soon after the CUP revolt restored the 
Ottoman Constitution. al-Misri had participated in the CUP's military revolution from 
Macedonia, and presented himself to Farid as "still a Unionist" but dedicated "to construct an 
Arab Caliphate or Sultanate": "the Turkish element has lost all its political and martial qualities 
and Islam's only hope to get out of its sorry state lies in the Arab element". al-Misri invited 
members of the Kamilist Patriotic Party's Administrative Committee to join his secret "Society 
of Arab Youth" (Jam'iyat Shubban al-'Arab). 'Abd al-' Aziz Shawish was present at the 
meetings. "After a long discussion" Farid and his colleagues declined because such Arab 
endeavors could only lead to "division between the two elements/communities of the [Ottoman] 
State". However, Farid believed that al-Misri had proceeded to found a branch of the secret 
society in Cairo111 • Farid's perception that the movement which al-Misri represented would 
throw Turks and Arabs into destructive conflict was far-sighted. In 1909 al-Misri with Salim 
al-Jaza'iri founded the Qahtaniyyah Arab national secret society in Constantinople --- and in 
1914 al-' Ahd, the secret society that recruited Arab officers in the Ottoman Army, especially 
'lraqis112• Certainly, Farid by July 1913 believed that al-Misri, when prompted by the Khedive 
'Abbas, had become ready to proclaim the "independence of Syria", and "the independence of 
the Arabs", at the head of Ottoman troops under his command in Bayrut (most Turkish troops in 
the city had left to fight in the Balkans). Britain and France would support such Arab 
secession113• al-Misrijoined the 1916 Arab revolt against the Turks launched by the Sharif 
Husayn and his sons' Abdallah, Faysal and' Ali from the Hijaz. 
Personal Antagonisms Retard Pan-Arabization. After the CUP coup in 1908, Lutfi made 
110. A good overview of al-Misri's roles in early Ottoman Arab nationalism, judiciously noting transitional 
aspects that do not fit into nationalism proper, is given by Majid Khadduri, " 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri and the Arab 
Nationalist Movement" in Albert Hourani (ed.) Middle Eastern Affairs (St. Anthony's Papers no. 17) (London: OUP 
1965) pp. 140-163. 
ll 1. Farid, Awrag v. 1, pp. 100-101. Farid's notes about his 1908 encounter with al-Misri in Cairo, 
however, were written subsequently, from memory. 
112. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1938) pp. 91-92. Many of the 'Iraqi friends who influenced the pan-Arabization of Ahmad Hasan 
al-Zayyat had had pre-1918 backgrounds in the secret Arab nationalist societies that al-Misri built in the Ottoman 
anned forces in particular: B 321 fn. 
113. Farid'sjoumal entry dated 27 July 1913, Awrag v. 1, p. 99. 
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the significant point that confederation with the Ottoman State would threaten "the interest of 
[Egypt's] royal [Khedivial] family" 114: and indeed the Khedive 'Abbas henceforth until the 
Ottoman Empire collapsed was in consistent bitter conflict with the Young Turks: al-Hizb 
al-Watani, led by' Abbas' enemy Farid, was the third party in a tight, tense triangular 
relationship. That the 'Abbas he loathed continued unceasingly to fan Arab discontent 
throughout the CUP era for a time made Farid support Turkish authority more strongly. Ethnic 
division in the Ottoman State would only help the expansionist imperialists to harm and 
subjugate the Arabs and Egyptians. The Tripolitanian War that broke out in 1911 when Italy 
invaded Ottoman Libya, Egypt's neighbor, presented a first-hand illustration: Farid believed that, 
in order to win the Italians' goodwill, and thus to facilitate sale of his Maryut railway to them, 
'Abbas engineered the collapse of the Libyans' guerrilla resistance in Cyrenaica, by tempting 
'Aziz' Ali al-Misri to return with his Ottoman troops to Bayrut to work for Arab 
independence115• In 1912 in a French newspaper he denounced 'Abbas for plotting against the 
Ottoman Empire in order to establish himself as head of an Arab Caliphate under British 
protection116• Similarly, in 1911 he denounced the Egypt-resident Syrian Islamic revivalist 
Rashid Rida (1865 - 1935) for working in league with the British imperialists to create a puppet 
Arab mock Caliphate117• 
Muhammad Farid's gradual alienation from the Turks had distinct periods. From July 
1908 to August 1914, after difficulties in the first twelve months, Farid built up workable 
relations with the Young Turks, and won from them considerable aid for the Egyptian 
independence movement. Many Egyptian Watanis, even as early as September 1910118, 
expected the Turks to liberate Egypt from the British militarily. Farid and other Watani leaders 
114. Lufi, Safahat p. 36. Analysis ofLutfi's vehement particularist ideological response to the proposal of 
Egyptian deputies for the Istanbul parliament in Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 178. 
115. Farid's journal of 27 July 1913, filmlll v. 1 pp. 99-100. Gershoni and Jankowsky, too, saw' Abbas as, 
during the Italo-Ottoman War in Libya in 1911-1912, while verbally supporting the Ottoman cause, "acting in 
collusion with the Italians in exchange for financial considerations within Egypt": 'Abbas' urging of the Libyans to 
capitulate for his own enrichment showed that his activities in the Ottoman Arab provinces was not a genuine 
"nationalist involvement". Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, Eg)'.l)t. Islam and the Arabs (New York : OUP 
1986) p. 19. 
116. Farid, "La Lutte du Khedive contre le Sultan pour le Khalifa", La Siecle (Paris) 14 August 1912; 
summarized Goldschmidt "Egyptian National Party" p. 328; Safran, Eg)'.l)t In Search p. 292. 
117. Haim, Arab Nationalism p. 47. 
118. Report in September 1910 from Cheetham to the British Foreign Office quoted 'Isam Diya' al-Din, 
"al-Hizb al-Watani fi Misr wa 'Alaqatuhu bi-Turkiya 1-Fatat" (The Patriotic Party in Egypt and its Relationship with 
the Young Turks), Afag 'Arabiyyah (Baghdad) v. 2: 1 September 1976 p. 19. 
unrest s 
occupying that 
the political community, rejected Farid's motto "Egypt for the Egyptians" 119 : Farid considered 
Shawish and his emigre faction eager to collaborate in a Turkish administration of Egypt120• 
Farid drew near to an internationally open break with the Ottoman Turks, with which 
Mustafa Kamil so long associated Egypt when lobbying in the West. In a January 1916 
interview with acting German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmerman, Farid opposed Egypt being 
placed under the administration of the Turks "in any circumstances": "we are much more 
developed than they, our country was administratively more organized from before the British 
conquest", "their ignorance of administration is to be witnessed in the lands of Syria and 
elsewhere" (socialized quasi-pan-Arabism: cf. the 'Iraqis' transmission of this motif to al-Zayyat 
after 1929: B 313-314). Already, Farid--- al-Jaridah-like! --- equated Britain and the Ottoman 
State as equally intent to "eat up" Egypt121 • 
their view that the was 
the instrument by which one nation collectively oppressed another. He still intermittently stated 
that Islam's nationalities-unifying political ideal should restructure the Ottoman Empire. 
Emotionally, though, Farid increasingly felt that the Egyptians and the Asian Arabs shared 
parallel oppression at the hands of two similar imperialist powers. But could he really endorse 
armed rebellion by Muslim Arabs against Muslim Turks as morally valid like the Muslim 
Egyptians' struggle against Christian British occupation? 
Jamal Pasha, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Ottoman forces in Syria from the 
outbreak of World War I, executed eleven prominent Arabs in August 1915 and twenty-one more 
119. In December 1914, Shawish already told Farid in Constantinople that wearing of the Patriotic Party 
pin with the motto by Farid and his colleagues had angered the Turks, as had Farid's statement at a meeting on 
anti-British pamphlets that "we must be careful in our writings not to enable our enemies to say that we of the 
Patriotic Party want to hand Egypt over to the Turks" Awraq v. 1, p. 193. Shawish countered the slogan "Egypt for 
the Egyptians" with his slogan "Egypt for the Muslims" which would allow the Turks some permanent role in 
Egypt's government. Awraq v. 1, p. 199. 
120. Other members of Shawish's pro-Turkish, pan-Islamic faction among the watani emigres were 
Muhammad Hilmi Muslim, Ahmad Fu'ad and Fu'ad Salim. 
121. Awraq v. l,p. 280. 
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the following January122• These executions in Damascus, intended to quell unrest in Syria and 
other Arab provinces, ushered in a new stage of violent hatred. Farid reacted with shock anP. 
anger, aware through his constant contact with Arab Ottomans of the long-term Arab-Turkish 
conflict that the executions would foster. 
Farid vented his anger discreetly, in his diaries and in private conversations with 
Egyptian comrades, with Asian Arabs and even some Turks. In public, his emigre faction of the 
Kamilist independence movement remained formally allied with the Turks as the shock-waves of 
the executions spread, yet in June 1916 he saw the Turks' treatment of the Asian Arabs as worse 
than the British imperialists' repression of the Egyptians. The British Commander-in-Chief, Sir 
Archibald Murray, had commuted to life imprisonment the sentences of hanging issued against 
Muhammad Shams al-Din and Najib al-Halbawi who threw a bomb at Egypt's puppet sultan 
Husayn Kamil. Farid believed that the Egyptian ummah (nation) appreciated this British 
clemency, contrasting as it did to Jamal Pasha's hanging of twenty-one of the most prominent 
men of Syria, "from the greatest Islamic families", among them the Islamic Shaykh 'Abd 
al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, member of the Ottoman Parliament whom the Turks had arrested in 
violation of his rights under their Constitution and even martial law. "All these acts make the 
Egyptians hate the Turks; they make us fear that hanging will be our fate if Jamal Pasha gets into 
Egypt, as he threatened us more than once in Syria"123• Nothing in his diaries indicates that Farid 
ever seriously considered arguments or evidence presented by the Turks that the Arabs hung 
were in treasonous contact with foreign powers; the in places well-documented volume that 
Jamal Pasha published in Arabic, French and Turkish to justify the executions only inflamed his 
hatred of the Turks124• 
Emotionally, then, Farid was well prepared to accept armed Arab insurgency against the 
Ottoman State by the time that the Amir Husayn proclaimed the Arab Revolt from the Hijaz in 
June 1916. He told the German Foreign Ministry Arabist, Baron Oppenheim, that Jamal Pasha's 
executions and oppression in Syria "were one cause of the Sharif of Mecca's uprising": the 
Sharif had now called himself King of the Arabs and gained British and French recognition125• 
122. Peter Mansfield, The Arabs (London: Allen Lane 1976) p. 194. 
123. Awraq v. 1, pp. 308-309. 
124. The Arabic version, published in Istanbul, was titled lciahat 'an al-Masa'il al-Siyasiyyah; the French 
version La Verite sur la Question Syrienne. Hairn, Arab Nationalism p. 47. 
125. Awraq v. 1 p. 344. 
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Despite this continuing encouragement from the British imperialists, Egypt's enemy, Farid 
clearly by 1917 was sympathetic to the Arab movements whereas he had denounced them as a 
British instrument in 1912. A residue of Islamic ideology's commitment to a unitary Ottoman 
State was that he described the family of the Sharif Husayn as loyally and scrupulously 
discharging their duties to it until the Turks' murderous oppression forced them to revolt. He 
wrote down the account of a Watani Egyptian just come from Istanbul that the Amir Faysal had 
creditably fought at the head of 2,000 Hijazi tribal volunteers in Jamal Pasha's expedition against 
the British in Egypt; but when Faysal had interceded for some of the Syrian notables about to be 
executed, Jamal only insulted him. This harshness motivated Faysal to return to the Hijaz. The 
Turks were preparing to arrest Husayn and his whole family when he proclaimed the revolt 
shortly after Faysal's retum126• Farid's limited perception of Arab nationality as in its own right 
a motive of Arab rebellion against the Turks, also underlay his discussion of the Sharif's motives 
with the German Foreign Secretary, Zimmerman, in February 1917. Farid stressed the 
background of Turkish oppression and violence but did not mention any ideological Arab 
nationalism that would inherently have opposed Husayn to the multi-national Ottoman State, had 
the CUP remained true to the State's integrative Islamic principle. Husayn had asked the Turks 
to grant his posterity hereditary title to his position as Amir of Mecca: the harsh CUP had refused 
and provoked him into avoidable rebellion. Even after he proclaimed the rebellion, Husayn 
(Farid stressed to Zimmerman) had not rejected the Ottoman Sultan's title to the Islamic 
Caliphate nor declared his secession127• Like Lutfi's attunedness to Ottoman Arab grievances 
(Ch. 6), Farid was accurate: even Husayn's more Arabist son' Abdallah, too, had long been held 
back from insurrection by the Islamic elements shared between Arabs and Turks that the CUP 
chipped down 128• 
126. I.!lli1 p. 358. 
127. Ibid p. 346. 
128. Dawn's judgement is that from 1912 to the beginning of 1914 the Sharif Husayn was generally 
regarded by the Turks and Arabs alike as a supporter of the Ottoman State and not as an Arab nationalist C. Ernest 
Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1973) p. 15. Dawn reconstructed that although Husayn's son' Abdallah became a convert to Arabism and 
armed revolt well before his father, even his conversion took to July 1914. I.!lli1p.69. A side of Sharif Husayn 
accepted that as long as the Ottoman government maintained the shari' ah, it was the Islamic state for all Muslims. 
Thid p. 82. In his Revolt proclamations, Husayn charged the secularoid CUP with being "heretical conquerors" and 
having lost territory from "the state oflslam". Ibid pp. 80-82. Dawn stresses stubborn shari'ah-centric, Caliphal 
elements in even' Abdallah's cooling to the Turks: he interestingly believed that the Unionists "did not understand" 
the alien Western forms with which they downgraded the Qur'an and Sunnah. Illlil p. 72. 
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From mid-1916 the emigre Watani milieu in both Constantinople and Europe was in 
close contact and accord with disaffected Ottoman Arabs and there were signs at points tha~ the 
two Arab movements, the Egyptian and the West Asian, might merge. Farid now let even 
Christian Ottoman Arabs bend his enfeebled pan-Islamic ideology so that it validated the 
political expression of ethnic-national communities. Sulayman al-Bustani, Christian Syrian 
deputy in the Ottoman parliament129, was one of the high Arab officials in the CUP 
administration who helped radically to ethnicize Farid's view of the Ottoman Empire. When 
discontented Arab leaders held the Arab Conference in Paris in June 1913 al-Bustani (Farid 
credited) played the main part in negotiating a temporary reconciliation between the Turks and 
the Arabs in the CUP. When Farid met him in Switzerland in June 1916, they discussed Turkish 
"atrocities" in Syria and al-Bustani expressed his deep regret 
about the bad policy that the Turks followed towards us Egyptians ... [He] said that this 
was the view of many Unionists, that he often had demonstrated the unsoundness of their 
policy to them, the policy of the old-style Turkish conquest, and that the [Ottoman State] 
could revive again only through agreement with the other Islamic nationalities (ajnas) 
with maintenance of the independence of each in its internal govemment130• 
By June 1916, then, Farid the Egyptian nationalist was developing views about the 
Ottoman Turks that paralleled those of ethnically militant Ottoman Arabs. He and the Asian 
Arab Sulayman al-Bustani still verbally reiterated --- and he clearly retained residual 
commitment to --- the ideals of united Ottoman and wide pan-Islamic communities, which the 
CUP-led Ottoman Turks, too, officially were pledged to promote. By mid-1916, however, 
neither Farid nor al-Bustani believed that these theories determined the Turks' treatment of 
Arabic-speakers. Farid now readily accepted al-Bustani's anti-Turkish historical view: the Turks 
129. Sulayman al-Bustani (1856-1925) became member for Bayrut in the post-Hamidian second Ottoman 
Parliament. He was originally educated in the secularish "Patriotic School" <al-Madrasat al-Wataniyyah), 
established in Bayrut in 1863 by Butrus al-Bustani to integrate the sects. He served as Minister of Commerce and 
Agriculture from 1913, but resigned when the CUP-dominated Ottoman Government entered World War 1, in 
protest at its alliance with Germany. He drifted into self-exile in Switzerland later moved to Egypt where he had 
resided several times before the War and published anti-Hamidian works on Ottoman politics. He was well-known 
to Egyptians as the translator of the Iliad. Daghir, Masadir v. 2 pp. 189-192. The al-Jaridah intellectuals were well 
aware that al-Bustani was protesting CUP foreign policy in resigning, as had Muhammad Pasha, Minister for Public 
Works, and Jamal Pasha the Minister for the Navy. "al-Wizarat al- 'Uthmaniyyah Ba' da l'lan al-Harb" (The 
Ottoman Ministry after the Declaration of War), al-Jaridah 7 November 1914. al-Jari<lah was hardly correct to 
categorize Jamal Pasha among the malcontents: as the senior member of the CUP triumvirate with Enver and Talat, 
Jamal went on to become Governor of Syria and Commander of the Fourth Army there. 
130. Awrag v. 1,pp. 309-310. 
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were originally, and remained, intrusive conquerors in the Arab regions. 
Pan-Turkish Excoriated 
Between 1914 and 1918 both (a) Ottoman Arabs and (b) some Watani Egyptians exiled 
among them, came to see Turks as national enemies whom it was right to resist with 
counter-violence. However, Farid's habitual pan-Islamic formal conceptual categories shifted 
more slowly than his more and more ethnicized emotions and stances. The accelerating shift 
from Islamic to pan-Turkic attitudes among Ottoman Turks helped him to depict them as the 
rebels against his ongoing pan-Islamic political ideal, legitimizing his own --- and the Ottoman 
Arabs' --- national resistance. Farid several times encountered the Tatar Yusuf Akcuraoglu 
(1876 - 1939), editor of the journal Turk Yurdu, founded a few years after the CUP coup. 
Around the end of 1915 Farid already perceived Akcuraoglu's group to stand for "the supremacy 
of the Turkish element, construction of a pan-Turkic community to be made up of the Turks of 
the Ottoman Empire and those outside under Russian rule, the basis to be jinsiyyah (racial/ethnic 
nationality), not religion"131 • It angered Farid that Mehmet Ali Tevfik, the youthful Turkist 
editor of the CUP's French journal Hilal "mentioned nothing about the [classical] Arabs at all" in 
mid-1918 lectures in Berlin that extolled the origin, history, conquests and civilization of the 
Turks. Yet "the Turks" could have weight as ah ally for the Oermans only if they represented all 
Islam132• Despite Akcuraoglu's extra-Ottoman origin133, Farid soon considered that his 
131. Ibid v. 1pp.277-278. Farid's evaluation that Akcuraoglu's pan-Turkic nationalism ruled out union 
with non-Turkic Muslim peoples was correct Akcuraoglu explicitly rejected pan-Islamism and Ottomanism in his 
famous essay "Three Kinds of Policy" published in the Cairo magazine Turk in 1904. Instead the Ottoman Turks 
should base their struggle to survive on "the Turkish race" in the Ottoman Empire and beyond in regions occupied 
by Russia. Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: OUP 1968, 2nd ed) pp. 326-327. 
132. Farid's reaction to Mehmet Ali Tevfik's lecture in Berlin on 25 May 1918. Awrag v. 1, pp. 400-401. 
133. Yusuf Akcuraoglu (1876-1933) was born a Tatar in Simbirsk on the Volga, but came to Istanbul in his 
youth and was educated in' Abdul-Hamid's military schools. He popularized Turkic populations under Tsarist 
Russian rule, and in reaction to the Ottomanism of Young Turk fellow-emigres published his Uc Tarz-i-Sirn 
(Three Kinds of Policy) stressing the national unity of all Turkic peoples, as distinct from other Muslim peoples. 
After 1908, he returned to Istanbul to become a CUP politician and editor of Turk Yurdu (1911) and Tmic Ocagi 
(1912) and professor of history of Dar al-Funun. Stanford J. & Ezel Koral Shaw, Histmy of the Ottoman Empire 
and Modem Turkey v. 2 (New York: CUP 1977) pp. 263, 289, 301; Lewis, Emergence pp. 320-321, 345-346. 
Akcuraoglu was heading a delegation of Russian Tatars come to lobby the Central Powers to deliver the Tatars in 
Russia from Russian rule when Farid encountered him in Berlin around the close of 1915. Farid might have 
questioned how representative he was of Ottoman Turks: his origin structured his thought to meet the needs of 
Turkics under Russian rule. Yet pan-Turkism was being accepted by the Ottoman elite: the heir apparent Prince 
Yusuf 'Izz al-Din was president of the scholarly and cultural Turk Demegi founded in Istanbul in December 1908. 
Lewis, Emergence p. 349. 
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pan-Turkic doctrines had become the ideology that motivated the Empire's ruling Turks. In 
March 1916, just three months before the Sharif Husayn proclaimed the Arab revolt in the J:Iijaz, 
Farid in Constantinople denounced the Turk Yurdu movement for preferring Magyars to Arabs 
"on the grounds that the Magyars are of Turkish origin although they are Christians". To the 
argument that the Arabs had provoked the Turk Yurdu's extremism in the first place by 
maintaining their clubs and racial nationality Uinsiyyah) in Constantinople, Farid replied that 
"they are right to do so because you want to Turkicize them and you despise their language and 
customs and treat them no better than dogs" 134• By mid-March 1917, Farid believed that the 
Ottoman Turks, having psychologically withdrawn from Islamic community loyalty, did not care 
about the Empire's Arab provinces and therefore were not seriously defending them from 
conquest by the British and French. Just after the British conquered Baghdad, Akcuraoglu 
delivered a lecture at the Ottomans' club in Berlin: it was all about the Turks' ancient history, the 
Turks under Russian rule, and pan-Turk.ism but did not even mention the fall of Baghdad. This 
indicated for Farid that the Turks had no serious will to wrest back the "lands of the Arabs" that 
had fallen to the Europeans; they rather directed their military resources north to liberate "their 
[Turkic] brothers" under Russian rule. Their "mad" policy of "pan-Turquisme" had lost them 
th~ir kingdom; the Ottoman State would become "confined to the authentically Turkish 
provinces in Anatolia". The Turks "shall emerge from this war as a small state like Persia or the·· 
Afghans and all the Arab lands will have come into the hands of the English and the French" 135• 
For Muhammad Farid by the end of World War I, then, the new Turk.ism, and 
ill-treatment and murder by Turkish officials and soldiers, released the Ottoman Empire's Arabs 
from any community obligation towards Turks. Turkist chauvinism, the cause of earlier cultural 
134. Farid's Constaninople journal entry for 16 March 1916, fil:yrrui v. 1, pp. 300-301. The form of his 
language in the entry is that he was addressing the Turks. He was directly arguing, though, with an Egyptian, Jalal 
al-Din' Arif, a lecturer in the Istanbul Law School. However, Farid despised him as a collaborator of the Turks, and 
denounced the Turks' attitudes towards the Arabs to him so that it would finally be reported to the Sadr-i-A'zam 
Sa'id Halim. Ibid, p. 301. By 1913, the CUP-led government was unpopular in the Arab provinces in comparison 
to Kamil Pasha and his decentralizing Ottoman Liberal Union. Having lost huge territories in the Balkans with their 
Christian populations, though, the CUP could now tum to a policy oflslamization to hold the Empire's Arabs and 
Turks together. Ahmad assessed that from early March 1913 the Unionists had a sincere Islam-inspired drive to 
foster an Arabic-Turkish bilingualization of Ottoman life not just in the Arab provinces (some use of Arabic in 
education and administration) but in the Turkish heartland, also. Citation from lsma'il Hakki in Tanin 12 April 1913 
in Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks p. 136; pp. 133-135. 
135. Awraqp. 353. 
to 
Ottoman Empire as he imagined. view of the State's thrust into --- extensively 
Muslim-populated --- territories that Russia had ruled was a failure of pan-Islamic sympathy. 
Farid showed no pan-Islamic sympathy for the past sufferings of Muslims in Russian-occupied 
Adharbayjan and the Caucasus. 
From Territorial to Linguistic Nation 
Farid's anger when the pan-Turanists cut out the classical Arabs was natural in his Party: 
Kamil and his followers had for decades projected Baghdad and Muslim Andalusia as definitive 
for Egyptian identity. The classicist cultural symbols that solidified the Asian Arabs' resistance 
resonated as much in the Watani Egyptian psyche. Berlin in March 1917, Farid chatted with 
Ahmad Mukhtar and Muhammad 'Ali, two grandsons the Algerian Amir 'Abd al-Qadir who 
had resistance to French from 1832 to 1847. 'Ali Farid 
"Jamal Pasha is determined to obliterate everything is Arab, even in names": ordered 
removal of the tablet inscribed "Muhyid-Din Ibn 'Arabi" over the grave of that 
Andalusian-born mystic-philosopher (1165 - 1240 AD), and replaced it with another inscribed 
"Muhyid-Din Effendi". Farid then fumed in his diary that Jamal destroyed the grave of the Ami_r 
'Abd al-Qadir because it was situated on the course of a road under construction: Jamal could not 
be bothered to change the road's course slightly to show respect. Farid headed this paragraph of 
his diary "the hatred towards Jamal Pasha in Syria"136• 
Ottoman Arabs, then, helped culturize Farid's perceptions of the conflict into which the 
Ottoman Turks slipped with both the Egyptians and the Asian Arabs. Turkish attacks on Arab 
136. Awraq v. l, p. 356. Farid denounced French oppression of Algerians --- terming the latter "the Arabs" 
--- in his "Halat al-Jaza'ir wa Tunus" (The Condition of Algeria and Tunisia), al-Liwa', 29 September 1903. Farid 
visited Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and (in best Arab-centrizing style!) Andalusia in 1901, 1902 and --- for the 
Algiers International Orientalists' Conference --- in 1905. Daghir, Masadir v. 2 p. 635. Kamil denounced French 
rule at a conference of Algerian 'ulama': William Scawen Blunt, My Diaries (London: Martin Secker 1919-1920) v. 
2 pp. 168, 203. The editor of the pro-Khedive al-Mu'ayyad, 'Ali Yusuf, also denounced actions of the French in 
Algeria, despite the importance of courting French support to dislodge Britain. Jaques Berque, Egypt: Imperialism 
and Revolution tsd. Jean Stewart (London: Faber and Faber 1972) p. 262. 
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culture had forced the Ottoman Arabs to fight them in its defence. The common classicist Arab 
identity and the exiled Egyptians' empathy for the Ottoman Arabs were welding the two gr?ups 
into some new community. The Kamilists' decades-old pan-Islamic association with the Turks 
--- and the delimitation of the innermost political unit by the territorial homeland, Egypt ---
slowed Farid's pushing out of the boundaries of intimate nation. He and other Egyptians, 
nonetheless, moved towards a linguistic pan-Arab political nation in conflict with a Turkish 
nation. Farid had the sense that Egyptians (plus North Africa?) and the Asian Arab territories 
constituted one emotional community when he told Zimmerman in early 1917 that Jamal Pasha's 
atrocities had "tremendously harmed the Ottoman State in Egypt and all Arab lands (jami' 
al-bilad al-' Arabiyyah)" 137• The sentence left ambiguous whether he included Egypt fully in the 
category "the Arab lands". In February 1918 Farid learned that the Ottoman Prime Minister 
Tala'at refused to raise navigation through the Suez Canal (and thus Egypt's political status) at 
the Brest Litovsk negotiations in order not to "complicate" achievement of peace with Russia: 
discussion of the Egyptian problem should be left with Britain. This only confirmed for Farid 
that "the Turks" in general did not care about, or feared, Egypt. If Egypt became independent, 
the initiative and education of its population might endanger the Ottoman State's control over its 
Arab provinces; on the other hand, were it incorporated in an expanded Ottoman State like the 
union of the German States headed by Prussia, Arab Egypt's demographic weight would 
transform the Empire's ethnic politics: "the Egyptian [deputies] and [the deputies representing] 
the remainder of the Arab[ic] lands (baqil-mamalik: al-' Arabiyyah)" in the expanded Ottoman 
parliament would "outnumber the deputies of the Turks and win control over the Ottoman State, 
with the Turks falling into second position" 138• Thus, Farid now envisaged that the Arab lands, 
Egypt one unit, could come to constitute an explicitly political quasi-national national entity and 
had a vague vision that Egypt might lead the other Arab lands in certain circumstances. 
AWARENESS OF ARAB RACE IN CONTEXTS OF MUSLIM-COPTIC SECT ARIAN 
TENSIONS 
This section sets out weaker identification with Arabness among Copts, compared to 
137. Awraq v. I, pp. 345-346. 
138. Ibid v. I, p. 394. 
to 
or 
as Egypt's all sects 
Nimr Effendi, spokesman a predominantly Coptic group, have categorized Egyptians as 
"Arabs" in appealing for French aid to establish independence from Turkey in 1801 139• Coptic 
intellectuals in the late nineteenth century were well aware of the 'Urabi movement's evocation 
of ethnicist Arab identity at home --- and its despatch of emissaries to the Hijazi and Libyan 
Arabs, which Mikha'il Sharubim (like Kamil) saw as the Turcophobe Wilfrid Scawen Blunt 
manipulating 'Urabi into an "Arab Caliphate" clash with the Porte, probably to serve official 
British designs. For all his political quietism and caution, though, Sharubim made no 
particularist Coptic objection to a wider Arab entity140• 
Language was a strong bond, but religion sectionalized racial Arabization in Egypt within 
the Arabic-speaking Muslims' community. Islam permitted marriages by incoming Arab 
Muslims local Egyptian converts to Islam, male or female, and Christian women, 
forbade Muslim women to barring the Arab blood into 
Egypt's continuing and Jewish communities. Because Arab was perceived as 
confined to Muslims, the motif further differentiated the sects. 
Both Egypt's Muslims and Copts --- and the British --- maintained awareness under 
British colonial rule that the element of Arab blood was distinctive of the Muslims among the 
139. Nimr Efendi's possible formulation, in an 1801 letter to Tallyrand requesting French aid to realize 
Egypt's independence, was: "Arabs like us speak as much as you want but they write little". Unselfconscious use of 
the term "Arab" for a critical image of self in this sentence would be like Ya'qub Sanu's. The ambiguity is whether 
the term "Arab" was Nimr's usage or that of Theodore Lascarus, Piedmontese visionary and ex-Knight of Malta who 
drafted the letter for him in French. George A. Haddad, "A Project for the Independence of Egypt, 1801", American 
Oriental Society Journal v. 90, 1970, p. 176. 
140. Mikha'il Sharubim, al-Kafi fi Ta'rikh Misr al-Oadim wal-Hadith (Cairo: 4 vols Bulaq 1898 - 1900) v. 
4 pp. 268 - 269. Sharubim's suspicion that Blunt's interest in Arabic was a feigned cover badly misread the 
anti-imperialist aristocrat: yet Blunt's attempts to maintain a link between the 'Urabists and Gladstone may have 
misled some Egyptians in 1881-2 about the extent of his influence and about what Britain was likely to do. Hourani, 
Arabic Thought p. 111. Blunt, in his 1882 book Future of Islam, proposed an Arab Caliphate independent of the 
Ottoman Empire: Kamil in 1898 denounced this as an official British strategy to destroy the Ottoman Empire and 
replace it with a puppet Arab mock-Caliph so as to annex Egypt and the region permanently. Muhammad 
Muhammad Husayn, a1-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu'asir (Bayrut: 2 vols Dar al-Irshad 1970) v. 2 pp. 24 -
25. Yet, when they met years later on English soil, Blunt and Kamil realized they were two brothers in 
anti-Imperialism. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 202. 
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Arabic-speaking religious communities in Egypt. S.H. Leeder, a mildly pro-Coptic British 
observer with some knowledge of Arabic, who set out to mix with the native populations d~ng 
pre-World War I travels in Egypt, thought that gins far'uni (Pharaonic race) was (still) a common 
nickname for the Copts by Muslims "who themselves boast of being Arabs and the sons of 
Arabs" 141 • Coptic-Muslim differences in 1910-1912 bear out that extensively 
Westernizing-educated Muslim and Coptic intellectuals still often assumed that the Copts could 
claim purer indigenous Pharaonic blood. Conversely, Arab blood was still felt to be important in 
Egyptian Muslim identity. 
Both Mustafa Kamil and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid formulated ideological responses to the 
problem posed for national integration. Kamil's response was the more post-traditional. He 
sought to refute the thesis of Coptic militants that their community alone was truly Egyptian, and 
that Arabic-speaking Muslims were racial aliens (ghuraba') in Egypt, by countering that "the 
greater part of the Muslims of Egypt are of antique Pharaonic stock" 142• Kamil's formulation did 
not deny that Muslim Egyptians had a component of Arab race. 
Later, affirming Egypt's unitary nationhood during sharp 1911 controversies between 
Coptic and Muslim pan-Islamist communalists, Lutfi argued that there was no difference 
between the Muslim and the Christian and no inherent superiority of the son of Isma'il 
[progenitor of the Arabians] over the son of Ramses except through greater self-sacrifice in 
serving the homeland143• True, territoriality (homeland) and shared socio-economic life within it 
were here more powerful a community-builder than racial connections or differences for Lutfi. _ 
Although more often subordinated to his quasi-particularist theses, Lutfi's traditional habit of 
thought racially linking Egyptian Muslims to Arab populations beyond Egypt, while 
distinguishing Egypt's Muslims from their Coptic compatriots, did recur in his 
Occupation-period writings. An instance was his observation that Egyptians would never be 
hostile to foreign European migrants who helped Egypt progress because love of peace 
"distinguishes us from all our neighbors who are of our race Ciins) and of our blood"144• 
At a time of the 1911-1913 communal tensions over jobs between the Coptic and Muslim 
141. S.H. Leeder, Modem Sons of the Pharaohs (London: Hodder and Stroughton, 1918) p. 312. 
142. Kamil quoted by Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 247. 
143. Lutfi in al-Jaridah 6 May 1911 quoted Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 239. 
144. Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyyah p. 46. 
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acculturateds, the poet 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri, who was a Jaridist but favorably disposed to the 
Kamilist independence movement, wrote a conciliatory poem which he titled "An Egyptian.Arab 
Addresses his Coptic Brother". Shukri's title instances how "Arab" was often synonymous with 
Muslim in Egypt under the British Occupation: although, while complimenting the Copts' 
stronger racial link to Pharaonic glories, he did assume that their Muslim compatriots had some 
diluted Pharaonic blood of their own145• 
The Coptic communalist publicists in English, and their British Christian allies, 
intensified the Copts' sense of their own pure Pharaonic blood, as against their Muslim 
neighbors' racial Arabness. The Copts were depicted as simultaneously (a) Christians persecuted 
for a millennium by Muslims and (b) the indigenous "remnant" of the ancient Pharaonic 
Egyptians amid Egyptian Muslims largely descended from Arab and other subsequent Muslim 
invaders. In his introduction to Kyriakos Mikhail's 1911 English polemic, Professor A.H. Sayce 
applied this racial contrast, beyond the specific grievances of Copts, to deny acculturated elite 
Muslims independence. The "young Mohammedan Effendi" who would "expel the English 
infidel" with the slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians" was "generally not an Egyptian at all. Until 
very recently his boast was that he was an Arab, or of Arab descent"146• 
Egyptian-Muslim acculturated intellectuals maintained identification with Arab race in 
face of its use by British authors to delegitimize Egyptian independence. The highly 
Westernized Egyptian nationalist Duse Mohamed, an older admirer of Mustafa Kamil, replying 
in 1911 to arguments by "European writers" that only the Copts --- and not the Muslim 
nationalist leaders --- were true Egyptians, granted that "the Copts are the legitimate descendants 
of the subjects of the Pharaohs, and that the fellaheen for the most part migrated from the 
145. Fakhrel-Deen, 'Ab<l al-Rahman Shukri p. 39. The poem, composed out of 'Abbasoid classical 
poetical vocabulary, addressed the Cop ts as "sons of fine chieftains ... [with] the lineage of princes that can never be 
questioned. If descent [somewhat] removes you from our glory, you yet are very Arabs in the heights of glory to 
which you soared. Familiar acquaintanceship has left lineages unable to turn either of us away from the other ... 
Devoted though I am to my kin (abl), I feel delight that I can claim blood relatedness to you when I have to boast. If 
I must boast, what better than in those princes who captured Time's events, and never lacked victories? ... [In your] 
resplendent [Pharaonic] State ... you looked proudly down over the stars you had soared beyond, making the heart of 
Canopus palpitate/sink". Text, "Misri 'Arabi Y ukhatibu Akhahu al-Qibti" (An Arab Egyptian Addresses His Coptic 
Brother), in Niqula Yusuf (ed), Diwan 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri (Alexandria: al-Ma'arif 1960) p. 50. 
146. Kyriakos Mikha'il, CQPts and Moslems Under British Control: A Collection of Pacts and a Resume of 
Authoritative Opinions on the CQPtic Question (London: Smith Elder & Co 1911) p. vii. Mikhail reprinted 
statements presenting the modem Copts as the indigenous descendants of ancient Pharaonic Egyptians and often the 
Muslims as Arab intruders from the Times, the Yorkshire Daily Observer, the Commonwealth, the Church Times, 
the Globe, and the Manchester Guardian (ibid pp. 104-110). 
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Arabian country". Duse Mohamed elsewhere, however, referred to intermarriage between Arabs 
who came to Egypt and local women147• 
Beliefs of descent from Arabs from outside Egypt were important for Arabic-speaking 
elite Muslims in the period of British colonial rule. Then Arab race faded out in the 
ultra-linguistic acculturated pan-Arab nationalism that was to evolve after 1922. This section has 
not denied the early capacity of standard Arabic and its high literature to make Copts such as 
Wasif Ghali, within active French or English bilingualism, identify themselves and Muslim 
Egyptians, together, as Arab before Westerners (Wafdist Makram 'Ubayd also)148• Still, Muslim 
Egyptians showed some readiness to maintain self-identification as Arab in areas such as race 
images where it made Coptic compatriots' feel less like them and thus did not help the 
movement for independence. 
Book 2 of this thesis will present development by Muslim particularist intellectuals in the 
1920s and 1930s of Kamil's tentative conciliatory formula about common Pharaonic blood of 
Egypt's Muslims and Christians, for example by Zaki Abu Shadi (1926) and Young Egypt's 
Ahmad Husayn (1938). Ahmad Husayn's argumentation that Egypt's Muslims were racially as 
Pharaonic as its Copts was to betray awareness that some Copts were increasingly rejecting 
Egyptian Muslims as racial Arab aliens (B 218 - 220). 
Assessment 
By 1918, the Kamilists, the Jaridists and other dual-cultured Muslim Egyptians had 
assembled most of the historical data and continuity of language with the classical Arabs that 
147. Duse Mohamed, In the Land of the Pharaohs pp. 274-275. Duse defined himself (ibid p. 274 fn. 2) as 
"a cross between Arab and Ethiopian, my mother being a Nubian or full-blooded Negress". It is to be borne in mind 
in assessing his views on race and community that he began his education in England in 1876 and practically resided 
there from 1884 (ibid p. 2). Duse Mohamed, in some aspects, may thus represent the community assumptions of a 
Muslim Egyptian generation earlier than Kamil' s and Lutfi' s. His national thought developed to prefigure ~ 
pan-Africanism and US Black Nationalism, and he varied somewhat from younger nationalists more continuously 
rooted in Egypt's environment. Still, he often addressed Watani Egyptians in London: Farid, Awrag pp. 140-141. 
Duse Mohamed's book frequently expresses admiration for Mustafa Kamil. Duse edited the African Times and 
Orient Review, published in London, July 1912-August 1914, January 1917-0ctober 1918. 
148. WasifGhali condemned the March 1911 Asyut Coptic Conference, held by confrontationist Upper 
Egypt-based landowning and professional elements. He gained fame by publishing nationalist articles in the French 
press. E. Lynn Carter, The Copts in Egyptian Politics. 1918 - 1952 (London: Croom Helm 1985) pp. 13, 60. Like 
Kamil and such Syrian Christians as Shukri Ghanim, he had a high literary Araboid stance in relating himself and 
Egypt to his French audiences. See Ghali, La tradition chevaleresgue des Arabes (Paris: Plon-Nourrit 1919) and Les 
Perks Epamillees: Contes et Legendes Arabes (Paris: M. Chulliat, 1923). 
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became a basis for the more political "Eastern" pan-Arabism of the 1920s. Ancient Arab virtues 
and idioms were already applied to the current (still Egyptian) nation to (a) prescribe its literate 
discourse and some behavior within modernization and (b) focus very novel conflicts of 
Egyptian and other Arabs with imperialists (politicization). Concepts of territorial Egyptianism 
unfolded among the same Muslim writers, before 1918: but incoming dribbles of translated 
Pharaonic data could not match the floods of classical Arab materials (eg. poetry), already in 
Arabic. On the plane of the joint restoration of the classical Arabs' language, the cultural 
pan-Arab successor-community was already reality, interlocking a chain of Muslim and 
Christian literary elites: Kamilists readily accepted recreations of classical Arabs from SCS 
whose anti-Turkism off ended for a time. al-Hizb al-Watani already felt special affinities with 
West Asian Arabs within pro-Ottoman pan-Islam; they abhorred SC ethnicist criticism of the 
Ottoman State but its detailed data prepared them and the Jaridists to support Arab nationalist 
protest there later (Farid). 
Overall, the period 1892 - 1922 laid the culti.rral bases (including·historical consciousness 
of the classical Arabs) for a modern pan-Arab nation to be centered in Egypt. True, there was a 
gap between (a) the cultural and (b) uneven political integration of the elites involved. Apart 
from political and economic sources of conflict with Syrian, and to limited extent Coptic, 
Christians, Kamilist Arabism in itself, though it highlighted a joint language, was too blended 
with Islam to draw Christian and Muslim Arabs together. 
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CHAPTER 6: ARABIST AND MUSLIM FACETS OF AL-JARIDAH PARTICULAROIDS 
The West-centric scholarly literature has unusually one-dimensionalized Ahmad Lutfi 
al-Sayyid and the al-Jaridah intellectuals down into simple isolationist particula1ists and 
Westernizers, highlighting their rejection of pan-Islamism1. (C.D. Smith did pay some attention 
to their reservations towards sectors of the West that might threaten their ascendancy over wider 
classes)2• There were already significant proto-particularist motifs among the al-Jaridah school 
prior to 1915: this corrective Chapter, though, traces how supra-Egyptian Islamic and Arab 
cultural elements and community drives already alternated or blended with these. Our diverser, 
more life-like --- much more Arab --- portrait of the Jaridists will make the al-Siyasah 
successor-group's development of pan-Easternist, pan-Arab and ideological-Islamist activity 
from the 1920s more intelligible as a progression that was decidedly non-sudden. 
PROTO-PARTICULARISM 
The Rural Land of EQ:ypt: Loved Mother 
Acculturated quasi-particularism. The recurring anti-emotionist stance of al-Jaridah 
particularoids, their cold-blooded refusals to pursue community with extra-Egyptians lest that not 
1. Nadav Safran assessed Lutfi's pre-1914 particularoidism and repudiation of pan-Islam as "the highest 
point of emancipation reached by any Egyptian from the obsession with the problem of power as a religious issue". 
Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1961) p. 95. A late, 
unusually bald, instance is Gershoni and Jankowski's 1986 treatment ofLutfi al-Sayyid's pre-World War I writings 
as "the first formulation of an exclusively Egyptian and thoroughly modem territorial nationalism unencumbered by 
residual Ottoman-Islamic overtones". Their work gave obsessive weight to recycled statements in which Lutfi 
defined Egyptians as one "blood", spoke of the historical continuity of their development of a national "character", 
rebuked Egyptians who affiliated with Turkdom or Arabdom and rebuffed Ottoman Arabs who came with 
complaints of bullying by Turks. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski. E2:ypt, Islam and the Arabs: the Search 
for Egyptian Nationhood. 1900 - 1930 (New York: OUP 1986) pp. 13 - 14, 18. Their analysis drew heavily on 
communications by Lutfi in Wendell's 1972 The Evolution of the Egvptian National Image: From Its Ori2ins to 
Ahmad Lutfi al-Savyid (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972). This work already had been ideological 
enough but fourteen years later Gershoni and Jankowski only particularized Lutfi even more relentlessly --- ignoring 
Araboid statements by him in at least Wendell's appendices that had pointed out of the paradigm. Describing the 
features of Arabic in Egyptian identity, Lutfi in 1909 characterized Egyptians as "an Arab people who feel joy and 
sorrow keenly, for the noble are so moved". He considered Egypt's indigenous music "Arab music" derived from 
"the ['Iraq-based] 'Abbasid dynasty ten centuries ago", and desired patronage for it so as to lift it out of its decline: 
Wendell, Egvptian National Image pp. 306-9. Orientalism has been persistently unwilling to incorporate how Arab 
Lutfi often formulated Egyptian "personality" to be. 
2. Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egvpt: A Biographv of Muhammad 
Husavn Havkal (Albany: SUNY Press 1983) pp. 58 - 59, 44 - 47. 
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pay off, most struck their contemporaries. Their spasmodic Egyptianism cited the land and a 
much thinner Pharaonic past but also drew (Lutfi) on the British Utilitarians and such mor~ 
sociological French thinkers as Montesqieu --- whose anti-Muslim facets nonetheless Islamized 
and Arabized3. Montesqieu's 1734 Considerations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et 
de leur decadence had characterized the Romans as happy to sacrifice their lives for their 
republic so long as it was confined to Rome's environs, but progressively less and less as its 
borders expanded over most of the known world. Such European thought legitimized or 
deepened insularist Egyptianism. Concern and effort from individuals increases as the circle of 
personality narrows: any person is more eager to serve his homeland than humanity, his family 
more than the homeland and his own self more than his family. To Western and pragmatic 
motifs, this Jaridist attached a rudimentary particularist vision of Egyptian history: since a 
(Pharaonic?) sovereign age, the Egyptian personality had had somehow to survive a succession 
of "conquering nations": so abraded, it now needed a novel systematic "strengthening" 
(=particularization)4. (Pharaonic and non-sovereign post-Pharaonic history was to be similarly 
dichotomized seventeen years later by the Coptic Pharaonist Marqus Sumaykah in 1926: B 478 -
481). 
The author cited narrower self-interests and pragmatism when those marginalized Turks 
3. In a context of Kam ii-like characterization of Gladstone and Cromer as anti-Muslims, Lutfi in a 1908 
article depicted such classical French writers as the Baron de Montesquieu as an ultimate source of the anti-Islamic 
venom of French colonialism in Algeria. Lutfi ridiculed the statement of Montesquieu that "the Christian religion 
strengthens just government" while "the Mohamedan religion strengthens despotism". He fired back an overview of 
the Catholic Church's persistent advocacy of the divine right of kings, instancing arguments by Bishop Boussuet -:--
whose claim, though, to derive his monarchist ideology from the Gospels was spurious. Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyyah 
min Ta'rikh al-Barakat al-Istiqlalivyah fi Misr (ed. Isma'il Mazhar) (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Misriyyah 1946) 
pp. 110 - 112. It is true that the Jesuit-educated Jaques-Benigne Boussuet ( 1627 - 1704) argued the divine right of 
Kings in his Politique tir€e de l'ecriture sainte,although also their duties to their subjects. Boussuet labored to 
inculcate his ideas into the Dauphin as his tutor from 1670 - 1680 but met mainly "incuriosit~". Paul Harvey and 
J.E. Heseltine, The Oxford Companion to French Literature (OUP 1959) p. 80. 
4. "Ibn Mukhlis" (pseud), "al-Shakhsiyyat al-Misriyyah" (The Egyptian Personality), al-Jaridah 11 
September 1909 p. 5. Lutfi. too, often described the nation as an extension or magnification of the family unit, 
being influenced by Rousseau and Aristotle. Wendell, Egyptian National Ima!!e pp. 270-1. S. Haykal shared this 
1909 item's sense that Egypt lost national sovereignty with the end of the Pharaohs thirteen centuries before: 
thereafter it was ruled by a succession of conquerors --- Greeks, Romans, Arabs, [Muslim] North Africans 
(=Fatimids), Tatars. Mamluks. Turks, the French and the British who had all wiped out Egypt's original 
"civilization" and "nationality". S. Hayk::ll. '"A Turidunaha Hazimat al-Abad?" (Do You Want This Defeat to be 
Eternal?), al-Jaridah 30 October 1911 p. 5. This view of history was directed against non-autochthonous Muslims 
--- Turco-Circassian, Turkish and immigrant Ottoman Arab (Syrian =Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i? Rashid Rida'?) ---
who were using religious appeals to involve Egyptians in the Italian-Libyan-Ottoman War and other Ottoman or 
Arab issues, just to "fill their pockets". Ibid. Cf idem "al-Wadi al-Qadim" (The Old Valley), al-Jaridah 1 November 
1911 p. 5. 
- A285 -
or other Arabs, but mystic self-sacrifice of the individual also motivated. Only tenacious 
"attachment to this Compassionate Mother, the land of the Nile Valley" had preserved the 
Egyptian Nation's personality through the ages of catastrophes: as re-articulated by editor Lutfi it 
now was igniting a qualitatively new resistance to "all who work to annihilate it within some 
larger personality". The writer had previously rebuked Kami list pan-Islamism by guarded 
innuendo but, heartened by Lutfi, would henceforth assail it comprehensively5. 
Clearly, alongside flat utilitarianism and materialism, the Jaridists had some intense 
emotions. To the Kamilist opponents' "love" of other Muslims and Arabs they retorted a holy 
devotion to the land of Egypt, on which they now claimed a patent. Hourani stressed the original 
vividness of Lutfi's "physical consciousness of Egypt and its countryside" before 1914: his 
youthful disciples Muhammad Husayn Haykal (B 397-8) and Taha Husayn were after World 
War I to publish much creative literature describing the Egyptian countryside and its peasantry's 
harsh life6. Lutfi's al-Jaridah followers, however, politicized the new feeling for physical Egypt 
to batter those elements of the independence movement that called for some political alliance or 
unity with Turkey on the basis of shared Islam. A 1914 late al-Jaridah article published shortly 
before Turkey declared war upon Britain and France, described "love of the homeland" as "a 
variant of intense passion" (al-' ishq) inculcated by the unique (rural-sedentary Nilotic) 
environment in which one grows up, and which binds together "people of the one country". 
Outside this eclogic innocence stand Egypt's pan-Islamists who "almost tremble with joy at ... 
good won by others among those te1med 'her female relatives' even though it work to Egypt's 
loss". In relations between nations "it is Egypt that merits love --- others sympathy"7• 
The physical, objectively existing, secular entity of the homeland thus determines the 
5. Ibid. 
6. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thomi:ht in the Liberal Age. 1798 - 1939 (London: OUP paperback 1970) pp. 
176 - 177 partly ascribes Lutfi's sensitivity for the Egyptian countryside to Tolstoy; for Taha's (and Haykal.'s) 
development of this quasi-nationalist exploration of rural Egypt ibid pp. 332 - 333. 
7. Anon., "Fil-Wataniyyah Aydan: A Tanjim hadha am Mudi'ah lil-Waqt?" (On Patriotism Once More: is 
this Astrology or a Squanderer of Precious Time?), al-Jaridah 7 October 1914. The article's beautiful, if politically 
tendentious, evocation of the Egyptian countryside ran: "For, he who remembers a moonlit night which he spent on 
the bank of the Nile: he who has grown up through childhood running after moths in [his village's] golden fields: he 
who has tramped along the long road ... on which the young maidens, after ending their cotton-picking, have passed 
singing songs of homecoming behind the loaded camels: he who has gone to take shade from the sun's heat in a 
clump of trees and began to cat of the cucumbers and vegetables of the earth, milking its beasts as he looks over the 
plain ... he who has cultivated and tended grain with his own hands ... all these undoubtedly feel between their souls 
and the environment a golden bond". Ibid. 
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units of human solidarity. All beyond Egypt's boundaries are political strangers even if sharing 
Islam or Arabic with Egyptians --- for at least this spasm in Jaridism. 
Anti-Ottoman Particularism 
The Arab-Muslim landowning class from which the Ummah Party and many Jaridists 
stemmed, had had to overcome and supplant the old Turcophone absentee aristocracy in its rise8. 
Some pa11icularoid stances by al-Jaiidah intellectuals when solidarity with Turks or outside 
Arabs came up had starting-points in parochial communalism --- as against Lutfi's more 
generous, if fragile, drive to integrate all Turks in Egypt, if they only wanted9• One 1911 item 
defined "the original Egyptian" in Egypt as "the Muslim sons of the land and the Copts and some 
of the Jewish families which settled in this country centuries back". This excluded Syrian 
immigrants, more of whom were Christian, but also --- explicitly --- Muslim North African 
(Maghribi) immigrants, making those Arabs as foreign as the resident Europeans. The article 
lashed out at Turkish emigres who made Egypt the base for their vocal opposition to their 
regime, justifying the wish among the Egyptians that "some" Turkish emigres repatriate to 
Constantinople, now that the Ottoman Constitution had been restored. West-patterned 
illiberalism: some Britishers told Anglo-Jewish politicians and publicists during a recent 
contretemps in parliamentarism to go back where they came from: "authentic" Egyptians had 
title to marginalize immigrant Muslims and Arabs10• 
However, this writer did not see either the anti-Semitism in England or his own irritatio!l 
at non-native Arabs or Turks as systems. al-Jatidah often carried the extra-Egyptian statements, 
8. See B 304 - 306. 
9. As a territorialist nationalist. Lutfi was ready to enrol immigrants from the Ottoman Empire into the 
Egyptian nation after a mere fifteen years residence. Some residual emotions of wider multi-lingual Muslim um mah 
and even of Ottomanism may have influenced him here, since in the same speech he warily only courted a neutral 
extraterritoriality from resident Europeans. whose press he knew tended to align against Egyptian nationalism with 
the British. Lutfi's territorial or geographic determinism was a bit naive about the persistence of linguistic and racial 
ethnicity: he was surprised and upset that Turkish-speaking anti-Hamidian liberal refugees who had come to Egypt 
with their families. abruptly returned to their lands of birth after the end of· Abdul-Hamid's despotism. "It grieves 
us that some Egyptian nationals who still have some connection with the other Ottoman homelands. are intending to 
return to their original lands. That offends us because they are the sons of Egypt whom we expect to have the 
patience to stay in Egypt and serve it, until Egypt. too. win her hoped-for independence". Lutfi, Safahat Matwiyyah 
p. 32. On the incorporativeness that Lutfi's Egyptianism could voice towards resident Europeans as well as 
immigrant Ottoman Turks and Arabs. Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt. Islam and the Arabs pp. 13 - 14; Wendell, 
Egyptian National Image pp. 8 - 12. 
10. Anon, "al-Asil wal-Dakhil" (Natives and Interlopers), al-Jaridah 20 August 1911 p. 5. 
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activities and interests of the Ottoman Arab and Turkish groups conducting politics from Egypt, 
including the League of Ottoman Decentralization that Muslim and Christian Syrians had 
organized in Cairo in 191211 . 
The controversies between al-Jaridah and the pro-Kamilist press sharpened and 
systematized both their Egyptianity and pan-Islamist stances --- pola1ization that obscured the 
extent to which each shared in a different mix features it now had to denounce in the opponent. 
al-Jaridah: 
The [Kamilist] newspaper al-' Alam presumes to impose some principle that every 
Muslim is to be considered an Egyptian whoever he is and from wherever he came. In 
contrast, our journal states that, while we have to respect our religion, ... Egypt must be 
for the Egyptians spanning their different sects, and that Egypt should have a 
particularistic personality (shakhsivvah khususiyyah) entailed by international conditions, 
and by the supreme interest of the Homeland12• 
The Kamilists increasingly wonied that Lutfi's much more particularist, anti-Turkish 
articulation of the Egyptian Personality was gradually winning at least a hearing from some 
educated Muslims. One 1914 attack in the pro-Hizb al-Watani al-Afkar retorted to Lutfi's calls 
for "independence" from Turkey and "Egyptian Personality" that the European States would not 
sincerely support Egyptian independence from Britain --- while the Ottoman State would help 
Egypt realize "true patriotism". Repeated acts of aggression by the European powers against 
Muslim peoples, in particular the Italian invasion of Ottoman Libya, had made the Kamilists (a) 
close ranks more with the Ottoman Turks and (b) wind down their previous drive to court the aid 
of the good Europeans against the aberrantly non-liberal British ones13 . Yet pooled 
11. Some resident Syrian/Arab emigre communications that al-Jaridah published, at least initially voiced 
loyalty to the post-Hamidian --- more secular --- Ottoman central government, on which hopes for economic 
modernization depended, as against Arab protest ethnicism. An early 1909 Cairo meeting by the Ottoman 
Brotherhood Society in Egypt. chaired by al-Muqattam 's SC editor Dr Faris Nimr. condemned "some Ottomans in 
Paris who were working to set up a Syrian League to seek autonomy for Syria .... This endeavor is not in the 
interests of the Syrians in particular or the Ottomans in general given that. coming at the inception of the 
constitutional era, it might tend to weaken the Ottoman community and the Ottoman State that now so sorely needs 
the unity of all elements of its um mah. religions and provinces". "Jam'iyyat al-Ikha' al-'Uthmani bi-Misr" (The 
Society of Ottoman Brotherhood in Egypt), al-Jaridah 4 February 1909. For Nimr's Arab nationalist youth and the 
Arabizing influence of the SC publications in which he took part in Egypt. B 336 fn. 
12. "Katib" (pseud.), "Jaridat al-'Alam wa Dukturuha" (al-' Alam Daily and its Doctor), al-Jaridah 23 
October 1911 p. 5: cited Zakariya Sulayman Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani wa Dawruhu fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah. 
1907 - 1953 (Cairo: Wikalat Fabrant 1981) p. 147. Cf fn 59. 
13. "Ad'iya' al-Shakhsiyyat al-Misriyyah aw Du'atuha" (Those who Claim or Over-Stridently 
Propagandize an Egyptian Personality), al-Afkar 20 May 1914; cf. "al-Jaridah wa al-Ahali Sharrun min 
al-Mu'ayyad" (al-Jaridah and al-Ahali me Worse than [the Khedive-financed] al-Mu'ayyad), al-Afkar 20 May 1914. 
Both cited Bayyumi. al-Hizb al-Watani pp. 148-149. 
amount to 
to 
Europe the might indeed 
independence for a time as the Kami lists charged (the Australia- or Canada-like 
dominion road to more independence) 14• Yet the Jaridists discreetly shared much of their 
opponents' angry pessimism about Westerners. 
Neo-Pharaonism 
The neo-Pharaonism developed in the 1920s by al-Sivasah intellectuals who had been 
fonned before 1918 in the al-Jaridah milieu strove unprecedentedly to trace or restore legacies of 
ancient Egypt in Islamic and twentieth-century Egypt. Yet some elements for it had already been 
pioneered in al-Jarid ah before 1914. 
Lutfi wanted Egyptology to be taught in Egypt as in England, and pride in the 
supra-Egyptian Pharaonic Empires 15 . (Ancient Pharaonic empires and exchanges, though, could 
foster pan-Arabization over the long tenn: B 425 - 432). The Egyptology of Westerners, via 
multi-lingualization, fed the neo-Pharaonism of al-Jaridah: its swift Arabic versions of items 
the French and European press kept the general readership abreast of issues of Pharaonic 
antiquities16 . In rare cases, Egyptology flowed over into propagation of real data from Pharaonic 
14. Lutfi repeatedly argued that Egyptians should achieve independence in stages by building up its 
preconditions: education, an indigenous modern pri vale enterprise comparable to that of the resident Europeans, 
greater efficiency by Egyptian ministries. the effectiveness of the advisory parliament Britain allowed, by winning a 
Constitution etc. After the Egyptians had achieved all that, the British would be unable before International Law 
and the other Western states, to refuse self-government. (=It might all put off a showdown for decades!) Lutfi, 
"Nazariyyatuna fil-Ihtilal wa fil-Jala .,, (Our Theory on the Occupation and Withdrawal) al-Jaridah 20 September 
1911 pp. 1-2. "Y .B." (=Syrian Christian sub-editor Yusuf al-Bustani) in "Ma'nal-Himayah" (The Meaning of the 
[just declared British] Protectorate), al-Jaridah, voiced the hope that it would be the first step in Egypt's evolution to 
autonomous Dominion status. already incrementally achieved by Canada. Australia and New Zealand --- not the 
other possibility, annexation. As ever with al-J:u-idah. al-Bustani's modest accommodationism throbbed with 
repressed acculturated antipathy to European tormentors: now that Britain had set the scene for Egyptian juridical 
independence, the extra-ten-itorial mixed courts could be abolished, there need only be Egyptian courts before which 
the Egyptian, the Englishman. the Italian "and every European" would plead as equals under one law: no more 
could any "oaf" from the resident foreigners' "rabble" injure an Egyptian, then decamp across the Mediten-anean to a 
lenient court in his own land. Ibid. The Protectorate was also hailed in "Misriyyatuna" (Our Egyptianism), 
al-Jaridah 27 December 1914. welcoming the end of the Ottoman connection: the conditional collaboration offered 
by all these items, though, perhaps strove to preempt the British repression that followed. Cf fn 63. 
15. Wendell. Errvptian National lmarre pp. 236 - 238. 
16. For example. the translation of a Firraro item "Haykal al-Karnak: Hadith Iii-Monsieur Maspero" 
(al-Karnak Temple: An Interview with M. Maspero). al-Jmiclah 14 October 1909 p. 5. This was part of an argument 
among the Egyptological cstablishment in Egypt as to whether water leaching threatened that temple. 
new al-Jaridah even 
extracts 
A Historv of the Beaux Arts among the Ancient Egyptians 
had illustrations depicting the social classes and religious, sporting and cultural ancient 
Egypt --- "every Egyptian" should buy that book. al-Jaridah may have been wary of how 
conceptually remote or contentious "the beneficent gods" of "the pious forefathers" might prove 
for its readers: it excerpted a rather proto-monotheistic hymn to Ra17 . 
The durable stereotypes and aesthetic of the classical Arab Muslims continued to fog 
Reconnection. The 1909 poem "Pharaoh and his People" by Isma'il Sabri softened the 
immemorial Coptic and Muslim images of despotism to depict Pharaoh as able to fire his 
colleagues and subjects to a sincere proto-constitutionalist activism: "unless other Pharaohs from 
among you support me, I cannot myself be a Pharaoh of so elevated a throne ... Draw not near the 
Nile if you lack the will to carry through great tasks". The Egyptians proceeded to "fly as swiftly 
as the jinn at the command of the Prophet Solomon out of devotion to he who commanded, not 
in either fear or greed". The huge pyramids they hewed thenceforth "mocked" as the millennia 
levelled all other "soaring edifices and palaces" of the whole Earth's subsequent kingdoms and 
rulers 18. 
This hybrid poem's aesthetic continuities with the classical Arabs were obvious. From 
far-off upper Egypt, one "Writer" compared Sabri to Arabist poet Hafiz Ibrahim as both pioneer 
builders of a "renaissance" and "independence" of the Egyptian nation to be animated by a 
constitutionalist anti-despotism parallel to that Hugo inculcated in France. This Egyptianism was 
(a) in political ideologies West-patterned and (b) implicitly flayed the "despot" Khedive 'Abbas, 
al-Jaridah 's bugbear19 . But he was well aware that the aesthetically equally classicist-Arabist 
Sabri in evoking the bygone Pharaonic Egyptians instead of the classical Arabs somewhat 
followed the 'A~~~-s~d p~~t-~l~BL1hn~·i_(8_?~-897), whose siniyyah_!Cl__l1_:1_~nted the departed glory of 
17. "Ta'rikh al-Funun al-Jamilah 'inda Qudama' al-Misriyyin" (History of the Beaux Arts Among the 
Ancient Egyptians), al-Jaridah 27 September 1909 p. 5. This item's reference to the Pharaonic Egyptians as "the 
Pious Forefathers" (al-salaf al-salih) in their pagan religious aspect was either joking or daringly unconventional 
given that, from al-Afghani, pan-Islamists had for decades applied al-salaf al-salih to the first model generation of 
(mainly Arab) Muslims. The item respectfully introduced Sadiq as "Secretary of the Egyptian Beaux Arts' Club", 
and cited a platitudinous motto from Emerson that he appropriated for his own book --- the belletristic tincture from 
Anglo-Saxon culture recurrent in al-Jaridah and the elite modern Muslim strata it expressed. Ibid. 
18. Isma'il Sabri. "Fir° awn wa Qawmuh" (Pharaoh and His People) (ode), al-Jaridah 11October1909 p. l. 
19. "Adib" (A Writer). "Fir°awn wa Qawmuh", al-Jariclah 14 October 1909 p. 4. 
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Iran as symbolized in the ruined palace of Kosroes (Kisra) at al-Mada'in20 . During the 
Arab-Islamic reaction of the 1930s, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat would argue that the inherent. 
homogenizing contents of literary pan-Arabic pre-doomed all neo-Pharaonism in it only to 
transmit the unitary Arab culture and identity that it protested (B 436). 
The same number of al-Jaridah printed an appeal from Homs by anti-Hamidian Syrian 
'Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, for a time an al-Jaridah editor, for Egyptians to contribute to the 
relief of mostly poor residents of his city made homeless by recent floods21 . The more real 
pan-Arab community was tightening at the very side of neo-Pharaonism. 
Could Pharaonic religion and divine monarchy be fitted into the acculturation-diluted 
Islam and European liberal parliamentarism of the modern-educated classes? Deep acculturation 
made Egyptian intellectuals prefer "democratic" classical Greece to Pharaonic Egypt: Western 
high cultures, superficial hyper-modernism and persistent Islam all helped maintain casual but 
recurring disdain for Pharaonic despotism, religion and priesthoods, in Lutfi22 and such disciples 
20. al-Buhturi kepi up the poetical idiom of pre-Islamic Arabia, but. as the Turkish soldiery assassinated the 
Caliph al-Mutawakkil, he saw Arabs and Persians as having been collaborators in the threatened 'Abbasid venture. 
Made aware of mortality by the crisis, al-Buhturi paid tribute at the ruins of the al-Mada'in palace (iwan) to Sasanid 
Persia's "high endeavors which, but for partiality on my pm1, that of' Ans and 'Abs could not match": line 17 of his 
sinivyah in A.J. Arberry Arabic Poetrv (Cambridge University Press 1965) pp. 72-81. "Adib" (Joe cit) exaggerated 
Sabri's transcendence of "the limits of most ancient poets [of Arabic] and [their modern] imitators in interrogating 
ruined abodes and weeping !'or camel-litters [or women borne on such litters: az'an: sing. za'inah] and addressing 
she-camels and other things that. present in the first ages. poets could never avoid". Sabri 's tribute to Pharaoh had 
made Egyptians forget al-Buhturi and his sinivyah. al-Jaridah kept its readers info1med of the editing and publishing 
of al-Buhturi's complete di wan from two manuscripts by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Barquqi, editor of the stylistically 
neo-classical al-Bayan. "Diwan al-Buhturi", al-Jaridah 21 November 1911 p. 5. The persistence of classical Arab 
aesthetic elements in the most particula1istic or West-patterned endeavors of Egyptian intellectuals would be hard ~to 
exaggerate. Wendell cited 1908 excitement of Lutfi when Constitutionalists in Iran resisted the Shah's cossacks: 
"the Persian Nation" would never yield up her sovereignty over the freedom of the press and of speech within her 
borders or her immemorial "national character": it never accepted "any rulers not of her own stock". For Wendell, 
this attack on the Shah (and Britain and Russia?) instanced that "Lutfi unreservedly threw in his lot with local 
nationalism and against Islamic internationalism ... painted by al-Afghani". Yet Lutfi's "memorialization of the 
pre-Islamic greatness of the Persians" here was culturistically Arabo-Islamic in a pre-modern and conventional way: 
he quoted a verse that Persians conquered Time when it was young actually penned by the' Abbasis shu'ubi poet 
Mihyar al-Daylami (d. 1037). er rn 25. and for the post-1922 recurrence of al-Daylami in neo-Pharaonism and 
pan-Arabism B 278. 432-4. 
21. "Saylu Hims" (The Floods in Homs), statement from · Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi, al-Jaridah 14 October 
1909. 440 houses had been destroyed and al-Zahrawi urged the readers to donate for the construction of new houses 
for those made homeless. before winter deepened. "Humanity" and a shared (pan-Ottoman?) "Patriotism" should 
make al-Jaridah's readers donate. Ibid. It is unclear if al-Zahrawi addressed this communication to al-Jaridah only 
or if it was a standard appeal that he also sent to variety of papers. 
22. Lutfi's acculturating drive ranged out over unusually diverse sectors: as well as French and British 
authors and thinkers better known in his elite. he became interested in classical Greek philosophy, even translating 
Aristotle into Arabic, although from French versions. since unlike Taha Husayn he did not learn Greek: for their 
Arabic translations of classical Greek works B 390 - 393 inc fns. In one 1907 evocation of a perpetual alienation of 
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as Husayn Haykal and Taha Husayn23 . The dislike was to resurface with venom after 1930 in the 
acculturated Arabo-Islamic assault on Pharaonic particularism. Yet the pre-World War 1 . 
al-Jaridah had already carried one or two affirmations of joint Pharaonic racial origin to bring 
together disputing Copts and Muslims24 . That was to be an integrative function of the future 
ordinary Egyptians from their ever-despotic rulers. Lutfi imaged that from the earliest periods these were all foreign 
in race or religion or language or customs. Pharaonic Egypt, in this spasm of Lutfi, never experienced anything of 
"the scientific government" that generally characterized Greece in "pre-Christian" antiquity. More than the 
stereotypes about "democratic" Greece of the French and British in his day, Lutfi's scholarly experience of Aristotle 
and other classical Greek writers oriented him to "the laws of the science of politics" that, he believed, had 
effectively restricted individual dictatorship in Athens etc. Article, "al-Jafa 'u Bayn al-Um mah wal-Hukumah: 
Asbabuhu wa Nata 'ijuhu" (The Coldness between the Nation and the Government: its Causes and Effects), 
al-Jaridah 2 April 1907: Lutfi, Safahat p. 175. In a 1916 assessment of the pioneer of women's emancipation Qasim 
Amin, Lutfi 's disciple Haykal depicted Egyptians as fatalistically submissive to the autocratic rule of monarchs or 
other despots from the time of the Ph:u-aoh~ who had not included a single indigenous Egyptian. The youth 
Haykal's Westernizing geographical determinism was hostile to Egypt's supposed specific features, not Islam: he 
saw al-Afghani and . Abduh 's salafiyvah as really purging Islam of local enviromental accretions --- a crucial ally in 
achieving change for the tiny. vulnerable modernist minority. Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Fi Awqat al-Faragh 
(Cairo: al-' Asriyyah 1925) pp. 104 - 117. Cf B 415 inc fn 23. Particularoids in the 1920s were still struggling to 
dislodge from Egyptian thinking the motif that ancient Egypt had been despotic, arguing in reverse that it had 
prefigured or originated Greece's rather derivative democracy (eg. Ahmad Lutfi Jum 'ah B 56). 
23. Hostilitv to Pharaonic reli!!ion or Indifferent Propa!!ation of the Acculturated Constituencv's Cliches 
About It. As a new law on al-Azhar was rammed through by' Abbas' supporters in the Advisory Council, Ahmad 
Lutfi al-Sayyid charged "autocracy" while the very young Taha Husayn tried to block it with ill-digested cliches 
from a French anti-clericism that had been directed against Christianity: the threat of a "Papacy of the Middle Ages" 
in Islam. He was manoeuvring :u-cmnd Egyptian Muslims who might accept that 'Abbas as head of the al-Azhar 
Council might promote Islam, yet his connection of the compliant 'ulama' to ancient Middle Eastern paganisms was 
also his own --- only thinning --- lslam-centrism. ('Abbas') elaboration of a religious hierarchy "takes Islam 
backwards not merely to the eras of Christianity but to those of paganism when the direction of knowledge and 
religion was a monopoly of the priests of Amun, Marduk and Baal. the idols of Egypt, Babylonia and Syria". 
'Abbas' caricature of Islam was meant to foster "polytheism ... the worship of human beings at the expense of 
Allah" as in ancient Egypt. Taha. "al-Ri'asat al-Diniyyah" (Authority Over{fhrough Religion). al-Jaridah 6 April 
1911 p. 1. Antiquities that particularisms of the 1920s made into national golden ages, were before 1914 disliked as 
opposed to Islam, even among al-Jaridah · s secular-educated readership. In al-Jaridah in 1913, Lutfi characterized 
ultra-classicists who would accept no deviation of style from the old Arab works as like the ancient Egyptian 
priesthood that monopolized "the secrets of religion and its authority in the times of our Pharaonic ancestors". 
Wendell, E!!vptian National lma2:e p. 278. In 1938_, Taha similarly denounced classicists who resisted simplified 
curricula pragmatically designed to propagate classical Arabic more widely: they sought to monopolize Arabic as 
"the ancient Egyptian priests maintained exclusive control over the various branches of learning and religion". Taha 
Husayn ("Hussein"). The Future of Culture in E2:vpt (Washington: Ame1ican Council of Learned Societies 1954) p. 
89. In 191 L Taha also tried to turn against "Abbas the reverence even secular-educated Muslim Egyptians had for 
the Ottoman Sultan: he had no title "to reconnect government with religion because there was no Constitution" to 
make it the representative of "the nation": it violated the prerogative of the Ottoman Caliph as the Guardian of 
Islam's overall religious community (mill:lh). protector of the shari 'ah (Islamic religious law) and inheritor of the 
Prophet chosen by the Muslims. "al-Ri'asat...". 
24. See the Halo-Egyptian Abat:1 Pasha's '"Anasir al-Jins al-Misri Kulluha min Jinsin Wahid" (The 
Elements [=sects] of the Egyptian People Are All from One Race) al-J aridah 30 April 1911 pp. l - 2. Abata argued 
the indivisibility of Egyptian nationhood to accord with the confessions-blind incorporative nationalism imaged by 
Britain, France. llaly and other Western nation-states. He however recognized that Semitic immigrants from Arabia, 
Negroes from the South and H:unitcs from Libya had migrated into Egypt to form the Egyptian people long before 
dynastic times: this might prefigure a pan-Arabizing dysfunction of post-1922 neo-Pharaonist particularism (B 441 -
1 
Acculturation-Globalized Muslim Community 
The Islamic, Ottoman and Arab communities imaged from al-Jaridah were filled out 
solidified by Islamophobic communications and data from Britain and France. contrast to the 
simpler French-Arabic acculturation of Kami! and his colleagues earlier, al-Jaridah's younger 
contributors were increasingly trilingual as a result of Dunlop' s Anglicization campaigns. The 
Jaridists willingly drank from nineteenth century British social and political thought and British 
and American belles-lettres and poetry25 . Like so many contributors, the romantic poet 'Abd 
al-Rahman Shukri relaxedly wove together motifs from the literatures and pasts of English and 
Arabic26. Yet English and French only spurred them to artistic mastery of classical Arabic 
444). Moreover. Syrian Christian sub-editor Yusuf al-Bustani objected from the paper to Coptic evocation of a 
Pharaonic descent that would exclude his group: Egyptologists Champollion and Maspero had shown that 
race-mixing had already began in antiquity: today. the Egyptian is whoever serves Egypt. al-Jaridah 20 March 1911 
p. 1. 
25. The young poet 'Abb:"ts Mahmud al-· Aqqad published a transbtion of a poem on a rose by William 
Cowper. al-· Aqqad. "al-Wardah" (The Rose), al-faridah 15 August 1911 p. 6. Muhammad Zaki Salih published a 
translation of an essay by Emerson on "the Poet": "Ras~il Emerson ---Taht al-Tab"' (The Essays of Emerson --- In 
Press), al-J aridah 29 October 1911 pp, 1 - 2. On 21 October 1911 (p. 2), the paper printed an Arabic translation by 
al-Bavan editor Muhammmacl al-Siba'i of an essay by Hazlitt. Evincing the paternity of his own verse,· Abd 
al-Rahman Shukri fiercely clcfcndcd Byron :1gainst charges by Muhammad Jalal that half of his poetry was 
balderdash. Yet Shukri in the item quoted from the 'Abbasid poet Mihy:u- al-Daylami (d. 1037) to exonerate' Abel 
al-Rahman al-Barquqi's nco-classicist al-B:1van magazine from charges of solecisms from Jalal. Shukri, "Shi'ru 
Byron wa Naqidu Majallat al-Ba van (Byron ·s Poetry and the Critic of al-Bavan Magazine), al-Jaridah 14 September 
1911 pp. l - 2. For dysfunctional Arabizing recuITence of verse by al-Daylami and other classical poets in even 
post-1922 neo-Phar:1onist literary particul:u·ism. B 432 - 433. SpuITed on by the puristically neo-classical Catholic: 
Lebanese Nasif al-Yaziji (1800 - 1871) and his :ii-Diva' magazine --- which al-Jaridah 's readers were urged to go 
through in the Khedivial library---, Shukri tried to hunt down solecisms (al-lahn) not just in the poetry of modern 
Egypt but also in some classical Arab authors. Shukri, "al-Shi'r al-'Asri: Lahn al-Shu'ara"' (Contemporary Verse: 
Solecisms of the Poets), al-J :u-idah 13 Nov cm bcr 1911 p. 1. al-Yaziji and al-Diva' long fostered stylistic purism ---
and a sense of the crucial joint Arabncss of Christian Levant Arabs and Muslim Egyptians --- in that Islamist pioneer 
of Egyptian pan-Arabism Ahmad Hasan :ll-Zayyat: B 334 fn 182. 
26. Lutfi was a trenchant critic of the immemorial despotic and absolutist drives of government and 
monarchs in Egypt. and of the popul:1tion's :llicn:ttcd submission to them. Hourani, Arabic Thought pp. 175 - 176. 
While Aristotle as well as Mill and other Western liberals patterned such critiques by J:u-idists, they could 
simultaneously draw on classical Arab situ:ttions and writings, too. 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri in a 1911 essay on "The 
Worship of Strength" wove together superficial references to Muhammad's prohibitions of idolatry, Emerson, 
Shakespeare and Muhammad · Abduh · s s:1lafist condemnations of saint worship. He dismissed despotic monarchs as 
only heightening the undesirable authoriwianism of tribal leaders. Like much published in al-Jaridah, this article, 
too, may therefore have been directed against the Khedivc 'Abbas, but the literary and rhetorical --- ultra-belletristic 
--- nature of such discursive al-Jaridah essays must be stressed: he alternated Western and old Arab literary motifs 
against his palate as a relaxed minor ~u-tist more than a social critic. Shukri, '"Ibadat al-Quwwah" (The Worship of 
Strength), al-Jaridah 10 August 1911 pp. 1 - 2. Shukri had a good, if romantic and dilettantish, knowledge of 
ancient Arabic poetry: cg. his pleasant retelling of the pre-Islamic Lakhmi king al-Nu'man's murder of two 
--- wh · could restructure to 
as co 1· long 
amateurs as lC. his colleagues were master 
demoralizing Egyptians within very narrow, hierarchical interactions: language 
gone, the Jaridists could pin him and his self-serving laissez-faire mouthings down under a 
detailed perspective of decades while still liking some people and institutions (eg. parliament) in 
Britain itself28 . 
Whenever the Jaridists were on the point of forgetting Islam, British imperial discourse 
applied it against Egypt's aspirations. After a British statement that self-government for Egypt 
was not on their program, Lutfi ignited when a "foul-mouthed" Dailv Tele~raph article 
boon-companions during drunken depression. and subsequent commemorative murder of individuals he came across 
by chance on that day: "Qissat al-Nu'man wa Yawmi Bu'sih" (The Story of al-Nu'man and His Melancholia Day), 
al-Jaridah 20 July 1911 pp. 5-6. Cf R.A. Nicholson, A Literarv Historv of the Arabs (Cambridge University Press 
1953) pp. 43-4. 
27. Aesthetically and in soci~tl patterns --- for example by adopting the allocations of roles between men 
and women that industrial societies developed in West Europe --- Jaridists like Shukri strove for substantial 
Westernization. At the same time. they transmitted to the modern Muslim Egyptian educated classes a sea of 
materials from pre-Islamic Ar:1bia, c:u·Iy lsl~1111 and 'Abbasid 'Iraq. Shukri argued that the face-veil --- and Muslim 
polygamy --- should be ended. It was a major cause of the high rate of divorce in Egypt that the husband and wife 
could not get to know each other before m:1ITiage. "The Prophet had permitted a Muslim more than one woman" 
because endless pre-Islamic t1ibal fighting had left an excess of maITiageable females. While Shukri cited ancient 
pre-Islamic Arab poetTy in support of an apologetical Westernizing argument he had also retained such verse for its 
aesthetic appeal. 'Abd al-Rahman Shukri, "al-Hijab wal-Surur" (The Veil and Uncoveredness), al-Jaridah 9 August 
1911 pp. 1-2. Shukri's naturaliz:1tion of the Anglo-Saxon pattern of life-long monogamous marriage had sanction 
from a haclith: "with Allah. the most detestable of all things permitted is divorce". Maulana Muhammad Ali, A_ 
Manual of Hadith (Lahore: Ahmadiyya Anjuman lshaat-i-lslam nd: 1945?) p. 284. 
28. For cool. calcul:llecl British psychological debilitation of even --- or especially --- very high Egyptian 
government officials, Robert L. Tignor. fVloclernization and British Colonial Ruic in E2vpt 1882 - 1914 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 1966) pp. 193-4. The al-foridah intellectuals were furious as both Cromer and Gorst 
progressively tightenecl the colonial relationship. brushing aside all overtures for a parliamcntarist partnership. 
Dunlopian immersion in English equipped the J:u·idists to dissect local imperial discourse --- yet they were seeing 
through the British or Egypt to a Britain whose liberal democracy they respected. One al-Jaridah essay sniped 
"despot" Cramer's efforts in retirement in the House of Lords to transfer powers to it from the Commons. The 
hopes of "the intelligent ones" in Egypt for constitutional advance under Cromer had indeed been misplac8d, given 
his aristocratist contempt for the cap:1city for self-rule of even the English, "who are more advanced than us in 
civilization and ... pioneered the way for p:ufo11nentary governments throughout the world". The item was intimately 
aware of such life-long hobby-horses or Cromer as free trade. Anon, "al-Ma'u min al-Sakhar wal-Istibdad al-Jamil" 
(Water From a Rock and that Most Benign or Despotisms), al-Jaridah 27 August 1911 pp. 4 - 5. One declared 
representative of "Youth" mocked the terminology with which Cromer had wanted to reserve political participation 
for "those with real interests" in Egypt --- disproportionately, wealthy resident Europeans. Yet his fury at 
disempowerrnent passed beyond his elite which would grow on. Such as he coulc! purchase exemption from a 
conscription which, given that male pe:1sants m:uTied well before they were twenty, destroyed their families: they 
were dispatched off to the lethal Sudan to est:1blish British rule. "Ana"(=!), "al-Tajnidu fi Misr'' (Conscription in 
Egypt), al-Jaric!;1h 27 August 1911 p. 5. 
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denounced Islam. Such ravings of British journalism could in no wise detract from a religion (he 
echoed Carlyle --- who often firmed up the Islam of more Angloid Jaridist acculturateds29),that 
had "met all the needs of hundreds of millions of people for over a millenium": "the Christian 
Rousseau" had ranked Islam's institutions over those of other faiths. The item made Lutfi view 
"the Egyptians" as "the Muslims" but, given figures like Rousseau in French culture, he here 
hoped that growing anti-British forces in France would get the Entente Cordiale abrogated as an 
error, and, with rising Germany, help dislodge Britain from the Nile Valley3°. 
Their minds pervaded by the language and communications of the British occupiers, the 
Jaridists dialogued back to them in English. Thus, the journal praised an English book The Truth 
About Islam, elegantly printed in a Cairo publishing-firm, by Muhammad Badr, one-time 
President of the Islamic Society in Edinburgh, and who had studied at London and Edinburgh 
universities. The rather political introduction mentioned the tide of anti-English feelings that had 
been rising among all Muslim populations in Britain's possessions goaded by decades of British 
misrepresentation of Islam (=pan-Islamism). The book had the same ambiguity to colonialism as 
al-Jaridah (and after 1922 the successor intellectuals around al-Siyasah and the Liberal 
Constitutionalists' Party). Badr saw Egyptian-British conflict in terms of a failure in 
communication of the respective religions of the two sides --- rather than the drive for power and 
economic profit with which radical Kami lists further explicated colonialism. With his book, 
29. One thin form of lslamism in al-Jaridah, given that its decultured youth audience was internalizing 
Anglo-Saxon values, had to take its starting-point from within English belles-lettres. To save them from English 
Protestant stereotypes about Islam, al-Jaridah published Carlyle's long-winded argumentation (reprinted in On 
Heroes. Hero Worship and the Heroic in History) that Muhammad could not have been an imposter as Britishers 
thought in 1840 because the great religion he had founded retained 200 million adherents, meeting their needs. 
"al-Abtal" (Heroes). al-Jaridah 16 December 1911 p. 6: an excerpt from the translation of Carlyle's work made by 
Muhammad al-Siba 'i, an editor of al-Bavan --- one more indication of Lutfi's and al-Jaridah's close association with 
that stylistically neo-classicist journal. C~u-lylc 's work entered the traditional Ottoman-establishment Sunni ethos 
around the same time, to resurface decades later as the Ataturkist order crumbled: Husayn Hilmi Isik (='Ishq), 
Seadet-i Ebediyye: Endless Bliss fascicle 2 (Istanbul: Hakikat Kitabevi 1989) p. 281. Cf W. Montgomery Watt, 
"Carlyle on Muhammad", Hibbert Journal v. 53 (1954 - 1955) pp. 247-254; and Muhammad 'Abd al-Husayn 
al-Da'mi, "On Carlyle's Concept of the Arab-Islamic Orient: A Study in 'The Hero as Prophet"', Orientalism: 
Comparative Culture Book Series v. 2 (Baghdad: Cultural Affairs and Afag 'Arabiyvah 1987) pp. 62-86. Charles 
D. Smith argues that Carlyle's theme of the Prophet's greatness encouraged the very young Haykal to view the 
prophets as receiving revelations from their own subconsciouses rather than God, as leaders of a specific stage of 
human development: the acculturated intellectual successors would now guide Egypt along West-patterned secular 
lines. Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 41 - 43. Haykal had first been given Carlyle's Heroes and Hero Worship 
(and works by Mill and Spencer) in the al-J:u-idah office. Smith, ibid. p. 38. al-Siba'i's translation of 
Shakespeare's Coriolanus. al-Jaridah 14 May 1911. 
30. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. "'Al:i Lahjat al-Daily Tele!!raph" (The Tone of the Daily Telegraph), al-Jaridah 
22 June 1910 p. I. 
to more 
to 
as equals of most 
Badr responded not just to British dislike of Islam but to ignorance the residents of 
Europe" in general. He credited that communicating "the truth" about Islam to establishment 
Europeans would change their colonial policies and put off a showdown31 . 
al-Jaridah contributors were extensively formed amid residence or summer-vacations or 
lobbying in Europe: European cultures in the age of imperialism helped widen out and globalized 
Muslim community for them. Apologetics in Western languages connected the Jaridists to at 
least elite Indian Muslims far beyond the Middle East and Egypt's traditional Ottoman world. 
al-Jaridah noted an exchange between the Indian Muslim jurist and politician Amir 'Ali and an 
English novelist-publicist about divorce among Muslims, ascribed to Islam's lack of motivation 
to achieve those loving stable families so characteristic of Christian Anglo-Saxon societies. In 
reply, 'Ali simultaneously (a) defended Muhammad as the embodiment of community and (b) 
pervasively adapted Islam to Anglo norms. On one hand, he stressed that the Prophet had hated 
divorce --- connecting him to Victorian British values. But a recent "custom" of gratuitous 
divorce some Muslim countries should be ended by some institute of 'ulama'32• s 
apologetical books were long highly regarded by dual-cultured intellectuals such as Ahmad 
Hasan al-Zayyat33 and by Haykal who in the 1930s drew from them to preempt any claim by 
Egypt's Islamic 'ulama' to control his West-tinted, if now Islamizing, elite34 . 
Discourses in such metropolises as Paris occasioned by Europe's discovery and 
colonization of Black Africa made the Jaridists aware of expanding Muslim African populations. 
31. "al-Haqiqah ·an al-Islam" (The Truth About Islam), al-Jaridah 25 July 1910 p. 5. 
32. "Bayn al-Sayyid Amir' Ali wa Hall Caine" (An Exchange Between Sayyid Amir' Ali and [Thomas 
Henry] Hall Caine). al-Jariclah 4 Sept cm bcr 1909 p. 5. Sec fn 73 for Lutfi 's awareness of British courtesy towards 
India's Muslims as compared to Cromcr°s hostile stance to Islam in Egypt. 
33. al-Zayyat. "Bayn al-Din wal-Hubb". written for al-Risalah 16 October 1939; Wahv al-Risalah (Cairo: 
Dar Nahd:it Misr 1953-1966) v. 2 pp. 94-97. This item was representative of the ultra-acculturated strata in which 
the former Ja1iclist Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyal moved. The father of the woman was an eminent physician who never 
ventured inside a mosque and married a post-Christian English woman who nominally converted. The young 
Egypto-Lebanese, himself rather Anglicized. hacl been al-Zayyat's student at the American University of Cairo. He 
was "expounding the principles of Islam" to his fiancee "as well as any Muslim who graduated at the American 
University could". Ibid pp. 94-97. 
34. Smith. Islam and the Sc~1rch pp. 105-106: influence of Spirit on Haykal's 1933 biography of 
Muhammad pp. 115. 123. 
concern of the 
ssionaries 
It should therefore be colonial pol to Chiistianize 
populations to block the spread Islam. Like Kamilists, the reacted 
sharply to the roles of Christianity in the imperialism of states now substantially secularizing: 
why did the missionaries not stay in France to stem the rejection by youth of all the religions, 
instead of proselytizing Africans? Attuned to French and British fears of "explosions of 
[Muslim] religious fanaticism", the item applauded defeats Islam-inspired "Negroes" had 
inflicted on the French around Lake Chad. But their Westernization (and salafism?) could also 
alienate the Jaridists, like the Kamilists, from other Muslims: the writer distinguished (a) 
between Islam, whose "renaissance" Egypt represented and (b) ordinary Muslims in Algeria, 
Morocco and Senegal whose "superstitions" and "ignorance" the Western travellers so 
tendentiously misrepresented as Islam35 . 
Although its focus was self-modernization and refonn, not pan-Islam, al-Jaridah's 
ambivalent coverage familiarized elite Egyptians with distant Muslim populations in the Tsarist 
Empire (Westerner-aborted Duma parliamentarism) and Iran 36. The exclusionist themes of 
35. Ahmad Abul-Nasr Balyun. ":1!-lslamu fi Ifriqiyya" (Islam in Africa). al-Muqattam 1March1910 p. 5. 
In its more deeply anti-imperialist mode. this item dismissed as tendentiously functional Western stereotypes about 
the "backward" peoples they colonized: if "the Muslim. or the Easterner in general. reacts peaceably and quiescently 
... the Westerner condemns him as lazy. p:1ssive and unqualified for self-government. If, on the other hand, he ... 
throws off defeatism, and moves to defend his violated rights, he is defamed as religiously fanatical and savage". 
Ibid. Herc. Egyptians and Maghribi :md Black African Muslims were equated. The sense of Egypt as a marginar 
link between Europe and Africa recurred :11 a 1909 conference of Egyptian youth receiving Western education in 
Europe. organized by Muh:unmad Farid :md al-Hizb al-Watani but with friendly p:u-ticipation by Lutfi and 
sympathisers. Egypt was envisioned there as ch:1rged with a civilizing mission in the other regions of Africa. 
"A'mal Mu'tamar al-Shabibat al-Misriyy:d1 fi Jan if: Min Khitab Hamid al-· Alayili" (Proceedings of the Conference 
of Egyptian Youth in Geneva: the Speech or Hamid al-'Alayili). al-Jaridah 4 October 1909 pp. 1-2. 
36. al-J aridah in mid-1907 translated an editorial from the 'Abduh-like Ism a "ii Gaspirali 's 
modernist-Islamic Tatar journal Vakil (Waqt) on national antagonisms in the Duma (Tsarist parliament). It urged all 
non-Russian nationalities --- Poles. Tatill'S. Kirgiz. Turkistanis. Caucasians, Armenians and Jews --- to form an 
Autonomist Party to counter the chauvinist front the Russian government and all Russian parties, right or left, were 
forming. The Ittifaq ul-Muslimin Party was going to press the religious needs and "the national rights" of the 
Muslims in the Duma. The Vakil edito1ial excerpted a racist :u-ticle from the semi-official Novoe Vremia: this 
condemned the principle of secret. universal fr:1nchise that the Democratic Constitutionalists demanded for the 
Tsarist Empire. Such electoral rights could ~1pply only in civilized countries of a single race and religion such as 
Britain: whereas Poland, the Caucasus. Turkistan. the Baltic Coasts. the Crimea. Bcssarabia and Siberia --- in fact, 
3/4 of the Tsarist Empire --- were inhabited by peoples hostile to the Russians. Just as Britain could not grant the 
vote to "the bedouins of Africa" and the lndiw1s whom she ruled. the Russians "cannot share the affairs of 
government with these enemies". Instead. they had to expel the non-Russian deputies from the Duma. "Zilzal 
al-Duma" (The Earthquake in the Duma). al-.J:U'iclah 3 June 1907 and 5 June 1907. Yet in the same year, 1907, 
ims , s ---
than al-Jaridah caITied communications that the 
efforts by such acculturated intellectuals as Ahmad Hasan 1 1940sto 
unify, standardize and fundamentalize the Egypto-Arab Sunni clergy so that it would then 
transfonn and lead non-Arab Muslim populations around the world. 
One such 1910 appeal for "refonn of the affairs of the Muslims", issued by the Cairo 
Literary Society blended salafist and acculturated antipathy to the 'ulama for not even attempting 
novel modern tasks of the religion. This, though, was to justify the new elite directing the 
'ulama in order to install Islam within modern West-originated processes and structures around 
the world, rather than to substitute such modernity for it. The scholars and men of religion ---
the 'ulama, the teachers in Islamic schools. the I mosque] sermon-readers and the preachers ---
were the ones responsible for the rigidity and retrogression into which the Muslims had sunk. 
Typical of acculturated Egyptian Islamism' s global sweep and instant seizure of all multiplying 
possible connections that modern communications offered was its far-flung conception of "the 
Muslims". The writers were sending their note to "all of the Islamic societies and newspapers 
all regions of the world, to the parliaments of the Islamic governments and the Muslim members 
of the Duma in Russia, to the office of the Shaykh al-Islam in Istanbul, to all the 'ulama' of the 
noble al-Azhar and its attached religious institutions, to all headmasters of the [secular] schools 
of Egypt and elsewhere, imploring them all to make Reform of the affairs of the Muslims their_ 
urgent goal". The memorandum's hope that (Egyptian and, probably, Ottoman) preachers would 
"fan out across the distant lands to purify the religion of those heretical innovations and 
falsehoods" was to be heightened by Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat --- and put into practice by Kings 
Fu'ad and Faruq but, above all, by Nasser, in outreach to non-Arab Muslim populations37 . Like 
al-Jaridah also ascribed the failure or p:1rli:1mentarism in Russia as well as Iran to the fact that "the Slavs ... have been 
neighbors of the Turks for long ages and thus :1cquired their ethics": St. Petersburg and Moscow were developed but 
most Slavs in the countryside were as illiter:1te and backward as most Iranians. Yet. this writer was resentfully 
aware of the exclusion ism of the Westerners whose modernity he pursued: "enemies of the Easterners, who 
propagate the West's inherent superiority over the East" would seize on the failure of parliaments in oriental Iran 
and semi-oriental Russia as confirm:1tion. "Khulasah Usbu"iyyah --- Huna wa Hunak" (Weekly Survey --- Here and 
There), al-Jaridah 30 May 1907 p. 1. But cf the completely sympathetic "Dawlatu Iran Bayn al-Asad al-Baritani 
wal-Dubb al-Rusi" (The State of Iran Between the British Lion and the Russian Bear); al-Jariclah 30 November 1911 
p. 1. 
37. "lslahu Shu'un al-Muslimin" (Rcf"orming the Affairs of the Muslims). al-Jariclah 21March1910 p. 4. 
'ulama' not convert 
fundamentalizes the Egyptian 'ulama' more 
destructive Arabizing purifiers of Indian, Indonesian, or Black B 
300-302). 
In accordance with the Jaridists' more secular accommodation of both local and Western 
non-Muslims, the appeal called for the promotion of "peace, love and goodwill between the 
Islamic peoples and nearby Christian" ones38 . The conflicts of Christian nationalities with the 
Ottoman Turks were in the European psyche. But the Jaridists' wide modern awareness of 
Muslims in such Christian polities as Czarist Russia was also as liable to collect injustice, 
exclusion and massacres as the Karnilists'. 
Both al-Jaridah and the al-Sivasah writers after 1922 offered nexi for sectionally 
modernist Muslim intellectuals to continue to exchange motifs and vocabulary with purely 
Islamically-educated clergy: the two intellectual elites keep some sort of communication and 
novel collaborations always going even when they snap or shout. 
Coptic-Muslim Relations 
Coptic secularists in later periods highlighted the territorialist-Egyptianist and 
anti-pan-Islamic stances of Lutfi in al-Ja1idah as crucial for drawing the Copts into Egyptian 
nationalism, given that the pan-Islamic tint of Karnilism had long turned them off39 . Lutfi and 
38. Ibid. 
39. Salamah Musa. The Education of Salama Musa tsd LO. Schuman (Leiden: F.J. Brill 1961) pp. 42 - 44. 
Musa retained no memory of Ahm:id Lutli al-Sayyi(fs partisan arguments for at least some sectional Muslim 
interests or elements of identity during the 1911 Asyut and Heliopolis conferences. The latter "Egyptian 
Conference". while overwhelmingly Muslim. did. as its n:11ne indicated. try to mute sects as bases for public identity 
more than the overtly "Coptic Conference". In one 1911 item. Lutfi did :u-gue that all reports and speeches 
presented at the Heliopolis conference h:1d been free of any suggestion of "pan-Islamism". By reaffirming the 
"Egyptian patriotism" previously territorially dcCined by Egypti:m law, and political rights and duties, the 
Conference had reestablished the basis for workable community of Muslims and Copts. Lutfi's main concern in this 
item, though, was, again. but how Egyptian nationalism might be damaged by British/Western ascription of 
pan-Islam ism to it. Lutfi, "Nata' ij al-Mu' tamar al-Misri" (The Results of the Egyptian Conference), al-Jaridah 10 
May 1911 p. 1. al-Jaridah 's cl:iim that it was Egyptianist and conciliating the two elements of the Egyptian people 
was accepted, and the Coptist communalists denounced. by Ya'qub Miyadi. a Coptic merchant at Samalut. 
"Kalimatu Qibtiyyin Hurr" (The Opinion of A Liberal/Independent Copt). al-Jaridah 3 March 1910 p. 5. Lutfi also 
printed a Christian reply to Riyad P~1sh~1. ~u-guing th~it all appointments now had to be opened to the Copts. Nasif 
al-Miqbadi. "Jawab Martuh Ila D~1wbt al-Wazir Riyad Pasha" (An Open Letter to HE the Minister Riyad Pasha), 
al-Jaridah 13 April l 911 pp. 4 - 5. 
- A299-
al-Jaridah did intennittently restate unitary Egyptian nationhood during the 1910-1913 tension 
between the Coptic modernizing-professional communalists and the modern Muslim elite .. Yet 
the Jaridists, untraditional social Muslims, got too drawn into all the polarization to win much 
response from the Copts as defenders of an Egyptianism that did have potential to bridge the 
sects40 . al-Hizb al-Watani leader Muhammad Farid boycotted as divisive the (moderate) 1911 
"Egyptian Conference" held in reply to the Coptic one: but old-time Turco-Circassian and 
al-Ummah Party leaders including Lutfi figured prominently-ti. The literature has 
underestimated the long-standing relationship of reciprocal needling and mean-spirited 
obstructionism between Lutfi's modernizing Arab-Egyptian rural landowning class and its 
successful Coptic rural equivalent, the Upper Egypt component of which organized the 1911 
Asyut Conference42 . His party leader Mahmud Sulayman was intent at the Heliopolis 
counter-conference to block the Copts' assault on the last positions reserved for Muslims43 , 
40. Lutfi declaimed Egyplianist rrinciplcs in reply to the Coptic uln·as but they were deformed by the 
Islamic energies throbbing under their sccul:u- surrace. The hyper-Coptists had demanded not just time off for mass 
on Sunday but that it be made the rest day or Coptic employees. with Friday to remain that of the Muslim officials. 
(This would have been workable in offices where Copts were a majority). Lutfi responded that the minority 
employees always had to take their day of rest on "the day of the majority. the day of the nation", although he 
admitted that Friday had not always had this status. unrequired by Islam. For a sect of officials to get a different day 
off must amount to "an annihilation of the personality of the nation um mah)". "al-Harakat al-Qibtiyyah --- 2: 
Ta'assub al-Aqalliyyah" (The Coptic Movement --- 2: The Fanaticism of the Minority), al-Jaridah 11March1911 p. 
1. Acculturation-heightened: the Utilit:u·ian John Stu:u-t Mill. who greatly influenced Lutfi's thought, placed a 
community of religion alongside that or l:mguage as factors that greatly detem1incd nations. Wendell, E!Ivptian 
National Imag:e p. 271. 
41. Lynn Carter. The Copts in favptian Politics. 1918 - 1952 (London: Croom Helm 1985) pp. 14-15. The 
Heliopolis counter-conference presented itself. in name at least. as "Egyptian" to underscore the Asyut ultras' 
explicit communalism. A few Corts did attend on that basis. Lutfi read out the Report of the Organizing 
Committee which was substantially a Muslim communalist document: the Coptic activists were fabricating 
grievances to win British help to gain precedence over the majority. In an acculturated twist, the Report noted that 
the common practice of states established that "every country should have an established Church" (sic), that no state 
could have more than one officially-recognised religion. Ibid. 
42. The Coptic-Muslim communalism in which al-J:u-idah took part was no polarization between traditional 
clerical elites. but more between two modernizing ones competing to enter or erect West-patterned structures. When 
the (Muslim) governor and propertied men and notables of J:u-ja mudirivvah collected money in 1911 to establish an 
ophthalmic hospital there. the Coptic mouthpiece al-Watan publicized claims or a local Muslim that pressure was 
used to make him shell out. In a telegram. the Muslim notables denounced "the contemptible aim" of that paper 
dedicated "to destroy and crush the Muslims". "A 'yan J:u~ja wa Jaridat al-Watan" (The Notables ofJarja and the 
Newspaper al-Watan), al-J:u·idah 3 August IL) 11 p. 6. In its patriotic-integrative mode, al-Jaridah did, in a friendly 
tone, publicize Coptic educational endeavors: "Madrasat al-Aqbat bil-Mansurah" (The Coptic School at 
al-Mansurah) al-Jaridah 15 August 1911 p. 3. As ill-feeling rose. al-J:u-idah dismissed with brusque unconcern fears 
voiced by Coptic leaders. and somewhat supported by the Ministry of the Interior. that it might be unsafe for them to 
hold their forthcoming conference in Asyut. "Mu 'tamar al-Aqbat" (The Conference of the Copts), al-Jaridah 2 
March 1911 p. 4. 
43. Sec B 41. Such Coptic polemicists as the journalist Kyriakos Mikhail protested in Britain that Copts 
remained informally excluded from the highest administrative position of mudir (province governor): Lutfi charged 
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whereas Lutfi presciently objected to their proto-micro-nationalist terminology that failed to 
meet the criteria of real nationalism44 . 
Acculturation and the Metropolis. For Lutfi, made anti-British by Sir Eldon Gorst's 
refusal to make accommodatory Muslim Egyptians around al-Jaridah and the Ummah Party 
partners, what enraged most in the Coptic communalists was their lobbying in Britain. As a 
(lukewarm) Muslim, Lutfi in this alanning context saw "the Copts" and the British as both 
Christian, over-unitmizing that religion. He rebuffed nervous signals from one Coptic activist 
that both sects now break off the cycle of exchanges, out of fury that, for two years, that man had 
lobbied English officials and the English press to support "the people of God in Egypt, namely 
the Copts" --- collaboration for supremacy to "divide in two" "the national community" so that 
"the common homeland" would never become independent45 . The young Muhammad Husayn 
Haykal, a Jaridist, before 1914 had a similar acculturated sense that the French as well as the 
British seized on Coptic-Muslim conflict to reject Egyptian nationalism as "fanatical" (B 492 fn). 
In this variation of article in 1911, Lutfi was writing as a spokesmen for "the Muslims", 
not a bisectarian Egyptian nation, with "the Copts" as a whole the opponent --- here, the Coptic 
communalists did speak for "the minority". Sharp acculturated differentiation between various 
groups in European societies: "the minority" was courting backing from diverse English forces 
--- "some of them liberal, some of them imperialist that want to break the links between the 
elements [=sects] of the Egyptians"46. Like almost all acculturat~d Muslim Egyptian 
that Copts were dispropo11ionately numerous as clerks and accountants in the bureaucracy --- in which they were . 
banding together as every Coptic office head gave top priority to surrounding himself with Coptic appointees. 
"al-Barakat al-Qibtiyyah --- 2: Ta'assub al-Aqalliyyah". al-Jaridah 11March1911. This surely is already very like 
Baykal's paranoia in 1929 that. under the Wafd. "fanatical" Copts were taking over ministries, thinning out Muslim 
recruits to the civil service. B 38-39. 
44. The universal criterion that only a socially independent community within a discrete homeland could 
constitute a nation denied any validity to the ultras· repetition of the term "the Coptic Nation (Ummah). Lutfi, 
"al-Barakat al-Qibtiyyah --- 1: Nazrah 'Amm:-ih" (The Coptic Movement --- l: A General View), al-Jruidah 8 March 
1911p.1. Wendell documented that Lutfi in 1908 h~1d bracketed the Copts and Muslims as together formiag "the 
body of a single nation": already. he was trying thereby to talk the Copts out of self-withdrawal from "Egyptianness" 
with Muslims. Egyptian National lmag:e p. 240. 
45. Lutfi, "Shay'un Jadid" (Something New), al-Jaridah 23 March 1911 p. 1. The campaign of the Coptic 
comunalists' English supporters in the British press was also publicized in "Shakawi al-Aqbat" (The Grievances of 
the Copts), al-Jaridah 2 March 191 l p. 4: the campaign assailed proconsul Gorst and such top collaborators as PM 
Muhammad Sa 'id --- "Misru wal-lslam: l'vlaqalat al-Morning Post (Egypt and Islam: the Article of the Morning 
Post), al-Jaridah 14 May 191 l p. 4. 
46. Lutl"i. "Shay'un Jadid". Ignoring the sectional Upper Egypt, landed background of most of the 
organizers. Lutfi accepted the procedure under which eighteen thousand Coptic heads of family had authorized in 
writing the holding of a general conference as proof that the Asyut gathering "m·ticulated the will of the whole 
Islam as a modern community Egypt. 
The tension between the parallel Coptic and Muslim modern professional elites 11 
summoned up one or two wild sectarian outbursts at odds with the Jaridists' usual 
particularoidism. These blended (a) pan-ivluslim macro-history with (b) prizes in modern 
West-patterned professions and (c) the West's own systematization and politicization of enclave 
sectarianisms. 
The important point is that, more than traditional Islam, acculturated knowledge of such 
transferism-prone Western ideologies as anti-Semitism, Zionism, and Irish sectarian 
enclave-nationalisms, pushed one or two modern Muslim Egyptians towards no-holds-baiTed 
responses against Coptist-communalist elite peers. It is true that the West's secularism 
simultaneously desectarianized: "Ba'duhurn" in another spasm saw such a European ideology as 
anti-Semitism as a "darkness of barbarism" --- "modern civilization" had, by and large, 
contracted such "religious fanaticism" to Russia. Yet migration of the Muslim minority from 
Crete and the annexation of the island to Greece was the solution that ruthless European public 
opinion wanted there: again, acculturation --- Westerners picked up loud and clear --- suggested 
a radical solution to the Coptic acculturateds' militancy. The writer ideologically oscillated. 
one impulse, he agreed with the disaffected Syrian Christians that the Ottoman Empire to the fall 
of' Abdul-Hamid had been a despotism-ridden economic backwater. Elsewhere, he saw the 
unsatisfactory lives of Syrian Christians there as inherent in being a minority: inability of the 
ultra-parliamentarist English to contain Ireland's sectarian divisions showed that, regardless of 
the recent Ottoman constitution, Syria's Christians had to transfer themselves wholesale to the 
West, and --- or was this just verbally violent teasing? --- the Copts to Coptic Ethiopia, as their 
own orators imaged47 . 
Coptic sect or at least that or the sect's m:1jority". "The rational Copts" would have to bear the responsibility of the 
Congress' resolutions. "al-Harak~1t al-Qibtiyyah --- l: Nazrah 'Am mah". 
47. "Ba'duhum" (pseud.). "Hall :11-Mas'alat al-Misriyyat al-ljtima'iyyah" (The Solution for the Egyptian 
Social Problem). al-Jaridah 30 May 1911 p. 1. Autonomy for Ireland was perpetually blocked by the Protestant 
minority centered in Ulster: it owned more factories and shops than the Catholic majority from which it feared 
ill-treatment in the event of Home Rule. Ireland was one case where conflict between enclave sects in the West (he 
also mentioned the increasingly Zionist Jewish enclaves in Russia) showed that "religion is the greatest social bond 
for nations and difference in religion the greatest cause of conflict between them" --- and transfer of minority 
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Although this writer objected to Lutfi's (as he saw it, utopian) drive to fuse Copts and 
Muslims, and indeed to standard Egyptian nationalist discourse, he rather had a different rnix of 
Lutfi's own duality of West-heightened elements, Egyptianist and pan-Muslim. Editor Lutfi was 
angry enough with the Copts to print the item. 
The West's anti-Semitism would refigure as a catalyst justifying political differentiation 
of Copts and Muslims in the successor al-S ivasah-Ahrar milieu in the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
too, amid a repudiation of neo-Pharaonist particularism that opened into an Islam-tinted 
pan-Arab linguistic nationalism (B 36-42; B 491-495). In 1911, Haykal, al-Siyasah's future 
editor, saw Coptic-Muslim arguments as secondary compared to the violence into which 
Christians and Jews could now explode in France, for all Voltaire's legacy, over a mere play 
(Bernstein's Apres Moi). For him, Egypt as a land, and advanced Western thought, together 
ruled out politicized communalization: yet he was already confused by the contrary patterns 
coming from the West48 . 
The wider secularizing-educated Muslim readership of al-Jaridah was competing for jobs 
with their Coptic peers. All self-interest was needed to make the Jaridists define themselves as a 
populations the only solution. British administrators themselves, whether Conservative or Liberal, would soon work 
to transfer the Ulster Protestants to England or one of Britain's numerous colonies. He noted that the early Zionist 
movement had been negotiating with the Egyptian government through its British overlord to colonize an area on 
the margin of Sinai near al- 'Arish (cf. B 132 for the development of this in pan-Arabizing Egyptian consciousness in 
the 1920s). The item proposed a parallel solution to "the Egyptian social problem" by transferring the Coptic 
minority to their own "promised land": when the Ethiopian emissary bestowed a decoration upon the editor of the 
Coptic communalist al-Watan. "one or the Coptic orators advised his people to migrate to that salubrious land". 
Perhaps this flight of Coptic rhetoric could now be implemented. since it was unreasonable to expect Egypt's 
Muslim majority. besieged though it was, to migrate. Ibid. Western racist ideologies repeatedly patterned 
transferrist resolutions to Egyptians: al-Jaridah noted that at the general Race Congress held in London in 1911, 
British Zionist Israel Zangwill extolled the migration of Jews from Russia to Palestine --- and that the Austrian 
delegate applauded this decisive solution to Europe· s problem. "Mu'tamar al-Ajnas al-' Amm" (The General Race 
Congress). al-Jarid ah 7 August 191 1 p. 4. Text or Zangwill 's speech: "The Jewish Race". Selected Articles and 
Letters of Israel Zanl!will eel. Maurice Safron (London: the Soncino Press 1937) pp. 82 - 97. At one point Zangwill 
wondered if the world's "hotch-potch" Jews were a coherent race: ibid p. 93. For bigotry in official and royal life ir 
Britain and the Catholic Continent. (SC) Salim Sarkis. "Diyanat al-Duwal: Ghara'ib al-Ta'assub al-Dini al-'Asri" 
(State Religions: Quaint Instances or Contemporary Religious Fanaticism), al-Jaridah 8 June 1911 p. 2. 
48. As an alternative to the communal politics of 1911. Haykal restated Lutfi's aim of a sects-neutral 
Egyptian nation integrated by "material, moral and economic" constituents or preconditions (mukawwinat) --- still 
"theory" given Egypt's all-round backwardness that had to be removed before independence (cf. fn 14). Haykal in 
1911 disdainfully saw through the individuals and cliques who incited Coptic-Muslim polarization as "one means of 
livelihood and to win attention". Voltaire, Renan, Rousseau and other French "champions of freedom of thought" 
accorded with the "theory" of Egyptian community that he offered. but riotous anti-Semitism in Paris fed his 
uncertainty about what the West meant for Egypt. Haykal. "Wujhatuna fil-Siyasah: al-Wahdat al-Qawmiyyah --- l" 
(Our Orientation in Politics: National Unity --- I). al-Jariclah 29 October 1911 p. 1. Bernstein had tried in his 1908 
play Israel to deal with the Dreyfus affair. His play Apres Moi assailed anti-Semitism in France: riots in the wake 
of the premiere forced its closing. Ari. "Henri-Leon Bernstein". EB 15 eel (mic). 
nst ultras. were much more 
awareness to 
s of all s 'Amr as one long 
Golgotha ethnicized defences of wide classical Arab history from al-Jaridah. Yusuf 
argued that the Rashidun Caliphs had checked their governors from ove11axing Egypt, fostering 
Coptic compliance: he was defending the record of not just Arabs in Egypt but of the whole wide 
Arabo-Muslim empire to the decline of the 'Abbasids. Educationally and scientifically at the 
head of the world, it was the connection with this advanced wide State that gave all Egyptians 
prosperity. Ill-treatment came from later only supe1ficially Islamized non-Arab rulers49 • 
JARIDIST ATTITUDES TO THE OTTOMAN STATE 
The Young Turks' 1908 restoration of the Constitution and parliaments transformed the 
Ottoman State for Lutfi fron1 an ethnically unpleasant stronghold of retrogression into the main 
"Eastern" model of Progress --- British discourses greatly fuelling his identification with Turkish 
constitutionalism50 . For the time, al-Jaridah now favorably covered Ottoman personalities and 
49. 'Ali Yusuf (editor of al-Mu'avvad). "al-Ta'limu fi Misra wa Hazz al-Muslimina wal-Aqbat minhu" 
(Education in Egypt: Access of Muslims :rnd Copts Compared). al-Jaricbh 2 May I 911. Yusufs counter-portrait of 
Coptic prosperity and contentment under the classical Arabs was tendentious. but he showed himself well-read in 
such classical histories as those of al-Tahari :ind al-Maqrizi. from which he drew statements ascribed to Arab 
Caliphs and their governors: his argument that the Arabs long held taxes well below wh:ll the Byzantines had levied 
upon Egypt was documented r:ither judiciously. The l:ltcr b:1d experiences th:it the Copts did undergo were at the· 
hands of "rulers newly entered into !or: alien to --- dukhala'] lslam to which they adhered solely in name so that they 
did not carry out either the Book of God or the shari ':ih of Muhammad". Ibid. Cf the obs.ervation of a Pakistani 
scholar that "leaders of contcmpor:u-y [Egyptian Arabo-lslamic] thought repeatedly stress that non-Muslims share 
equal rights and responsibilities with their Muslim compatriots. Certain aspects of inequality and discrimination 
with regard to non-Muslims which have been an integral part of the classical Islamic attitude and were embodied in 
the pre-modern Muslim socio-political institutions. arc either connived at. or regarded as a real misunderstanding of 
the real purport of Islam on the part of the Muslims of the past". Zaf:u- Ishaq Ansari. "Contemporary Islam and 
Nationalism: A Case Study of Egypt". Die Welt des Islams v. 7: I (1961) pp. 3 - 4. In his above-cited a..-ticlc, 
though. Yusuf defined Copts and Muslims as "a single nation" in "national customs". and to some extent racially, 
with an Egyptianism that equalled or surp~1ssed particuloid motifs achieved by ~ll-Jaridah. 
50. For Lutfi in 1908. imperi:li discourse :1hout "the Easterners" (he avoided the term "Muslims" and did 
indeed register Japan: fn 72) w:1s :1 unity: the British tried to devalue Egyptians and Turks together with the same 
stereotypes. They had denied that either the Turks or the Egyptians wanted or were capable of constitutional 
government. Gladstone had dismissed the Constitution of Midhat Pasha as "the most insolent of the frauds by whict-
thc Turks have attempted to deceive Europe". Lords Milner :ind Cromer had similarly argued that the Egyptians, so 
representative of Easterners in this. understood and wanted only authoritarian government. Lutfi seized on a recent 
article in the Daily Telegraph that admitted the British had been wrong to dismiss "Young Turkey" anti-Hamidian 
exiles in Europe when they spoke of Midhat Pasha's Constitution and their struggle to restore it: their overthrow of 
m an 
Turkey was balanced between was 
sparking attempts by ordinary Egyptians to wrest one from 'Abbas52 and (b) the need to dampen 
impulses in the public to win parliamentarism or independence by reincorporating Egypt into the 
Ottoman State53 . 
Islam and Non-Muslims 
al-Jaridah opinion-leaders stressed that the new (still Muslim-led) Turkey patterned a 
secularoid West-like political order intent to integrate the sects: this could draw Copts and 
'Abdul-Hamid's despotism showed that they had been serious in their parliamentarist cause. Lutfi, Safahat pp. 
244-245. 
51. Ottomanoid activities in Egypt after l 908 had a progressive llavor at once cosmopolitan and modem. 
The 1910 celebrations of the restoration or the Ottoman Constitution, held ander the patronage of the Ottoman High 
Commission one balmy night in Cairo·s al-Azbakiyyah Gardens, included a play on the struggle ofEnver and 
Niyazi against the Hamidian despotism, and brought together a good cross-section of resident Turks, Christian 
Egypto-Syrian writers and Muslim Egyptians (including the Chief Qadi and high army officers). An Arabic poem ol 
Salutations to the Ottoman flag by SC al-Zuhur editor Antun al-Jumayyil (1887 - 1949) --- later a friend of Ahmad 
Hasan al-Zayyat (B 334) --- was vividly recited. Both English and completely "Eastern" Egyptian music were 
played: women as well as men attended. al-Jariclah voiced the hope that Egyptians would soon have such a 
constitution of their own: for the Jaridists, the post-Hamidian Ottoman political order lent new hope that they could 
similarly get rid of that other despot ·Abbas. "Haflat al-Dustur al-'Uthmani" (The Celebration Marking the Ottoman 
Constitution), al-Jaridah 24 July 1910 p. 4. Cf fn 58. 
52. In January 1909. Lutfi noted that the "contagion" of the Ottoman Constitution of 1877 had prompted_th' 
Egyptians to struggle for, and achieve. their own Constitution and parliament, aborted by the British in 1882. When 
the overthrow of' Abdul-Hamid·s despotism in 1908 restored constitutional government in the Ottoman State, the 
contagion "flowed on the pens of our writers and from the mouthes of our orators, passing beyond them to pervade 
all classes of the Nation". At the ceremony of the departure of the mahmal (litter) of Egypt's black brocade coverin~ 
for the Ka'bah, youths had shouted "long live the Khedive! long live the Constitution!": the troops were ordered to 
truncheon the crowd, as also when the same cry was raised at the Friday congregational prayers at al-Sayyidah 
Zaynab Mosque. Lutfi. Safahat pp. 41 - SI. For Lutfi in 1909, given the connections the Ottoman Empire 
maintained with ordinary Egyptians through religious life, the rebirth of parliamentarism there might he1£,amplify 
the demands for a Constitution by his elite in the feeble advisory council into something more like a popular 
movement. The Ottoman example helped even the odds of his clique's conflict with the Khedive and the British, 
formidably allied under Gorst. Note. too. acerbic. only thinly disguised. hopes that Egyptians could rid themselves 
of' Abbas as the Turks had deposed ·Abdul-Ham id. in al-J aridah 's responsiveness to the 1910 Cairo celebrations of 
the Ottoman Constitution day. fn SI. 
53. Hourani. Arabic ThouQht p. 178: Lutfi. Safahat pp. 37 - 38. Lutfi in later 1908 dismissed the call by 
some associated with the Khedivc --- al-Mu'avvad? --- that Egypt send deputies to the Ottoman parliament to 
advocate her rights there: 'Abbas knew in advance that his British allies would never allow it, it was just one of a 
range of time-buying ploys with which he maintained his anachronistic personal despotism in the face of the 
Egyptian public's growing wish for a Constitution. Lutfi, Safahat p. 151. Lutfi mainly critiqued the demand for 
representation in the new Ottoman parliament to block those Kamilists who did mean it. 
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Muslims together in Egypt54. Argumentation for the new constitutionalist parliamentarism by 
Muhammad Sahib, Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam, ran parallel to the Islamic reformism of 'Abduh, 
still so accepted among the secular-educated Muslim Egyptian students and professionals, not 
just in seeing modern Western institutions as fulfilment of Islam but in echoing the salafist 
Arab-centrizing periodization of classical Islam that Lutfi also voiced55• The Rightly-Guided 
Rashidi Caliphs, the Turkish cle1ic imaged, had ruled by consultation (al-shura), but clashes of 
personal aims and the mixing of Arab peoples/tribes (aqwarn) with non-Arab groups after them 
usually substituted compulsion for the free Islamic oath of allegiance (bay'ah) to he~ds of 
government. Few Caliphs were selected/elected (lam yuntakhab) in accordance with the shari'ah 
until the Ottoman Sultans, who destroyed injustice like the Rashidun Caliphs, and built a huge 
Islamic judiciary and religious institutes of leaming56. Now, the Ottoman Sultans were being 
controlled by parliaments: "let there be among you a group who call to good, command right 
conduct and forbid wickedness" (Qur'an 3: 104), now elected by the nation including its 
non-Muslim elements. Citing the Qur'an (5: 82), the Shaykh al-Islam warned the religious 
Ottomans that they would violate Islam if they let reactionaries incite them into communal 
ill-treatment of their Christian compatriots57• 
54. To achieve fusion and then move to take control of the homeland, the Egyptians had to overcome "all 
impediments thrown up in their path from the direction of religion". Noting the CUP regime's replacement of 
diverse public titles of respect that had distinguished sects with a new common application of "efendi", "Murad" 
(Copt?) in 1911 exalted the Ottoman State as more evolved (arqa) than Egypt: "we follow the Empire as our model 
in religion but not in the public courtesies/decencies (adabuha) it is now developing which can in no wise harm . 
Islam ... since religion maintains its soundness by not haiming others". The Ottoman State was following with · 
I 
resolve the same path earlier taken by every country that had achieved Progress/evolved (taraqqat). "Murad", "Harb 
al-Watan" (The War for the Homeland). al-Jaridah 25 September 1911, p. I. Cf. fn 61 for al-Jaridah's engaged 
coverage of the CUP's unitarist gesture of conscripting Christian and Jewish Ottomans into the armed forces, 
hitherto overwhelmingly Muslim. 
55. In reply to British denigration. Lutfi ascribed the growth of despotism after the Rashidun Caliphs----
implementers of the Qur'an and Sunnah that had fostered "Islamic fraternity" --- to "mimicking the kings of the 
Persians and the princes of the Berbers". Wendell. Egyptian National Image p. 226. 'v1 
56. Bernard Lewis ( 1961) speculated Byzantine influence in the appearance under Turkish Ottoman rule, ol 
"an [official] ecclesiastical hierarchy. with muftis presiding over territorial jurisdictions, under the supreme authorit) 
of the Shaykh al-Islam, the Chief Mufti of the capital" --- "the Archbishop-Primate of the Ottoman Empire". "Here 
for the first time in Islamic history [was! created an institutional structure --- a graded hierarchy of professional men 
of religion, with recognized functions and powers. worthy of comparison with the Christian priesthoods ... The 
origins of the great Ottoman religious institutions can no doubt be traced back to the Sultanate of the Great Saljuks, 
when schools and schoolmen were organized to counter the threat of revolutionary heresy". Bernard Lewis, The 
Emergence of Modern Turkey (London: OUP 1961) pp. 6, 16. 
57. Muhammad Sahib (Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam), "Mashyakhat al-Islam wal-Ummat al-Uthmaniyyah" 
(The Institution of Shaykh al-Islam and the Ottoman Nation), al-Jaridah 6 September 1909 pp. 1-2. This declaration 
was issued in a situation in which counter-revolution threatened the CUP. To depict the fragile West-European sty!( 
own 
a terminology 
also be a conduit for future re-Islamization and Arabization of the implanted institutions and 
patterns, for Young Turks and Jaridists. 
Contributing Egypto-Syrian journalists chimed in with Lutfi that effects on Egyptian 
"interests" of the foreign policies of post-1908 Istanbul governments, not "emotions", had to 
have priority58. Yet the SC Jaridists --- after the interactions that their foreign-language 
. 
missionary educations had nm them through back in "Syria" --- had their special hope that the 
Ottomans in the Empire, the Hamidian despotism ended, would now win through to more equal, 
positive interaction with Westerners. "Y.B" (= al-Jaridah's Sy1ian Christian sub-editor Yusuf 
al-Bustani) in later 1909 remained angry not just at delays and incompetence in foreign policy 
under' Abdul-Hamid but at how the Russians, French and B1itish exploited it to bully and 
liberal parliamentarism in the post-Hamidian Ottoman State as the expression of Islam, the Shaykh quoted the hadith 
"la ta'ata li-makhluqin fi ma'siyyal al-khaliq: innama al-ta 'ah fil-ma'ruf": "no obedience can be commanded by any 
created being in an act of disobedience 10 the Creator: obedience is owed only in a good deed". To justify the 
integration of all the Ottoman Empire's religious sects into one new Ottoman Nation, he argued that the Prophet had 
consulted non-Muslims and employed them in his wars: he cited a phrase ascribed to the Prophet lahum ma lana wa 
'alayhim ma 'alayna: they have both the same rights and the same duties as us --- also employed by al-Nadim and 
'Abduh to conciliate Copts and Syrian Christians. Cf. 'Abduh, al-Islam wal-Nasranivyah ma'al-'Ilm 
wal-Madaniyyah (Maktabat Muhammad 'Ali Subayh 1954) p. 64. 
58. "Y.B.". "al-Siyasat al- 'Uthmaniyyat al-Kh:u-ijiyyah: 'Alaqatuha bi-Misr --- Inqilab Khatir" (Ottoman 
Foreign Policy: Its Bearing On Egypt --- A Serious Change), al-Jaridah 8 September 1909 p. l. Jaridist 
Egypt-firstism: the more respectful treatment that the revitalized Ottoman State was now winning from Britain, 
France and the Russians pleased SC Yusuf al-Bustani's extra-Egyptian origins, but "the Egyptian zealously devoted 
to his country might rightly ask now" if greater closeness to the Triple Entente might encourage the Ottoman 
suzerain to give Britain a freer hand in Egypt. Ibid. Lutfi noted with interest that the press enthusiasm and heavy 
tum-out of crowds to welcome Prince Diya' al-Din, son of the Ottoman Sultan, when he toured lower Egypt in 1911, 
amounted to a protest against the Occupation --- specifically against Britain's attempt to destroy Ottoman suzerainty 
by denying Turkish troops passage over Egypt to Libya, and by refusing to allow the Egyptian govemn:ient to cut 
diplomatic tics with Italy. Here. LutJi toyed with the idea that Egyptians should encourage the Turks to 'm3.intain 
Egypt's traditional connection with an Ottoman suzerain because it internationally denied legality to Britain's 
presence. In the other direction. he also apprised Egyptians that Diya' al-Din initiated his tour as a courtesy call, in 
company with the Khcdivc. on the King of England in Port Sa'id: were the Ottoman suzerains now accepting 
Britain's control over Egypt? Lutfi was calculating what "benefit" (fa'idah) the Turkish move might bring Egypt 
and genuinely undecided. "Ziyarat al-Amir Di ya· al-Din: I'tibaratun Siyasiyyah" (The Visit of Prince Di ya' al-Din: 
Political Considerations), al-Jaridah 27 November 1911 p. 1. Lutfi left it up in the air if cancellation of the Prince's 
contact with the masses in the latter part of the tour had been because of Britain's or the Khedive 'Abbas' alarm: cf 
fn 51 for how 'Abbas-Ottoman conflict might alter Jaridist stances. Yusuf al-Bust:mi stressed that the former 
Ottoman High Commissioner Ghazi Mukhtar Pasha had obstructed Britain's stabilization of her rule in Egypt: 
"al-Qumsir al- 'Uthmani al-Jadid: Muhimmatuhu wa Siyasatuh" (The New Ottoman Commissioner: His Mission and 
his Policy), al-Jaridah 22 September 1909 p. 1. 
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degrade "the Ottoman Nation" (al-Ummat al-'Uthmaniyyah) with their sadistic gun-boat 
diplomacies, and with evei·-widened extrateITitorial capitulations for their residents. al-Bustani 
hoped that the post-Hamidian Empire was now modernizing economically, administratively and 
as a parliamentary democracy and that that "liberty, equality and fraternity" would now lead the 
Powers to let "the Ottoman Nation" keep its territories in Europe(= political integration of 
Slavic, Greek, Armenian and Arab Christians). This hard-nosed sectionally-Westernizing SC 
writer was apprehensive of Arab-Turkish ethnic conflict. He would, though, accept the Ottoman 
State, with Turkish Muslim leadership and considerable disabilities for (Arab) Chris,tians, if it 
even gradually moved towards economic development and a West-patterned liberalish polity ---
against impatient SC factions in Egypt59• 
Post-Hamidian governments were attractive to the Jaridists in both (a) discouraging 
Egyptian anti-imperialists who wanted to tighten confederal relationship with the Ottoman State 
in part to evacuate the British and (b) because they bidded for acceptance as equal from the 
European powers on the basis that Turkey was now implemendng their civilization internally. 
al-Jaridah not only ca1Tied the (non-CUP) Prime Minister Husayn Hilmi's denial to Le Temps 
that his government had any contact with radical "Egyptian youth" or the Kamilist Hizb 
al-Watani, but, in full, his appeal through that French newspaper that the European powers now 
accept the progressive abolition of their capitulations in Ottoman lands. When the Le Temps 
correspondent objected that European citizens needed extraterrit01ial status to avoid a legal 
system based on Islamic shari'ah, Hilmi replied that Ottoman commercial, an,d many penal, laws 
were "taken from their equivalents in the foreign nations". As the Ottoman State upgraded 
59. "Y.B.", "al-Siyasat al- 'Uthmaniyyat..." SC al-Bustani in part was contributing to an internal argument 
amongst a cluster of emigre Ottoman factions in Egypt, including embittered Arab Christian residents y;ho "hated 
the Unionists" (CUP) when they governed as automatically as they had 'Abdul-Hamid; and perhaps sorTle-Turkish 
groups that had chosen to stay on in Egypt. The instructions from Russia, France and Britain to their consular staff 
to accommodate more to Ottoman officials and laws should be a sign of Ottoman revival "for those Ottomans who 
can make out no difference between this and the bygone era and who want to reform such a Sultanate as the 
Ottoman within a single year". Ibid. Cf fn 11. The following year, al-Bustani dutifully commemorated the day of 
enthronement of "the first constitutional Sultan" Muhammad V, yet his morale, too. was starting to crumble before 
the endless brawling of the Istanbul political parties. feral infighting within the regime, implacable insurrection from 
the Bulgars and Yemenis and mounting despair among non-Muslim and Arab Ottomans that the Turks ever would 
accord them real equality. However. his acculturated antipathy that Western powers were fanning those national and 
sectarian conflicts in the Ottoman Stale under their veneers of goodwill, and the completion of some effective 
reforms in its armed forces and finances. made him rally to it. '"Ala Dhikra al-Julus al-Sultani" (Commemorating 
The Sultan's Accession). al-Jaridah 27 April 1910 p. I. 
its courts itto 
as 
a more it 
to effect Egypt. These tense Turkish and Egyptian modernists wanted people to become 
more like impelial Europeans loth to reward them with equality: would rejections ignite them? 
al-Jaridah was eager to swallow whole the rationalizations or propaganda of post-Hamidian 
Ottoman governments that they stood for secularism and such sect-neutral institutions as 
parliament, and as such were the hope of the Empire's Chiistian ethnic groups, whom Christian 
, 
religious hierarchies should not be allowed to embroil in politicized communalism61 • The 
Jaiidists were ultra-sensitive to European support for Christian nationalities. 
The particularist and cold-bloodedly pragmatic aspects of Lutfi usually subordinated his 
Muslim and Arab identifications. The class-interest of the rising rural Arab-Egyptian 
landowners who sustained Hizb al-Ummah and al-Ja1idah, and cultural affinity, both pushed him 
to moderately negotiate more self-government by stages out of the Biitish --- yet would 
accommodationism ever pay off? The obdurate, skilful obstmction by the British of any 
expansion of parliamentarism inclined him to view Turks more as co-victims of 
discliminatory Western powers. When the already autonomous --- and prosperous --- Chlistian 
60. "Hadith al-Sadr al-A 'zam ma'i!l Murasil al-Temps" (The [Ottoman] Prime Minister's Interview to Le 
Temps). al-Jaridah 11 October ! 909 p. 4. al-J;u-iclah was sensitive to European accusations against post-Hamiclian 
Turkey given affinities to those made against Egypt's aspirations. It carried a reply by fonner Ottoman Education 
Minister lsma'il Haqqi Babanzadeh made in the French press to charges by a former French Minister for the Navy: 
that the CUP was controlling Ottoman governments. establishing a regime that murdered critical journalists, and that 
Turkey was anti-France. Haqqi replied that the new Turkey was a true pluralist constitutionalist polity (although it 
had lost one journalist who went too far beyond what Turks were accustomed), and it was culturally and 
intellectually bound to France as shown by its expansion of French education and by sending hundreds to study in 
France. "Bayna Wazirin ·u1hmani wa Wazirin Faransawi --- Hal Hunaka Dustur 'Uthmani?" (An Exchange 
Between an Ottoman and a French Minister --- Is There an Ottoman Constitution?), al-Jaridah 22 August 1911 p. l. 
61. al-Jaridah can-ied Sadr-i-A 'zam Hilmi's validation of he and his colleagues as West Europ,ea~-type 
positivist or liberal secularists upholding the new sects-integrating parliament: he had the right to bar internal and 
foreign clergy (here. the Pa11iarch of Moscow) from taking up the grievances of, for instance, Greeks injured by 
"men of a different sect" in Macedonia: only the (neutral, Ottoman) "civil administration" was entitled to handle 
complaints from communities, all Ottoman clergy, too, had to confine their statements to purely religious matters. 
"Hadith al-Saclr..." Before the CUP, Christian Oltomans had not been recruited into the Army, a Muslim preserve, 
but, exulted al-Jaridah. "the world must always advance": "al-Jaysh al-'Uthmani wa Tajnid al-Arwam" (The 
Ottoman Army an cl Conscription of The Greeks), al-J ariclah 26 September 1909 p. 5. Dawud 'Ammun and Edward 
Bistiris, "al-Nasara wal-Yahud fil-Jaysh al- ·uthmani" (The Christians and the Jews in the Ottoman Army), 
al-Jaridah 2 October 1909 p. 5. Cf fn 54 for a desectu-ianizing application to Egypt. al-Jaridah stressed 
reconciliation between Armenians. and the Turks represented by Ottoman deputy Riza Tawfiq, at the 1911 Races 
Congress in London. "Mu·tamar al-Ajnas al-' Amm" (The General Races Congress), al-Jaridah 13 August 1911p.4 
cf fn 47 for Zionism there. 
on it 
IS ). It was 
the so to grant violent 
government independence and union with Greece without bothering to consider how 
accommodatory Egypt under Britain lagged behind the other "Eastern" governments [=Turkey] 
in the implementation of Constitutional p1inciples62 . 
Sometimes the gradualist Jaridists sought to somehow incorporate Egyptian local 
nationalism into some humanized imperial order63 ; yet the post-Hamidian Ottoman ~tate still 
figured as an intermediate and perhaps more relevant model for West-patterned Progress from 
1908. The Ottoman State came much closer when he despaired that he and his colleagues would 
ever be able to install Egypt's political progress within the interlocking discourses of any of the 
European states. Even when triggered off by Crete, though, Lutfi maintained significant duality 
towards the Turks. Feeling that the callousness or enmity of Westerners lumped all Muslims 
together, he recalled common nineteenth century actions of Egyptians and "the Turks" against 
the imperialist Napoleon or the similar British --- or under Muhammad against the early 
insurgent nationalists, including those Crete. But also re-evoked the conquests 
"the hero" Ibrahim Pasha in Ottoman Asia "to the gates oflstanbul" --- a memory that the 
62. Just as she now justified intervening to stop the Ottoman army moving against turbulent elements in 
Crete, Britain had claimed in 1882 to he entering Egypt only to prevent bloodshed. Yet "their first measure of 
reform" was to abolish Egypt•s Constitution, plunging Egypt into the despotism it still suffered at the hands of th~ 
Khedive 'Abbas. Conside1ing "the Egyptian Question" now as only one component in "the Eastern question in 
general" made Lutfi wonder if his group's incrementalism ever would win any response from any European power. 
In contrast to Egypt, "the Cretans enjoy autonomous self-government [so that] Ottoman suzerainty in no wise harms 
them". Egyptians of all political groups h:1d so long and so fruitlessly with meek "legalistic" diplomacy courted 
intervention from European powers to make Britain withdraw: in contrast, when the Cretan Orthodox used "violent 
means" to incorporate their island in Greece, the Powers intervened at once. Yet, Egypt was more important for · 
"international balance and the Eastern Question". Lutfi, "Bayn al-Madi wal-Hadir" (Between the Past and the 
Present), al-Jaridah 1September1909 p. l. al-Jaridah excerpted materials from the Times and a letter ftom an 
Orthodox Cretan merchant describing Oltoman Crete as a paradise in which anyone could trade freely until they got 
rich, to justify the status quo. al-Jaridah 2 September 1909 p. 5. 
63. As Cromer left the stage, Lutfi reflected that he could have won still more gains for his country had he 
tried to win the loyalty and friendship of the Egyptians. for example by giving their competent individuals that 
margin for initiative essential for the British to truly teach the Egyptians how to administer themselves. That would 
have won the friendship of those liberal Egyptians who praise his work to expand "personal freedom, respect for law 
and equality between the classes or the nation"(= fostering growth of Arab-Muslim landowners vis-a-vis declining 
Turco-Circassians?). Lutfi, Sarahat p. 74. Lutfi resentfully noted the refusal of the British to associate with any but 
toadying officials or those seeking favors: they excluded the enlightened intelligentsia for whom he spoke --- and 
who he implied would have welcomed more humane or pragmatic interaction with a ruling group from which they 
wanted to learn. Ibid p. 245. Cf fn 14. 
to unrest 
the 1 1 
could separateness competitiveness Egyptians, 
nonetheless here saw as close associates in Muslim-regional joint enterprises. Nonetheless, Lutfi 
did not apply any Ottomanist vocabulary to "the Egyptian nation" in the item: it did not fuse the 
Egyptians and Turks it bracketed64 . 
In 1911-1913, then, the Jaridists set their face against the dtive of the Orthodox Greek 
politicians on Crete, supported by Greece's Cretan Prime Minister Venizelos, to shake off the 
' 
last vestiges of Ottoman suzerainty and join Greece. The Jaridists' concern for the Ottoman 
presence and Muslim minority on the island opened into a clash with mainstream Greek 
nationalism and the anti-Muslim European powers it tried to manipulate through culture --- not 
always with as much success as Egyptian acculturateds supposed65 . The joint history Egypt 
under its autonomous (but Turcophone) 'A lids always kept up with the Ottoman Turks 
resurfaced: but the post-1882 multi-culturization of Egypt's A1~ab Muslim elite clinched the 
response. The newspapers of local Francophone Greeks and of Britain and France in unison 
made and other Greeks as detailed as the Muslim Jaridists such as and 
Taha were to translate classical Greek philosophy and high literature. The very specialized, 
diverse sectors of acculturation in Egypt made specific Western nations speaking those 
languages intimately vivid as joint enemies of Muslims (for Egyptian blending in 1934 of both 
classical Greek civilization and Egypt's nineteenth century participation in th~ Turks' war 
against nascent Greek nationalism: B 169 - 170). 
~--~---------------------------
64. Lutfi, "Bayn al-Madi wal-Hadir". 
65. Prior to 1909. and although the Ottoman flag still fluttered, the Orthodox Cretans had already'been 
somewhat woven into the Greek polity: after the Greco-Turkish war of 1896-7, the Powers had imposed not just 
autonomy for Crete but also Prince George --- of Greece's royal family --- as the island's nominal head. British 
politicians cultivated in Britain by Cretan-born pan-Hellene Venizelos included Lloyd George and Winston 
Churchill. Like the Kami lists from the earlier 1890s, the Jaridists now in 1909 exaggerated emotional cultural 
"favoritism" of the Western powers which had not backed Venizelos in his 1908 enosis protest from the Cretan 
parliament. As Greek Prime Minister from 19 l O, though, he skilfully courted British and other Western politicians 
who in 1913 transferred Crete from the Ottomans to Greece. Data supplied by Professor John Burke, Senior 
Lecturer in Modern Greek at Melbourne University, 27 June 1991. For background, "Ikritish" EI2 and Stanford J. 
Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (v. 2): Reform, Revolution and 
Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkev, 1808 - 197 5 (New York: Cambridge University Press 1977) (esp. the 1866 -
1869 revolt pp. 151-2 and bibliography of Greek, Turkish and Western sources and scholarship pp. 451-2) 
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PROTO-EASTERNISM 
Pan-Easternisrn by Lutfi' s al-Siyasah disciples in the 1920s has been viewed in the' 
literature as a later deviation from his Egyptianist thought, one of which he was to disapprove66• 
(Pan-Arabism crystallized within Eastern ism towards the end of the 1920s). In reality, the 
Jaridists' pre-1914 Easternist anti-imperialism already extended and deepened (a) the unassured 
feelers of the Kamilists and al-Afghani much earlier, towards some coordination with 
non-Muslim Afro-Asian independence movements into (b) widened (still ultra-political) 
religious and aesthetic conjunction with those non-Muslim peoples. 
Lutfi kept his Easternist rage against Europeans more controlled: his colleagues, though, 
distilled it into a fuel for their most parochial Egyptianist ventures. An instance was reflections 
of S. Haykal around a drive to establish an Egyptian National Bank: the financial independence 
of Egyptians would help achieve (a) ultimate independence and (b) help smaller Egyptian 
peasants keep their small landholdings out of the hands of usurers. Smith argued from al-Jaridah 
materials that Muhammad Husayn Haykal wanted to maintain "Such transfer of land through debt 
and usury from the small peasants ("fools") to the expanding holdings of his class of 
Arab-Egyptian large landowners67 • S. Haykal was wary lest some "defect" (sha'ibah) be 
perceived in the response of the rural (Arab-Egyptian) land-owning notables (a'yan: his class?) 
to this threat to small peasant proprietors: he sought to motivate them to subscribe shares for the 
coming bank not just by appeals to their Egyptianist patriotism but much more to "the Eastern 
sincerity/devotion" that had enabled the Japanese to sink all their internal divisions and achieve 
I 
the globally-respected might by which they broke Russia in the Far East. Some al-Liwa' 
journalistic intellectuals had wanted the Japanese to convert to Islam as a further precondition for 
a modern international alliance against the imperialists. But S. Haykal by 1911 could . · 
incorporate and cherish all the religions of the peoples of the East, not just their "patricaj_sms" 
66. Jankowski characterized that Liberal Constitionalists/al-Siyasah intellectuals were at the fore of the 
propagation of pan-Eastern (Arabism-fostering) ideas in the 1920s and early 1930s in comparison to the Wafd. 
However, "the intellectual mentor of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, differed sharply 
from many of his disciples in regard to Eastern ism·~ refusing to lend support to an "Eastern Student Conference" 
being organized by Fathi Rid wan on the grounds that "your country is more suited to your activity". James 
Jankowski, "The Eastern Idea and the Eastern Union in Interwar Egypt", The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies v. 14:4 (1981) pp. 648-649. 
67. Haykal's opposition to the Five Facldan law, designed to aid peasant landownership, from al-Jaridah in 
1912 as analysed by Smith, Islam and the Search pp. 45-46. 
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that hanned Westerners. The Westerners could not understand the Easternist motive that fueled 
Japan's will to victory, but also aesthetic and religious aspects of resistance by other Easterners. 
The tendency of various European elite groups to lump a range of sometimes disparate high 
literatures in the non-Western world together as "Eastern poetry", a common Eastern literary 
sensibility, stimulated his search now for cultural as well as political pan-Eastern common 
ground on which to rally68 • In the 1920s, al-Siyasah, al-Jaridah's successor, was to project both 
classical Sanskritic (Kalidas) and modern Bengali Indian literature (Tagore) --- and also a 
somewhat theosophical respect for Hindu "spirituality" which Husayn Haykal was even to install 
in his Islamic apologetics of the 1930s and 1940s (B 61-2; B 91-2). Some classical Arab 
writings mutedly, reinforced by the Asian (especially Indian), rather than Western, theosophy 
al-Jaridah extended69, respected Hinduism but Sadiq Haykal's article was new in equalizing a 
range of literate but pagan Asian religions and Islam in one new imperialism-repelling 
community. As well as the resistance of Shintoism, Hinduism and Buddhism, Eastern devotion 
was also what had sustained "the [first] conquests of the [classical] Arabs ... [so that] their state 
incorporated within eighty years what the Roman state did not attain within eight centuries" (cf 
Muhammad Lutfi Jum'ah B 57)70• Acculturation --- the Victorian classicism of the British that 
they had recycled in Egypt's schools, the cult of Latinism by the French in their literature, public 
life and impe1ialism --- often highlighted the classical Arabs. British communications that the 
68. Eastern devotion/self-sacrifice was "a forgetfulness of self ... like the incandescent Eastern sun and 
clear blue Eastern skies and the Eastern poetry ... clothes ... emotions that. given their extreme extravagance, only: 
Easterners can ever understand. This [Eastern commitment] ... inherited by the sons from the' fathers [in every 
generation] ... is the secret of the tenacious adhesion --- so baffling to the Westerners --- of people of Islam to their 
religion, just as it has constantly renewed the religions of India, China and Japan in the souls of their adherents over 
thousands of years". This 1911 item was certainly very acculturated and non-traditional. The tendency of various 
European elite groups to lump a range of sometimes disparate high literatures in the non-Western world together as 
"Eastern poetry", a common Eastern literary sensibility, encountered by S. Haykal in Western languages, stimulated 
his search now for cultural as well as political pan-Eastern common ground on which to rally. S. Haykal, ','al-Ikhlas 
al-Sharqi" (Eastern Devotion/Self-Sacrifice). al-Jaridah 7 May 1911 p. 1. To be sure, the classical Arab?' writings 
had also revered India's sciences and learning. 
69. Extracts from a Hindu Maharaja"s speech, in which he equated Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism and 
Christianity as all sources of the same. or complementary,, benevolent human virtues for inter-personal relations 
were translated by "F.B." in "Wahdat al-Adyan fil-Jawhar" (The Essential Unity of All Religions), al-Jaridah 23 
October 1909 p. 2. C.D. Smith's impression was that theosophism first impinged on Haykal's consciousness after 
World War 1, and as an expression of a now demoralized Western intellectualism's loss of faith in science --- and 
that Haykal implicitly disapproved. Smith. Islam and the Search pp. 99 - 103. The presence of theosophical 
materials in al-Jaridah well before the War shows that the net of Eastern religious cultures as a sanctuary or 
rallying-point against the West was not introduced into Haykal's consciousness after 1922, although Western 
sources had also contributed to it from the inception. 
70. S. Haykal. "al-Tkhlas al-Sharqi". 
- A313 -
Jaridists picked up stressed Egypt's connectedness to India as regarded imperial power, which 
establishment B1itishers feared could face concerted resistance from a range of Afro-Asian 
nationalist movements and states (Japan-prefigured)71 • Such data implanted awareness among 
Jaridist (/Siyasahist) intellectuals of both particularoid Muslim and --- perceivedly more 
anti-British --- Hindu-led Congressite nationalist currents in British India. 
Militarily mighty but parliamentarizing Japan was a reassuring Jaridist reply to 
imperialist discourses about Easterners72 . Lutfi, himself, sometimes almost fused the "spiritual 
Easterners" in dichotomization against the materialist Westerners73 . Syrian Christians who had 
, 
known Westerners at over-close quarters also called for non-Western values74. Vague protest 
Easternism put space between our intellectuals and the pervasive West until they decided how 
Islamic they would make their coming reaction against it. 
71. In 1910. al-Jaridah copiously excerpted a long London Times editorial that juxtaposed the growing 
independence movements in India and Egypt as both influenced by the Ottqman constitutionalist movement ---
which had also stimulated both Egyptian press criticism of Britain and political assassination [Butrus Ghali]. The 
Times, however, also lumpe'd in Japan's expulsion of Russia from Southern Manchuria. the constitutionalist 
movement in Iran that attacked foreigners, the development of violent resistance in Bengal and recent fierce 
resistance by hitherto despised Tibetans to British troops. All manifested one growing will of "the East" to resist 
such kindred European states as Britain and Russia politically, militarily and through economic self-modernization 
(Japan, China). Excerpted London Times editorial. "Ikhtimar al-Sharq" (The Ferment in the East), al-Jaridah 17 
May 1910 pp. 4 - 5. Thus, the assumption of the British that, for instance, Japanese defeats of the Russians could 
weaken them, too, made the Jaridists more likely to become supra-Muslim pan-Easternists. 
72. Although with limitations on voting, Japan had inaugurated its Diet (Parliament) in November 1890: for 
Egyptians faced with Cramer's stereotypes about the congenital incapacity of Easterners, Japan's c.onstitutional 
politics were as heartening as her defeat of Russia in 1904-1905. In early 1909. Lutfi cited a range of parallel 
Eastern constitutionalist politics or movements (and Herbert Spencer against Aristotle) to refute the arguments of the 
British and the Khedive that the passive Egyptians preferred autocratic government. "It is truly bizarre that after the 
(1889] Japanese Constitution and the Ottoman Constitution and the Iranian [Constitutionalist] movement, they 
continue ... to claim that the East was created to obey and can appreciate only personal rule, as a preliminary for 
proving that the Egyptian Nation ... will never unitedly demand the Constitution". Lutfi, Safahat pp. 49, 45. For 
another instance where pagan Japan inspires as Easternist model of modernization for a less successful Egypt see 
'Abd al-Qadir Hamzah, "Inna fi Dhalika la- 'lbrah: Misru wal-Yaban" (Verily in that is a Lesson: Egyp_t and Japan) 
al-Jaridah 28 August 1910. ·~· 
73. Taking up musings about Easterners and Westerners by British writers, Lutfi in 1907 (somewhat 
prefiguring S. Haykal's 1911 pan-Easternism) contrasted that "the Easterner" gave priority to such "moral virtues as 
charity, generosity, loyalty and religious devotion" as against the Westerner's pursuit of "material benefit". This 
was still much more traditionally Araboid and Islamic than S. Haykal's 1911 theosophist pan-Easternism. Lutfi in 
1907 stressed as the determinants of the Eastern personality geographical conditioning from the calm air common in 
all the Eastern homelands. the ultra-mch1phoricism of Eastern languages, and the religious customs so immemorially 
central in the Easterner's soul. Writing in the context of the British constriction of education, denial of a politicial 
life, and Cramer's charges of pan-fslamism and "religious fanaticism" when Egyptians objected, Lutfi in 1907 was 
very aware of Curzon and the British in India but mainly for their contrasting courtesy to modem Muslims there (Sir 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan). He did not discuss Hindus in the item, although he mentioned Japanese and Chinese 
"Easterners" whom Cromer evoked in passing. Lutfi, Safahat pp. 96 - 97, 100 - 101. 
come pro-Ottomanism or 19 
commmunity identifications in Egypt, as the literature has exaggerated75 • The CUP's 
overthrow of' Abdul-Hamid and the party politics that ensued in Istanbul riveted the attention of 
al-Jaridah, like all Egyptian newspapers, for years76, somewhat distracting even SC contributors 
from the Arab provinces. The Jaridists often perceived West Asian or Libyan Arabs as a 
component in an Ottoman community whose modernization was led by Turks. Yet Libyans 
' 
fighting invading Italy in pa11nership with Turks were sharply seen as Arab and hence closer77 • 
74. Yusuf al-Bustani in 1910 voiced a tone of reserve about Egypt"s wholesale borrowing of Western 
customs. dress and political institu!ions. As a corrective to such openness, he cited the regulations of the Mikado for 
Japanese nationals visiting Europe or America. The Japanese adopted the West's commercial and industrial 
methods in order to "benefit" but were very cautious about its political and social institutions. This dual approach 
had enabled them to keep their Eastern. Japanese characteristics. "Y .B.", "Ma Na'khudhuhu min Urubba wa Ma 
Yanfa'u Misr" (The Things we Take from Europe :md What Benefits Egypt). al-Jaridah l March 1910 p. l. Cf fn 
113 for his conservatism about women. 
75. "Of the three alternative bases for political identity which competed for the loyalties of Arabs in the 
'liberal age' (religious; territorial; ethnic-linguistic) by far the weakest in Egypt was the third". The ensuing 
discussion exaggerates gaps between (a) the Ottoman Arabists and (b) the Kami lists and Jalidists out of any 
proportion or perspective, ignoring almost all the many more positive interactions and exchanges. James JankowskL 
"Ottoman ism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914", The Muslim World v. 70:3-4 (1980) p. 245 et seq. 
76. As other Ch. 6 fns document (cg. fn 60). al-Jru·idah published copious Arabic translations of the greater 
number of Western Press interviews with post-Hamidian Turkish leaders. It supplemented these with SC interviews 
and studies on the Istanbul political scene: these showed deep blow-for-blow psychological involvement in the 
ongoing struggle between reactionary members of the royal family who wanted to turn back the clock and the new 
parliamentary politicians. Interview by Yusuf al-Bustani of anonymous Ottoman deputy, "al-Dustur al-'Uthmani wa 
Markazuhu al-Hali" (The Ottoman Constitution and its CmTent Standing/Situation), al-Jaridah 6 March 1910 p. 5. 
Like most Egyptian newspapers in the years following' Abdul-Hamid's overthrow, al-Jaridah also had an · 
(anonymous) correspondent of its own in Istanbul, apparently a Turk. who relayed minutae of parliamentary 
debates and manouvres and the interactions between all the factions in post-Hamidian Istanbul politics. Eg.: 
"al-Astanat al-' Aliyyah li-Murasilina al-Khususi fi 27 Fibrayir --- Majlis al-Mab'uthin" (Elevated Istanbul From Om 
Own Correspondent. 23 Febrmu-y --- The Parliamentary Session), al-Jaridah 5 March 1911 p. l; cf similar report 
datelined 12 March 1911 in al-J:u·idah 19 March 1911 pp. I - 2. For political gossip about the motives of ministers 
from a previous ministry or Haqqi Pasha joining that of Sa 'id Halim Pasha. and speculation about a coming 
parliamentary session, "al-Astana! al-· Aliyyah fi 25 Uktubir --- li-Murasilina al-Fadil", 1 November 19ll,.pp. 5 - 6. 
77. An accurate account of the Sanusi mystic order leading the Cyrenaicans was given in "al-Sanusiyyun", 
reprinted from SC Antun al-Jumayyil's al-Zuhur. al-Jaridah 9 November 1911. Phrases used by Turks additionally 
pushed the Jaridists to perceive the Libyans as "Arabs". A despatch from Istanbul spoke of large-scale Italian 
massacres of women and children, of "the Arab-Turkish force" resisting, and of "volunteers of the hero Arabs". 
"al-Astanat al-'Aliyyah fi 8 Nufimbar --- li-Murasilina al-Khass" (Sublime Istanbul on 8 November --- by Our 
Special Correspondent). al-Jru·idah 15 November 1911 p. !. The same term "the Arabs" was again used by the same 
Istanbul Ottoman correspondent: Ottoman regular "officers are organizing the Arabs" for a long war of resistance, tc 
the consternation of Italian forces afraid to venture beyond their fortified positions and artillery. "al-Astanat 
al-' Aliyyah: li-Mukatibina al-Khususi --- l'i 16 Nufimbar'~ al-Jaridah 23 November 1911. The despatch ironized 
that Italy was mistaken if it was banking that Turks and Arabs were "enemies" in the Ottoman State, which in realit) 
would continue to fight until a substantial portion of its forces in Libya were destroyed. Ibid. 
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This section traces the Jaridists' special relationship with the Ottoman Arabs that shared literary 
language automatically imposed, drawing them into their anti-Turkish protest ethnicity --- a 
conflict that the focus on tense multi-cultural Istanbul itself could only underscore. 
Jaiidist Reactions to Italy's 1911-1912 Invasion of Libya 
Libya had been pa11 of the Ottoman Empire, and the invasion confronted the Jaridists 
with the legal and international complexities and contradictions of Egypt's attenuating 
community with that suzerain78. The lives of fellow-Arabs --- much closer neighbors --- were 
, 
also at stake. The Italians responded to resistance with massacres of populations: these 
traumatized Egyptians conditioned by their duality of culture to hope that Westerners were 
evolving towards a respect for a neutral body of international laws or even liberal pacifism79 --- a 
shift needed for Egypt to become independent through secular gradualism. With all its rural and 
provincial connections, al-Jaridah covered and gave direction to the drive to organize material 
aid to the Libyans from those areas of Western Egypt with most trading and marriage links with 
them. Given that the Italian fleet was starving "the Tripolitanians" by stopping any food coming 
by sea, "the Muslims in Egypt" had to send grain. The people of Bani Suwayf were urging the 
provincial aid committee there to collect that grain. One mill-owner offered to grind flour free of 
charge out of all grain donated. The Egyptian bedouin Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali Bayyah of 
al-Fayyum, visited the al-Jaridah office and unde11ook to carry aid by camels to Bani Ghazi, the 
78. Muhammad Husayn Haykal. "Markaz Misr fil-Waqi' wal-Qanun" (Egypt's Position in Reality and in 
Law), al-Jaridah 9 October 1911 p. 1. took Egyptians over the anomalies. Legally, the Ottoman State had the right 
after a declaration of war on Italy to demand passage of its troops over Egypt to Tripolitania. Knowing that Britain 
might further curtail its suzerain rights in Egypt if it did so. Istanbul had taken care not to declare war even while 
waging it. Ibid. The Ottoman State had been consolidating its hold over its faraway Libyan province for decades 
with various administrative and educational reforms. For Libyan participation in these up to the invasion, L. 
Anderson, "Nineteenth Century Reform in Ottoman Libya" IJMES v. 16:3 (August 1984) pp. 325-348. See also 
Michel Le Gall, "Ottoman Reaction to the European 'Scramble for Africa': The Defence of the Hinterland' of 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica", Asian and African Studies (Haifa) v. 24:2 1990 pp. 109-136. 
79. "An Egyptian" responded with shock lo the discrepancy between mainstream West European discourse, 
which Italy mouthed like the others. and her violence lo Egypt's West: "the whole world today is witnessing the 
most hideous of scenes of savagery to be carried out by sons of a country purported to be ancient in civilization". 
Italy's treacherous war against the Ottoman State had cost it its faint tint of the twentieth century but did not shatter 
his belief that a new humane community was possible with liberal Europeans: "in every country there are men who 
have lately come to feel that all who arc slaughtered for no sin are their brothers in humanity". "Misri", "Wuhush 
al-Madaniyyah" (The Beasts of Civilization), al-Jaridah 16 November 1911. For vivid excerpts from a British 
account of mass murders by Italians. "A 'ma! Tushib al-Wildan --- Risalat Mushahid 'Iyan" (Actions Which Would 
Make The Hair of Children Grey --- Account of an Eye Witness). al-Jaridah 12 November 1911p.1. Colored by 
European pacifism was 'Aziz Khalqi's "Haw! al-Harb" (The Terror of War). al-Jaridah 18 November 1911 p. L 
nearest war 
set to organize stores 
a telegram by of Progress 
physical reprisals against Italian subjects the Ottoman Empire proper. The upshot, though, 
was much unpleasantness for Italians with business or even academic roles in Egypt81 • 
Lutfi was undoubtedly ambivalent to the collection of such (proto-pan-Arab, ethnically 
pluralizing) aid to "our Tripoli cousins and the Ottomans"82 . He did fear that it could deplete 
resources and energies that the Egyptians badly needed for their own long-term dec?lonization. 
He feared how readily Italy might retaliate against Muslim Egypt and that Britain was liable to 
do hann of its own if internationally inconvenienced. 
Material aid from the Egyptian provinces to the Libyans, already highlighted and fanned 
by al-J aridah in 1911, swelled to an unbroken stream of foodstuffs and weapons that continued 
for the next two decades until Graziani finally crushed the Libyan resistance. Periods in which 
the Liberal Constitutionalists, successors of al-Ummah, led or served cabinets after 1922 
were particularly indulgent to the traffic. 
Lutfi's insularoid responses to Italy's invasion of Ottoman Libya have been stressed by 
the West's scholarly literature as an early rigorous pa11icularist repudiation of Egyptian 
pan-Islamism (and, objectively, future pan-Arabism) 83 . This paradigm misses not just nuances 
80. "Hawadith al-Harb: I'anat al-Dawliit al-'Aliyyah" (Developments in the War: Aiding the Ottoman . 
State). al-Jaridah 7 October 1911p.4. 
81. "A group of Ottomans and their Egyptian brothers decided yesterday in Cairo to' form a committee for 
the boycott of Italian stores. and that they will publish a list of the names of those businesses". "Hawadith al-Harb" 
(Developments in the War). al-Jaridah 4 October 1911 p. 4. Students at the fledgling Egyptian University walked 
out of the class of the Italian oriental isl Professor Carlo Nallino. James Jankowski, "Ottomanism and Arabism", p. 
244. al-Jaridah had insularistically ridiculed that while (Khedive-supported) al-Mu'ayvad and the Kamilist al-' Alam 
and al-Liwa· all ceaselessly called on Egyptians to boycott Italians, they continued to buy the paper on which they 
were printed from Italian merchants. "al-Qawlu wal- ·Amal" (Words and Deeds), al-Jaridah 25 August 12,11p.5. 
The students had to drive Nallino out for their pan-Islam and Arabism to mean anything: after he lost his'Egyptian 
University post over the invasion of Libya, the imperial Nallino was the Italian government's natural choice to 
survey captured Turkish documents and set up a translation bureau in the new colony. Donald M. Reid, "Cairo 
University and the Orientalists", IJMES v. 19 (February 1987) p. 57. 
82. Rejecting the practicality of aid by Egyptians to the Ottoman (and local Arab) resistance in Libya, Lutfi 
himself allowed that "kinship" (garabah) raised some obligation to convey food-relief to the drought-stricken 
"cousins" there. Lutfi. "al-Gharat al-Talyaniyyah 'ala lkhwanina al-'Uthmaniyyin" (The Italian Invasion/Onslaught 
Against Our Ottoman Brethren).,, al-J<u-idah l October 1911 p. I. 
83. See Wendell's characterization of Lutfi as a simple. rigorous particularist, cold-bloodedly determined tc 
keep Egypt outside the 1911-1912 llak1-0ttorn:m W:ir because he equated the Turks as imperialists with the British. 
Wendell, Egvptian National Image pp. 233 - 235. Lutfi was an even more total p~u-ticularist for Gershoni and 
Jankowski since he was prepared lo be forced to step down for a time, for that insularist stance, by the other staff of 
's stances to 
11 a denial Egypt. 
European journalists had misrepresented: none but a handful of journalists in Egypt had even 
thought of amalgamating Egypt into the wide Islamic world in the sense of ending its political 
distinctness. Since 1841, Egypt had been consolidating its specific political personality vis-a-vis 
other Islamic homelands, Lutfi stressed. Yet Egypt was treated before international law and the 
whole world as the Bulgars had been plior to their declaration of complete independence from 
the Ottoman State three years before --- he, too, followed the unfolding of Chlistian nationalisms 
in the Ottoman Empire, for all his anti-pan-Islamism84. 
In minimizing the place of pan-Islamism in the Egyptian psyche, Lutfi stressed Blitish 
manipulation of it: this, though, suggested both (a) its potency for Egyptians as an emotionalism 
of vicarious sovereignty and (b) how much Muslimness influenced the way Europeans saw and 
treated Egyptians and other Muslims. Lutfi noted that Egypt's-Supreme Committee for 
Donations had asked the British Foreign Office to put pressure upon Italy to halt its attacks on a 
province of the Islamic Caliphate and upon international law. Europeans would interpret 
Egyptians and Indian Muslims were content to be ruled by Britain so long as she aided the 
Islamic Ottoman State. Britain was manipulating the Islamic emotions of, for instance, the 
Indian Muslims in order to set them against the Hindus who more militantly sought 
independence. Yet Lutfi 's gradualism, too, would blatantly accommodate th~ colonial presence 
for a long time to come. "Most of our methods for achieving independence have to be through 
peaceful civic activity ... preconditions ... developing our economic, educational-intellectual 
(al-'ilmiyyah), ethical and political capacities". The avoidance of any near clash would certainly 
not harm the growth of the rural propertied Arab-Muslim elite --- it already had "ecoriornic" 
capitalist ambitions --- that financed al-Jaridah and ran the Ummah Party85 . 
Lutfi also perceived that serious pan-Islamism by Egyptians could ignite pan-religious 
al-Jaridah --- compelled. of course. by wider public feeling rather than any Arabism or pan-Muslimism in 
themselves. E2:ypt, ls lam and the Arabs p. 10. 
84. "Siyasat al-Manafi · La Siyasat al-' Awatif --- 2" (A Policy of Benefits [to Self] Not A Policy of 
Emotions). al-Jariclah 22 October 1911 p. I. 
85. Ibid. Cf "Igharat al-Talyan "Ala T,arabulus wa Nasibu Misra min Dhalik" (The Italian Invasion of 
Tripolitania and Its Be~u-ing for Egypt), al-Jaricbh 26 October 1911 p. l. 
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passions always present in the make-up of the European powers. Some Egyptian newspapers 
had frankly called for holy war (jihad) against Italy. Such association of Egypt with 
"pan-Islamism or fanaticism" (he used the French words) could be used by Britain to discredit 
demands for Egyptian independence in Europe: Europe might permanently legalize Britain's 
occupation of Egypt86. Thus, Lutfi saw pan-Christian, anti-Muslim emotions as easily-ignited 
determinants of the international policies of European states. Despite shaky liberal and 
secularoid elements in European life, Europeans too, in politics and other sectors, likewise lived 
in an ongoing religious age. 
Despite their stress that "interests" should determine Egyptian responses as they did the 
policies of Western states, Lutfi, and other Jaridists more, had invested hopes in the West's 
consolidation of international law, for Egypt's liberation. Italy's violence in Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica shattered such culture-nourished images of Westerners in general. Approaching 
militant-Kami list campist views of international relations, Lutfi described "surprise attack [as] 
not a characteristic of pre-Islamic Arabia ... savage tribes". "Preservation of the general peace" 
and "the international balance". "international law", "the traditions of modern civilization" were 
turning out to be just "phantoms". The other Westerners were not so different to Italy. 
Excerpting the French, German and Austrian Press, Lutfi characterized Western states as 
nonchalantly viewing from their balconies "a tenible war that will ... inflame hatred between 
millions of human beings". The English state refused to share the outrage of liberal writers and 
parliamentarians, instead recalling English sailors serving with the Ottoman fleet87• 
Some of the most vivid accounts that al-:J aridah printed of Italian atrocities in Libya came 
from British correspondents, and liberal denunciations in the British parliament88. Lutfi's young 
86. Lutfi, "al-Gharat al-Talyaniyyah 'ala lkhwanina al-'Uthmaniyyin", al-Jaridah 1October1911p.1. 
Against this editorial's overall sense of Europe as a general camp coordinating the Ottoman Empire's de&uction, 
ran his motif that some European powers chose not to oppose Italy's expansion in Libya lest they themselves fall 
victim to its drive to restore "the Roman glory". Ibid. The classics among Egypt's British --- Cromer had a 
penchant for Latin saws and allusions in his stuffy prose --- fed the acculturateds' awareness of ancient Rome. As 
well as Arabic articles. there was at least one book in Arabic, Ta'rikh al-Ruman (The History of the Romans) by 
Mustafa Sabri: notice. al-Jaridah 16 April 1911 p. 5. The Jaridists were thus quite well-equipped to understand the 
expansionist ancient neo-Latin motifs that fueled Italian as well as French imperialism in North Africa. 
87. Ibid. 
88. For accounts of indignation in B1itain at Italy's invasion, "al-Inkiliz wa Faza>i' al-Talyan" (The English 
and the Atrocities of the Italians), al-Jariclah 16 November 1911 p. 4. Discussion in the British press and parliament 
stressed that a solution had to be fair to Turkey and the Libyan Arabs in the face of Italy's insistence on total 
annexation. Ibid 
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disciple, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, too, sidestepped European reactions that could sugg~st 
Italy's aggression did not represent Europe in general: "our present age is a vile materialist era in 
which man eats the flesh of man with a hearty appetite for all that the writers and philosophers 
may say". Italy's violence vibrated Haykal's liberal European library; but he had as shrewd a 
grasp of the realities developing on the ground of Libya. Italy might be able to break the regular 
Turkish forces in Tripolitania, but she would not be able to "swallow" Libya's war-like Arab 
nomads, who would conduct a protracted partisan war. Italy's drive to carve out a new Roman 
Empire was grandiosity given the poverty that made hundreds of thousands of Italians migrate, 
determined never to return. Haykal hoped that weak Italy would now negotiate a comprornize 
with the Ottoman State89. 
Communications from many parties worked to engage the Jaridists in the Libya mayhem: 
Istanbul voices, the British press, French despatches from very Rome, the culturally intimate 
anti-impe1ialism of SC Yusuf al-Bustani90 --- who commemorated in al-Jaridah Italy's 
unification and subsequent national advances --- and Ottoman Arabs91 . Primarily, the Egyptians 
89. Haykal. "Italia fi Harbiha al-Hadirah" (Italy in Her Current War), al-Jaridah 7 October 1911 p. 1. 
Haykal's bleak prognosis for tl1e ftalian forces was soon echoed by the military expert of the London Times who 
noted the huge distances and inhospitality of the Sahara desert from which the Arabs could long debilitatingly 
harrass Italy's armies. Excerpted, "Hawadith al-Harb" (Developments in the War), al-Jaridah 15 November 1911 p. 
4. Cf. fn 77. and Haykal, "Haw! al-Harb al-Tarabulusiyyah" (On the Tripolitanian War), al-Jaridah 20 November 
1911 p. 1. Marshall Rodolfo Graziani himself bore rueful witness to the long-term tenacity of the Sanusi-led 
resistance in Cyrenaica. Graziani. Die Erobenm!! Libvens (Berlin: Vorhut-Verlag Otto Schlegal 1939) passim. Cf 
Francesco Malgeri, La guerra libica 1911-1912 (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1970), which covers the . 
subsequent longer-term Arab resistance, not just Turkey's. Ottoman Turkish documents were utilized by Aghil · 
Mohamed Barbar, The Tarabulus (Libyan) Resistance to the Italian Invasion, 1911 - 1922 (University of Wisconsin: 
PhD 1980). 
90. With great feeling. al-Bustani identified "vengeance" as, alongside religion and the homeland, factors 
firing Libyan resistance: the Italians had butchered so many Arabs, but "for every one killed two [rise] to win 
vengeance". "Y. B.", "aJ-Duwal wal-Harb: Mas'alar al-Muwafaqat al-Rasmiyyah 'ala Damm Tarabulus" (The . 
Powers and the War: The Question of Formal Agreement to An Annexation of Tripolitania), al-Jaridah 14 
November 1911 p. 1. To further involve the Egyptians, the Latinoid, well-informed al-Bustani skilfully fu,eled their 
fears that expansionist Italy might one day turn her violence against them: "Italiya wa Siyasat al-Tawass'ti' ---
Matami'uha fi Misra wal-Jaza'ir wa Corsica wa Ghayriha" (Italy and the Policy of Expansionism --- Her Designs on 
Egypt, Algeria, Corsica and Other [Countriesl), al-Jaiidah 18 December 1911 p. 1. He gave some close accounts, 
drawing on the European papers and knowledgeable Egyptians, of the fighting in Libya: "Ma'rakat 'Ayn Zarah wa 
Hal Hi ya al-Hasimah Kama Yadda 'un?" (The Battle of' Ayn Zarah, and Will It Be the Decisive One As They 
Claim?), al-Jaridah 7 December 1911 p. I. 
91. Analysis from the West has dichotomized Lutfi and pre-1918 non-Egyptian Arab nationalists, but the 
latter tried to contain his isolationist spasms over cg. Libya. conciliating Lutfi and his colleagues as, overall, very 
Arabist. The Muslim Syrian Rafiq al-· Azm was in 1912 to join with Rashid Rida in founding the very autonomist 
Party of Ottoman Decentralization. and had long had use or al-Jaridah to propagandize for Ottoman protest Arabism 
even being allowed to promote the subversion of the Khedive ·Abbas, whom Lutfi and Hizb al-Ummah detested (cf 
fn 101). Perceived inadequate Turkish assistance to the Libyan Arabs greatly helped radicalize Ottoman Muslim 
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did, as Arabs, feel with neighbors facing a Darwinian destruction so hard to fit into any 
pragmatism. 
Jaridist Reactions to France's Conquest of Morocco 
Reactions by Lutfi and other al-Jaridah intellectuals to the final French conquest of 
Morocco in 1911 again coldly dissected the full ferocity of Westerners. The successor 
al-Siyasah intellectuals after 1922 would similarly side-step conditioning from the French culture 
in their psyche to denounce France's actions in Morocco, Lebanon and Syria (B 95-97). Yet the 
Jaridists in 1911 also felt significantly different from the traditional Moroccans, unchanged by 
the West. 
The multi-lingual SC Yusuf al-Bustani offered an informed account of France's use of 
her institutionalized high finance to hold off Germany during this lunge. "The fittest and 
strongest win": Darwinism to which "the last [independent] Arab State" Morocco had opened 
itself through the Sultan's failure to eliminate pre-modern "ignorance"92 • Lutfi was a 
Francophone and had been educated in a secular law mainly derived from that of France. 
However, her occupation of Morocco again brought home a grim international order based not 
on the most solemn international covenants but on the right strong European powers gave each 
other to conquer non-Europeans, each within a roughly allocated sphere. Unlike al-Jaridah SC 
sub-editor Yusuf al-Bustani, Lutfi did not apply Arab terminology to the conquered Moroccan 
state. 
Neither the French nor other Europeans, harmonious among each other, were inhibited by 
their laws or contracts in their treatment of non-Europeans. "The f 1906] Algeciras Conference 
guaranteed the integrity of the Kingdom of Morocco, just as the treaty of Berlin has guaranteed 
that of the Ottoman Sultanate. But these are purely written guarantees that can hold of{Jhe 
strong only so long as the interest of the stronger requires". Drawing on the Spanish press, Lutfi 
was acidic about the combination of force and legalisms with which France was reducing the 
Sultan of Morocco to its figurehead. The international debt of the Moroccan central government 
Arabs of al-· Azm 's kind. In 1911 he published a friendly response to "my friend Lutfi", still cast in pan-Islamic 
language, over his Egyptianist resistance to involvement in Libya. al- 'Azm, "Siyasat al-'Awatif ma' a Siyasat 
al-Manafi"' (Conducting A Policy of Emotions Alongside One of Benefits), al-Jaridah 23 October 1911 p. 5. 
92. al-Bustani. "Akhir Dawlah "Arabiyyah Yun'a Istiqlaluha Rasmiyyan" (The Last Arab State's 
Independence Proclaimed Dead), al-Jaridah 6 November 1911 p. 1. 
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--- Lutfi, here, paralleled the grounds Britain cited to occupy Egypt --- was a pretext France 
could mouth to "supervise" that government, its treasury and its new French-commanded army: 
while debt repayments continued all European states would accept that as scrupulous observance 
of the Act of Algeciras93 . 
As was the case with Britain in Egypt, France was thus careful to present itself as intent 
to take over and adapt --- rather than destroy or dismantle --- the pre-existing central 
governmental system headed by the Sultan. France was establishing a Cromer-like "veiled 
protectorate" over the old Muslim ruling class. Lutfi predicted how the French could transform 
the Sultans into puppets dependent upon them for military protection from their own people. Ye1 
he left Egyptians in no doubt that Moroccan society had been perpetually wracked by conflict 
between the sphere of central government (he gave the Moroccan term al-makhzan) and wider 
populations that resisted it: "if the Moroccans remain violently divided against each other ... and 
if some of them, including their Sultan, continue to rely on those who seek to usurp their 
independence", then Morocco would never again govern itself.-
In their parochializing, Britain-appeasing aspect, Lutfi and his colleagues did seek to reap 
political profit for the incrementalist al-Ummah Party out of one more discomfiture of the 
Kamilists: if the France they had so long courted to dislodge Britain "sees it as in her interest to 
expand the rights she gave Britain [in Egypt] under the 1904 agreement, she will do so at once". 
The final death of the culture-fanned French option could push Egyptian nationalists to coax 
independence from Britain by stages. Conversely, Lutfi's characterization of all Europeans as~ 
predatory might leave no other path to independence than organized mass movements that could 
risk class interests of his land-holding elite (the 1919 Uprising). al-Hizb al-Watani members in 
this period shared his perceptions of all Europeans as feral, and desperately tightened an bttomar 
pan-Muslim counter-bloc that al-Jaridah both resisted and fed. Like the non-Muslim al-Bustani, 
'V 
Lutfi kept the phrasing of his obvious supra-Egyptian emotions Easternist, and thus sects-neutral, 
in regard to Morocco: France's occupation was a matter for urgent consideration by "the 
[establishment] leaders of the East" (umara' al-Sharq)94• 
Alongside their concerns about Europe's imperialisms, the Jaridists, then, could perceive 
93. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, "Fi Mwakush" (In Morocco), al-Jaridah 7 June 1911 p. I. 
94. Ibid. 
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other Arab and Muslim peoples, such as the Moroccans and Libyans, with a detailed realism. 
This blended data from Arabic and several European languages to make a range of European 
predator-societies as vivid as their Arab and Muslim victims. 
Interactions With West Asian Arabs 
Cultural Elites. al-Jaiidah was an important nexus for literary and intellectual exchange 
between West Asian Arabs and Egyptians. It not only had on its staff, or as contributors, Syrian 
Christians who blended West-conscious modernism with old Arab elements, but also emigre 
Ottoman Muslim Syrians such as 'Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi: his quasi-national critique of 
Turkish groups fitted well with al-J a1idah' s Egyptianist anti-pan-Islamism95 . al-Jarid ah relayed 
the resisted, ethnicizing d1ive of such Syrian Arabs as al-Zahrawi and Rashid Rida' to restore 
Arabic as a modern educational and governmental language from apex institutions in the 
Turcophone capital96. While the Jaridists gave territory primity before 1914, Arabic also defined 
their nationality. France propagated French far abroad: that encouraged the Jaridists to 
abrasively back the language struggle of the Ottoman Arabs against the CUP's stepped-up 
imposition of Turkish97. 
95. Muhammad Muhammacl Husayn. al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu'asirah (Bayrut: Dar 
al-lrshad 1970) p. 100. 'Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi ( 1871-1916) edited the underground anti-Hamidian paper 
al-Minbar in Homs. He spent 1902-1908 as an exile in Egypt during which he contributed to the particularoid 
al-Jaridah. The early protest ethnicism that West Asian Arabs developed against successive ruling cliques of Turks 
could dovetail into the anti-Ottoman dimension of Jaridist Egyptians. It is piquant, here, that Safran did not seem !O 
understand that a 1907 nationalist critique of any nations-fusing pan-Islam ism or Ottomanism by al-Zahrawi--- not 
another Egyptian disciple of Lutfi as assumed --- stemmed from a very different origin. Nadav Safran, Egypt in 
Search of Political Community (Cambridge. Mass: Harvard University Press 1961) pp. 95-96. After the 1908 CUP 
coup, al-Zahrawi was elected deputy for Hamah and became prominent in the anti-CUP Liberal Union, serving as 
President of the Khedive-fanned Arab Congress held in Paris in 1913. Biodata on al-Zahrawi in Ahmad, The Young 
Turks p. 180. The exiled Kami list leader Muhammad Farid grieved at the CUP's 1916 execution of al-Zahrawi 
along with 21 other figures "of (Syria's] greatest Islamic families". Farid, Awrag Muhammad Farid v. 1 (Cairo: 
al-Hay'at al-Misriyyat al-'Ammah lil-Kitab 1978) p. 309. -. , 
96. Back in the Ottoman State following 'Abdul-Hamid's fall. al-Zahrawi became Ottoman MP'for Hamah, 
editing from Istanbul the newspaper al-Hadarah,a mouthpiece of Arabist ethnicism. In it. he vigorously publicized 
Rashid Rida's plan to open an Islamic seminary in Istanbul that would have Arabic as its medium of instruction: 
al-Jaridah relayed al-Zahrawi's PR build-up to Egyptians. "Dar al-'llm wal-Irshad fil-Astanah" (The College of the 
[Religious] Sciences and Instruction in Istanbul), al-Jaridah 22 June 1910 pp. 1 - 2. The CUP's refusal to support 
his seminary was one of the factors that pushed Rida' to evolve into an Arab nationalist secessionist by 1914. 
Hourani, Arabic Thouuht pp. 302 - 303. 
97. Speaking for "we Egyptians", the group at the fore of promoting "our noble language", al-Jaridah noted 
with snapping patience that "we have been hearing for a long time that the Arabic language, the language of the 
noble Qur'an, and of almost half the Sultanate's population, would be the official language alongside the language 
of the Turks" --- but entrenched Istanbul officials had sabotaged all steps. Relaying its West Asian Arab friends, 
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Nomads. The literature got dislike or incomprehension towards nomad Arabs among 
sedentary Egyptians out of proportion98 . Haim (1962) mispresented Lutfi al-Sayyid as in i911 
"contemptuously" advising those who politicized Arab giievances to explain the Ottoman 
Constitution to the bedouins99. Orientalist dichotomization ignored the capacity of Lutfi, the 
Jaridists, the Ummah Party and wider connected Muslim Egyptian strata to conduct sympathetic 
relationships with nomadic as well as intellectual West Asian Arabs. al-Jaridah-linked 
acculturated urban elites or associations, but also rural Egyptians, maintained relations with the 
autonomist Hashimite-led Hijazi establishment. The people of Mit Ghamr and the surrounding 
countryside collected for the relief of the drought-afflicted Hijazis of' Ayn Zubaydah, "the 
neighbors of Allah's Sacred House", leading to an exchange of letters between the Amir of 
Mecca Husayn and the organizer al-Shaykh Ahmad al-Ghamrawi, a merchant100. al-Jaridah 
covered the Khedive 'Abbas' fanning of restive Ottoman Arabs including the Hijaz 
Hashimites 101 . A writer in Suez in c01Tespondence with the Hijaz informed its readers that 
al-Jaridah hoped that "the rational supreme leaders of the Sultanate" would finally overcome "the enemies of the 
Arabic language':, given that the empire so badly needed its ultra-"loyal" Arabs to fight in its defence. This 
Egyptian Jaridist's angry conviction that "the life of the language is life for its nation" was very 
acculturation-heightened. being conditioned to extend beyond the inner territorial unit in part by contemporary 
Western nations, notably the French and English, that allocated millions of francs to spread their languages abroad. · 
"If we examine the moral influence of France in the different parts of the world we see that most of it derives from 
her language". "al-Lu ghat al-' Arabiyyah fil-Astanah" (The Arabic Language in Istanbul), al-J aridah 9 March 1910 
p.4. 
98. Specifically seen as alienating Egyptians from Hijazis in Jankowski, "Ottomanism and Arabism" p. 
251. 
99. Sylvia Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley: University of California Press 1962) p. 41. 
Jankowski was more level-headed: "Ottomanism and Arabism" p. 255. 
100. "Ki tab min Amir Makkah --- Iktitab Ii- 'Ayn Zubaydah" (A Letter from the Amir of Makkah --- A 
Collection for' Ayn Zubaydah). al-Jaridah 14 September 1905 p. 5. The item was a report from Mit Ghamr --- self 
promotion from al-Ghamrawi himself? --- and was published in the section "Ottoman News", the perspective to 
which al-Jaridah subordinated Egyptian special relationship with Arabs in West Asia. 
101. al-Jaridah kept Egyptians abreast of "Abbas· fanning of Olloman Arab dissidence, such as the 
rebellion against Istanbul in the Yemen. "al-Janah al- 'Ali wal-Yaman" (His Highness and the Yemen), al-Jaridah 15 
September 1909 p. 4. al-Jaridah, hostile to the Khcdive. charged that he shipped guns and ammunition lcYihe 
Yemenis. "al-Mu'ayyad wa Masa'ib al-Dawlah" (al-Mu'anad and the Catastrophes of the [Ottoman] State), 
al-Jaridah 25 August 1911. For al-Mu'ayyad's amplification of Yemeni complaints against Istanbul cf A XXX fn 
94. al-Jaridah itself got sucked into the protest quasi-pan-Arabism that 'Abbas focused: during Prince Muhammad 
'Ali's 1910 subversive tour of Lebanon and Syria, it carried the Arabist greetings of the Homs Orthodox (al-Jaridah 
16 April 1910 p. 5). Also the protest of Lcbano-Syrian Muslim Arabist militant Rafiq al-' Azm that when the Prince 
arrived, the Turkish governor of Syria Isma'il Fadil had only sent his director of foreign relations to meet him at the 
station --- brusque marginalization of a still formally Ottoman Egypt. "Ihtijajun 'Ala Wali Suriya" (A Protest 
Against the Governor of Syria). al-Jm·idah 12 April 1910 p. 4. These Syrian and Egyptian Arabs keep journalizing 
to each other over decades: in 1923, R:11"iq al- 'Azm argued in al-Siyasah with Taha Husayn over his largely 
de-Islamized. secularish recreation of' Ahhasid 'Iraq that alternated aestheticism with raunchiness: Taha, Hadith 
al-Arbi'a' (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif. 1960 - 1962) pp. 58 - 70. 
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al-' Arab (here: the nomads or, just possibly, Arabians) had gathered at the gates of al-Madinah 
"with the intention to dash with/confront the Ottoman State": but this stemmed from famine 
caused by "the failure of the rains". The group of nomads had even brought their daughters, 
offering them in marriage to the townspeople for five riyals each to stave off starvation ---
suffering that "makes the heans bleed" 102 . The minutae from al-Jaridah's Hijaz correspondents 
did show anachronistic motives --- the Hijazis' reluctance to let the CUP abolish slavery --- in 
the Sharif Husayn' s conflicts with Istanbul 103 . 
al-Jaridah followed Arab-Turkish ethnic polarization in the new parliamentary politics 
that succeeded' Abdul-Hamid's autocracy. Drawing on private information from 
Constantinople, it equated "disagreement" between Arab and Turkish members of parliament 
with Armenian and Greek deputies angry at communal bloodshed at Adana and the crisis 
between Orthodox Greeks and Muslims on Crete (=potentiality for secession). But al-Jaridah 
praised those Arab deputies who were trying to reconcile Arab and Turkish deputies: one had 
turned down an ambassadorship in London. Even Le Temps credited the CUP's intent to offer 
equality to all ethnic and religious groups in the Empire: Javed Bey had convinced the Dashnak 
Armenian deputies to rally with the CUP to defend the Constitution, heading off Armenian 
demands for independence 104 • 
The persistence of old classicist Arab grammatical norms and literary motifs in al-Jaridah 
intellectuals, for all their utilitarianism, and the new special community that they were forging 
102. "Huyaj al-' Arab wa Tajammu'uhum 'ala Abwab al-Madinat al-Munawwarah" '(Unruliness of the 
Nomads and Their Gathering at the Gates of al-Madinah the Illumined), al-Ja1idah 18 October 1909 p. 4. Hunger in 
the Hijaz had political significance in Turkish-Arab relations. In his proclamations justifying the 1916 Arab Revolt 
against Turkey, the Sharif Husayn was to evoke the famine and want created in the Hijaz. "the unendurable hardship 
which befell my nation and my countrymen". C. Ernest Dawn. From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins 
of Arab Nationalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1973) pp. 80-82. 
103. "Makkat al-Mukarramah: al-Amir wal-Ittihadiyyun" (Honored Mecca: the Amir and the Unionists), 
al-Jaridah 28 March 1910. pp. I - 2. "" 
104. "Masa 'alat Ta 'adduct al-Ajnas fil-Saltanat al- 'Uthmaniyyah" (The Problem of the Plurality of 
Races/Ethnic Groups in the Ottoman Sultanate), al-Jaridah 18 September 1909 p. 1. The CUP did not come across 
as so liberal in this nervous article which noted that it had issued a law prohibiting political meetings under ethnic or 
sectarian categories: clubs of "the Bulgars" in Salonika and Constantinople had to adjust to this new framework with 
repect for law. Ibid. The Dashnaktsuthium was formed in Tsarist Tiflis in 1890 with Russian Armenians as leaders. 
Unlike the Hunchaks (fo1med 1887 Geneva) who always demanded independence. the Dashnaks advocated 
Armenian reforms within the Ottoman framework and for a time did show a conciliatory attitude to the post-1908 
constitutionalist Young Turk regime. Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: the 
Development of Armenian Political Prn·ties Throu!.!h the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press 1963)pp. 182-5.151-178. 
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with (Ottoman) West Asian Arabs in general, were brought out by Lutfi's 1911 pilgrimage to 
Mecca and al-Madinah. 
Lutfi' s responses expressed both his persisting Islamic religious faith and the extent to 
which the West's modernity and his elite's pragmatic common sense made it modest and 
historicist. When he saw the green dome over the grave of Muhammad he recalled "those noble 
principles of which these sacred precincts were the matrix and from which they radiated out 
through all comers of the world". With an elitism of which al-Afghani and 'Abduh had not been 
free, though, Lutfi was cherishingly skeptical of the light that the su·enuously-prostrating 
"common people" ('awamm) descried around the dome. The classical works had familiarized 
Lutfi in advance with the Hijaz' awesomely bare landscape, which reminded him of "the 
difficulties faced by the Arab Prophet Muhammad Ibn 'Abdallah in communicating his message 
throughout these far-flung, waterless, mountainous regions". On the outskirts of Mecca, Lutfi 
noted the house of the third Rightly-Guided Caliph 'Uthman Ibn 'Affan. He was, though, aware 
of bedouins with guns there105• 
Encounter with the more nomadic Hijaz put Lutfi in touch with Islamic and Arab 
elements that his dual-cultured elite regretted Western influence was eroding in Egypt. He was 
alert to the railway station of al-Madinah (Progress) and regretted that modern education was not 
reaching more females. As Hijazi women still did, previous generations of (upper-class) 
Egyptian woman had sat in on mosque lessons for males, and then applied those religious 
injunctions in household life: now, elite urban Egyptian women frittered awa~ their time reading 
linguistically and morally sub-standard translations of European cheap fiction. "Arabian 
women" (al-mar'at al-' Arabiyyah) were, Lutfi allowed, in general backward in comparison to 
their peers in Egypt and "the country of the Turks". But this had not cost Arabian Woman her-
independence or strong character: "she remains worthy to be a spouse to a proud, strong;.willed, 
chivalrous, brave, generous Arab male". Wo1Tied about Egyptian women, Lutfi approved that 
the wives of at least powett\tl Arabians, the umara', themselves built up a stock of ancient Arab 
poeu·y and hadiths that they carefully taught their children so that they would make "the proud 
feats" of the classical Arabs their model in life 106• 
105. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, "Usbu' fil-Madinat al-Munawwarah" (A Week in Effulgent al-Madinah), 
al-Jaridah 27 August 1911 p. I. 
106. Lutfi, "Us bu" fil-Madinat al-Munawwarah: al-Mar'ah fi Bi lad al-' Arab" (A Week ... : Women in the 
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Lutfi went to Arabia with the literature-conditioned expectation that the spoken Arabic 
there would be close to the ancient classical: he was disconcerted to find that it had no 
declensions: Meccans paid no heed at all to his remonstances. He was sensitive to errors of 
language in Hijazis, "especially if he belonged in lineage to [Prophet Muhammad's clan] 
Quraysh, the most eloquent of the Arabs, and especially when this language is the language of 
the Qur'an". In contact with the Hijazi desert, Lutfi idealized semi-nomadic tribes that, he 
perceived, still maintained the language more than urban Hijazis: in his travels, he had evidently 
interacted with Syrian bedouin Arabs, regretting their more decayed case endings. The 
peninsular matrix of high Arabic activated the Jaridists' restorationist linguistic aspect that, when 
they were not being pragmatic, matched the Kamilists' all-encompassing Arabic. For Lutfi "to 
preserve ... serve, propagate and update a language so that it keeps pace with novel modern terms 
and methods f maintainl personality ~n~ lelf-respect for both individuals and nations" (=towards 
. ot.> ~"°' linguistic nationali~ Lutfi worried, like the Kamilists, that in Egypt many elite "youth, 
scholars and ministers cannot read or write Arabic coITectly and see that as no shortcoming": 
however, "leading men" responded with rigorous con-ectness of language. Even "journalists who 
must relinquish many features of high style to enable the common people to read them still take 
care to maintain the constructions of [high classical] Arabic". The adaptable pragmatism of the 
al-Jaridah school, Lutfi 's insistence that the literary and spoken languages had to move closer, 
the readiness to experiment with the written medium, could work in two ways. In holy Arabia, 
Lutfi proposed that the system of writing be improved so that the common people could learn the 
I 
case ~ndings of the integral classical Arabic 107 . 
Land of the Arabs [Peninsular Arabia])> al-Jaiidah 28 August 1911p.1. Earlier in the same year, he had voiced 
from al-Jaridah reservations not just about contamination from cheap Western love fiction, but about young writers 
deriving patterns from heroes and heroines in Shakespeare. This drew a retort from 23-year-old disciple Haykal that 
love between the two sexes had to be frankly celebrated as the motive-force of Humanity's progress and h;ippiness: 
Lutfi had aligned himself with those in Egypt who forbad Arabic authors to explore love and benefit fro~Western 
masterpieces about it. Haykal specified Dante, Shakespeare. Rousseau and Goethe among authors whom Egyptian 
writers should read for guidance --- juxtaposing his master Lutfi with misogynist Schopenhauer. Haykal, "al-Bubb" 
(Love), al-Jaridah 4 March 1911 pp. I - 2. The popul~u-ity of slim novellas or story booklets translated from (or 
inspired by) Western fiction a!;u·mcd 1ieo-classicist Mustafa Wahbi: he objected to their "Christian" indecency, their 
impoverished Europe-patterned Arabic that would leave the Easterners unable to read the Qur'an (=apostacy), and 
because the pulp fiction stopped people reading al-Hru·iii, al-Mutanabbi and Abul-' Ala' al-Ma'arri. Wahbi, 
"al-Riwayat" (Fiction), al-Jaridah 26 March 19 l l p. 1. The Jaridist/Siyasahist fiction-writers, though, were to attune 
Egyptians to those classical writers: B 109 - 110. 
107. Usbu' fil-Madinat al-MunawruTah: 5, al-' Arab wal-Lughat al-' Arabiyyah" (A Week in al-Madinah: 5, 
The Arabians and the Arabic Language), al-faridah 29 August 1911 p. 1. 
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Lutfi 's 1911 romanticization of fleetingly-encountered Arabians was linked to his 
, 
year-round high literary relationship with modern intellectual peers in or from Arab West Asia. 
His set of Hijaz articles were fueled by exchanges with "my friend" the Syrian pan-Islamist 
Shakib Arslan (1870-1946), who likewise imaged Arabian adherence to such stereotyped Arab 
virtues as protecting anyone who seeks refuge. He and Lutfi turned a blind eye to the 
under-government, insecmity and tribal feuds of, for instance, the Najd nomads --- chaos for 
which most of the Arab virtues had functions108• 
Arab anti-Turkism. In 1912, Lutfi sharply picked up the discontent against the 
, 
centralizing CUP spreading among Hijazis. As they saw it, those now ruling from Istanbul were· 
taking away control over their lives and making government remote in comparison to the defunct 
Hamidian regime, less "despotic" to them than for the Ja1idists. Matters once settled on the spot 
in the governor's office now required long and expensive cases in the Comt of Cassation in 
far-away Constantinople. Lutfi in 1911 coITectly saw Islam as, more than Arabness, the focus 
for Hijazi resistance: the common people misperceived the new Constitution as opposed to 
Islamic shari'ah. Yet he saw how local Islamoid discontent in the Hijaz connected out into the 
much more ethnic, Arabist protest politics conducted by more modern Syrian and 'Iraqi 
politicians against "the Turks", although still in large part from metropolitan Ottoman institutions 
(notably parliament). Although he rejected the evolution of Arab discontent into nationalism, 
Lutfi agreed with those ethnicist politicians that electoral rolls favored Turks, and that the 
Ottoman Arabs were under-represented in the Ottoman parliament and civil service. The CUP 
' 
had to stop favoring "the Turkish element" against "the Arab element" and give Arabic its due 
position in such provinces as Sy1ia, Arabia and 'Iraq. Lutfi noted with wry respect hard-hitting 
ethnic militancy in the Ottoman parliament by deputy Shukri al-' Asali, but rejected "divisive 
verbalization" (al-gawl al-mufarriq) and long-term "unvarying theories" (al-nazariyyat'./ 
al-da 'imah) 109. 
108. Ibid. Echoing Mustafa Kamirs sense of superior Arabian virtues. Lutfi downplayed banditry in the 
Hijaz as rare or unrepresentative of "the Arabian nation (al-um mat al-' Arahiyyah) which has been famous in ancient 
and modern times for chivalry. and love of good reputation .... and kindness to guests and readiness to take the part 
of the weak and love of justice ... Such exalted characteristics are still more marked in the Arabs than among other 
nations". Ibid. 
109. "Usbu' fil-Madinal al-Munawwarah: 6,al-Mas'alat al-'Arabiyyah" (A Week in Effulgent al-Madinah: 
6, The Arab Question) al-Jaridah 30 August 1911 p. l. 
some bl to 
he was to n of nomadic as as 
literature has viewed his preference in 1911 for Ottoman modernization over the 
Empire-wide Arab protest nationalism as indifference to fellow-Arabs when it was really 
vision of the likeliest way to realize their interests. 
Pre-1918 exchanges and interactions between elite Muslim Egyptians and West Asian 
(Ottoman) Arabs were multi-dimensioned --- and much closer to the core of Egyptian identity 
than al-Jaridah's links to the Turks. The shared print-language brought aesthetic self-expression 
from other Arabs to al-Jarid ah' s Egyptian readers with a speed and immediacy that literature in 
Western languages could not match. In the joint pan-Arab high literature before 1914, Egyptian 
and other Muslim clerics --- and also Catholic Lebanese clergy repropagating ancient Arab texts 
and language forms --- together with Egyptian acculturateds idealized archetypal Arabian 
language norms and virtues. On the other hand, such an Egypf-resident Lebanese Christian 
writer as Ilya Abu Madi already in 1909 radically dislocated the elements wrenched out of the 
classical Arabs' literature to convey the most recent break-throughs of the West's modernity 
such as aviation 110. The irritation as well as appreciation with which Muslim Egyptian and 
Christian Lebano-Syrian al-Jaridah contributors reacted to each others' writings decades later 
(Taha and Abu Madi B 112) shows the intimacy of the literary community that the journal got 
underway in their youth. Egyptian contributors to al-Ja1idah also published ii; ethnicist Arab 
publications in the Ottoman Empire, such as al-Zahrawi's al-Hadarah 111 • 
Above all, al-Jaridah was in itself the nexus or institution in which the different 
categories of Arabs met on a routinized day-to-day basis. 
al-Jaridah 's blended Ottomanist-Arabist outreach already in a crude way anticipated the 
110. llya Abu Madi, "al-Tayaran" (Aviation), al-Jaridah 4 October 1909 p. 5. Another contribution was 
item, "al-Tiflatu wal-Qamar" (A Child and the Moon) 21 March 1910 p. 6. The strain of Christian Egypto-SC and 
Syro-American diaspora modernism was quite strong in al-Jaridah: it published a tribute to fonner President 
Theodore Roosevelt from "the half-American" Farah Antun. editor of al-Jami'ah. who had moved to the US after his 
controversy with 'Abduh around lbn Rushd. Antun, "Ilal-Mistar Ruzifalt" (To Mr Roosevelt), al-Jaridah 24 March 
1910 p. 5. al-J aridah (7 March 1910 p. 5) also publicized al-Zuhur magazine of future al-Ah ram editor SC An tun 
al-Jumayyil, who also wrote high literature set in pre-Islamic Arabia: cf fn 51. 
111. "Bahithat al-Badiyah" (Egyptian feminist), "Wasf al-Bahr" (Description of the Sea), al-Jaridah 23 
July 1911 pp. 5 - 6. This is a pleasant long purple pastiche-Byronic evocation of the ocean. 
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Egyptian economic pan-Arabism of the 1920s with still half-baked attempts to duplicate new 
Western technology as tools to integrate the wider community. Muhammad Rushdi, a legal 
expert in the French-modelled Egyptian courts, in 1909 drew up a map for possible future 
railways in the Ottoman Empire and gave it to the Ottoman High Commissioner in Egypt. He 
very much meant to put Egypt into that grid, through a line from Egypt to Bayrut that he 
projected would cost 1 1/2 million pounds, and which would bind Egyptians to Syria and, 
hopefully, the Persian Gulf. Rushdi claimed to have discovered many minerals in Ottoman West 
Asia and he offered his services as a consultant to any trading or agricultural company that might 
' 
be set up. He had inspected the potential of the cotton cultivation developing in Palestine112• 
The modern Muslim Egyptian classes had traditionally sought careers in the civil service 
or such professions as the secular law, whereas Syrian Christians had cultivated an 
entrepreneurial ethic. But al-Jaridah shows how SC-fanned acculturateds before 1914 were also 
planning a Muslim Egyptian neo-capitalism more viable if region-wide (later= pan-Arabism). 
JARIDIST STANCES TO THE LANGUAGE FORMS AND PAST OF THE CLASSICAL 
ARABS 
Egyptian Women's Emancipation and Lamrnage 
Early Egyptian feminists were struggling to awaken women whose daily spoken Arabic 
was much simplified grammatically from the Qur'an-patterned classical. Illit~rate or 
semi-literate Egyptian men at least heard literary Arabic when they attended mosques. It would 
be harder to awaken and mobilize more under-privileged Egyptian women using high Arabic as 
the medium of speeches, newspapers and pamphlets. 
al-Liwa' under British colonial rule insisted that the Qur'an's extended neo-clii.ssical 
Arabic had to be made the medium of teaching modem knowledge and sciences, and of 
administration and public life. In contrast, in al-Jaridah, the feminist Labibah Hashim in 1910, 
upon hearing a classical speech at a conference of Egyptian women, wished that "the eloquent 
lady had replaced this language --- ... beautifully cast as it may be --- with a simple colloquial 
112. "al-Khulut al-Hadidiyyah Bayna Misr wal-Dawlat al- 'Aliyyah" (Railways Between Egypt and the 
Ottoman State), al-Jaridah 25 September 1909 p. 5. 
our women at present is to 
colloquial European languages and 
are This was "among leading causes [both] of our backwardness" and the swift 
advance of Western nations. Whereas "common people among the Easterners hate reading 
(study) because [literary language] is diametrically opposed to their conversational speech, we 
find that the least knowledgeable of Westerners flock to read newspapers with the same 
eagerness as their scholars and wtiters" 113 . 
Without particularist animus against standard Arabic in itself, such wiiters associated 
with al-Jaridah wondered if pragmatism might not dictate using something more like colloquial 
Egyptian for modernization. 
Reform or Extension of Arabic 
Given their connections with the rural landowning or gentry classes, the al-Jaridah 
publicists lacked the populist outlook for linguistic revolutionaries. Though steeped Western 
cultures, most were formed by the writings the classical Arabs to some extent: Lutfi had 
jahili Arabian poetry off by hean 114 • Lutfi a11iculated some pragmatic and even odd particularist 
113. Labibah Hashim in al-Jaricbh 18 April 19 lO p. 5. Hashim at the time was editor of Majallat Fatat 
al-Sharq (The Ma!!:azine of the Youn!!: Woman or the East); the woman whose antique neo-classical Arabic she 
criticized was "Bahithat al-Badiyah" (The Woman Scholar of the Desert) the pen-name of Malak Hifni Hasif 
(1886-1918) a teacher. and wire of a bedouin shavkh of a tribe in the Fayyum province, who .in 1911 fought the 
Italians in the Libyan war: Bahithat poured out iu-ticles on women's conditions for publication in al-Jaridah. 
al-Jariclah carried Labibah Hashim's 1911 lectures to elite women at the Egyptian University: eg. "al-Muhadarat 
al-Thalithah lil-Sayyiclat fil-Jami'at al-Misriyyah" (The Thircl Lecture for Ladies in the Egyptian University), 
al-Jaridah 2 March 1911 p. l. The last was mainly on child-rearing and other domestic matters, but cautiously more 
radical was her later talk there, "al-Raju! wal-Mm·'ah wa Ihtiyajuhuma ilal-' Amal" (Man and Woman and the Need 
of Both for Work), al-Jaridah 20 and 22 March 1910. al-J~u-idah (28 May 1907 pp 1 - 2) noted female suffrage and 
the election of the world's first woman MP in Finland. But even SC Yusuf al-Bustani countenanced w·omen 
working in the professions only as a last resort to sustain the household: as with the Kamilists, education had to 
prepare (neo-bourgeois) women for home-centred nurturing roles --- although a remmk of Bismarck from Le Temps 
bore out this "Easternist" view. al-Bustani, "Kalimatun 'an al-Mar' ah wal-Shughl" (A Word on Women and Jobs 
[which peasant women had!), al-Jaridah 9 May 1910 p. 1. Labibah Ha<>him herself explicitly spoke for women of 
"the Middle Class" in "al-Raju! wal-M<u-'ah": daughters of poor families were unable to read: her class should take 
them as servant girls instead of leaving them to be employed by foreigners --- overlooking the Arab Muslim elite's 
sexual abuse of servant girls. This J ~u-idist women's movement was rather hostile to popular women's culture: it 
denounced the release of the i;ar --- spirit exorcism ritual --- as "an evil custom that education has virtually 
eliminated from the developed/elevated (rnqivah) classes of the Egyptian Nation so that only the women of the 
lowest class continue to tenaciously practise it". Nabawiyyah Musa, "al-Zar", al-Jariclah 18 April 1911 pp. 1-2. 
114. An al-Siyasah columnist after World Wm· I described Lutfi as "a perfect littcrateur who has 
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ideas for language development. He discussed naturalization of some Western terms for modern 
inventions and objects instead of losing time on coining and popularizing equivalents from 
classical Arabic roots --- although this was in a context of joint efforts with Islamic clergy to 
modernize Arabic 115• His acceptance of "automobile" in Arabic ran against pan-Arab Ahmad 
Zaki Pasha's purist insistence on "sayyarah" (B 83-4). Lutfi wrote of the need to narrow the gulf 
between written and spoken Arabic: language is the property of the nation and ordinary 
Egyptians could reject coinings that the scholars made from ancient Arab books116• 
Yet a neo-classicizing atmosphere persisted in the al-Jaridah milieu, marking contributors 
, 
from the Westernized as well as Arabo-Islamic-educated cultural elites. In 1911, Ahmad 
Ibrahim al-Basilah used the same terms as al-Nadim two decades earlier. The language of the 
Arabs had been untainted by solecisms (al-lahn) or hackneyed feebleness (al-rikkah) but when 
"mixing" with non-Arabs ('A jam) took place "the Arabic language sta1ted to gradually fade away 
until, by our own age, it had virtually gone out of existence". Despite his rather clerical 
education, Basilah was in the line of al-Jaridah and later al-Siyasah intellectuals in the resolute 
drive to make standard Arabic cover all West:derived modernity: translations of "books of 
industries and crafts ... agriculture and mathematics". More common ground with 
Westernizing-educated Lutfi, Haykal etc was his functionalist demand that pseudo-classicist 
rhetoric be pruned from such forthcoming publications. Like Haykal and Ahmad Hasan 
al-Zayyat in the 1930s and 1940s (B 106-8; B 266-9), Basilah evoked al-Ma'mun and other 
-
classical Arab caliphs who patronized translations from foreign languages. However, his barring 
I 
of any colloquialisms of "the common people" from w1itten language contrasted to Lutfi's, 
Haykal's and even al-Zayyat's pragmatic or paiticularoid admission of some spoken syntax or 
words 117• 
memorized off by heart a great body of the best passages of the poetry of the Arabs and their most fam~'Us' 
statements": his apparently unaffected style was in reality highly rhetorical. Fil-Mir'at: Mukhtar al-Maraya allati 
Nushirat fi al-Siyasat al-Usbu'iyyah wa Ta'ifah min al-Oita' al-Adabiyyat al-Ukhra bi-Oalami Muharrir al-Mir'at 
(Cairo: Mitba'at Dar al-Kutub 1927) p. 67. 
115. Wendell. Egyptian National Image p. 277. About 1916, Lutfi and a group of friends had drawn up a 
constitution for an Academy of the Arabic Language: it was duly launched, with the Rector of al-Azhar, Shaykh 
Muhammad Abul-Fadl al-Jizawi, as its President and Lutfi as its Secretary. It spent an entire year discussing 
nothing but the legitimacy of Arabicizing foreign loan-words. Ibid. pp. 221-222 fn. 
116. Ibid pp. 276 - 280. 
117. Ahmad Ibrahim Basilah, "Ruqiyy al-Lughat al-·Arabiyyah: al-Asbab al-Muwassilah ilayhi" (The 
Development of the Arabic Language: the Means to Achieve it). al-Jaridah 11 September 1911 pp. 1-2. Basilah was 
a student at Cairo's Shari'ah Law College. 
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The shari 'ah cou11 judge 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, along with some relatives, was to be at the 
cutting edge of al-Siyasah-Liberal Constitutionalist radicalism, denying in 1925 that Islam 
prescribed any Caliphate or form of government (B 20 - 29). In 1911 he voiced from al-Jaridah a 
liberal, acculturated neo-classicism: his interest in classical Arab works had been stimulated as 
much by texts edited and analyzed by mientalists as by his readings of local manuscripts in the 
Khedivial Library. (Western scholars had restored 
aspects of the ancient Arab intellectualism, notably in 
philosophy, abhorrent to Egyptian Sunni traditionalism). 'Abd al-Raziq was urging "the sons of 
the Arab tongue" to help restore books that had appealed equally to "Easterners" and "the 
Westerners". The "glorious relics" continued to "benefit" in modem times (=but did not require 
Islam in their readers?). Despite al-Ja1idah 's occasional pragmatism, 'Ali here hoped that the 
densely neo-classicist al-Bayan would "at last" offer "the scholars of the Arabs ... the effective 
[specialist] forum by which they can convey to the Nation (ummah) their views and [Arab and 
Islamic] researches". Thus, the old I iterature suggested a contemporary successor community 
defined by the current area of learned language: "the sons of the [classical] Arabs". 'Abd 
al-Raziq's lack of awareness of any distinct Egyptian race here would have disconcerted future 
neo-Pharaonist particularists of the 1920s in the al-Siyasah milieu that was to succeed al-Jaridah. 
However, the item made no contemporary political application of this narrowly 
historical-academic 1911 community 118• 
'Ali' Abd al-Raziq in 1911 thus evinced a post-traditional, somewhat ,West-accepting 
attitude: Egyptians had to keep linguistically and aesthetically linked to the literature of the 
classical Arabs as the core component of self --- without having to view the heritage of those 
ll8. 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, "Hajatuna ilal-Majallat wa Majallat al-Bayan" (Our Need for More Magazines and 
al-Bayan) 30 August 1911 pp. 5-6. _ 
119. Haykal, "Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i: Ta'rikh Adab al- 'Arab", al-Jaridah 28, 29 April 1912 pp>i02-220; 
"Jurji Zaydan: Tarikh Adab al-Lughat al- 'Arabiyyah", al-Jaridah 11. 14. 15, 16 July 1912; Awqat, pp. 221-246. In 
1910, the infant Egyptian University had invited Zaydan to prepare a history course on Islamic literature, but then 
cancelled it, apparently out of worry at possible adverse reaction from "the uneducated Muslim common people" if a 
non-Muslim taught such a subject. R\!id, "Cairo University" pp. 62 - 64. Muslim opinion inevitably objected to 
Zaydan's not-too-competent attempts to characterize Sumerians. Assyrians and other pagan peoples as Arab and to 
depict Hammurabi's law --- rather than God --- as the source of Moses, law. "Ibn Hatim", "Ta 'rikh Adab al-Lughat 
al- 'Arabiyyah li-Hadrati Mu'allifihi Jurji Afandi Zaydan", al-Jaridah 17 July 1911 p. 5 (review of Zaydan's book). 
Zaydan dashed his books and novels on classical Arab history off at a break-neck speed: it was not hard for "Ibn 
Hatim" to spot misunderstandings of classical Arab sources in them. Ibid. For the progress of al-Rafi'i's insertion of 
himself into the Egyptian University and the modernizing Muslim Egyptian elite as an authority on Arabic and its 
literature, by the time Haykal wrote, sec fn 130. 
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relics any more as self-sufficient universal perfection. 
Haykal's Pre-Independence Stances Towards the Classical Arabs 
The usually sectionalized rebellion against the classical Arabs by some Jaridists was 
voiced in early articles of Haykal. In two 1912 pieces, reviews in form, he blasted the Muslim 
Egyptian Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i's Ta'rikh Adab al-'Arab (History of the Literature of the 
Arabs) and the resident Christian Syrian Jmji Zaydan 's Tarikh Adab al-Lu ghat al-' Arabiyyah 
(History of the Literature of the Arabic Language) 119. 
al-Rafi 'i (1880-1937) abidingly captured the Egyptian popular imagination as a defender 
and restorer of the past, literature and styles of the classical Arabs in Egypt: a 1935 
advertisement for Phosferine tonic termed him "the genius of literature and the argument of the 
Arabs" 120• A deliberately archaist poet, he from 1911 defended traditional Arab philology and 
culture against young Jaridist and al-Siyasah modernists: "in social and political questions [he] ... 
stood for the revival of the old Islamic values" 121 • He was to write a polemical work alternately 
titled The Battle Between New and Old or Under the Banner of the Our' an to refute Taha 
Husayn's claim in his 1926 On Pre-Islamic Poetry that most such poetry was forged for 
politico-sectarian reasons in the Islamic period. al-Rafi 'i later charged the Westernizing 
left-wing Copt Salamah Musa --- who condemned the classical Arabs' literature for 
de-Egyptianizing writers --- with "hostility to Islam and attacks against everything that is 
Arab" 122• al-Rafi'i, then, intertwined the classical Arabs and their literature and culture, even 
120. al-Mugattam. 26 February 19357 p. 3. 
121. Biographical note on al-Rafi'i by L.O. Schumann in his translation of The Education of Salamah Musa 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill.1961). p. 259. The young modernist authors with whom Schumann mentions al-Rafi'i_to have 
conducted controversies over classical Arabic language and heritage arc Taha Husayn, Mahmud ·Abbas al-' Aqqad 
and Salamah Musa. Like Haykal, Taha and al- 'Aqqad published extensively in al-Jaridah; Haykal's hos@e "review" 
of al-Rafi'i's book published in al-Jaridah might be viewed in this context. The vendetta continued over decades. 
When Taha Husayn published his 1926 Fil-Shi'r al-Jahili, Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i collected his articles of refutation, 
and other radical-restorationist writings on Arabic, as al-Ma 'rakah Bayn al-Oadim wal-Jadid: this volume reprinted 
some of his pre-World War l polemics and depicted Taha Husayn and Muhammad Husayn Haykal as "youth" who 
had briefly studied in Europe and on their return waged war against "the whole Arab heritage", which al-Rafi'i 
depicted as an indivisible unity of the language, its most ancient styles --- and Islam, the real target ofTaha's and 
Haykal's assaults on his stylistic positions. Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2 pp. 242-247. 301-302. From 1922, al-Rafi'i was to 
argue (from SC al-Hilal!) that an Islam he saw as social ethics had to be a basis in coming pan-Arab nationalism. 
Ibidv.2, 118-119. 
122. Ghali Shukri. Salamah Musa wa Azmat al-Damir al- 'Arabi (Sayda: al-Maktabat al-'Asriyyah 1965) p. 
58. 
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when pre-Islamic, with revealed Islam. Before 1915 --- from al-Ja1idah! --- he flexibly 
popularized the West Asian classical Arab past and offered straight foward, topical verse as well 
as his integralist restoration of the classical Arabs' style: he somewhat related his ethos to 
Lutfi's123. He was trying to convert al-Jaridah 's modern Muslim elite constituency to his 
totalistic neo-classical style. 
Haykal's two essays 
1. denied that the early --- especially the pre-Islamic "nomadic" peninsular --- Arabs 
should be the behavioral model for modern sedentary Egyptians (al-Rafi'i and Zaydan). 
2. denied that the language and idioms of at least dese1t pre-Islamic ancient Arabs had to 
prescribe style and sensibility for w1iting by modern Egyptians (al-Rafi'i's enterprise). 
Haykal in 1912 appealed simultaneously to (a) things indigenous, Egyptian and (b) 
West-derived contemporaneity, "the twentieth century", to marginalize some classical Arab 
language and literary patterns. In the al-Rafi 'i item, Haykal reproved Egyptian writers who, in 
expounding to their twentieth-century readers the psychology (saha'if nafs) of the earlier 
classical Arabs affected "the latter's [antique] way of understanding, thought and expression" 124. 
123. The virtually monolingual al-Rafi'i could lucidly evoke overall societies, although with sectors 
missing. One of his essays renccted that "the first degree in the upward development of nations is that love of wider 
identity tenned 'Patriotism"': a patch or common ground with Lutfi (cf Eliraz. "Conception" pp. 118-9). al-Rafi'i 
held up as the model of seltless dedication lo nation. the B1itish in India as they cornered trade --- thereby laying the 
foundations for seizing political power --- in the reign of Emperor Shah Jahan. The essay simultaneously saw the 
British as lethal and was prepared to adopt attitudes lo community from which they had derived their strength. 
Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i, "al-Fard al-Wahid fi Wujudin min al-Ummah" (The Individual Derives [real] Existence 
from the Nation), al-Jaridah 28 May 1907. Among al-Rafi'i's moral-cum-psychological essays was his "Darsun f.i 
Tabi'at al-Mukabarah" (A Study on the Nature of Arrogance), al-Jaridah 22 May 1910 p. 2. :ropical and accessible 
was his poem "Mudhannab Halley" (Halley's Comet), al-Jaridah 20 April 1910 p. 5. There was some vocabulary 
from the tribal warfare of pre-Islamic Arabia in al-Rafi Ts elegy to Egypt's veteran minister and administrator 
Mustafa Riyad Pasha. but it was clear on the whole --- and had one or two moving compliments: "Khudhu min 
Mawtihi Ma'na al-Hayat" (Draw From His Death the Meaning of Life). al-Jaridah 20 June 1911 p. 1. In regard to a 
sense of Arab macro-history, the pioneer pan-Arab Ahmad Zaki compared him to Yahya al-Ghazzal, the · 
multi-lingual minister of several "Amirs of the Muslims" in Andalusia, who acted as their plenipotentiary to the 
Norman and Byzantine kings. Zaki also stressed Riyad's services to the Arabic language. "Ta'binu Riy)dBasha" 
(In Tribute to Riyad Pasha), al-Jaridah 2 August 1911 pp. 1-2. Mustafa Riyad Pasha ( 1834-1911) served as a 
provincial governor and as director of the departments of Education, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Justice and the 
Interior. His first language was Turkish. and he was ethnically a conservative Muslim Turco-Circassian. But Riyad 
may have originally been a Sephardi Jew from Smyrna maITied to the daughter of a Balkan Turk who came to Egypt 
with Muhammad 'Ali. He began his cw·cer as a copyist of Arabic documents in the Department of Finance, and 
came to speak and write the language remarkably well for a TC. F. Robert Hunter. Egypt Under the Khedives. 1805 
- 1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy (University of Pittsburg Press 1984) pp. 158 - 165. 
Riyad had fostered the Arabic encyclopedia of Butrus al-Bustani whose son Najib al-Bustani discussed its 
completion with Ahmad Zaki following the service. "Da'irat al-Ma'arif al-' Arabiyyah" (The Arabic Encyclopedia), 
al-Jaridah 28 December I 911 p. 4. 
124. Haykal. Fi Awqat al-Faral!h p. 205. 
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In this period, the young Haykal admitted the capacity of the classical Arabs' literature to 
stylistically homogenize at least a cultivated minority of nee-classicist Egyptian writers: he 
himself somewhat responded even to the peninsular jahili poetry's antique "music" and idioms 
that he nonetheless associated with an arid Arabian homeland different from Egypt. Writers had 
to search for some more "easy" or accessible "Egyptian" style to reduce their use of ancient Arab 
and Western patterns. Yet he ruled out making the colloquial Egypt's literary language and 
foresaw that' Abbasid styles (eg. Ibn al-Muqaffa ', al-Jahiz) could be run into the future Egyptian 
one12s. 
For Haykal, al-Rafi 'i's use of the earliest classical Arab modes of language and 
sensibility represented a son of treason to Egypt and to the "people": "the writer who detaches 
himself from the environment in which he lives and follows (adopts yantahilu) [other] concepts 
and images in his style ... virtually becomes a rebel against the human community amid which he 
lives". "A writer who lived in Egypt and among the Egyptians" can only be termed "a denier of 
Egypt" if he "loves the desert" and "calls on the cloud to give rain". al-Rafi'i's book is a 
retrogression to "the nomadic encampment traces/ruins [al-atlal] of the population of the Asiatic 
Peninsula [Arabia]" 126. 
125. The young Haykal only qualified the prescriptiveness of the classical Arabs for new literature. In 
1911, he wrote of the far-out neo-classicists who wanted all further literature to be in the Arabic of pre-Islamic and 
early Islamic Arabia. The "magic" of this style "makes you suppose yourself in the Arabian peninsula" but could 
read a bit as "alien" --- although a more numerous group of neo-classicists had blended clearer ancient vocabulary 
("Arab raiment") with new concerns, winning wide approval. And there were pure Westernizers in literature. _ 
Haykal belonged to a "reconciling" "third pmty", aware of Western literatures, who used a smooth, musical, direct 
style drawing on words of somewhat later --- 'Abbasid --- writers such as Ibn al-Muqaffa' (d'. 757: started secretarial 
school of letters in Arabic from Sasanian comt literature) and the polymath al-Jahiz. Their idioms and vocabulary 
did not clash with the even Egyptian natural environment, unlike the "frowning" environments evoked by 
totalistically Westernist works in Arabic or the "barren" Arabia that pervaded way-out neo-classicist writings 
(=al-Rafi'i's ruggedly neo-jahilist style). Selective patriotic rejection of classical literary models in 1911 · 
conveniently defined as alien only those sectors of the classical Arabs' language least intelligible to those educated 
in English and French, as he had been. Haykal more or less dismissed the possibility of turning the colloq\lial into a 
literary medium, only discussed in a theoretical way by a few intellectuals. In this 1911 article, he saw thf dynamic 
neo-classical verse and oratory penned during "the 'Urabist revolution" by such figures as Mahmud Sarni al-Barudi 
as a turning-point in the resuscitation of the "corpse" of standard Arabic. given the wide public that these 
communications activated. Haykal thought that the colloquial had lost a chance for a formal role in mass 
mobilization "in that age" --- unaware,, here, of populist writing and oratory in the colloquial by, for instance, 
al-Nadim. Haykal, "al-Kitabatu wal-Kuttabu fi Misr" (Writing and Writers in Egypt), al-Jaridah 19 April 1911 pp. 
1 - 2. 
126. Awgat p. 207. Syrian descent: al-Rafi' i was born in one of the villages of the mudiriyyah of 
Qalyubiyyah in the Nile delta in 1800. but to a family of Syrian origin: the shaykh Muhammad al-Tahir al-Rafi'i 
was sent by the Sultan to Egypt in the 1820s to take charge of its Hanafi legal system. This family background 
made al-Rafi'i feel linked both to Islam·-- so many of its members served Egypt as gadis and muftis --- but also to 
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Haykal also appealed to utilitarian considerations of communication with the Egyptian 
reading public, against al-Rafi'i's attempts to duplicate the language and idioms of the ancient 
desert Arabians when describing their literature and history. He wickedly quoted al-Rafi'i's own 
Lutfi-like maxim that language has been developed by societies to meet their requirements for 
communication --- that a language is composed of "words that in reality are the property of the 
hearer instead of the speaker" 127 • 
Islam at Stake? Jahili Arabia might at first sight seem the antithesis of Islam: but the 
classical Muslims studied the pre-Islamic Arabs and their culture to elucidate the Qur'an. 
Specific inquiries of al-Rafi'i's work were at least formally independent of Islam: eg. the "news" 
of the pre-Islamic Arabs, the "genealogies" of the Arabs, the process of "oral transmission" 
(riwayah) of jahili verse. However, al-Rafi'i (Haykal?) juxtaposed that transmission of jahili 
verse with the origin and riwayah of the hadiths of the Prophet Muhammad. Several subjects 
that al-Rafi'i addressed --- for instance dialectical divergence between [pre-Islamic Arabian] 
tribes, pertinent to readings of the Qur'an --- were central in Isfamic religious studies. 
In presenting an idealized picture of the pagan pre-Islamic Arabs, al-Rafi'i demonstrated 
their worthiness to receive and bear God's final, culminating revelation (Qur' an). Yet his 
idealization of them got out of control of Islam's universalism. al-Rafi'i exalted the Arabian 
the Syria of his forefathers. Giora Elira7~ "The Social and Cultural Conception of Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i", Asian 
and African Studies July 1979 p. 102. al-Rafi'i's development of a crude pan-Arabism, long debilitated as 
community under all those layers of archaic culturism and myths, by bracketing Egypt and West Asia legitimized:hi~ 
pride in a non-Egyptian proven~nce. With a tint of racism, al-Majallat al-Jadidah of the leftoid Copt Salamah Musa 
in 1930 lumped the Egypt-born al-Rafi 'i with the Syria-born Rashid Rida as reactionaries motivated by their origins 
to draw Egyptians into non-modem relations with backward non-Western outsiders. And of course Syrian 
Christians had to be eliminated from journalism in Egypt. Gershoni and Jankowski, Egypt. Islam and the Arabs p. 
128. Haykal's query if al-Rafi'i were a denier of Egypt may, likewise, have resisted his extra-Egyptian ethnicism. 
127. Ibid p. 206. But how far was Haykal prepared to allow his Egyptian audience or community to shajJe 
his style or vocabulary? Some of the early stories he published in al-J aridah were not merely set in the countryside, 
depicting popular life, but had snatches of dialogue approaching the real colloquial speech of uneducated-J"i.Jral 
Egyptians: "Fi Intizar al-Faraj" (Waiting for Relict). al-Jaridah 27 April 1911 pp. 1 - 2. al-Rafi'i believed that Islam 
validated only one form of Arabic --- the dialect of Quraysh. He accordingly opposed attempts to "Egyptianize" 
literary Arabic by incorporating distinctively colloquial vocabulary, on grounds of pragmatic communication that 
would view Arabic purely as a social organism. Eliraz, "Conception" pp. 116-117. It is to be noted here, though, 
that Haykal stayed within sight of al-Rafi'i, seeking to convey rural local color more than rural popular speech 
patterns. In 1911, he noted that the popul:U" epics ~U"ound such figures as Abu Zayd al-Hilali had been written in a 
simple, colloquial-influenced Arabic for recitation to the illiterate masses. He thought some of those epics' 
"meanings" beautiful but found the semi-colloquial language in which they were clothed graceless: "I don'tknow if 
that resulted from an inherent incapacity of that language to convey beauty or whether there was not enough time to 
polish and lift it among the beautiful languages". Haykal, "al-Kitabatu wal-Kuttab fi Misr". Haykal's use of 
colloquial Egyptian Arabic for uneducated peasant characters petered out in his fiction shortly after World War I. 
as 
to to 
m lll 'Abd 
--- or ... Haykal's mentor Lutfi?). was biting: 'i was out to depict 
peninsular Arabs as "a group of angels who descended down to earth and were garbed in human 
bodies, then took up residence among people to be the model for human perfection". Bursting 
out of control of Islam's religious viewpoint, the proto-pan-Arab al-Rafi'i even argued the 
Arabians' racial superiority 128. 
From the most unfamiliar :~abulary and idioms of the classical Arabs, al-Rafi'i forged a 
unique style most incomprehensible those educated in English and French 129. Yet Haykal's 
A 
ridicule may have been so sharp because it was this class most conscious of cultures and most at 
risk of deculturation that al-Rafi'i's unbroken integralist Arabic could most attract. His slabs of 
. ~ 
pre-Islamic Arabian materials and vocabulary had pagan features that could rather foster a 
secular pan-Arab nationalism. Yet al-Rafi 'i continually underscored his Islamic motivation as he 
bidded for the support of the ultra-West-dyed modern intelligentsia and professionals who were 
al-Jaridah's constituency 130. 
128. Ibid pp. 214 - 215. 219-220. An inherent link between the pre-Islamic Arabs and the 
subsequently-revealed Qur'an is langu~1gc. al-Rafi'i's exaltation of the pre-Islamic peninsular Arabs was to establish 
(Awqat p. 219) that "they were the people or this miraculous language" (hadhil-lmi:hat al-mu'jizah). The verbal 
noun from the active participle "mu'jizah" or miraculous is i'jaz which can mean the Divine Miracle of the Qur'an's 
stylistic inimitability. It also may be borne in mind that the second volume of al-Rafi'i's work on the literature of_ 
the classical Arabs was later retitled I' jaz al-Our' an wal-Bala~hat al-Nabawivyah (The Inimitability of the Qur'an 
and the Prophet's Rhetoric). Elizar,."Social and Cultural Conception" p. 104. 
129. For the incomprehension of the Egyptian public. and even such a wide-ranging scholar of classical 
Arabic literature as Taha Husayn, as to the messages al-Rafi'i was expressing. ibid pp. 105-6. 
130. In 1911. the Tanta Club invited al-Rafi'i to give a lecture "on the history of the literature of the 
language". Tan ta was a country fown, bu!: the audience was heavily made up of such acculturated elite elements as 
"physicians. lawyers. judges of the loc~tl civil court, dist rid attornics" and "the litterateurs of the town". "He 
explained in detail the religious message upon which classical Arabic was founded". "Ta'rikh al-Adab.,, , 
al-' Arabiyyah" (The History of Arabic Li tcrat urc ), I I May 1911 p. S. In regard to al-Rafi' i · s penetratiorl"of modern 
West-inspired structures. he had stw·ted his history of the literature of the classical Arabs at the urging of some staff 
and officials of the fledgeling Egyptian University. Arabic and its literature in their broader sense were taught by 
Orientalists there because Muslim scholars could only teach ultra-specialized aspects. This al-Jaridah contributor 
hinted that the University should give al-Rafi'i a teaching position now that the volumes of his pioneer history were 
appearing, in order to restore Egypt's "inclcpendcnce" in her language at least. "Ghayur 'ala-Adab" ("One Zealously 
Devoted to Literature). "Ta'rikh Adab al-'Arab wal-Jami'at al-Misriyyah" ([al-Rafi'i's] History of the 
Literature/Manners of the (Classicail Arabs and the Egyptian University), al-Jaridah 4 May 1911 p. 5. Haykal thus 
published his 1912 assault-review in the context of readiness in al-Jaridah. modern institutions and in the 
Westernizing-educated Muslim classes to accept al-Rafi· i as the authority on the past literature and future 
development of standard Arabic. 
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Jmji Zaydan, too, highlighted ancient pagan or non-religious Arab national identity 
elements, but to bring together twentieth-century Christian with Muslim Arabs. He applied the 
standard Arab past and classical culture to bracket and fuse his immigrant Christian Syrians with 
their Muslim Egyptian host population, but slimming down and fundamentalizing the language 
elements of the classical Arabs. Haykal assailed al-Rafi 'i because he used the language of the 
ancient Arabs he supposedly was explaining to his Egyptian audience rather than the "workaday" 
or "commonplace" prose style (lue:hat kitabiyyah muta'arafah) that Egyptians used in their 
newspapers or private letters131 • Reviewing Zaydan's book, however, Haykal was confronted 
' 
with a prose style more stripped, functional and popular than his own: Zaydan "writes for the 
people in their commonplace language by which they make themselves understood to each other 
in their newspapers and letters" --- against which Haykal had judged al-Rafi'i. However, Haykal 
spoke in rather scornful te1111s of Zaydan as a mere popularizer and even observed that no rules 
could be laid down for valid style because every writer of value shapes his own132• 
al-Rafi'i had made the peninsular pagan Arabs the ethical-behavioral (as well as stylistic) 
model for modern sedentary Arabic-speakers. As a (post?)-Christian, Zaydan sited the formative 
period, and as many of the achievements of the Arabs as he could, in that sects-neutral section of 
their history. Those (proto-Waspoid? AUE-enrolled?) pre-Islamic Arabians synthesized 
free-mixing and chastity between the sexes: suspicion-free social advancedness that "people 
attain only among the highly developed nations". Zaydan' s suggestion that the pre-Islamic 
. 
Arabs were "the model of human perfection" in this respect got short shrift from Haykal. Zaydan 
( 
had quoted the jahili 'Antarah 's verse "I cast down my eye when my (female) neighbor appears 
to me until she is concealed from sight by her dwelling": a verse by Abu Nuwas that youth was 
the steed of ignorance and that he often had visited the husband's wife while people slumbered 
contrasted later 'Abbasid-period moral deterioration. Haykal rebutted that the pre-Islamic Arabs 
were morally exemplary by quoting from Imra' al-Qays' mu'allaqah (suspended ode): "many 
like you pregnant have I visited by night or one suckling whom I distracted from her one 
year-old amuleted infant". Chastity was held a great vi11ue by the pre-Islamic Arabians because 
they were divided into tribes founded upon imaged descent from a shared ancestor. Such tribal 
13 l. Haykal. Awqnt p. 206. 
132. Ibid pp. 223-225. 
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public opinion, however, could not suppress human nature and the pre-Islamic Arabs were no 
better and no worse than other people133 . 
In combining free-mixing and chastity, Zaydan's pre-Islamic Arabians justified--- or 
could subtly contain --- Westernization of Arab societies. Haykal ironically observed that the 
casual reader of Zaydan 's work might suppose that the pre-Islamic Arabs "had attained a 
greatness in knowledge, ethics and politics that would vie with the most advanced twentieth 
century nations". Haykal applied his critique of Zaydan's idealization to the whole "group of 
writers" holding up the Arabs as a model of "faultlessness" and "perfection". Haykal charged 
that the attempts of Zaydan to morally guide his (Egyptian) readers by selecting jahili episodes 
illustrating virtues, distorted the historian's function to "establish the truth of the events about 
which he speaks" 134• 
Arab History De-Islamized. Haykal here revealed his recurrent ambivalence towards 
Arabic Christians, and also --- at least in that period of his intellectual life --- towards Islam as a 
revealed religion. He discussed criticism by the Qur'an of the life-style of pagan poets as among 
factors that dampened poetical activity. He nonetheless rapped Zaydan because he presented no 
biographical data about the orators of the early, Rashidi period of religious conquests, and 
especially for his virtual silence about the Caliph 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib. "More important than this 
is his complete silence about the Qur'an and the hadith as though they do not enter into the 
history of the Arabic language's literature while medicine and sooth-saying (al-kahanah) do". 
Haykal was in two minds about the Islamic period of the Arabs. On the one ~and, he adopts a· 
European-type post-religious stance: had some apprehension of Zaydan (as a [post?-] Christian?) 
that he might offend "the beliefs" of his audience made him sidestep alleged stylistic and 
conceptual continuity between (a) the Qur'an and (b) preceding Arabian oral literature stimulated 
during the latter jahili period by mounting religious dissatisfaction with paganism? Some readers 
might extend such arguments of Haykal to view the Qur'an as the human product of its Arabian 
milieu, not revelation 135 . 
In contrast to his own questioning spasms towards the Qur'an, Haykal speculated that 
Zaydan minimized discussion of Islam, its advent, early Islamic Arabic literature and the period 
·-·------·--------· .......... ······--·······----------·------------------
133. Ibid pp. 330-233. 
134. Ibid pp. 228. 233. 
135. Ibid pp. 240-244. For the background of criticism of Zaydan from Muslims., see fn 119. 
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of the Rightly Guided Caliphs because he "considered this short period an interlude (a passing 
, 
interruptive period: fatrah 'ardiyyah) in the life of the Arab nation ... [followed by] the return of 
the Arabs ... to the pagan jahili spirit in the era of the Umayyads". Against this sensed thesis of 
Zaydan, Haykal argued that "he who wants to study the Arabs of the days of the Umayyads and 
the 'Abbasids must refer back to the originating transformations effected by Islam" in Arab 
ethics and literature136. 
The young secularoid Haykal was Islamist here in comparison to Zaydan --- whose stress 
on the continuity of the Arab nation was to be carried forward by Taha's post-1922 
characterizations of' Abbasid 'Iraq as a secular society and culture (B 113 - 115). al~Rafi'i 
agreed with Haykal that the later cosmopolitan, urbanized period of the Islamic empire brought 
fundamental changes in the outlook and culnffe of the Arabs. al-Rafi'i, however, viewed the 
change from desert nomad ism to world empire as ushering in decay of the eloquence of the 
Arabic language and Arab model ethics previously defined in the Arabian peninsula137. 
During his earlier years as a Westernizer and particularoid, Haykal preferred the 
Islamic-literate period of the Arabs' history and literature to their pre-Islamic "nomadic" 
peninsular pagan period. At ultimate stake in exaltation of the ancient Arabs by writers such as 
Zaydan or al-Rafi'i was not only whether modern Arabic-speakers would define themselves as 
Arab but also with what classical sectors. "Many of us ... say that they are wliting (about) the 
literature of the [classical I Arabs ... so that the sons of the Arabs (abna' al-' Arab) may know the 
history of their forefathers ... who filled the world with their conquests and PC?ems" 138• Haykal's 
habit of thought seeing Islamic character in the life of the Arabs after the advent of Muhammad 
would provide mate1ials for development of an Islamic pan-Arabism in Egypt. 
For Haykal, the revelation of Muhammad was a point of departure that enabled the Arabs 
to issue forth from their arid peninsula to establish a much wider universal state of Islam: its 
urban literate 'Abbas id civilization offered elements --- eg. the Mu'tazilite rational theology 
revived by 'Abduh --- that could aid Egyptian modernity. In a 1925 review of the Twentieth 
Cenmry Encyclopedia by Egyptian Islamist Muhammad Farid Wajdi, Haykal shared his 
identification of the Arabs with Isl:lm but demanded that attention should be more evenly 
---------·---------------
136. Ibid pp. 245-246. 
137. Ibid p. 211. 
138. Ibid pp. 234-235. 
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distributed between "the Arab(ic) cities and lands", which included Andalusia and Baghdad. 
Wajdi's Encyclopedia ignored Baghdad --- the "capital of Islam for a long time" --- in favor of 
religiously more central Mecca 139 • 
The young Haykal, then, did not view the classical Arabs only within the temporary 
Arabian environment that constricted their horizons in the jahili period. Very like the Kamilists 
earlier, he was more drawn to the subsequent wide-extending area in which Arabic was daily 
speech in the classical period and which c01Tesponded, excising Arab Andalusia, to the 
linguistic-geographical entity of "the Arab(ic) lands" (al-bi lad al-' Arabiyyah) of his ,own day. 
In 1925, Haykal --- developing his 1911 position --- called on "the Arabic critic" to 
reconcile (a) the diverse tradition of Arabic and (b) imported Western literary patterns in the East 
in (c) the synthesis of a living "Arab or Egyptian culture". He only reproached al-Rafi'i for 
utilizing "the literary relics of the most ancient people" (the jahili nomads' poetry) when some 
old' Abbasid styles of the Kitab al-Ae:hani and Ibn al-Muqaffa's Kalilah wa Dimna have "close 
affinities to the styles of our age" 140. 
Generally, then, Haykal viewed Umayyad and' Abbasid city-based culture as having in 
some sense expressed Islam. He saw sectors of classical Arab high literature as symbiotic with 
the West-structured modern thought and literature he and his colleagues were creating in Arabic. 
His mild, fleeting, assertions of Egyptian pa11icularity in the content and language of literature 
clashed with but one sector of the classical Arabs' literature. 
Taha H usayn 's Arab Classicism (1911) 
Taha and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat studied together at al-Azhar in adolescence; it proved 
139.Ibidpp.174-175;cf.pp.169-170. 
140. "Khawatir fil-Naqd" (Reflections on Criticism), al-Siyasah 13 March 1925; Awqat, pp. 22-24. The 
Kitab al-Aghani was a 20-volume collection on Arabian and early Islamic life and manners with biograptdes of 
poets and musicians. assembled by Abu I-Faraj al-lsfahani (d. 967). This essay of Haykal gives casual details of his 
dual culture. On a sleepless night. he browsed through Rousseau, the Kitab al-Aghani, Anatole France, Mustafa 
Sadiq al-Rafi 'i etc. Ibid p. 12. For Haykal's increasing realization of his and his fellow modernists' (partial) 
affinities to even the extreme neo-jahilian wing of neo-classicism that al-Rafi'i led, B 101-4. In stressing moral and 
intellectual self-preparation in prophesy. as well as the ensuing sudden revelation, al-Rafi'i was influenced by the 
medieval Muslim philosophers. Elir~ "Conception" p. 115. In his 1935 Hayat Muhammad, Haykal imaged 
Muhammad's path to prophethood as tt prolonged rational observation of Nature. a highly intellectual activity that 
some more orthodox Muslim reviewers rrotestecl was not very religiously conceived. Wessels speculates that 
Mu'tazilite rationalist theology and tasawwuP,as well as modern Western thought, contributed to Haykal's anaemic 
vision of the beginning of Muhammad's mission. Wessels. A Modern Arabic Bio!!raphy of Muhammad: A Critical 
Study of Muhammad Husayn Havkal's Havat Muhammad (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1972) pp.86 - 92. 
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repressive of their aesthetic need of classical Arabic literature and for original analysis in 
religion. They turned to West-patterned courses at the fledgeling Egyptian University and 
staited to learn French: B 240-241. 
Taha's youthful sniping at al-Azhar and at neo-classicist stylist al-Rafi'i, in al-Jaridah, 
sounded radical before 1914. Many of his al-Jaridah articles on language and classical Arabic 
literature, though, were a humanist restoration of that heritage. Several key attitudes were to 
recur in his maturer development in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s of components for a pan-Arab 
linguistic nationalism. These included: (a) a diluted Arab ethnocentrism that under-registers 
' 
non-Arabs in the classical culture or brands them its enemy (although Taha did accommodate the 
loanwords they gave Arabic); (b) the sense of standard Arabic in pe1il throughout both classical 
and modern times, entailing constant defensive labor and creativity; (c) the Qur'an, Islam and 
religious movements figure mainly in the useful succor they give Arabic; (d) the classical Arabs 
were akin in their lesser creativity to some very great Western people (Greeks, 
Anglo-Ame1icans); (e) Western intellectualism already restructures (rather than supplants) 
classicist Arab identity; (f) pan-Arabi zing: the continuous language has to resist contemporary 
deculturation from alien rulers of Arabs outside Egypt, too (the French, but also the Turks). 
Classical Arabs Defended. Already able to read some French, the 22-year old Taha was 
aware of Western images that Islam and Arabic had been spread by conquest and "force" in their 
heyday. He defended less Islam than the Arabic language's inherent vitality that enabled it to 
supplant Persian, Byzantine Greek, Syriac, Coptic and Spanish and to besiege Berber in the 
peaks of the Atlas mountains, all within 85 years with little compulsion. Taha's linguistic 
apologetics already --- though this also looked back to 'Abdallah al-Nadim's articles in the 
earlier 1890s --- offered macro-historical bases for linguistic nations that were to help Egyptian 
pan-Arabism vanquish particularism in the 1930s. The immature Taha already had thb-.sense of 
some linguistic-cum-national groups as incorporative and fluid in their racial and geographical 
borders: 
Some nations have natural strength that enables them to triumph materially and morally. 
The English in America obliterate the personality and national-racial identity of the other 
nations [there I replacing them with their own nationality, language and religion without 
any need to resort to force or anns. The classical Arabs were in this category. Had they 
not met malevolence from Persians and strength and resistance from their language, they 
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would have quickly finished off that tongue for good 141 . 
Clearly, the very young Taha exulted in the scope and sweep of Arabic and the (classical) ·Arabs 
in world history. Their past and language were essential for him, but juxtaposed and interwoven 
with paralleled Western cultures and pasts. Taha would maintain and extend into the 1930s and 
1940s many of these 1911 linkages: the classical Arabs as almost as creative as great Western 
peoples (Americans, ancient Greeks); the capacity of literary Arabic to absorb other cultures and 
human groups, only somewhat checked by his al-Jaridah-originated particularoid sense of 
Egyptian place and nuances of sensibility. The classical Arabs' written language for Taha was 
already, in 1911, a central element that he or others could later apply in something verging upon 
a linguistic nationalist option (B 278-282; B 462-5). Already in 1911, Taha defined Islam as "the 
Arab Religion" that he cherished, because the Arabic worship it imposed spread and maintained 
the language's coJTect form in their empire, checking linguistic coITuption from all those 
non-Arab subjects142 • 
Classical Muslim History Ethnicized. Taha saw no positive relevance of any classical 
Muslim sect for his age and its needs: those religio-political factions, though, never-endingly 
fired at each other propaganda poetry and oratory that extended the gains of style and subjects 
the Qur'an had bestowed on Arabic 143 . Taha would henceforth view the religious ethos in 
classical Muslim history from the aesthetist perspective of its consequences for language and 
high literature. In 1911, like al-Nadim in 1892 or 1893, he presented classical Muslim states in 
ethnicized terms as Arab. "The Arabs feared for the language --- and thus the Qur'an --- from· 
( 
the deterioration and coITuption" being caused by all the non-Arabs in their empire. They 
accordingly moved quickly to draw up rules of grammar, and declension and to collect and 
record the language. In the 'Abbasid period, "the grammarians of al-Basrah and al-Kufah took 
the language from tribes of pure Arabs whom they could be certain had not mixed withJhe 
Indians, Persians, Byzantines, Ethiopians or Copts". Taha affectionately reviewed the gradual 
141. Taha, "Hal Tastaridd al-Lughah Majdaha al-Qadim? --- 6" (Will the Language Recover its Ancient 
Glory? --- 6),al-Jaridah 31 October 191 l pp. l-2. Taha adroitly countered Western charges of linguistic duress by 
noting that "the offices of administration of the Islamic government in Syria, 'Iraq and Egypt continued to use 
foreign languages [for records] up to the age of [Umayyad Caliph] 'Abd al-Malik lbn Marwan: that is, to the point at 
which people had become Arahi:t.ed and it would he foolish ... to interact with them in other than the language they 
understand". Ibid. Taha, here, exaggerated the speed of Arahization. 
142. Ibid, p. 2. 
143. Ibid, p. I. 
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elaboration, for instance, of vowel-signs in the Arabic script to prevent the language getting 
lost144. Although not always, Taha in al-Jaridah could over-ethnicize the classical venture-of 
Arabic and its high literature, almost refusing to register the non-Arab provenance of many of the 
'Abbasid philogists, phoeneticians and grammarians who labored to fix and save the language 
for a religious motive. 
Masses and Lamruage. Taha was empathic to the common people of 'Abbasid 'Iraq and 
modern Egypt. On the fo1ms of written language, though, he stood with elite minorities against 
such masses. Despite the great success of "the Arabs" in the classical period in preserving and 
extending a continuous written language, this became confined in the urban centers to the 
scholars and the elite: "the common people started to speak an ill-pronounced and 
corruptly-constructed/syntaxed vulgur I lit. "of the market place] language-form". The 
counter-measures of "the Arabs" (sic) had only "preserved the language and the Holy Book": 
they had not been able to make people speak in correct Arabic 145. 
1911 alienation from contemporary speech. The fourtlT century (of Islam) had began 
Arabic's "age of degradation" ('asr al-inhitat) 146. In that age, the Ottomans subordinated it to 
Turkish in Syria, 'Iraq and Arabia: however "the common people continued to speak [Arabic] in 
dialects any Egyptian will hate, although his own dialect, too, has much linguistic corruption" 147. 
Like Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid in the Hijaz, Taha in 1911 had a sense of a precarious 
modernist literary elite composed of both Egyptians and Syrians, that was restoring an 
endangered standard Arabic on behalf of all Arabic-speakers. He voiced contempt for al-Azhar's 
I 
traditionalist refusal to teach classical Arab literature, a basis for restoration. The educational 
missions to Europe, and translations from European languages initiated by Muhammad 'Ali were 
144. "Hal Tastaridd ... --- 8", al-J:u·idah 5 November 1911 p. I. 
145. Ihid. In the context of the ferment of ideas about the classical Arabs. their literature. and'CQ.,mparative 
Semitics at the Egyptian University --- Zayclan. al-Rafi'i. Hifni Nasif and European staff were all writing and 
lecturing --- Taha had been more appreciative of contributions by non-Arabs, and in particular Persians (although 
also from Greek grammatical concepts) ~i classical Arabic grammar. "The outstanding authorities on the language 
were Persians more than Arabs. We stand in relation to our Arabic language in this era where the Arabs stood in 
theirs vis-a-vis the sciences of the Greeks and Persians, with the Orientalists succeeding the native custodians of 
those sciences [in their superior knowledge of] Arabic and its sister languages ... They have mastered Arabic, 
Hebrew and Syriac, deciphered the scripts of Babylonia, read the inscriptions of the Nabateans and excavated the 
structures of Thamucl. while our scholars know of Syriac only that it is the language of those in the graves". 
"al-Adab al-'Arabiyyah fil-Jami'ah" (Arabic Literature at the University). al-Jaridah 9 May 1911p.5. 
146. Ibid. 
147. "Hal Tast:U"idd ... --- 9", al-Jaridah 6 November 1911 p. I. 
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essential --- but stylistically expendable --- steps. Instead of laissez-faire Westernization, Taha 
wanted 'Abduh 's incorporation of European liberalism and sciences amid restoration of classical 
Arab texts whose language forms pervade the boITowings148 . 
West-Restructured Arabism. From his adolescence, the Arabo-Islamic heritage was 
relativized and somewhat seen from the angle of.the Western human and linguistic sciences. In 
1911, Taha alerted that Western scholars had made fundamental advances in the history of the 
Arabic language by deciphering other Semitic languages, even Assyrian. The classical Muslim 
philologists had been in a position to trace Arabic's connections to Syriac because it was still 
spoken, but they did not. In this 1911 aiticle, after urging modern Arabic-speakers to adapt 
Western comparative Semitics approaches for their language, Taha extolled classical Arabic 
literature as great and essential for him149 . Still, the youth Taha was already letting the West 
pervasively tint him, admitting its approaches even into the language at the center of self. This 
set him, or at least other intellectual leaders who respected his intact classical Arabic, up for a 
reaction. Comparative Semitics in the hands of such scholars as Ernest Renan were 
ultra-political, impe1ial and racist. In the 1920s, Renan 's stereotypes would fuel ravings about 
the classical Arabs by neo-Pharaonic particularists; Taha later took part in their refutation with 
Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and other pan-Arabs of the 1930s and 1940s (B 462-5). 
Pan-Arabizine Contemporaneity. As Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and other one-time 
Jaridists were to be in a more politicized way in the pan-Arab 1930s and 1940s (B 337), Taha in 
1911 had a vivid awareness of the peril facing Arabic among colonized Algerian evolees. 
' 
Literary Arabic had already been weakened in North Africa by competition from Berber and had 
now become little understood although it lingered within mosques. 
The French have staited to teach their language to [Muslim] adolescents while neglecting 
to teach them the I literary] Arabic language so that one of them can grow up to a~ulthood 
148. Ibid p. I. Taha, then only 221 praised 'Abduh extravagantly as "intelligent, insightful, resolute ... He 
mastered knowledge and achieved what no Egyptian did before or after him ... in all history to this day". In regard to 
the contribution of Syrians to the revival of Arabic, Taha sidestepped any competitiveness as to whether they or the 
Egyptians had contributed the most (which in one twinge was argued about in 1928 by Ahmad Zaki Pasha: B 88 fn 
80). Ibid. 
149. Taha, "Hal Tast:u-idd al-Lughah Majdaha al-Qadim?", al-Jaridah 24 October 1911 p. 1. Taha did not 
want modem Egyptian neo-classicists (such as Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i) to take up the wealth of synonyms in 
classical Arabic: these were due to collection by the ancient philologists of mutually duplicative vocabulary of 
Arabian tribes. With its huge vocabulary. Arabic was able to encompass an ever-widening range of genres: 
"eulogies for goodness anu virtue, condemnation of evil and vice, descriptive pieces; elegies, poetry evoking passion 
for women, poems in which the poet boasted his nobility of lineage and ethics". Ibid. 
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knowing of his language only that vulgar market-place jargon that common people use in 
their conversation, a mixture of Arabic, Berber, French and Spanish that appeared as a 
result of savage war. The youth of Algeria have come to hate their language so that 
Islamic religious literature may now have to be composed for them in French150• 
His 1911 sense of France as waging "war" to destroy his literary language, his concern that 
Algerians and North African Arabs could suffer language death, was to fuel his urging of 
Egyptian governments in the 1930s to mount ostensibly apolitical educational missions in French 
North Af1ica, Lebanon and Syria (B 189 - 190). 
Compared to' Abdallah al-Nadim two decades earlier, Taha's 1911 classical Arab 
heritage had been extensively de-Islamized and humanized. Taha's concerns had shifted to a 
much more aestheticized language component. This remained inimical to both linguistic 
expression of watans-particularities and adoption of Western languages for formal modern 
discourse, although it already accepted the content of Western intellectualism. 
Perspective 
This Chapter could assay only a preliminary Arabist and Islamist revaluation of the 
complex Jaridists, so long flattened into one-dimensional particularists. Our 
communications-scan showed that it would be wrong to think even in terms of Arabo-Islamic 
survivals and thus division in the Jaridists' psyches: more often, their Arabo-Islamic elements 
quickly locked into, and were heightened by, motifs from Western cultures, interactions with 
Westerners, and modern activities patterned by the West. This was so for (a) wider community 
I 
and (b) language in nationhood. As with the more formally pan-Islamic Kamilists, acculturation 
to imperial powers multiplied al-Jaridah 's supra-Egyptian community identifications more than it 
fragmented or particularized. 
Monolingual Islamic intellectuals had some access through Arabic to the issues"of the 
wider non-Arab Muslim world: but the Jaridists fu11her encountered French and 
English-language data --- and involving racist attitudes --- about Turkish, Balkan, Indian, 
Maghribi, Tsarist and Negro African Muslims that poured in from so many metropolises. Their 
early drive to express the wider community with economic connection matched (as did Kamilist 
pan-Islamism) the stress on imperial trade in British discourses: al-Jaridah contributors were 
150. Taha, "Hal Tastariddu ... --- 9". al-faridah 6 November 1911p.1. 
more more to 
111 
as a whole, rather than just the 
momentum 
as 
responses to 
sometimes veered towards the Kamilists' 
sense of international warring camps rather than atomistic nations. However, the Jaridists held 
back from a comprehensive anti-imperialist activism that might deplete their class' assets and 
Egypt's energy. Their one-sided cultural bonding to Westerners conditioned them to hope that 
Western laws could neutrally order a more equal and humane international relations. Repeated 
rebuffs and nightmare ill-treatment of Egyptians and other Muslims, though, would in the end 
trigger a supra-Egyptian reaction, the more intense because so long pent up. The 
successor-group of al-Siyasah intellectuals and politicians after 1922, though, would retain 
al-Jaridah's pendulum-like duality vis-a-vis Westerners. 
Lamma£e. Despite mild Egyptianizing impulses, the al-Jaridah intellectuals before 1915 
laid many cultural and literary bases for post-1922 liberal ethno-linguistic pan-Arabism. They 
were readier to accommodate Western languages in formal education, and Western vocabulary 
the written language, than were the Kami!ists. Westernizing-educated as well as 
Islamic-educated Jaridists --- including, often, Lutfi --- felt Kamilist-like concern at 
vulnerability of pan-Arabic under the British: they had compensatory drives not just to save the 
"relics" of the classical Arabs' literature, but to install recycled language and historical motifs 
from that past within the most novel activity. 
Beyond anything that the Kamilists ever conceived, the Jaridists wanted to draw from 
Western high literatures as well as thought. Yet accepting these as superior and necessary did 
not stop them anistically cherishing old Arabic literature no longer seen as unique and universal 
God-sparked truth. In denying total prescriptiveness to the classical Arabs' idioms --~~i·least, 
the jahili verse sector --- for new liteniture, Haykal spoke for a modern elite whom non-Arabic 
formal educations had left unequipped to read that oldest Arabian verse. Yet writers of his kind 
had enough joint activities with more Islamic-educated cultural elites (and Fertile Crescent 
Christian Arab writers): all recovered the classical Arabs together as an inter-elite enterprise. 
Even hard pre-Islamic peninsular Arab verse sparked some of the most engaged criticism that 
Haykal ever wrote. Taha instanced a Jaridist modernism that can accept Western analysis even 
the 
it more 
was an Egyptian Arab 
for its identity on a shaky formal language 
defined a millenium before. 
into v conceptual 
analysts have 
prepared even before 1915 to stand and 
mostly extended what Arabs outside Egypt 
The teeming diverseness of al-Jaridah items sampled burst through the Anglophone 
literature's paradigm that this school kept up any rigorous or determined insular pa11icularism. 
From the social point of view, al-Jarid ah was itself a pan-Arab structure, given Christian and 
Muslim Syrians in its staff and contributors. Non-Egyptian Arabs were always dropping in to 
see Lutfi. Their copious contributions dovetailed into various modern Jaridist enterprises, and, 
as editor, Lutfi did not restrict their articulation of a contemporary Arab identity. By the time it 
closed down, al-Ja1idah had greatly helped connect Egyptians to a variety of Arab literary and 
economic elites in Ottoman West Asia, and brought home the grievances that fueled 
Arab-Turkish ethnic conflict over there. The paper had laid bases for the pan-Arabism evolved 
after 1922 from the al-Siyasah successor-forum, but without yet articulating a formal ideological 
system for a contemporary pan-Arab nation. 
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PRE-1919 ACCULTURATED ARAB AND PAN-MUSLIM IDENTIFICATIONS IN 
PERSPECTIVE 
In comparison to at least the pre-1882 writings of the older-generation pioneer 
pan-Islarnists, educationally formed in Arabic, both the Karnilists and the Jaridists had 
incorporated the West much more within their intimate selves. These multi-lingual lawyers' 
cogent legalistic refutations of British arguments and propaganda offered one ideological 
preliminary for intimacy between Egyptians and Westerners. These two rival groups had 
internalized interlocking sectors of the law and historical and political ideologies of, in particular, 
the French Westerners. It is clear that French motifs of the rights of man and nations were 
psychologically crucial along with Islam for heartening the very young Karnil to resist an 
Occupation so contemptuously overwhelming. Indeed, the responses and resistance by both · 
groups were at most points genuinely constructive, not just dampened down by elite self-interest. 
The Jaridists' incorporation of the poetical romanticism, belles lettres, and liberal political and 
social thought of the Anglo-Saxon world leaped over the immediate colonial relationship with 
the occupier. Yet, the more Muslim Egyptian acculturateds opened themselves to the West, the 
more its traumatizing discourses --- that in so many mutations made religions criteria for 
international policies --- pan-Islarnized them. 
Given the dominance of Europeans, politically and in the cities and modern economy, the 
' . 
small modernizing Muslim Egyptian elite had more exposure before 1919 to Western languages 
than to literary Arabic. Despite resultant gaps in their indigenous formation and real differences 
between Islam and both Christian and secularoid Western concepts, which the Kamilists had 
already started to highlight, both the Karnilists and the Jaridists were much less fragmented in 
their personality than might have been the case. The Egyptian intellectuals often skilfully 
reconciled, or related in dichotomization, Western and Arab elements that had unfolded in a sort 
of shared (if often polarized) macro-history. The West, as liberal part-model and as challenge, 
continued to influence or color the selective Arabo-Islamic reaction by old al-Jaridah 
intellectuals against it after 1930 (Ch. 9; al-Zayyat Ch. 10). 
The First Book has represented two main responses by acculturated Muslim Egyptian 
intellectuals to the West's imperial power and creativity. The first, to which Mustafa Kamil and 
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his followers leaned, was supra-Egyptian architecture in international relations: a wide 
Arabo-Islamic counter-camp with which to roll back the West economically and in joint modem 
education as well as politically. The second approach, which the Jaridists developed more, to 
varying extents would distinguish and separate Egyptians, politically in particular, from other 
Arabs and Muslims, although in part to appease Westerners whom the gradualist Jaridists, too, 
feared as so ferocious. However, data in Chapter 6 showed that they also --- and only somewhat 
differently from the Kamilists --- often articulated very strong consciousness of joint linguistic 
and cultural enterprises to which all current Arabic-speaking populations had to con~ribute, and 
of the Turks' post-1908 evolution of liberal parliamentarism as some sort of region-wide venture. 
It is true that Lutfi made resistance to the impulse of some Kamilists to send deputies to the 
post-Hamidian Ottoman parliament one of his most dramatic particularist stands. Yet had a riew 
Ottoman liberal-democratic polity evolved and economically modernized, the Jaridists, too, 
might have considered confederation. 
Despite their sense of an Egyptian homeland as a political unit, the Kamilist and J aridist 
communications sampled in some respects already had more affinities to linguistic nationalism. 
They defined as crucial to nationality and national sovereignty a high literary language 01iginated 
outside Egypt and that worked to homogenize the Egyptian elite with its equivalents in other 
Arab countries. It is true that al-Jaridah --- in contrast here to al-Liwa and other Kamilist media 
--- printed some proposals to make fori;nal Arabic approximate more to spoken Egyptian Arabic 
and represent local life. Book 2 sets out much more radicalized efforts of the successor 
al-Siyasah intellectuals to develop a localistic "national" literature that would depict (in 
particular, rural) EgJ'ptian reality in language less totally supplied by the classical Arabs, and 
which was to evoke a Pharaonic golden age with a much more systematic intent. 
Overall, our revaluation of pre-1919 community identifications in Egypt often 
highlighted common ground between the party of Mustafa Kamil and the writers around 
al-Jaridah and the Ummah Party. The two groups did differ as political factions, somewhat in 
the mixes of their memberships and followings, and in particular in their tactics or strategies for 
getting the British out. Yet, for all their verbalized emotionalism, the lawyers who led al-Hizb 
al-Watani, too, wanted to leave riots and uprisings to the last resort --- while the impossibility of 
gradualist engagement with the British pent up dangerous frustration among the Jaridists that, 
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although dampened by insularist formal ideology, likewise had many Arabo-Islamic drives and 
motifs parallel to al-Hizb al-Watani's. Our scanning documented little personal interaction by 
Jaridists with either Turco-Circassians or outside Turks in comparison to the Karnilists' Ottoman 
and Palace contacts. It cannot be said, though, that al-Jaridah ever managed to become truly 
Egyptianist or insular in the sense of marginalizing out of thought the Ottoman Empire that 
always so massively pervaded its pages through all its swings of attitudes to different Turkish 
regimes. 
Survival and Modernization of Arabism 
The newspapers and magazines of both the Karnilist independence movement and the 
al-Urnrnah Party transmitted Islam and key language traits and memories of the classical Arabs 
as living culture, amid galvanizing peril from imperialism, foreigners and illiteracy. It has been 
one precondition for the survival and cohering of nationalities and their national languages in the 
modern world --- in particular for cultures subordinated within empires or large Western States 
--- that they have a daily press in the language which in itself functions as another homeland for 
the linguistic nation. Pre-1919 Arabo-Egyptian culturism and proto-nationalism may be usefully 
compared here with Celtic languages and protest movements under English domination. In a 
gloomy 1975 prognosis of the future of Welsh, W.B. Lockwood observed that to survive in the 
modern world a language has to be "made official in an exclusive sense", in "its own national 
administration, its own educational system operating through the national language, .. .its own 
mass media ... a daily press using that language". It does not matter how many foreign languages 
individuals learn so long as "the national life is expressed solely in the national language" 1• 
Clearly, articles in al-Liwa' that not only fused standard Arabic with the survival of Islam, but 
called for it to cover all modern administration and education alerted Egyptians to these 
requirements. Irish peasant leaders or nationalists, in contrast, had been content with English as 
the medium of their protest movements until the foundation of the Gaelic League in 1893 
installed the crumbling indigenous language, too late, within Irish nationalism2• The case of 
1. W.B. Lockwood, Languages of the British Isles Past and Present (London: Andre Deutsch 1975) pp. 
32-33. 
2. The contribution of the Gaelic League to the belated development of a linguistic Irish nationalism is 
traced in Padraig 0 'Fearail, The Story of Conradh Na Gaeilge (Dublin: Clodhanna Teo 1975). 
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Wales shows that even a rich centuries-old high literature --- one supplemented by new poetry, 
plays and fiction that reformulate the golden age for the needs of modem situations ( = the 
Watanists and Jaridists) --- are not enough, without a daily press, to maintain the speech and 
nationality in the modern elite without which the non-sovereign nation dissolves. Occasional 
reading of books and literary recitation rituals are not enough if more evolved or richer 
colonizers can marginalize that literary language outside of modem institutions and transactions. 
The British impoverished and wounded classical Arabic by replacing it with English in the 
modern school system and civil service, yet the modern Egyptian elite refused to I.et. English (or 
French) become their language of intellectual and apologetical discourse in the way that other ---
Indian Muslim or Hindu or Irish Catholic, or Welsh --- modern elites did. The two major 
nationalist movements had built a daily press that extended the Qur'an's Arabic into one habitual 
medium of modernity. They had made educated Egyptians sufficiently conscious on the frorit of 
modern education to force the British to somewhat reverse their drive to freeze classical Arabic 
out of the schools. It remained excluded from the bureaucracy, most modern tertiary education 
and the modem economic sector. 
By 1919, then, by Lockwood's criteria, the Karnilists and Jaridists --- against all the odds 
--- had just managed to keep open the possibility of language and nationality survival within 
modernity, and the political independence to which these could lead. Literary Arabic remained 
dangerously remote from the daily speech of the mainly illiterate Egyptian masses and forty 
years of official neglect and marginalization had impoverished and enfeebled it among the 
modern elite. In the other direction, the perils facing Arabic under the British had had a 
compensative steeling influence on most intellectuals formed in the period. Now, after the 
limited independence of 1922, this modern bilingualized Muslim Egyptian elite came to lead and 
administer Egypt. The new era offered intellectuals like Muhammad Husayn Haykal and Taha 
Husayn the opportunity to develop into (a) an Egyptianist-cum-Westernizing establishment 
pragmatically pursuing other goals as Islam's standard Arabic further crumbled or (b) an elite 
with more affinities to linguistic nationalism because it subordinates West-patterned tasks to the 
restoration of standard Arabic or synthesizes the two. Book 2 of this inquiry sets out how the 
continuing vulnerability of standard Arabic after 1922 propelled the multi-lingual ex-Jaridist and 
ex-Watani intellectuals in the second--- pan-Arabizing --- direction. 
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That standard Arabic was defined by a religious scripture constantly heard recited gave it 
very great coherence and authoritativeness. Breton and Irish and Scots Gaelic in their struggles 
for survival never had such authoritative standardization and multiple functions as the repository 
of religious as well as national distinctness. Better motivated than those doomed nations, and 
more removed from the enemy's centre, Muslim Egyptians fought with triple, skilled fury to 
save the language of religion, homeland and Arab community. Yet its connection with Islam 
obstructed Arabic's potential as a ready-made basis for a pan-homelands nationality distinct from 
Turks and other non-Arab Muslim peoples. Some Jaridists did dilute the religious emotionalism 
around Arabic heightened by the Kamilists --- and the young Taha Husayn even separated the 
continuous standard from Islam. Jaridist relativization and humanization of the classical Arabs' 
Arabic --- now cherished as a worthwhile heritage that did not have to be in all ages the very best 
that humanity had ever produced --- left them in general quite committed to installing it within 
modernity, although in language policies they could be more pragmatic than the Kamilists. 
When Islam figured less, classical Arabic still retained its aesthetic grip. Although he cut Islam 
out of the standard language, the young Taha kept up an intolerant drive to make it the medium 
of all major enterprises, steamrollering particularities of dialect, that could predoom attempts 
from the successor al-Siyasah intellectuals from 1922 (Book 2) to evolve a particularist 
Egyptian-national idiom within the neo-classical. Islamic self-definition from al-Jaridah 
contributors was more on-off, more alternated, but the antipathy of Europeans to Muslims 
regularly re-activated it among them as well, including in languages. The Kamilists connected 
Arabic, and the classical Arabs who had defined it, too often to Islam to attract many Christian 
Arabs to their prototype for a future linguistic nationalism, although the fusion helped mobilize a 
front of Muslim classes against British policy. Such holy war over languages and cultures, 
though, may be distinctive to the intersection of languages, and the overall modern situation that 
faces Westernizing-educated intellectuals. Only the stratum most threatened with deculturization 
could detail the extensions of standard literary Arabic required, and have the compensating 
commitment to carry the vast tasks through. 
The elements for Arab identity that accumulated over forty years of British rule were 
diverse. They included odd book studies conducted by a handful of antiquarians (eg al-Rafi'i on 
pre-Islamic Arabia). More crucial was pre-1919 journalism that --- precisely because it was 
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scholarly in a disjointed or fragmentary way --- could serve splinters and slabs hooked up from 
that ancient past to a professionally busy, activist, modern elite. Classical Arab antiquity was 
planted at the very heart of journalistic political excitement and factional party politics among 
the acculturated secular stream strata. Yet it had uneven impact. In formal literature and 
language, the elements bequeathed by the long-dead Arabs had the clear upper hand over such 
thin elements as had developed for a separate Egyptian identity. In the sphere of political 
community, in contrast, the habit of thought had taken root that the separate Egyptian homeland 
framed a discrete "Egyptian people": the wide "Arab nation" --- however linguistically definitive 
it always had to be for Egyptians --- was the past classical entity that had ceased with the unity of 
the wide classical Arab empires. There was a definite schizophrenia between, in particular, (a) 
the Kamilists' vision of the far-extending Arab past and the homogenizing pan-Arabic they 
propagated and (b) their politically compartmentalized and differentiating vision of Egypt's 
region in the present. This disparity of orientations was to sharpen among acculturated Muslim 
Egyptian intellectuals after 1922, to be resolved from 1929 or 1930 in a new systematic 
pan-Arabism (Book 2). 
That both the Kamilists and Jaridists directed so much of their pan-Islamism to non-Arab 
sectors of the Muslim World showed their failure to carry through the integration of the cultural 
and political sides of their personality by 1919. The Kamilists' and Jaridists' interactions with 
the Ottoman Turks and such other non-Arab Muslim peoples as Turkic Central Asians were real 
multi-dimensional relationships, whereas their cultural and linguistic Arabisms could prescribe 
that priority rather be given to tightening contemporary community with other Arabs. The 
separate state entity that had been differentiating since Muhammed 'Ali did work against the 
pattern set by the often politically unified wide classical Arab Nation. The Jaridists had the 
better range of elements for a pan-Arab identity: (a) the classical Arabs' language and the past, 
but also (b) ethnicized topical dislike for the declining Turco-Circassians, (c) a projection of that 
out over the region in Egyptianist-phrased sourness towards the Ottoman Empire and (d) cultural 
community with Ottoman Arabs and sympathy for their cultural self-differentiation vis-a-vis the 
Turks. The Jaridists did not, however, synthesize (a) and (d) with (b) and (c). It was to be an old 
member of the al-Jaridah milieu, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, who in the 1930s and 1940s tightly 
wove all these long-standing elements together into a rigorous Egyptian pan-Arabism that finally 
1 
of 
to 
an 
welfare, 
Islam Arabic of Arabo-Berber Muslims there: the successor Siyasahists after 1922 
would tighten the pan-Arab solidarity and modernize Egyptian linguistic-educational 
competitiveness with France in her colonies (B 9-10, B 96-97; al-Zayyat Ch. 10). 
Pro-Ottoman Pan-Islam 
Cultures, all the sensitivities as they intersected, and visionary designs for Egypt's 
long-term welfare, greatly determined this complex of supra-Egyptian identifications. The 
Kamilists' relationship with the Turks was more than Egyptianist manouevring within the 
constraints of regional and international legalities and relations. As well, Kamilist pan-Islam had 
a readiness to gamble on wide enterprises: many Egyptian interests it pursued were only 
potentialities for the future to decide, and had to be complexly synthesized with those of other 
Muslims using West-patterned technologies. The connection with Turkey alienated when 
bidding for the aid or neutrality of various European groups --- although it was precisely 
emotional chemistry of cultures-steeped discourses with or about Westerners that often ignited 
campist pan-Islamism in Kamil and his colleagues, and indeed sometimes in the Jaridists as well. 
Both Kamil and Lutfi offered their elite --- citing its very real West-steeped multi-lingualism and 
liberalism --- as equal partners to Western intelligentsias and establishments. The refusal of 
French or other Europeans to whom appeal was made to concede equal sovereignty amplified 
their sympathy for Bulgars, Armenians or Greeks fighting the Ottomans. Europe's disparity of 
sympathy drove home that religions determine political communities, internally and in 
international relations --- awarding a nightmare vividness to anti-Turkish Christian nationalisms 
in the minds of both the Kamilists and J aridists. European high cultures and journalism affirmed 
secular laicist --- and even some post-Christian --- principles that drew the Kamilists and 
Jaridists~ into the interactions: but then Western animus against the Turks reinflamed the 
solidarity impulse from Islam. 
Pan-Islamism was a modern response to the global power of Western nations that 
Egyptians actively helped formulate and shape. Even under the British, Egypt was already a 
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massive and key Muslim and Arab country: Kamil and his colleagues and successors were 
actively applying its weight to pull the development of the region --- Ottoman "Turkey" its 
sovereign core --- in a direction they chose. The initiative for much pan-Islamism came less 
from the Sultan' Abdul-Hamid who went through the motions needed to conjure a bogey, than 
from the other colonized Muslims who needed a rallying point of sovereign self-modernization 
and strength. The religious cult that the Kamilists whipped up around the Sultan-"Caliph" looks 
precarious, inflated and pre-modem but it was precisely the modem age, with its new 
communications, economics and technologies brought from the West, that could ~t ~ast realize 
the immemorial myth of wide Muslim unity. After 1908, the Ottoman State's restored liberal 
multi-party parliamentarism gave it credibility as a pace-setter for modernization even for the 
more Egyptianist al-Jaridah circle. The Ottoman-centred pan-Muslim impulse was so coherent 
because Western perceptions and enterprises stimulated and fused with classical and traditional 
Islamic community emotions, even in the al-Jaridah circle. 
Book 2 presents post-1918 blending of Islamic community emotions with West-patterned 
modernization in Egyptian attraction to Ataturkist Turkey. The writings of Haykal show how the 
images of 'Abdul-Hamid's despotism, West-based resistance from so mew hat Westernizing 
Turkish oppositionists, and the attempted reforms by the CUP --- data he must in large part have 
come by through al-Jaridah, along with the SC press --- formed the foundation of his 
responsiveness after 1918 to Ataturk's new Turkey3• The Turks had at last found the leadership 
able to smash back such Christian nationalisms as Greece --- whose classical past was respected 
3. When Haykal in 1927 wrote down his responses while visiting the new Turkey, he was ultra-aware of 
Ottoman-period radical movements that had prepared the way for its success. "The Turkish renaissance is not the 
product of today or the creation of Mustafa Kemal: this social rebirth whose manifestations so strike one in Istanbul 
and other areas of Turkey can be historically traced back to a time that began earlier than 1908 when the Ottoman 
Constitution was proclaimed [by the CUP]: it goes back to when the Committee of Union and Progress was founded 
but then even earlier to when Midhat Pasha drafted [ = 1876] the preliminary Constitution for the Ottoman State, and 
when Prince Sabah al-Din started to advocate decentralization. From that long-bygone period of history, Turkey's 
best minds were thinking through the correct strategy for its rebirth. But the Ottoman Caliph and the reactionary 
elements around him had at that time enough resources of repression to prevent these first efforts bearing fruit", 
although they built up in the Turkish people the preparedness to aid Ataturk's finally successful movement when it 
came. Haykal (1931), Waladi (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif 1978) p. 136. ·The blended or alternating Islamic-Westemist 
duality of Haykal' s post-1918 resposiveness must be stressed: he exalted the Ataturkists' transformation of the status 
and roles of women (p. 134) (which eliminated even Islam's personal or family law): but he was aesthetically 
responsive to Istanbul's Islamic architecture (pp. 129-132) and also voiced some anti-European motifs in backing 
changes. For Midhat Pasha's reforms, and the young 'Abdul-Hamid's suspension of the brief parliament and 
constitution, Hourani, Arabic Thought pp. 103-106. 
B 
as a 
regard to women (B 18). pan-Islamic connection bequeathed durable respect for the 
Ottoman State and Caliphate among Egyptians(' Abd al-Rahman' Azzam B 226-227) that would 
have made it hard to deny an assertion of leadership by the new Turks. Yet the Ataturkists' 
withdrawal, fulfilling the lukewarmness of Hamidian pan-Islam, was to leave the Arab World 
clear for Egyptian leadership (B 161-162). Impulses for economic integration with Turks in the 
1920s (B 68-69) carried forward a Kamilist synthesis of modernity with Islam that after 1919 
instead found its fulfilment with other Arabs. For the time-frame of this study, pre-1919 
Egyptian pan-Islamic relationship with the Turks has significance as a prototype for some 
aspects of post-1922 pan-Arabism --- yet also prefigured the at first heavily economic return of 
Turkey to the Arab World in the 1970s. 
Persistence and Limitations of Homelands 
The tensions (a) immigrant Christian Syrian intellectuals and (b) acculturated 
Muslim Egyptians whose historical self-definition often turned equally Arab, to some extent 
followed from such special features as collaboration and divergent Christian backgrounds. Yet 
the separateness of the region of origin, the divergencies of the sub-cultures that had evolved 
within each territorial homeland, and differences in the historical experiences and interests of 
Egyptians and Syrians also contributed without regard to sect. The sense that differences of 
homeland interests, sub-cultures and heritages were carrying on in the now-shared Egyptian 
milieu alienated some normally pan-Islamic Egyptians from such Muslim Syrian Arabists as 
Rashid Rida, before 1919. On this plane, the tension between the mainly Christian Syrian 
intellectuals and the Kamilists, rather than due to sects, was inherent in relating Egyptians and 
Syrians of any religion, or Egyptians and any other Arab people. Particular features aside, 
contentions and conflicts between Egypto-Syrians and modern Muslim Egyptians before 1922, 
then, raised some issues that would crop up again over the long-term in the new pan-Arabism 
Egyptians and West Asian Arabs were to evolve together in the 1930s and 1940s. Even Ahmad 
Hasan al-Zayyat, the most unitary of the liberal Egyptian pan-Arabs examined in this thesis, had 
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to note in 1940 how pre-1918 pro-Turkish attitudes by Egyptians made some key figures in 
'Iraq's pan-Arab establishment strive to marginalize Egyptians out of 'Iraq's education and 
development (B 326-7; cf. B 328-9 on the 'Iraqi government's abandonment at the UN) --- in 
counterpoint to impulses by Egyptians to fuse in an organic way with 'Iraqis (al-Zayyat, 1936: B 
336-7; 'Allubah 1933 B 159-160). Most post-1930 Egyptian Arabism was to retain some of the 
sense of homelamds as durable political and cultural units earlier developed in pre-1919 J aridist 
and Kamilist nationalism and in the neo-Pharaonic particularism of the 1920s. Much like the 
Kamilists' bygone pan-Islamism, the future pan-Arabs would seek to integrate the Arabs by 
up-to-date economic and technical means that would not amalgamate the established homeland 
state units. 
In filling out the geometrical particularist ideology to which Western scholars reduced 
Lutfi and the Jaridists in particular, then, we have taken care not to substitute an equally 
exclusive Arabo-Islamic counter-stereotype. To trace the pervasive --- if multi-culturized and 
hence special --- Arab and Muslim attitudes of the Jaridists and Kamilists before 1919 need not 
gainsay their simultaneous development of Egypt-first concerns. The two types of community 
impulses, though, clearly had to clash in the longer term as modernity and the West offered more 
and more stimuli and facilities for the actualization of supra-Egyptian community. Acceptance 
of Egypt as a discrete or distinct political unit increased over the forty years of British 
Occupation surveyed, yet fatally little genuine cultural content had been articulated for that 
homeland in print or formal oratory by 1919. In cultural and intellectual endeavors, and in many 
of the supra-Egyptian interactions these entailed with other Arabs, the Kamilists and the Jaridists 
had journeyed a good deal further towards political as well as cultural pan-Arabism, whose 
crystallization in the 1920s Book 2 now proceeds to examine. 
1 
over long term to bi-sectarian pan-Arab (application 
al-Rahman 'Azzam, Secretary-General of League of Arab States, the 1940s: B 
229-230). 
Arab Nation's Pre-Islamic Arabian Origins. al-Afghani and 'Abduh in al-'Urwat 
al-Wuthqa (1884) denigrated the pre-Islamic Arabians as cruel and barbarous, an in part religious 
habit of thought that he never shook off103• To beat back the West, the pan-Islamists wanted 
indigenous military strength, strong states and literate rational civilization, which the pre-Islamic 
Arabians could not offer. However in 1887 'Abduh urged study of pre-Islamic Arabian culture, 
on the face of it to understand Islam. The Qur'an is "the source of the successes of the 
Muslims": modern Muslims therefore now had to study the preceding idioms, history, customs 
and modes of disputation of the Arabs, so as to respond to the Qur' an as had its first audience of 
Arabian shepherds and camel-drivers104. Review of the Qur'an and earlier Islam for new 
purposes, and to bypass post-classical Sunni traditionalism and sufi mysticism, would expose the 
Egyptian Muslim public to the pre-Islamic and early Arabians' (originally oral) poetry, 
linguistically so different. 
In the school of al-Afghani, al-Nadim was closest to that commitment to the continuous 
nation (the classical Arabs) in all its periods of religious beliefs that leads to true linguistic 
nationalism. He had recourse to the pre-Islamic, as well as early Islamic, Arabs to ethically 
guide contemporary Egyptians, for example interactions between the sexes in new urban 
conditions of more nuclear families, freer mixing and anonymity. An Arabian "would travel and 
leave his wife at home; his neighbor would give her provisions and be the last of people to make 
advances to her ... because she was in his charge until the husband's return" 105. al-Nadim's 
acceptance of pre-Islamic as well as early Islamic Arabs as still the model in ethics and 
103. al-Afghani kept on calling the pagan Arabians savages to Arab disciples even into the last period of 
his life in Constantinople after he went to live there in 1892: the Qur'an transformed the Arabs from "a condition of 
indescribable barbarism" so that within one and a half centuries of its revelation they ruled the world of that time, 
and politically and in knowledge, philosophy, industry and trade surpassed all the other nations on earth. 
al-Maghribi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani p. 58. 
104. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (University 
of Illinois Press 1973) p. 136. 
105. Quotation by al-Nadim of verses ascribed to the pre-Islamic Arabian Hatim al-Ta'i, and others by 
Hamid Ibn Thawr al-Hilali. "Mahasin al-' Arab" (The Virtues of the Arabs), al-Ustadh 15 November 1892, pp. 
305-6. 
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language106 suggested Arab identity's substantial independence of Islam. A non-sectarian Arab 
successor-nation could have Christian as well as Muslim members. The Christian Syro-Egyptian 
Jurji Zaydan and the Muslim Egyptian Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i were simultaneously to idealize 
pre-Islamic Arabian ethics and language (Ch. 5). 
One Syrian Christian tried to detach and extend the aspect of Arabism in al-Nadim's 
anti-imperialist political nationalism. As he forwarded his subscription, the Syrian, a resident of 
Saint Petersburg, lauded "your Arab patriotic line [that you help] propagate among the speakers 
of the dad [Arabic]" because it disregarded "variation of the religions": now Arab unity can 
advance and withstand the attacks of all the types of enemies. The Christian correspondent 
undertook to "circulate your [unifying] magazine among both Muslims and Christians" in Russia. 
al-Nadim used the term al-Ummat al-' Arabiyyah (the Arab Nation) to evoke a revered bygone 
classical entity rather than for a tightening contemporary community as the correspondent 
wanted, yet a shared sense of Arabness was clearly one motive why he published the letter. He 
also cited it to refute charges from Syrian Christian journalists and government officials 
collaborating with the British in Egypt that al-Ustadh was promoting "religious fanaticism or 
splitting the Eastern Word". Yet al-Nadim could not leap with the Syrian correspondent from (a) 
the unique worth of standard literary Arabic in all periods of history and of the Arab Nation in 
past history to (b) a contemporary "Arab nation" as the prime loyalty. 
If this excellent individual had said that we were calling for the maintenance of the 
Eastern unity compromising Arabs, Persians, Turks, Circassians, Kurds, Armenians and• 
others regardless of the differences of religion, he would have hit the mark. That is what 
we advocate, not the Arab league (al-jami'at al-' Arabiyyah) on its own107. 
al-Ustadh, then, highlighted a classical Arab nation, Arab qualities and languages as a 
determinant in political communities and differentiated linguistic communities both within Egypt 
and in the Middle East. Yet, al-Nadim refused to draw the political conclusion of separate 
sovereignty-seeking nationalisms in the Middle East. His indigenous classical Arab golden age 
106. Many of al-Nadim's essays (although not his colloquial dramas or dramatic sketches) drew on the 
mature-classical' Abbasid badi' style or magamat. However, the much earlier pre-Islamic Arabs could also 
contribute to the style of modem Egyptians: he printed a prose letter from the pre-Islamic Arabian poet al-Nabighah 
al-Dhubyani appealing to 'Amr Ibn Harith, King of Ghassan, to release captives from al-Nabighah 's tribe. al-Nadim 
glossed archaic words with footnotes. "Ghurar al-Kalam" (Classic Passages from Literature), Ramadan literary 
supplement to al-Ustadh 13 June 1893, pp. 30-32. 
107. Letter by unnamed Christian Syrian from St Petersburg, al-Ustadh 6 June 1893 pp. 1004-5. 
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highlighted Islam as a dynamic of international strength; in contemporary history the Muslim 
East and Christian West were in life-and-death conflict: Turks and Arabs therefore had to unite 
with each other more in the 1890s. Later during British colonial rule, the party of Mustafa Kamil 
(initially al-Nadim's disciple) would long refuse to extend its high culturist and historical 
Arabism into divisive political support for West Asian Arabs against Ottoman Turks (Chapter 5). 
The classical period of the pan-Eastern system fostered Arab ethnic pride because it had 
been led by "the Arab race/folk" (al-jins al-' Arabi). For the post-classical period, however, the 
pan-Eastern unity that "the Arab race" originated would run against the crystallization of an Arab 
political nationality. al-Nadim wrote in a situation in which the Ottoman Turks governed some 
Arabs in West Asia and claimed authority over others in Egypt, the Sudan, Tunisia and Algeria. 
It was the disunity of the Easterners, increasing for four centuries past, that enabled Europeans to 
conquer them. The multiplying divisive "solidarities of race, language, religion and homeland" 
--- along with "selfish interests and personal power" --- split the pan-Eastern unity which had 
enabled the classical Arabs to beat Europe back. When his perspective was more international, 
al-Nadim thus opposed linguistic and geographical solidarities operating in his day that might 
eventually lead to an Arab political nationalism or political state (or smaller Arabic-speaking 
sub-nationalisms) within Islam's belief-community. The integrated "Eastern" system once 
originated and led by Arabs now would strengthen the authority of non-Arab Turks over Arabs in 
the Ottoman state and general pan-Islamic political community108. 
Ethnicity Within the Egyptian Homeland 
al-Nadim in his magazine al-Tankit wal-Tabkit in 1881 depicted a young Egyptian, 
disembarking after four years study in Paris, who refused to embrace or kiss his father on the 
quay. "[I] am not the rural person. You sons of the Arabs [abna' al-' Arab] are like animals. Say 
bon arrive and shake hands". al-Nadim gave this story the title'" Arabi Tafarnaj" ("An Arab who 
got Europeanized")109• Ordinary Muslim Egyptians did not just speak Arabic but were 
themselves Arab. al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa assailed Nubar Pasha, a non-Arabic-speaking Armenian 
108. "Ashtat al-Sharq wa 'Asabiyyat Urubba", al-Ustadh 30 January 1893, pp. 457-8. 
109. Najib Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim p. 167: cf. 'Ali al-Hadidi, 'Abdallah al-Nadim. Khatib 
al-Wataniyyah. (Cairo: Maktabat Misr nd). p. 113. 
1 
office as Minister from 1 
to safeguard 
his homeland, nor an 
religion, nor an Egyptian 
that to his 
- 1888, as a he 
be regard 
nationality (jins) would seize 
him" 110• Parochial Egyptian ethnicity that period perceived a combination of geography, 
religious belief and Arabness (language, descent) as defining Egypt's majority indigenous ethnic 
community. 
al-Nadim while underground following the British conquest encountered ongoing 
perception of distinct Arab-Egyptian and Turco-Circassian ethnic groups among Egyptian 
Muslims. His identity was discovered by a Circassian Army officer who, however, did not arrest 
him: "although I am Circassian in origin, I am Arab in chivalry (al-muru'ah) and in noble 
compassion for others (al-shahamah)"m. Prescriptive --- in origin pre-Islamic --- Arab virtues 
were to figure in the evolution of Arabism in the party of Mustafa Kamil (Ch. 5) and after the 
limited independence of 1922 (Ahmad Zaki Pasha, Ch. 8). al-Nadim repetitively used the terms 
"Arabs" and "Turks" his lists of non-Western ethnic groups in Egypt: these had "the Copts" as 
another category while not otherwise mentioning Arabic-speaking Egyptians. For him, for his 
modern parochial Egyptian context, "Arabs" meant Muslim Egyptians whose mother tongue is 
Arabic. Language, then, profoundly influenced al-Nadim's perception of the units in the 
Egyptian community of his time but in combinations with religions. His sense that race also 
contributed to define the ethnic communities only deepened his perception of Egypt's 
Arabic-speaking Muslims as Arab because of the popular belief of some remote racial descent 
from incoming Arabs. But al-Nadim assumed that the Coptic community that maintained the 
Christian faith did not receive any Arab blood, and excluded them instinctively from the ethnic 
110. "al-Lurd Nurth Bruk, Hakim Misr al-Jadid" (Lord Northbrook, Egypt's New Ruler), al- 'Urwat 
al-Wuthqa, p. 375. Cf. "Jaridat al-Ahram" (The Newspaper al-Ahram), ibid p. 389 for a similarly-phrased attack on 
Nubar: the Muslims are there defined as the millah and the Arabs as the~ (racial nationality or ethnicity) from 
whose interests Nubar was alienated by his separate identity. Nubar Pasha Nubarian (1825-1899) was born outside 
Egypt in Smyrna, Izmir, Turkey. When he resigned from his third, last term as Prime Minister in 1895, he went to 
Paris for his retirement. Tignor sees Nubar as trying to delay the extension of British control after 1882, albeit to 
maintain his and his Turcophone clique's authority and interests, not for nationalism. Robert L. Tignor, 
Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt. 1882 - 1914 (Princeton University Press 1966) pp. 174-175. 
However, al-Nadim in 1882 placed among "the Egyptian pioneers" (al-Misriyyin al-uwal) some multi-lingual 
Armenians such as Hekakyan who served in the earlier nineteenth century modernization initiated by Muhammad 
'Ali. al-Ustadh v. 1p.38. 
111. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim p. 66. 
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category of the Arabs of Egypt112• 
al-Nadim in al-Ustadh, then, sharply defined a multitude of plural ethnic groups or units 
in Egypt, even in the ranks of the believers in Islam113 • Allying the Egyptian independence 
movement to the restive Turco-Circassian Khedive 'Abbas, he used a cherishing tone in evoking 
the "Sons of the Turks" as distinct from "the sons of the Arabs" 114. His disciple Mustafa Kamil, 
long in need of funds, would carry forward this cooperation with parochial Turco-Circassians, 
checking Arabness. The Ummah Party-al-Jaridah milieu would perceive parochial Sons of the 
Turks and Arabs more sourly (Ch. 6). 
112. Discussing Muhammad 'Ali's provision of expanded government education to "the sons of Egypt" and 
that "the spark of love of learning and writing has lodged in the thoughts of the nation (al-ummah)", al-Nadim 
remarks that "all whom we see in administration nowadays, judges and clerks and ma'murs and mudirs and 
assistants (al-mu'awinin) be they Arabs, Turks, Circassians, Albanians, Copts, are the product of Egyptian schools 
and the native teachers from al-Azhar or the government school system". "al-Lughatu wal-Insha"' (Language and 
Literary Composition), al-Ustadh 11 October 1892, p. 177. al-Nadim praised Muhammad 'Ali because he "raised 
armies ... opened schools, taught the ignorant and appointed many Turks, Circassians, Albanians and Copts to the 
judiciary/administration (litawliyat il-ahkam)". "al-Murafa'atal-Wataniyyah --- Taqrir Ahl al-Khibrah" (The Legal 
Plea of the Homeland --- the Report of those with Experience) al-Ustadh 11 October 1892, p. 186. 
113. If racial ancestry conjoined with Islam and native speech to determine Arabness in Egypt, it was 
usually a millenium-old provenance. "We mean by the Egyptians every native, that is Arabs, Turks and Circassians. 
As regards the Arabs they lived with the Copts from the start of the Islamic conquest until now so that they have 
gone far into (became largely assimilated to) native [Egyptian] identity (fa tawagh11:halu fil-wataniyyah) from a 
remote period". "al-Jami'at al-Wataniyyah wal-Ikhtilat al-'Imrani", al-Ustadh, 13 September, 1892, p. 79. 
Sometimes, "Arab" meant more recently-arrived Arabians when he distinguished the maximum number of 
micro-races in Egypt: Muhammad' Ali "gathered many Turks, Circassians, Albanians, Moreans (al-Muraliyyah) arid 
a group (fariqan) of the Arabs and of the Egyptians in the variety of their religions and he made the aggregate a 
single nation". "Haluna Amsi wal-Yawm" (Our Condition Yesterday and Today) al-Ustadh 28 February 1893 pp. 
645-7. 
114. For al-Nadim, rather less than lineage or race, the language of daily speech, in particular in the 
household, determined the individual's ethnic group within Egypt. Foreign schools inflicted divisive 
multi-lingualization within elite Muslim families: yet this sharpened his awareness of the division between 
Turco-Circassian and Arab Egyptians, also. Zakiyyah: "Is not the man you will marry a son of the Arabs or a son of 
the Turks? ... Then learn the Arabic or Turkish in which the people of our land talk to us. As for the man who would 
desert his language and speak to his wife in French or English when he is the son of the Arabs or Turks, he shows 
little taste, knowing that we daughters of the East are not French or English, to address us in their tongue". 
"Madrasat al-Banat" (A Girls' School), al-Ustadh 10 November 1892 p. 246. al-Nadim defined "the Turks" and "the 
Circassians" as as much Egyptian as "the Arabs" --- ie. Muslim Egyptians who were native Arabic-speakers. "As 
regards the Turks, although they settled later than the Arabs, they ... have resided [in Egypt] from father to son down 
successive generations until they forgot their country. If one of them returned to it he would be a foreigner because 
of all the time that has passed ... The most recently settled would have buried his father in Egypt and himself been 
born among its natives ... All of this enterprizing race of high aspiration are indigenous Egyptians, distinct from the 
others only in maintaining their language which they take from their parents. The three categories [of Muslim 
Egyptians: Arabs, Turks and Circassians] are united together by the religious community even more strongly than by 
the bond of shared homeland". "al-Jami'atal-Wataniyyah ... ", al-Ustadh 13 September 1892 p. n. 
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Languages and the Evolution of Nationalities 
A dominant, expanding race can absorb other races, itself somewhat changing in the 
process. A world religion such as Islam can provide a framework within which the dominant 
race's amalgamation with (but cultural assimilation of) other races takes place. He was 
conscious that concurrently with the expansions of Islam in Africa and Asia and "parts" of 
Europe, "the Arabs mixed/intermarried with the Persians, Syrians, Egyptians, Turks, [Byzantine] 
Greeks, Goths, and some Italians and French, Sudanese, the Abyssinians, the Indians, the Uigurs 
and others". Strengthened by a unifying religion, a new distinct "Arabized" jins (race/people) 
resulted, no members of which had any racial loyalty to external entities115• Issues of linguistic 
and social survival once faced by the classical Arabs decisively corroborated for al-Nadim those 
streams of West European nationalism that identified language, more than static homelands, as 
the crucial determinant of political communities. 
Ancient struggles of the classical Arabs to maintain their integral language in the oceans 
of non-Arab subjects could offer intense linguistic consciousness with which to resist threats to 
classical Arabic under the British. al-Nadim now, in the early 1890s, was installing in the 
confused acculturated youth --- the core now forming for the coming elite --- juxtapositions that 
were to last. He made Arab leaders of classical Islam, dead for 1000 years, speak in their own 
words to the issues of language with which colonialism and modern functions confronted youth 
such as Mustafa Kamil. Mighty classical Caliphs, but also the grammarians they encouraged to 
codify Arabic against change, now focussed resistance to imperialists in language. al-Nadim's 
fusion of (a) grammarians and classical written language with (b) political Caliphs with (c) new 
resistance to imperialism, defined continuity of Arabic as an essence of sovereignty --- to 1918 a 
stance of both the independence movement launched by his disciple Kamil and, less sustainedly, 
115. "Tajadhub al-Jinsiyyat wal-Adyan" (fhe Constant Tugs-of-War Between Nationalities and Religions) 
al-Ustadh 14 March 1893, pp. 706-707. 
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in the Ummah-al-Jaridahmilieu. Also to last in these and other acculturated-modernist Egyptian 
groups was al-Nadim's portrayal of the classical Islamic leaders' sense of (mainly linguistic but 
also somewhat physical) difference from non-Arabs (the Caliph 'Ali): classical Islam would 
henceforth legitimize symbiotic blending of religion and Arab ethnicity for West-modified 
Egyptians116• In al-Nadim's writings of the early 1890s, classical Arab-Muslim figures already 
tilted national identity for colonized Egyptians away from territoriality to an ethnic orientation 
for which the language actually used determines nationality. He cited 'Ali and the more profane 
(Umayyad-appointed governor) Ziyad Ibn Abihi to guide the Arabic-speaking Egyptians of his 
day to ward off the influx of "alien" European words into "our written and oral communications 
... our formal/official and colloquial speech"117• 
al-Nadim's observations of modern European national movements increased his tendency 
to perceive history (including contemporary Egypt's) in terms of language conflicts between 
fluid, incorporative linguistic nationalities. Many nations (umam) temporarily subjected by more 
powerful nations had yet maintained their separate languages which later resurrected them to 
independence. Had such nations abandoned their languages for that of the nationality ruling 
them, they would have merged with it into a single nation. al-Nadim cited as examples "the 
Turks, the Persians, the Greeks, Spain, Rumania, Portugal, the Bulgars" 118• Change of languages 
changes a given population's nationality. The passing of power from (a) the classical Arabs to 
(b) Persians and Turks validly expressed the continuing separate nationalities the latter 
maintained when they refused to adopt alien Arabic. That the Persians and Turks became 
Muslim following their encounter with the Arabs but still regained "independence" (political 
116. al-Nadim affectionately listed classical grammarians who labored to record hitherto orally-transmitted 
Arabian literature and formulate phonetic and grammatical rules to save pure Arabic from "collapse" in face of the 
non-Arabian majority's impact in the Islamic Empire. He associated early religious Arabian leaders with them: the 
fourth pious or "Rightly Guided" Caliph 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib "the Commander of the Faithful", in early Islam gave the 
pioneer grammarian Abul-Aswad al-Du'ili --- putative founder of the Basrah school of Arabic grammarians --- a 
sheet setting out the rules for pronounciation and grammar of "the first Arabs". The Caliph 'Ali wanted to reverse a 
linguistic situation where, he reportedly said, "the speech of the Arabs has become corrupted through mixing with 
this red-faced multitude" of non-Arabs (al-hamra'). al-Nadim, "al-Lughatu wal-Insha"' al-Ustadh 11October1892 
pp. 170-172. 
117. Ibid p. 178. 'Abbasid historiography had depicted the Umayyads as secular usurpers after the Rashidi 
(Rightly Guided) Caliphs. In addition to the Caliph' Ali, venerated by Sunni as well as Shi'i Muslims, al-Nadim 
presented Ziyad, governor of al-Basrah under the machiavellian Mu'awiyah (first Umayyad Caliph, r. 661-680) as 
also promoting Abul-Aswad's initiation of the classical grammar and linguistics, as the means to preserve 
prescriptive standard Arabic. Ibid. 
118. "Bab al-Lughah'', al-Ustadh 30 January 1893, p. 469. 
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power?) shows the potential in al-Nadim's writings for more secular political communities 
constituted on other bases as well as religious belief among the Muslims. al-Nadim was aware 
of deep conflict between European nationalities such as the British and French, expressed in 
violence and war119• Some European nationalist movements he knew, however, only bore out his 
Arabo-Islamic tradition's association oflanguages with religious communities. Language forms 
with religion "the two great fundamentals": by holding fast to both against Turkey duringthe five 
centuries of her rule, Serbs, Bulgars, Montenegrins and Rumanians assured their future 
independence120• al-Nadim was particularly conscious of the role that the Christian religion 
played as a basis of personality that made possible Greek independence from Turkish rule. Here 
again, though, the religion and the literary language were one since al-Nadim misconceived the 
Christians' "Gospel" (al-Injil) as, parallel with the Arabic Qur'an, "revealed in the Greek 
language". Although Turkish was not a scriptural language of Islam, al-Nadim thus argued that 
if the Greeks had abandoned their original (religious) language they would have become not 
merely "Turks" but "Muslims by virtue of the language", never to recover independence121 . 
al-Nadim thus depicted all languages not as neutral communication instruments but as 
pervaded by the content of the particular religions predominant among those who spoke them. 
His theories about languages, religions and national identities paid little regard to Egypt's great 
Coptic minority, integration of which required religion-neutral culture or plural cultures in the 
shared Arabic. al-Nadim's sense of nationality as something that could change with a change of 
language, and that religion or the change of religion could reinforce or disrupt such functions of 
language, offered elements for the racially open-ended, incorporative way that Ahmad Hasan 
al-Zayyat and' Abd al-Rahman' Azzam were to characterize the Arab national community in the 
1930s and 1940s (Chs. 9 and 10). 
119. "Tajadhub al-Jinsiyyat wal-Adyan" al-Ustadh 14 March 1893, pp. 708-709. 
120. Wendell, Evolution p. 157. Given Egypt's historical links to the Turks, al-Nadim was particularly 
conscious of the development of political nationality among marginal European peoples under Ottoman rule. He 
also had a broad awareness of the death, through amalgamation, of various nationalities in West Europe where 
conflict had been linguistic without the religious polarization between Christianity and Islam of the first category. 
The assimilation of the originally Germanic Normans when they learnt French was one such warning to Egyptians. 
"Tarbiyat al-Abna' "(Educating New Generations), al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 p. 204. 
121. "Bab al-Lughah", al-Ustadh 30 January 1893, pp. 470-1. al-Nadim generalized about dispersal of the 
nations (umam) in the lands and length of severance of relations, and every nation's "developing a specific language 
and religion" that produced independent peoples (jins). "Tajadhub", p. 705. 
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Classical Arabic: Focus for Resistance Against the British 
al-Nadim and al-Ustadh were the prototype for the galvanizing psychosis about the 
survival of classical Arabic to be whipped up by the acculturated independence movement of 
Mustafa Kamil (1874 - 1908). Kamil in formative first youth was al-Nadim's disciple122• 
There was certainly a wide gap between the language of literature that the Arabic Qur'an 
had defined a thousand years before and the grammatically simplified dialects that al-Nadim's 
countrymen spoke in their daily lives. He thought that the British and other imperialistic 
Christians singled out the vulnerable crucial standard Arabic for attack, in order to destroy the 
Egyptians' nationality and religion, and thus incapacitate them from further resistance123 . The 
use of French, English etc as mediums of education and government, and the influx of European 
terms for the objects of modern life into everyday colloquial Arabic, threatened Islam's survival. 
Because it was impossible to translate the God-revealed Qur' an, Egyptians could retain access to 
it only if all areas of their lives maintained their general grasp of classical Arabic. The 
miraculous Arabic Qur'an was "the target of everyone fighting the language and endeavoring to 
destroy it". Even if circumstances and the needs of modernization forced them to use European 
languages widely, Egyptians should still maintain Arabic as the medium of their own dealings 
122. al-Nadim, while striving to politicize the semi-literate urban poor and women with some colloquial 
dialogues in al-Ustadh, alertly courted the new generation of Muslim Egyptian youth now receiving higher 
education under the Occupation. al-Ustadh in early 1893 noted Kamil' s editorship of the school magazine 
al-Madrasah and his production of student plays, mainly on ancient non-Egyptian Arab subjects; al-Nadim became. 
the responsive young nationalist's mentor and instructor. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 213, 217; al-Ustadh 28 
February 1893 p. 666 and 28 March 1893 pp. 759 - 760. He advised Kamil to avoid conflict with the Khedive, 
which had so contributed to his own and the 'Urabists' downfall and to the post-1882 British rule. Arthur 
Goldschmidt Jr, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party: 1892-1919" in P.M. Holt (ed), Political and Social Change in 
Modern Egypt: Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic, (London, Oxford 
University press, 1968), pp. 311 - 312. At its inception, Kamil recognized his new movement's continuity with the 
preceding generations of West-aware but non-acculturated pan-Islamists. In 1894, while in Paris to activate the 
Egyptian community and to lobby Europeans to make Britain evacuate the Nile Valley as promised, Kamil 
telegraphed a report to the now old Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, languishing in forced retirement in Istanbul under 
'Abdul-Hamid. Fritz Steppat, Nationalismus und Islam Bei Mustafa Kamil in Welt des Islams IV, 1956, p. 247 fn. 
Wendell saw the emotionalist vehemence of Kamil's denunciations of the British imperialist enemy as a 
continuation of al-Afghani's outlook and style. Wendell, Egwtian National Image p. 245. 
123. Expressed eg. in cautious terms by al-Nadim in an article assailing the proposal by Sir William 
Willcocks to make colloquial Egyptian Arabic Egypt's literary language, in place of the classical. This proposal to 
"achieve the death of the language of the Qur'an" revealed to all Egyptians "a secret of the secrets of Europe" 
previously known only to "those concerned with the study of Europe's aims in the East". al-Nadim was concerned 
in the article to present al-Ustadh as a "scholarly/scientific" ('ilmiyyah) rather than political journal. "Bab 
al-Lughah" (Language Section), al-Ustadh 30 January 1893 pp. 475-477. Sir William Willcocks (1852-1932), the 
British civil engineer who designed the first Aswan dam completed in 1902, had come to Egypt from India in 1883 
to work in the Egyptian Public Works Department. EB (15 ed) Mic. 
restore it as 
race .. 124. The loan-words 
chemistry other modern sciences European languages into Arabic was producing a 
younger generation, neither Egyptian nor foreigners, who were concocting a bizarre new 
composite language without grammatical rules. If this became dominant "it would be hard for 
the future generations of descendants of [today's] Muslims to know their religion or their 
Scripture because of the need of a translator to translate the Arabic in that case" 125• 
al-Nadim proposed that leading Azharite ulama' and teachers conversant with foreign 
languages form a society to invent Arabic equivalents of the Western medical, chemical and 
engineering terms entering the elite's spoken Arabic126. He conducted an acrimonious 
controversy with the Syrian-Christian al-Hilal which refused to accept proposed Arabic-Semitic 
coinings to replace such European loan-words as "advocate", "numero", "telephone" and 
"balcony"127. 
The monolingual al-Nadim hoped to enlist in the enterprise to extend Arabic out to 
convey and cover all modern life precisely those educated classes with the best knowledge of the 
European languages to be replaced. 
124. Ibid p. 469-470. Very old Islamic emotions fed al-Nadim's sense that "language is the emblem that 
makes nationality cohere and preserves it", and that a society accordingly should be established to revive and extend 
Arabic. But the imposition of totalistic national languages in European states also fueled his demands that classical 
Arabic cover all modernity: "they bring out all textbooks in the language used in their homeland: you find no 
Frenchman who learns through English, or Greek in German or Austrian who learns in Russian". The exception to 
particularity was certain standard Latin and Greek terms used in all those national languages. "Tarbiyat al-Abna' ", 
al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 pp. 203-204. 
125. "al-Lughatu wal-Insha"' pp. 182-183. al-Nadim was equally alert to (a) atomized Western linguistic 
diffusion in broader social interactions and that (b) in a more exclusionist way, the foreign languages were coming 
to monopolize modern specialized structures and functions: those of theoretical and applied sciences most 
strikingly. Thus, he objected that all subjects in the School of Agriculture (except Mathematics) were being taught 
in English. "al-Zira'ah fi Misr" (Agriculture in Egypt), al-Ustadh 21 February 1893, p. 628. He listed over three 
pages of al-Ustadh European loan words for chemical substances: mufin, Oksayd al-Potassium etc. "al-Lughatu 
wal-Insha'" pp. 180-183. On the other hand, he as inventively applied his classicist high culturism to cut out the 
more casual Western linguistic atoms multiplying in the new acculturated elite's off-duty, colloquial socializations. 
al-Nadim argued that bakh should replace "bravo" because "the most eloquent of the eloquent" Muhammad 
exclaimed bakh bakh to express admiration at a Qur' anic verse. He urged Egyptians to replace Bon Jour and Bon 
Soir with the ancient pre-Islamic 'Im Sabahan and 'Im Masa'an. "Mujtama' al-Lughat al-' Arabiyyah bi-Misr" (The 
Society for the Arabic Language in Egypt), al-Ustadh 7 March 1893 p. 678. 
126. "al-Lughatu ... " p. 180. 
127. "Mujtama' ... "pp. 675-680. al-Nadim wanted the school teachers and members of a forthcoming 
Egyptian parliament to propagate the neologisms to be coined by the Arabic Language Society. Ibid. 
As was a 
as a core sovereignty and strength 
to strengthen 
world's Muslims. 
Ottoman 
registering 
the Turkish language's development of an official status in Egypt, he was as hostile to the 
Ottoman State as to Europe's imperialism. Before Muhammad' Ali's seizure of power in Egypt 
"the use of the Turkish language in official communications" had brought literary Arabic to "its 
death gasp". By imposing Turkish as the language of administration upon "all the Arab lands", 
and appointing Turkish officials, the Ottoman State forced "the native population" to learn the 
Turkish language for dealings with the "rulers". Had it not been for al-Azhar, (literary) Arabic 
would have totally died out128• (al-Nadim's complaints that the Ottoman State suppressed Arabic 
as a medium of even primary school education anticipated similar themes of later, twentieth 
century, Arab nationalists in Ottoman West Asia, the Araboid Jaridist acculturateds before 1914 
[Ch. 6] and the more radical Egyptian pan-Arabs who by the 1940s had led stubbornly 
pan-Islamic Egyptians to finally support the West Asian Arabs' revolt against the Turks) 129. The 
'Alid dynasty's gradual restoration of Arabic as the medium of administration and modernizing 
Arabic-medium education remarkably revived the language130. 1892, al-Nadim appealed to 
the Ottoman Sultan to open primary schools in villages that would teach through the medium of 
either Arabic or Turkish --- whichever was the predominant local vernacular. Some Turks, 
Circassians and Kurds should be taught through Arabic to equip them to communicate with the 
populations of Arab provinces to which they would be sent as administrators131 . al-Nadim in 
1891 in exile had interacted with Jaffa's literati and 'ulama,i32: now, in 1892, he depicted Turks 
128. "al-Lughatu ... " p. 176. 
129. For the anger of Muslim Arabs educated in the Ottoman modern-stream schools and colleges of 
Lebanon-Syria see Amin Sa' id, Thawrat al-' Arab fil-Oarn al-'Ishrin (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal n.d. --- 1960?) p. 7 and 
Muhammad Jamil Bayhum, Falsafat al-Ta'rikh al-'Uthmani: Asbab Inhitat al-Imbiraturiyyat al- 'Uthmaniyyah wa 
Zawaliha (Bayrut: Farajallah 1954) p. 188. The Egyptian Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, a pioneer of more unitary 
Egyptian pan-Arabism in the 1930s and 1940s, in 1953 charged that the Ottoman Turks "expelled the Arabic 
language from the offices of state, even from the courts of the Islamic law, and used Turkish in education, even in 
the lessons of [Arabic] grammar". "al-Adab wal-Thawrah" (Literature and [Arab] Revolution), one in a 1953 series 
ofradio talks, in Wahy al-Risalah v. 4 (Cairo: Dar Nahdat Misr 1966) p. 266. 
130. "al-Lughatu ... " p. 176. 
131. Ibid, p. 183. 
132. For al-Nadim's interactions with Islamic 'ulama' and sufi mystics in Jaffa, Nabulus and Jerusalem, 
and his pilgrimages to shrines associated with prophets in Palestine, see Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 76-77. 
al-Nadim kept up his links with the scholars of Jaffa after his return to Egypt. He reported to Egyptians the death of 
al-Sayyid Sa'id al-Dajjani al-Husayni, surveying such works of Sa'id as his di wan of verses and his critical 
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ruling West Asia's Arabs disorientatedly and not justly promoting Arabic where it was the 
popular speech. However, he made such critical remarks in order to suggest procedures to 
strengthen the multi-national Muslim Ottoman state. 
The centrality of language in al-Nadim's understanding of political community could 
have influenced him to stand with early Arab ethnic dissatisfaction in the Ottoman Empire. 
However, the powerlessness and colonization Egyptians were suffering as al-Nadim brought out 
al-Ustadh made him emotionally need to defend any remaining sovereign Muslim state --- and 
Egypt's self-interest ran against any weakening of the Ottoman central government that could 
permit British power to spread out in the region. Resident Europeans were multiplying: he saw 
waning commitment to the Ottoman State as part of the dangerous Europeanization of the new 
Muslim-Egyptian elite developing under British rule. He analyzed the challenges facing the 
Ottoman Empire with empathic realism. It was weak militarily because it lacked rail 
communications and economically because it lacked perennially-flowing rivers: its agriculture 
was thus at the mercy of irregular rainfall. Outside Christian powers could exploit the Empire's 
religious and linguistic diversity to destroy it. Religion, anti-Islamic Christianity, was the motive 
of the European states' drives to dismember it: it is the sole Islamic power among fifteen 
Christian states. "The men of Europe" unceasingly promoted unrest and revolt among those 
populations in the Ottoman State with affinity of creed or race to them133 . 
Given the structure of international relations in the early 1890s, then, religious and 
anti-imperialist solidarity with the Turks overrode al-Nadim'_s perceptions that they were 
linguistically non-Arab and constricted the Arabic language of the West Asian Arabs. And in the 
1890s the immemorial identification of Arabic with Islam built an Arabic component into the 
literary languages of Muslim Persians and Turks. At that stage of the development of Muslim 
examination of hadiths about the isra' and mi'raj (night-ascent of the Prophet Muhammad). al-Nadim, "Ritha' wa 
'Aza"' (Elegy and Consolation), al-Ustadh 15 November 1892 pp. 311-312. 
133. al-Ustadh 17 January 1894, quoted Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, a1-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah 
fil-Adab al-Mu'asir (Bayrut: Dar al-Irshad 1970) pp. 21-22. al-Nadim was alert to signs of modernization under 
'Abdul Hamid: in 1893 he hailed the Sultan's increased provision of modem primary schools in villages as well as 
towns --- no Caliphs before him had attempted his drive to "universalize compulsory education", a precondition to 
develop a modem commerce and agriculture. He also referred to 'Abdul-Hamid's reclamation of long-disused 
lands, especially in such Arab areas as al-Karak and the Hawran: the Ottoman government resettled Cherkis, Kurds 
and Arabs in such underpopulated areas, where it provided them with agricultural implements. "Mahasinu Amir 
al-Mu'minin, Ayyadahullah!" (The Virtues of the Commander of the Faithful, God Strengthen Him!), al-Ustadh 2 
May 1893 pp. 866-9. For the resettlement of the Cherkis refugees by' Abdul-Hamid, see fn 35. 
to seem to Egyptians to a common 
enterprise Persians. thus the the 
"the Eastern nations", generally, promote the coming Arabic language academy of (a) 
Azhar scholars and (b) educationalists who combined their native Arabic or Turkish with 
European languages. He thought that its pure Arabic neologisms to replace European 
engineering, medical and chemical terms would also be adopted in other Muslim languages ---
(Cf. Ahmad Zaki Pasha even in 1925: B 82-83)134. 
The Turkish language had a real presence in urban Egypt in the 1890s as the minority 
ethnic culture of the Turco-Circassians. Arab Egyptians had a multiple linguistic, aesthetic, 
intellectual and religious relationship with Arab elites under Turkish rule that would be the 
strongest once fully activated. Yet perceived or potential cultural links to Turks, the solidarity of 
religion, and Egypt's political interests and anti-imperialism for the time held Arabist Muslim 
Egyptian political activists in an almost confederal pan-Islamic political community with the 
Turks of the capital Istanbul more than with the Arabs in the Ottoman provinces. For a long time 
this pattern was to hold with the pan-Islamic independence movement of Mustafa Kamil that 
al-Nadim first triggered. 
The Syrian Christians 
For many Egyptians under British rule, then, Islam and international conflicts interwove 
and blurred relations with Ottoman Arabs and Ottoman Turks. The Arabic-speaking Syrian 
Christian minority in Egypt, however, because it was non-Muslim separated Arabic as a 
determinant of community from Islam, and tested how much strength it could command on its 
own in the 1890s. 
Syrian Christians had been migrating into Egypt from the rule of Muhammad Ali. Many 
had been educated through Western languages at missionary institutions in Syria --- access to 
134. "al-Lughatu wal-Insha' ... p. 180. al-Ustadh publicized the Persian magazine Hikmat, edited by Dr 
Muhammad Mahdi al-Tabrizi on behalf oflrano-Egyptians. al-Ustadh 11October1892 p. 191. al-Ustadh was well 
aware of the earlier writings of Ahmad Zaki Pasha (1860-1934), after 1922 the "Shaykh of Arabism", noting that he 
had devoted his youth to bringing out beneficial translations from French. Notice on Zaki's translation Misr 
wal-Jighrafiyyah on geographical activity and works promoted by Egypt's 'Alid dynasty: "Taqariz" (Eulogies), 
al-Ustadh 18 )ctober 1892 p. 216. Even Zaki's translations from French were often on classical Arab subjects: list, 
Daghir Masadir p. 424. 
SC mam 
m independent to Britain's 1882 occupation. 
al-Afghani inspired his Syrian disciple Adib Ishaq to bring out the key constitutionalist 
newspapers Misr (from 1877) and al-Tijarah (founded 1878) from Alexandria: al-Nadim in his 
early nationalist career published in both 135• Pre-1882 constitutionalism focussed parochial 
ethnic sourness and conflict between (a) Turco-Circassians and (b) (Arab) "Egyptians", most 
sharply in the armed forces. Separate languages distinguished the two groups, and common 
Arabic enabled immigrant Christian Syrians to contribute to the still-fluid Egyptian national 
concepts: the Syrian writer Salim al-Naqqash first sloganized "Egypt for the Egyptians". 
The recent collaboration still led al-Afghani and' Abduh in 1884 to bracket such Syrian Ckris.l_~ 
and Muslim Egyptians within a contemporary Arab entity. When Ishaq died, al- 'Urwat 
al-Wuthqa lamented that "Time's inevitable misfortune untimely snatched away the adornment 
of the Arabs and the flower of literature, our close friend Adib Effendi Ishaq" 136 . 
As the British consolidated their rule in Egypt, though, this earlier acceptance came under 
strain. Some Syrian Christians served the British as petty clerks, intelligence agents --- or in 
Arabic newspapers that propagandized for the Occupation, notably Faris Nimr and his 
British-subsidized daily al-Muqattam, launched 1888137. al-Nadim, in al-Ustadh, wavered 
between (a) denial that collaborationist Syrian individuals were representative (other SC 
135. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim p. 140. Although it was Ishaq who set up Misr in 1877 at al-Afghani's 
request, Salim al-Naqqash proceeded to edit it: the two SCs again launched al-Tijarah together. In this pre-British 
period, Adib Ishaq and 'Abdallah al-Nadim were both members of the Misr al-Fatat secret society that brought out a 
paper bearing its name from 1879. Dr' Abd al-Latif Hamzah, Adab al-Maqalat al-Suhufiyyah fi Misr v. 2 (Cairo: 
2nd ed. Dar al-Fikr al-' Arab 1957) p. 11. al-Nadim's awarding of status of honorary Egyptian to Ishaq in 1893: fn 
81. For an overview of the West-transformed Ishaq's anti-imperialist and therefore Ottomanist stance, along with 
the proto-pan-Arabism, Hourani, Arabic Thought pp. 195-6. Thomas Philipp extrapolated sectarian tensions 
between al-Nadim and other Muslim Egyptian radicals and SC intellectuals like Adib within pre-1882 Araboid 
Egyptian protest Constitionalism. Philipp, The Syrians in Egypt, 1725 - 1975 (Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag 1985) pp. 
102-4. 
136. al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa p. 240. Adib Ishaq's adaption of old classical forms of the Arabic language for 
his very anti-traditional --- and, indeed, sometimes frankly post-religious --- writings also led Christian 
Lebano-Syrian writers to characterize him and the wider modem community he served in similar Araboid ways. 
Iskandar al-' Azar (1855-1916) elegized him as "the model that inspired us in mannered rhetoric and ... devotion to 
Humanity ... He was the flower of literature in Syria and the sweet-basil of the Arabs in Egypt". Daghir, Masadir v. 
2 p. 113. al-' Azar was on the fringes of Arab ethnicist dissidence in the Ottoman Empire, including that from the 
Hijazi sharif Husayn in the lead-up to his 1916 uprising against the Turks. 
137. al-Nadim in 1893 exploited the post-religious or anti-religious connotations of SC scientism to get at 
al-Muqattam's Cromer-subsidised Syrian Christian editors while sidestepping British attempts to make nationalists 
look anti-Christian: see fn. 81. 
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intellectuals fostered resistance to the British and recovery of the Arab past138) and (b) rejection 
of the Syrian Christian immigrant community. In both stances, though, he affirmed that common 
Arabness prescribed unity between Muslim Egyptians and Syrian Christians139. 
Whether or not resident Syrian Christians and Egyptian Muslims united would affect the 
Egyptian territorial nation's interests (decolonization). Unlike such quasi-particularists as 
Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid later, however, al-Nadim did not pursue incorporation of Egypt-resident 
Syrians into an exclusive patriotic Egyptian nation framed by the homeland. For him in 1892 -
1894, more at stake in the tensions was the supra-Egyptian pan-Arab community of common 
language and race that spanned and could negate the territorial units in the (Middle) "East". The 
wide unity of "the Easterners" to beat off Europe and coordinate assimilation of its 
strength-conferring civilization could validate plurality of nations: al-Nadim mentions Indians 
and Afghans as well as Egyptians, Arabians and Turks all in unison facing the West. To argue 
away the division between Egyptians and Syrian Christians in Egypt, however, he virtually 
denied plurality of territorial or racial nationality for the narrower Arabo-Islamic East. "The 
Egyptians and the Syrians (al-Shamiyyin) and al-' Arab [here= "Arabians"] are united by "the 
community of language and [Ottoman] authority for all of them, of religion" (Islam) "for most of 
138. In 1893, al-Nadim counselled Egyptians not to hate this people/race (jins) with which Egyptians had 
mingled from ancient times because of a few traitors or hypocrites: the SC-edited al-Ahram was as "Eastern" 
(anti-British) as al-Ustadhas were the SC al-Ittihad and al-Mahrusah. Ordinary Egyptians should not stop 
subscribing to such SC-edited newspapers merely because one (al-Mugattam) praised the foreigners and attacked 
Egypt's aspirations and leaders (=Khedive 'Abbas). "Hanafi wa Nadim", al-Ustadh 28 February 1893 pp. 663-4. 
al-Ustadh published a tribute on the death of Salim Taqla, one of al-Ahrarri's editors, describing the paper as 
"patriotic" (=anti-British) and loved by Egyptians because it had served "the East". "Ritha'" (Elegy), al-Ustadh 23 
August 1892 pp. 15 - 16. "Our friend" Bisharah Taqla presented al-Nadim with a volume of elegies to his dead 
brother Salim. "Hadiyyah" (A Present) al-Ustadh 30 May 1893 p. 984. al-Nadim publicized the first number of 
al-Hilal, edited by SC Jurji Zaydan, that was to project the wide classical Arab past and apply pan-Arab identity to 
bracket and merge Egypt and Syria, legitimizing the presence of non-Muslim Syro-Egyptians. "al-Bilal", al-Ustadh 
30 August 1892 pp. 42-43. 
139. al-Nadim did not in his tributes to Salim Taqla specify Arabness as the connection. He did, though, 
when the resident Syrian Christian Shibli Shumayyil proposed that the dialects of Arabic be developed into separate 
literary languages: with deep hurt, al-Nadim reminded him that it was his modernist and literary writings in the 
classical that had made him popular among "the Sons of the Arabs" in Egypt and Syria, "his people". "Bab 
al-Lughah" ([Arabic] Language Section), al-Ustadh 3 January 1893 p. 474. In such transitional passages, the 
classical Arabs and their language were getting close to entailing a contemporary Arab community that spans plural 
homelands like Egypt and (Greater) Syria and overrides the Christian-Muslim divide. Even one of al-Nadim's 
angriest denunciations against SC collaborators described the SC collaborators as tasting a morsel dipped in the 
blood of their own race (jins) --- very intimate terminology that in that spasm had already "become a kind of 
pan-Arabism" (Wendell). "Law Kuntum Mithlana ... ", al-Ustadh 17 January 1893 pp. 530 - 532; Wendell, Egyptian 
National Image pp. 157 - 158. Such early Arab bonding is minimized in James Jankowski, "Ottomanism and 
Arabism in Egypt, 1860 - 1914", The Muslim World v. LXX (1980) nos 3-4 pp. 249 - 250. 
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them and race for the majority of them, and contiguity which in aggregate render them 
effectively a single homeland". Race could not divide (resident Christian) Syrians and Egyptians 
because the two groups had mixed and lived together and intermarried following mutual 
conquests for so long a time as to virtually make the race Gins) of the two areas' populations 
onet4o. 
al-Nadim in the earlier 1890s, then, articulated elements for pan-Arab identity strong 
enough to match homeland but which did not yet do so because of situations. 
Religion. al-Nadim did not in al-Ustadh identify religion as a factor influencipg Muslim 
Egyptians' attitudes to Syrian Christians. On the other hand, he showed sensitive awareness of 
the insecurity that any member of a religious minority feels about the survival of his/her religion, 
reassuring the resident Syrians that there was no danger to their Christianity from Egypt's 
Muslim majority. "The community ofreligion Gami'at al-din) compelled" those Syrian 
Christians who collaborated with the British, although that alliance with the occupiers brings 
only "humiliation" in contrast to the "dignity" (al-izz) that a common patriotic struggle for 
independence offers141. It could be objected here that the Syrian Christians in standing with their 
(imperial) British coreligionists only acted rather naturally in terms of al-Nadim's repeated 
recognition that religion could sustain wide international political solidarities of linguistically 
disparate nations against a nation of another religion so long as it threatened one of their number. 
al-Nadim had interacted in depth with Christian (and Samaritan) as well as Muslim 
Christian 
"Syrians" during his exile in Palestine142. Syrian mt writers blended archaic classicist Arabic 
I\ 
140. "A Tataqallab al-Umam bi-Taqallub al-Ahwal wa Nahnu Nahnu?", al-Ustadh 20 December 1892 p. 
420. Although racially fused, contiguous Arabia, Syria and Egypt were not racially homogeneous: al-Nadim 
referred to some "Arabian lands (al-aradi al-'Arabiyyah) in which racial half-castes have no place". Ibid. The 
meaning "Arabia" for al-aradi al-' Arabiyyah here would anticipate the usage of the party of Mustafa Kamil, 
originally al-Nadim's disciple: cf. "al-Bilad al-' Arabiyyah" (The Arabian Lands) by "Lover of the [Ottoman] State" 
in al-Liwa' 10 July 1904 p. 1, denouncing Wahhabis in Najd. Both al-Nadim and the Kamilists later, though, also 
used such phrases to indicate the wide-extending Arab lands. including Egypt. al-Nadim: the Ottoman State 
"imposed its authority over all the Arab lands" (al-buldan al-' Arabiyyah). "al-Lughatu wal-Insha"', al-Ustadh 11 
October 1892 p. 176. 
141. "Law Kuntum Mithlana ... " pp. 531-3. 
142. As the relations of Muslim Egyptians and the resident Syrian Christians deteriorated, al-Nadim 
retained fond memories of the hospitality that Christians as well as Muslims had shown him during his period of 
exile in Jerusalem and Jaffa. "A'da' al-Suriyyin" (fhe Enemies of the Syrians), al-Ustadh 23 May 1893 p. 933. In 
late 1892, al-Nadim published an encomium to his magazine, written in the pseudo-' Abbasid rhymed prose that he 
favored, from Jabali al-Samiri ("the Samaritan") of the Palestinian town of Nabulus. The tribute thanked al-Nadim 
objectives needs preoccupying Egyptians period 
to the 
a whole complex political 
the time blocked or subordinated 
the crude trans-Arab community emotions that al-Nadim and other Egyptians felt towards 
non-Muslim Fertile Crescent Arabs. al-Nadim's Arab racial-linguistic nationhood transposed 
some motifs about wide classical Arabs into his discussion of the contemporary resident Syrians 
but he usually stopped one step short of terming the latter, or the contemporary Egyptians with 
whom they should rebuild relationship, "Arabs" 144• Only one or two odd passages in al-Ustadh 
objected to sniping against the Ottoman Empire from emigre Syrian Christian journalists: this 
was to alienate acculturated Kamilist pan-Islamists from the minority much more in the twentieth 
century. 
Proto-Particularist Motifs 
Twentieth century particularism has stressed the homeland, Egypt, as the secular definant 
that under Islam continued to separate an Egyptian nation from other Muslims and 
Arabic-speakers. During the British occupation, in contrast, al-Afghani, 'Abduh and al-Nadim 
most often solidified the resistance of Egyptians around religious, historic and linguistic themes 
that would foster Arab or Islamic communities extending far beyond Egypt. Proto-particularist 
concerns towards which these older pan-Islamists occasionally lurched, however, included: 
territorial homelands, awareness of the problem of division between the sects in the single 
homeland, and that the homeland-framed nation's Muslims have some continuity with a 
pre-Islamic pagan civilization. 
and the magazine for "diffusing his fields of knowledge among the two peoples, the Egyptian and the Syrian, so as 
to enlighten people's thoughts and bring people who are far removed from each other together in communication 
and to reconcile those who are at odds with one another". The letter of this non-Muslim Samaritan mentioned 
"Eastern Unity", not Arab. al-Nadim noted that he had written an unprecedented book surveying the Samaritans' 
religion, customs and history: he had collected the materials from their priests during his recent exile in Ottoman 
West Asia. The British were not to allow al-Nadim enough time back in Egypt to publish this now lost work, as he 
promised, in al-Ustadh. "Taqariz" (Tributes), al-Ustadh 18 October 1892 p. 216. 
143. al-Ustadh published a defence of the Lebanese Sa' id al-Bustani's novel Samir al-Amir. Set in Mount 
Lebanon, the melodrama condemned "ancient customs", and demanded free marriages across clan and class lines 
against the old jabal feudal aristocracy; however, al-Bustani couched his modernist, West-inspired message in 
archaist, neo-classicist high Arabic. "Riwayat Samir al-Amir" (The Novel Samir al-Amir), al-Ustadh 14 March 
1893 pp. 723 - 727. 
144. For an example of a crudely stated joint Arab nationhood between Muslim Egyptian Egyptian and SC 
intellectuals, see fn 139. 
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In an 1882 Calcutta address to a predominantly Muslim audience, al-Afghani sought to 
motivate them to acquire modem Western sciences by evoking the ancient (pre-Islamic, Hindu) 
Indians --- "the inventors of arithmetic and geometry" from whose vedas and shastras Roman and 
all later Western law derived145• Addressing Egyptians in 1878 from the columns of Misr, 
al-Afghani refuted the arguments oflndia's British rulers that the native population could not 
govern itself by describing the Indians as "the sons of Brahma and Mahadiv" who founded 
human laws when the British were savages146• Continuity of Indians could reinforce for 
Egyptian audiences odd --- much thinner --- statements by al-Afghani (and the young' Abduh) 
that the ancient Pharaonic Egyptians defined modem Egypt's Muslims. Keddie highlighted an 
appeal by al-Afghani during unrest that finally culminated in 'Urabi's revolt, to take inspiration 
from the ancient Egyptians who built the pyramids, and overthrow tyranny147• 
al-Afghani and 'Abduh occasionally opposed ill-feeling and disunity between Muslims 
and non-Muslims in both India148 and Egypt. In 1884, they tried to dispel in al-'Urwat 
al-Wuthqa reports of tension between Muslims and Copts in the town of J arja in Upper Egypt: 
they admitted, here, that communal fighting had occurred during the British conquest149. Keddie 
painted al-Afghani as a precursor of the "composite" Indian nationalism of the early twentieth 
century, and of Egyptian particularism: both used a pagan antiquity to unite two sects 150. This is 
somewhat one-eyed in terms of her own data. al-Afghani made clear to readers of Misr in 1878 
that only the extreme rapacity of the British made possible in India the anti-imperialist "alliance 
of sects ... holding such extremely opposite views that, under other circumstances, they would 
have gladly drunk one another's blood" 151 • For him, the incompatibility inherent in Islam and 
Hinduism divided Indians. More than uniting Hindus and Muslim Indians for joint struggle, 
145. Keddie, An Islamic ReS.Ponse to Imperialism pp. 58-9. 
146. al-Afghani in Misr in late 1878 quoted in Keddie's Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-"Afghani" p. 105. 
147. Keddie, "Pan-Islamism as Protonationalism", The Journal of Modem History March 1969 pp. 22-23. 
148. al-Afghani in 1887 collaborated with the non-Muslim Sikh Dalip Singh, last ruler of the Sikh 
Kingdom of the Punjab, in issuing from Moscow manifestoes calling for uprisings against the British in India. 
Kedourie, Afghani and' Abduh, pp. 56-57. The Punjab's ruling family had already figured in al-'Urwat al-Wuthga 
as victims of British manipulation and tyranny. "al-Lurd Northbrook Hakim Misr al-Jadid", al-'Urwat p. 375. The 
magazine also translated an Urdu letter from Lahore that accused the British of trying to divide Muslims from 
Hindus lest Indians of all creeds, starving, launch a joint uprising. "Lahore", al-'Urwat al-Wuthga pp. 390-393. 
149. Art. "al-Sudan wa Misr" (The Sudan and Egypt), al-'Urwat al-Wuthgap. 309. 
150. For Keddie's characterization of al-Afghani as promoting in India a prototype of later 
territorial-linguistic, sects-integrative, "composite" Indian nationalism, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-"Afghani" pp. 
157-160. 
151. 1878 Misr article by al-Afghani, Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din p. 102. 
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al-Afghani's images of a pagan antiquity adapted motifs about India from classical Arab-Islamic 
books to give Indian Muslims racial confidence that they could assimilate Western science and 
modernity to beat back imperialists152• In post-1892 discourses in Istanbul, al-Afghani urged 
Arab Muslims and the Ottoman State to conduct Islamic instruction courses for illiterate 
syncretist Muslims in India to purge beliefs and practices they had borrowed from their 
"idolatrous" Hindu neighbors 153 • 
Nor did al-Afghani evoke Pharaonic antiquity to integrate Copts and Muslims in joint 
resistance to Britain. His 1878 denunciations of immemorial governmental oppression and 
foreign conquerors --- among whom he included the Muslim Arabs --- were meant to incite the 
masses against the Khedivial house of Muhammad 'Ali and were anti-monarchical or 
constitutionalist. Although not directed to the Muslim-Coptic division, such statements of 
al-Afghani --- and by 'Abduh prior to his decision to serve under the British in 1888154 --- did 
suggest that Egyptians were some sort of collectivity continuous since the Pharaohs that had 
absorbed all conquerors in some sense. Neither offered data of Coptic participation in classical 
Arabo-Islamic civilization. 
Considering their awareness that Coptic-Muslim conflict could help Britain strengthen 
her grip, it could not be said that al-Afghani and 'Abduh in al- 'Urwat al-Wuthqa structured their 
152. 'Aziz Ahmad, "Afghani's Indian Contacts" pp. 476-504. Ahmad suggested as classical Arab sources 
of al-Afghani's respect for classical Hindu-Sanskritic civilization al-Biruni's Tahqiq ma lil-Hind and al-Jahiz' Fakhr 
al-Sudan 'alal-Bidan. Keddie's own quotations identify archaic, classical Arab images that helped precondition 
al-Afghani to voice Sanskritophilia in India: "we can say that the Indians were the inventors of arithmetic and 
geometry", adopted by the Arabs and in turn transferred to Europe (1882 Calcutta speech). Keddie, Sayyid Jamal 
ad-Din p. 160. 
153. al-Maghribi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani pp. 72-73. Garcin de Tassy noted in 1831 "numerous 
pilgrimages" by uneducated Indian Muslims "to the tombs of saintly personages of whom some are not even 
Muslims". Gustave Le Bon in the late nineteenth century noted that among the Indian Muslim common people 
"numerous saints are equally deified and confounded with the old divinities of the Brahmanical pantheon ... 
Mahomet and the Musulman saints are deities of the same rank as the other Hindu deities. The ceremonies are 
mutually borrowed from the rites, and sometimes unite partisans, of diverse creeds." Quoted by Rabindra Narayan 
Ghose, "The Civilization of Northern India: A Contribution to the Study of Hindu-Muslim Relations --- III", Dawn 
Magazine (Calcutta) July 1911pp.114-115. Unfavorable images of Hindu caste stratification recurred over decades 
in the circles of al-Afghani's Arab disciples: 'Abduh as Mufti of Egypt argued that Islam made perfection possible 
for all: it is not like Brahminism which divides men into castes, the lim_its of which cannot be overstepped. Adams, 
Islam and Modernism p. 16. 
154. The young Muhammad' Abduh, al-Afghani's disciple, wrote that the ancient "Kingdom of Egypt" 
possessed a "mature civilization when that of others was still in its infancy". Wendell, Egyptian National Image 
p.186. Subsequently, in an 1888 letter to the Shaykh al-Islam in Constantinople,' Abduh described "the people of 
Egypt" as a continuous entity that had racially and culturally absorbed all conquerors over "thousands of years". 
Ibid p. 188. 
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imaged territorial homeland (watan) to integrate resistance by the two Egyptian sects155 . 
However, al-Nadim did after 1882. He early wrote a play The Homeland (al-Watan) and had it 
performed by the pupils of his Islamic Charitable School before Khedive Tawfiq in 1879156. He 
addressed the group fighting the invading British in 1881 as "sons of Egypt": al-' Arab were 
formations in the Egyptian forces recruited from Egypt's nomads although 'Ura bi was "the jewel 
in the Arab necklace" 157• al-Nadim thus made his audiences aware of the homeland, Egypt, and 
"the Egyptians" as the inner entity for which they were struggling. al-Nadim in the 1890s 
sometimes betrayed apprehension that the Copts might ally with the British occupier, Christians 
like them. He therefore structured his Egyptian homeland to give them an inherent place: 
al-U stadh was careful to write in a respectful tone of the Coptic Church and the Coptic 
community158• His young Egyptian disciple Mustafa Kamil took up his integrative concept of 
homeland, extending it in relation to the pan-Islamic and historical Arab identities into which 
al-Nadim had blurred the Egyptians. 
al-Nadim often evoked the current territorial homeland to integrate Copts and Muslims 
against the British but not Egypt's particular pagan antiquity. al-U stadh did give some publicity 
to ancient Egyptian items held in local museums, noting the publication of an early guidebook to 
the Gizah Museum by Ahmad Kamal Pasha159• However, Kamal's Egyptological publications 
well into the 1940s were to convince many secular-educated Muslim Egyptians that the ancient 
Egyptians were racially and in their language (and monotheism!) related to the Semitic Arabians 
(B 439 - 444). 
155. al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa in 1884 argued the freedom of conscience of non-Muslims in the classical and 
post-classical Muslim states and that they rose unimpeded to the highest positions: this was, however, a side-issue in 
its argument with Europeans as to whether Muslims or Europe had practised "fanaticism". Art. "al-Ta'assub", 
al- 'Urwat al-Wuthqa p. 44. 
156. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah al-Nadim pp. 49-50. 
157. Ibid p. 210. 
158. For sympathetic coverage by al-Nadim of the Coptic community, wracked by conflict between (a) the 
patriarchate and (b) some clergy see "Ghibtat Batriyark al-Aqbat" (His Eminence the Patriarch of the Copts), 
al-Ustadh 7 February 1893 pp. 598-599. In further arguing the oneness of the Egyptian people spanning Copts and 
Muslims, al-Nadim called for the setting-up of some bisectarian organization to integrate the two sections under the 
patronage of the Khedive 'Abbas. "al-Muslimuna wal-Aqbat" (The Muslims and Copts) al-Ustadh 21 March 1893 
pp. 749-750. He praised the nine years-old Society for the Peservation of Coptic History in Asyut: it had recorded 
the death of Khedive Tawfiq and the accession of his son 'Abbas IL "Tahni'ah" (Congratulation), al-Ustadh 27 
September 1892 p. 143. 
159. "al-Khulasat al-Wajizah wa Dalil al-Mutafarrij 'ala Mathaf al-Jizah", al-Ustadh 28 March 1893, pp. 
756-7. The article's title is that of Ahmad Kamal's book. 
-Al30-
The Long-Tenn Legacy: Overview 
al-Afghani, al-Nadim and' Abduh, then, put into the minds of subsequent generations that 
the earlier wide Islamic empires centered outside Egypt were the indigenous states that matched 
the religion-focused international strength exemplified by modern Europe. More than the other 
two, al-Nadim evoked the territorial homeland but fused it with a delocalizing literary language: 
Mustafa Kamil and his al-Hizb al-Watani independence movement were to keep the two fused as 
the basis for political independence. al-Afghani and al-Nadim's sense of religion as one key 
instrument with which any society or camp, Muslim or other, integrated itself vis-a-vis rivals 
politicized and relativized religions in a utilitarian way. This deleted much of late-traditional 
Islam160: but could accommodate a nuanced awareness of new secularoid ideologies in "Europe" 
as the long-term pan-Christian enemy camp161 requiring a wide pan-Muslim counter-camp. The 
perception of international relations in terms of religion-glued conflicting camps, 
Eastern-Muslim versus Western-Christian, was long to retard Egypt-centric identifications. 
Particularist publicists in the 1920s were to find it very hard to wrench the minds of 
modern-educated Egyptian Muslims around to some acceptance that later classical or 
160. In 1892, al-Nadim depicted al-Azhar in al-Ustadh as an institution in which students were debilitated 
by sickness or skipped most lectures: its courses did not equip its graduates to read classical Arabic high literature. 
He disliked the unstructured, individualized relationship students had to their shaykh in traditional Sunni Islam and 
urged Egyptians to transform al-Azhar into a (Western-style?) university that would offer the modern mathematical 
and other sciences as well as religion and in which the students would read political newspapers. Tawfiq, 'Abdallah 
al-Nadim pp. 130-132. Cf. Delanoue, loc cit p. 112. Prior to the British conquest, al-Nadim was wont to flay 
traditional Egyptian Islam, categorizing "the charlatans" of the Sufi mystic brotherhoons with such social evils as 
illiteracy, alcoholism and hashish --- the mystics and divines exploited the peasants just like the magicians and 
village usurers. Delanoue, op. cit. p. 88. It is to be noted, though, that Sufis gave al-Nadim shelter during his 
decade underground after the British crushed 'Urabi: he himself belonged to the Khalwatiyyah order. Ibid p. 94. 
161. al-Nadim's alertness to the centrality of Christianity in the life and policies of European states was not 
unnuanced: his Syrian Christian and European friends had left him well aware of the erosion of traditional religious 
belief in the secularizing Western societies. Ignoring --- perhaps rightly --- militant anti-clericism and rationalism in 
West Europe, al-Nadim portrayed that all "civilized" Europeans had fused religious and secular education: every 
school had a church in which all pupils were required to pray before, and to close, the school day: the mathematics 
and physics textbooks were interspersed with religious principles. Educated Europeans who followed "free thought" 
still, although post-religious (la yadinuna bi-din), participated fully with their families in those Christian rituals that 
Europeans had made compulsory "for children, women, youths and the aged". The European free-thinker was 
careful to close his shop on all Christian holy days, however much he disbelieved in them, scrupulously called in the 
priest as a family member died, and far from criticizing Christianity in any public or elite literary gathering, penned 
vigorous apologetics to defend it against denigration. The Easterners had to duplicate religion as the tool with which 
Europe had achieved the "social unity" that sustained its modernity and power. "Tarbiyat al-Abna'", al-Ustadh 18 
October 1892 p. 203. Cf. fns. 8, 81. al-Nadim advised any Egyptian freethinkers to imitate this participatory respect 
by their European senior brethren for religion as the great social cement. Delanoue, loc cit p. 102. 
of Western 
psyches of 
1 -
themselves in 
or 
classical resurged 
1930s, Haykal re-evoking them in 
context of incessant war between Crusaderist-Western and Arab-Muslim camps throughout 
history, somewhat as al-Afghani and al-Nadim had (Ch. 9: B 153-4; cf. 'Abdallah 'Inan B 55-6). 
al-Nadim's drive to generalize supra-Egyptian neo-classical Arabic was to be carried 
forward more totalistically by Mustafa Kamil's independence movement up to 1914. Some in 
the more insular circle of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid occasionally voiced pragmatic unenthusiasm. 
Nonetheless, in the period of the post-1922 Egyptian particularist state such former youthful 
disciples of Lutfi as Muhammad Husayn Haykal and Taha Husayn would increasingly promote 
extended, modified classical Arabic in the name of the great classical Arab tradition. For them, 
the territorial entity of Egypt retained presence in the face of the definitive wide classical Arabs 
but failed to sustain distinctness on the plane of formal language. The pioneer Islamo-Arab 
nationalist Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in the 1930s and 1940s achieved the apogee of the attitude 
that the classical Arabs' Arabic must be extended to serve as the medium for all modem 
(West-derived) life. 
al-Nadim's stands on language issues would foster in Egypt the orientation that the 
classical Arabs' Arabic is the core of the nationhood of Egyptians, that finally led to linguistic 
pan-Arab nationalism, in place of geography-determined Egyptian particularism. 
CHAPTER 3: BRITISH COLONIAL 
MUSTAFA 
AND THE CULTURAL AND POLITICAL FORMATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT. 
This chapter sets out features of British rule (1882 - 1922) that constricted the 
opportunities, and the Arab culture of (in particular urban) secularizing-educated Muslim Egyptians. It traces the 
development of the Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) independence movement of Mustafa Kamil as the instrument 
to meet the class and cultural needs of that bullied acculturated Muslim bourgeoisie. Splintered cultural resources 
and connections to other Arabic-educated cultural elites enabled the Kamilists to unevenly develop Arabic culture 
and Islamic ideology in the face of imperial deculturization. From the outset, the Kamilists lobbied support from the 
true liberal West to evict Britain. Instead of instrumentalities, this Chapter focuses the acculturation-inculcated 
emotional needs for humane community with Westerners in such outreach. 
The Kamilist independence movement passed through three rough periods: 
1. 1893 - 1908: Under Kamil's direction, the movement concentrated on organizing the 
acculturating-educated students and professionals, a small but crucial minority in Egypt's population. 
2. 1908 - 1910: Under the leadership of Muhammad Farid, al-Hizb al-Watani, the political party that the 
late Kamil founded, reached out to the urban proletariat and lumpen proletariat by establishing workers' night 
schools, trade unions and to the peasantry through rural cooperatives. The Party was in the process of becoming a 
mass independence movement, a united front of a range of classes. But the British, closing its newspapers and 
waves of arrests, drove al-Hizb al-Watani's leaders into exile. 
3. The period of exile. 
COLONIALISM AND THE KAMILIST RESPONSE 
The Consolidation of British Rule 
In 1882 a British expeditionary force defeated the first Egyptian proto-nationalist movement at Tal 
al-Kabir. National feeling remained stunned for many years by the shock of defeat and by Britain's military power: 
over a decade passed before a new generation began to develop the organizations necessary to lead independence 
movements. From 1883 to 1907, Egypt was ruled in a "Veiled Protectorate" by Britain's Consul-General Sir Evelyn 
Baring (later Lord Cromer). Cromer left "an appearance of rule" to the Khedives and (mainly Turkish-speaking) 
Egyptian Government ministers1 while flanking the latter with British "advisers" who were the 
administrators in the Ministries. 
Britain's progressive extension of control in the administration threatened the economic 
livelihood and career prospects of the emerging Muslim student and professional class2• 
Lt-Colonel P.G. Elgood observed that by the early twentieth century Cromer had 
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placed Englishmen, Advisers in name, Controllers in fact, at the side _o! Minis~ers ... The 
actual government of the country had passed into the hands of the Bntish Advisers who 
ruled through an increased British Inspectorate. But ... presently E~glishmen in the 
Ministries in Cairo ruled every Department of State. As the Egyptian head of such a 
Department died or was pensioned off, his title and pay would be taken by the 
Englishman, and the latter's place be filled by a newcomer of the same race. . 
This anglicization of the new Central Administration took time to complete ... But ... m 
1914 there were few Egyptians controlling any State business of importance. 
Elgood noted the resentment among students and their parents, the overall "professional 
class", at the influx of British recruits: "no boy attends a Government school in Egypt who is not 
inspired mainly with the ambition of entering later the Civil Service"3. No wonder that Mustafa 
Kamil, from the outset of his career, recruited heavily among city-based students and less 
established professionals and by his death in 1908 had almost completely mobilized the 
secular-stream student class. 
The Larner West. Important to understand the relationships of Kamil and other 
Westernizing-educated Muslim intellectuals with the general West is that the main threat to 
Britain's rule in Egypt long came from the reluctance of other European states to accord it 
recognition. France's economic and ed~cational interests and resident nationals in Egypt had 
exceeded Britain's prior to the occupation. An agency representing Egypt's European creditors, 
the Caisse de la Dette Publique, had been set up in May 1876 with control of Egyptian finances 
to ensure payment of Egypt's debt. This international Commission maintained a considerable 
1. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party, 1892-1919" in P.M. Holt (ed.) Political and 
Social Change in Modern Egvpt (London: OUP 1968) p. 308. "Understanding their ambivalent position in the 
Egyptian population, the British chose mostly Turko-Circassian collaborators to sit as figure-heads over the 
ministries. The exceptions to this rule were three Muslim Egyptians" (ie. Arab-Muslim Egyptians) "and three 
minority sect officials of the total twenty-five ministers who held office from 1882 to 1908". Jeffrey Collins, The 
Egyptian Elite Under Cromer 1882 - 1907 (Ann Arbor PhD microfiche nd) p. 223. 
2. During the period of British colonial rule, "religion as well as nationality was highly correlated with rank 
and power within the state apparatus. Non-Muslims were extremely numerous among the government elite, 
constituting 18.84% of the total although they accounted for only 7.7% of the national population in 1897. 
Non-Muslims were particularly numerous in the ministries of Finance (56.52%), the Mixed Administrations 
(44.76%), Health (43.75%) and Justice (23.59%)". Collins, Egyptian Elite p. 243. 
3. Elgood, Egypt and the Army pp. 10, 17. "The Milner Commission of 1920, sent out to study the causes 
of the nationalist disturbances of 1919, reported that Egyptians occupied less than one-fourth of the higher posts in 
the government bureaucracy". Robert L. Tignor, British Colonial Rule in Egypt 1882 - 1914 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1966) pp. 180-1. In his 1907 assessment of the retiring Lord Cromer, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid noted 
that he extended the sphere of personal freedom in larger society but subordinated Egyptian officials to English 
ones: "many gifted young Egyptians began to shun the government service". Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the 
Egyptian National Image, From its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (Berkeley: University of California Press 
1972) pp. 295 - 301. 
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say in how Britain directed Egypt's economy under the Occupation. Through her participation in 
the Caisse, and the extraterritorial rights of her foreign residents, France could always obstruct 
Britain's government of Egypt until the 1904 Entente Cordiale. 
In 1892 Britain's puppet Khedive Tawfiq died. He was succeeded by his seventeen-years 
old, Austrian-educated son' Abbas. Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi II (reigned 1892-1914) wanted truly 
to rule in Egypt and thus was in consistent conflict with Egypt's actual ruler Cromer --- an 
adversary relationship crucial for development of nationalist organizations during the Veiled 
Protectorate. In an 1893 ministerial crisis, the Khedive dismissed Mustafa Fahrni, who had 
Cromer's confidence, from the Prime Ministership. Cromer forced 'Abbas to appoint Riyad 
Pasha as a compromise, and make a formal promise to follow the advice of the British in all 
important matters thenceforth4. In the 1894 "Frontier Incident" Kitchener, Sirdar (Commander) 
of the Egyptian Army, attempted to resign when the Khedive disparaged British officers in the 
Army. Cromer maintained Kitchener in his position and forced' Abbas to express satisfaction 
with the roles of the British officers in the Egyptian army. 
In 1898 a French military expedition, led by Captain Marchand, attempted to establish 
French predominance in the Upper Nile Valley, bringing France and Britain to the brink of war 
until he surrendered to British forces at Fashoda. Egyptians opposing British rule had hoped to 
win the aid of France to dislodge the British from the Nile Valley. The Anglo-French Entente 
Cordiale of 8 April 1904 ended their lingering hopes that France ever would act as such a third 
force. In return for freedom of action to subjugate Morocco 
the government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct 
the action of Great Britain in that country (Egypt) by asking that a limit of time be fixed 
for the British occupation, or in any other manner5. 
4. Tignor, op cit p. 105. Mustafa Fahrni was perhaps the most compliant of the Turco-Circassian 
politicians whom Cromer hand-picked for high office. Louis Brehier, a contemporary, described him as "un 
Algerien des plus dociles" --- while Cromer called him "a weak man" whose docility and "well-known sympathy 
with English policy" kept him in office as Prime Minister for thirteen unbroken years. Citations Collins, Egyptian 
Elite pp. 225 - 226; cf. ibid p. 224 for other confidential British assessments of other "dummies". The 1894 clash 
between 'Abbas and Cromer over Fahrni remained etched for decades in the mind of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid despite 
his view that the Khedive was despotic. Lutfi (1908: al-Jaridah), Safahat Matwiyyah min Ta'rikh al-Barakat 
al-Istiqlaliyyah fi Misr (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Misriyyah 1946) p. 145. 
5. Art. "Egypt", Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th ed. 1910-1911) v. ix p. 17. The French recognized 
Britain's predominance in Egypt in return for a free hand in Morocco. Some scope remained to the nationalists, 
though, to link up with French interests to obstruct British power. As late as 1909, the French dragged their feet in 
cooperating with Gorst in his enforcement of the 1881 Press Law against nationalist Arabic journals as a tactic to 
extract more British support in tightening French control over Morocco. Peter Mellini, Sir Eldon Gorst. the 
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Cromer retired in May, 1907. His successor, Eldon Garst (British Consul-General 
1907-1911), achieved an alliance with the Khedive against the nationalists. Garst struggled to 
check the annual influx into the Egyptian Government departments of British recruits who would 
take jobs from the educated and professional Egyptians inclined to support nationalism6. While 
conciliating the strata from which the nationalists recruited, Garst cracked down harder than 
Cromer on the organized nationalists themselves. He applied the 1881 Press Law, which Cromer 
had never invoked, to shackle and ban al-Hizb al-Watani's newspapers, and jailed or drove into 
exile its spokesmen and leaders. Garst' s alliance with the Khedive isolated Britain politically by 
driving the constitutionalist al-Ummah/al-Jaridah group, that had collaborated with Cromer to 
some extent, towards the radical nationalists7. 
In November 1908, Garst appointed the Copt Butrus Ghali Pasha as Prime Minister in 
succession to Mustafa Pasha Fahrni, who had held the post (with one inte1ruption in 1893-5) 
under Cromer since 1891. In February 1910, Egypt's quasi-parliamentary General Assembly 
overwhelmingly rejected a measure to extend the Suez Canal concession for forty years beyond 
1968. A few days later, a Muslim militant nationalist, al-Wardani, assassinated Ghali who 
advocated the extension8. The assassination heightened conflict between Coptic and Muslim 
Overshadowed Proconsul (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press 1977) pp. 182, 285. 
6. Gorst wrote of his attempts to encourage "the Egyptian official class" in his autobiographical notes, 
excerpted by Tignor, British Colonial Rule p. 292. 
7. Gorst's rigid and uncompromising rejection of organized nationalist movements was illustrated by his. 
1909 advice to the Foreign Office in London not to receive the moderate Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, associated with the 
Ummah Party, who was warning the British not to apply the Press Law. Lutfi said that he had refused many 
overtures from the Germans. Mellini, Sir Eldon Gorst p. 182. 
8. The assassination of Ghali by al-Tadamun al-Akhawi --- the "Fraternal Brotherhood", one of the militant 
secret societies spun off from the Patriotic Party as its base broadened under Farid --- brought out the (still 
incomplete) transition of some acculturated Muslim Egyptians in al-Hizb al-Watani from a more traditional sectariar 
to a secular-territorialist ideology of political community. Ghali' s Muslim assassin Ibrahim al-Wardani, educated as 
a pharmacist in Switzerland, was no pan-Islamist and regarded multi-sectarian territorial political nations as the 
norm. In a private letter predating the killing, he had written that "I had opposed the admission of Copts into our 
[secret] Society, not because they are Copts, the Copts being our brothers and we making up with them the children 
of a single homeland, but because the Copts are a small sect in the land and experience has shown that a small sect 
will seek shelter and protection with the government and fanatically take its part. This the Muslims do in India: the;, 
align themselves with the English government against the Hindus and sons of their homeland because the Hindus ar< 
more than they in number". al-Muqattam 4 April 1910. Thus, independence movements should not have any 
sectarian restriction, but temporary sectarianisms in larger society had to so limit them for a time. For the Ghali 
assassination as another motif in tensions between the Jaridist-Siyasahist stream of acculturated nationalism and 
Westerners, B 492 fn. In regard to the growing connections of al-Hizb al-Watani to militantly anti-imperialist Hindt 
rather than Muslim Indians, the noted Indian revolutionary Khrishnavarna offered Egyptians a thousand francs prize 
in memory of "martyr Wardani". Goldschmidt, "The National Party from Spotlight to Shadow", Asian and African 
Studies (Haifa) v. 16:1, March 1982 p. 17. 
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communalists in Egypt. Gorst admitted in his report for 1910 that his policies for containing 
discontent in Egypt had failed. 
Sentences of imprisonment against al-Hizb al-Watani leaders and suppression of its 
newspapers forced the party to become an exile movement, operating from Europe and the 
Ottoman State9. Kitchener, however, won the landowner-led Ummah party back into 
collaboration, by reorganizing a new advisory Legislative Assembly with high property 
qualifications that favored landowners involved in the Ummah. He also, however, made modest 
efforts to conciliate the peasantry with agricultural and hydraulic projects, distribution of lands, 
and the first small-scale extension of modern health services to the countryside10. 
Turco-Circassians. The political and social importance of Egypt-resident 
Turco-Circassians culturally linked to the Turkish core of the Ottoman State influenced the turns 
supra-Egyptian identifications took from 1882 to 1922. Until the 1904 Entente Cordiale, the 
young Turkish-speaking Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi II stood at the very head of resistance to 
Britain's ever-tightening control over Egypt's government and institutions. Even after,' Abbas 
fell into intermittent conflicts with the British ending with his deposition in 1914. Abrasive 
attempts by such British figures as Cromer and Kitchener to subject the Khedive would enhance 
Muslim Egyptians' identification of him and his Turco-Circassian family and court as heading 
the Arabic-speaking Egyptian population. The Turkish-speaking 'Abbas declared himself a 
Turkish national after World War 111 and, like many Turco-Circassians, usually went annually to 
Constantinople for the Islamic feast of Bairam12• The British exploited the House of Muhammad 
'Ali's Ottoman State links to wrest the Ministry of Waqfs from' Abbas. Overall, Egypt's 
Turco-Circassian Khedivial royalty and declining landowning aristocracy were one major factor 
that continually involved Arab Egyptians in the Turkish-speaking (more than the 
Arabic-speaking sector) of the Ottoman Empire, although 'Abbas did entangle Egyptians in its 
9. For British actions under Kitchener against the Watani Party and the latter's drift into exile, see 
Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" pp. 327-329. 
10. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 315 - 318. Beaman --- a vitriolic critic of Kitchener familiar with 
Arabic and Muslims --- had the impression that his 1911 "Five Faddans Law" won the Consul-General wide 
popularity among the poorer fallahin: Arden G.H. Beaman, The Dethronement of the Khedive (London: n.p. 1929) 
p. 55. The Law prohibited expropriation for debts of the land, houses or equipment of peasants owning five feddans 
of land or less. It proved unenforceable and "various devices of the moneylenders, short of outright expropriation, 
deprived the peasants of real control over their land". Tignor, op cit pp. 239-240. 
11. Beaman, Dethronement p. 105. 
12. Ibid p. 72. 
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early Arab nationalism as well through his fanning of the "Arab Caliphate" idea (Chs. 5 and 6). 
The Development of Nationalist Parties 
Westernizing-Educated Students. Mustafa Kamil's first major appearance in the history 
of Egyptian nationalism was at eighteen, when he led a demonstration of students in the higher 
schools of Cairo, notably the Egyptian government-run School of Law, before the offices of the 
Syrian-Christian owned pro-British al-Muqattam in 1893. The Khedive subsidized higher law 
studies abroad through which Karnil obtained the licence in law from the University of Toulouse 
in 189413• 
When Kamil returned to Egypt in that year, the former 'Urabist Latif Salim had founded 
the secret Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani); Kamiljoined and soon was the secret society's 
leader. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid participated with Mustafa Kamil in 1896 in the secret Society for 
the Revival of the Nation (al-Jam'iyyah li' -Ihya' al-Watan) of which 'Abbas was the head14. 
Appeals to Europe. Support by the Khedive was critical for enabling Kamil to commence 
his role as spokesman for Egypt's independence aspirations in Europe. It was with palace funds 
that he sailed to Paris in May 1895 intending to exploit the world-wide colonial rivalry between 
Britain and France to persuade French politicians and public to press Britain to carry out her 
frequently-promised evacuation from the Nile Valley15• In Paris, Kamil in "his first international 
act" presented a petition to the French Chamber of Deputies in the name of the Egyptian people, 
appealing for help from France which had declared the Rights of Man and liberated so many 
peoples16. Kamil also met in Paris the unusually non-imperial French nationalist Juliette Adam 
(1836-1936), with whom he maintained a son-like friendship and political collaboration until his 
death; henceforth her journal La Nouvelle Revue published his articles campaigning for Egypt's 
independence17. According to Robert L. Tignor, "during the 1890s Mustafa Kamil probably 
13. Financial dependence of Kamil on the Khedive in regard to his early student magazine al-Madrasah and 
his legal studies in France speculated by Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 312. 
14. Ibid p. 317. 
15. Ibid p. 313. 
16. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (London OUP paperback 1970) p. 204. 
17. Juliette Adam's Anglophobia was of long standing when the precocious young Kamil met her. During 
Britain's 1881-1882 seizure of Egypt, she had blasted the French minister of Foreign Affairs for recalling France's 
Consul General when he supported Egyptian independence, although France had had the predominant place in Egypt 
since the rise of Muhammad 'Ali. Adam was no French jingo, even though she did on the eve of the British 
conquest stress all the capital that France had sunk into Egypt, that her Suez canal had transformed the country and 
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spent as much time in Europe trying to propagandize the Egyptian question as he did in Egypt" 18. 
However, the failure at Fashoda of Marchand's 1898 expedition made clear to Kamil and his 
comrades (and to the Khedive) that France would not risk war to drive Britain from the Nile 
Valley. 
As the Khedive 'Abbas moved in the wake of France's backdowns to accommodate 
himself somewhat to the strengthening British presence, his relations with Kamil cooled. 
Throughout the 1890's, Kamil and his followers had widened their internal oratory and 
journalism as a means to expand their following in Egypt, and thus develop a basis for action 
against British rule independent of either the Khedive or Europe. Kamil had opened his activity 
as a spellbinding public orator in early 1896 when he addressed two public meetings in 
Alexandria, at which he called for British evacuation19. He had published extensively in the 
anti-British al-Ahram (SC) and al-Mu'ayyad from 1894, and on 2 January 1900 he launched his 
own daily, al-Liwa'. The Khedive "may have subsidized [al-Liwa] for a time to annoy 
Cromer"20. 
An instrument used by Kamil and his colleagues to politicize and organize the strata of 
students and secularizing-educated professionals was the Nadil-Madaris al-'Ulya (Higher 
Schools Club) "which brought together the students and graduates of Egypt's several 
professional schools in a distinctly nationalist milieu"21 • Kamil in 1906, as a development of his 
mobilization of the student element, "organized a strike at the School of Law which began a long 
period of student agitation that only came to an end when political activity itself came to an end 
under the military government of 1952"22• The British authorities obviously found it difficult to 
counter this new weapon of the independence movement. The 
that her citizens there numbered 40,000 compared to a paltry 7 ,000 resident Britishers. She wanted France to be the 
partner rather than ruler of the Egyptians. In her liberal pan-nationalism, "to be national elevates one's sentiments to 
active admiration for the patriotism and love of nation that others equally feel": she had supported "the Greek heroes 
of 1821, the great Hungarians of 1849, the great Italian unificationists, the Slavs fighting for liberation from 
Germanic tyranny" --- and the brief pre-British nationalist Egyptian parliamentarism, as much directed to loosening 
French as British control. Ella-Rachel Arie, "Juliette Adam et le Nationalisme Egyptien", Orient 1962 pp. 121, 123, 
138. 
18. Tignor, British Colonial Rule p. 268. 
19. One meeting was in Arabic for Egyptians, the other primarily for European residents, whom Kamil 
wanted to conciliate so that the British could not coopt them. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 315. 
20. Ibid p. 319. 
21. Ibid p. 319. 
22. Hourani, Arabic Thowzht p. 208. 
an by 
who not return at once, to 
students go to their studies23 . 
The Jaridists. While Kamil's independence movement broadened out, a group of wealthy 
Arab-Egyptian landlords, prominent government officials and young intellectuals launched 
March 1907 the daily al-Jaridah around which in September 1907 the Hizb al-Ummah or Party of 
the Nation formed. The national issue was important in the birth of this party. Ahmad Lutfi 
al-Sayyid had originally called the group's first meeting following the outbreak in January 1906 
of Britain's territorial dispute with the Ottoman State over Tabah: he accepted Britain's claim to 
be fighting Egypt's legal battle for her, and was furious that the pan-Islamic solidarity with the 
Ottoman State expressed by Kamil's movement, seemed to weaken commitment to Egyptian 
sovereignty in Sinai24 • The class of Arab-Muslim large landowners who sustained al-Jaridah and 
the later Party was somewhat bound by economic interest to the British colonial administration. 
George Lloyd viewed the Ummah Party as the "result of his [Cramer's] efforts" to group 
"moderate-minded men of influence and standing" into an "active organization" that could 
"check the (Kamilist) Nationalist Party's campaign" to end British rule25 . B1itish officialdom, 
near panic before the wide opposition expressed by Egyptians in the wake of the Tabah and 
Dinshaway incidents, thus actively stimulated the formation of al-Jaridah and the Ummah party. 
Yet Cromer' s, and especially Gorst' s, restrictive stances towards the development of 
parliamentary institutions made infuriatingly clear how secondary for British policy at that time 
was the possibility of collaboration with this Egyptian group26. 
Writers of the al-Jaridah/Hizb al-Ummah group viewed the political scene at their 
group's emergence much as alarmed British officials did --- that Mustafa Kamil, following 
Tabah and Dinshaway, was reaching out beyond the student and professional classes to "the 
common people" (al-'ammah) and that a destructive mass independence movement might result. 
23. AfafLutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations (New York: 
Praeger 1969) p. 169. 
24. Ibid pp. 167 - 168. 
25. George Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer (London: 2 vols, MacMillan 1933-1934) v. 1 p. 50. 
26. In his final report before retiring, all Cromer would hold out in the way of a prospect of constitutional 
advance was an international Legislative Council in which resident foreigners would have parity with Egyptians ---
enraging for Hizb al-Um mah and the Jaridists who wanted to become political partners. Mellini, Gorst p. 132. For 
bitter 1908 criticisms by Lutfi that the British under Gorst allied with the despotic Khedive to constrict the powers of 
the Consultative Assembly to those of a municipal council, see Lutfi, Safahat Matwivyah pp. 122-129. 
admitted in 19 the was launched 1907 the 
masses at a 
begun to demand an "unreasonable" independence they believed theiJ grasp: 
party of the limitations of freedom of expression (i.e. a British crackdown) threatened. 
notables of the people" (=Arab-Egyptian large landowners) chose Lutfi al-Sayyid, and launched 
al-Jaridah as his forum, to "bring the mood of the people to moderation to enable it to obtain its 
reasonable demands through peaceful ... argument, so that its demands be not discredited before 
European public opinion". Lutfi, representing Hizb al-Ummah, sought dialogue with the British 
instead of organizing resistance to them. He could not, the al-Jaridah writer admitted, hope to 
win to his side the masses, in need of prolonged re-education as preparation for eventual 
independence: 
A nation like the Egyptian, caught in a period of development, still emergent and 
struggling up the stairs of civilization --- still, indeed, in their first stage --- cannot 
possibly be fit to turn moderate principles to use save after the passage of long time. That 
is the reason the common people did not endorse the principles that Lutfi Bey's articles 
expounded, although they were the most eloquent ever written on their subject, modern in 
style, their approach logical and oratorical in a way that the intellectual elite of educated 
"7 people would pref er~ . 
The bond uniting the people of property and position who headed the Ummah Party was 
that they were all personae non gratae at the Khedive's (Turcophone) palace (al-' Aqqad, 1953)28. 
Lutfi in 1907 advocated that Egypt be led by an enlightened elite of "government officials, 
members of the liberal professions and the a'yan" ([Arab-Egyptian] land-owning gentry/affluent 
people)29 . The elitist Ummah party proved important for Egypt's long-term twentieth century 
political development. It provided leaders for the Wafd and leadership and policies for the Party 
of Liberal Constitutionalists when these fo1med following World War 1. Several 
of the acculturated intellectuals whose post-World War 1 community thought we 
examine -- e.g. Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Mahmud 'Azmi, Taha Husayn, Ahmad Hasan 
al-Zayyat -- were during the British Occupation youthful disciples of Lutfi or published in 
27. Ibrahim Ramzi, "Mudir al-Jaridah wastiqalatuh" (al-Jaridah's Editor and His Resignation), al-Jaridah 14 
December 1914 p. 1. 
28. Wendel!"s analysis of the composition and following of Hizb al-Um mah in E!.!vptian National Ima!.!e 
pp. 216 - 217. 
29. Quoted ibid p. 283. 
al-Jaridah. 
was fo1med 
Europe and proclaimed Patriotic had 
objectives of the immediate evacuation of British troops from Egyptian soil and the grant of a 
constitution by the Khedive"30. However, Kamil died prematurely on 10 February 1908. The 
Scots Christian missionary Temple Gairdner, no sympathetic observer of either Islam or the 
institutions in Muslim lands, made clear the mass, universal character of the mourning among 
Muslims. In a few hours, by word of mouth alone, all Cairo "had the news even on the night of 
his death". When Gairdner went to Kamil's house next morning 
many were already in tears, especially young men of the effendi class. Then the coffin, 
borne aloft by bearers and covered with the red Egyptian flag, appeared, swaying slightly 
in the doorway. The whole of the vast assembly in the court beneath burst into tears as 
by one impulse. Neither on that day nor at subsequent great meetings when thousands of 
Muslims were gathered together to hear orations to his memory did I hear insulting or 
revengeful or violent words ... The students, the schoolboys, the younger Government 
officials --- it is they who have made this man their idol and hero, and wept for him as the 
young weep for their heroes31 . 
Gairdner, then, identified the effendi class, the student youth and the younger government 
officials as still Kamil's core constituency at his death. 
The British-subsidized SC al-Muqattam described organized collective participation by 
the urban student class in the funeral in the midst of the mourning masses: 
At three o'clock in the afternoon the funeral march began to move in a great processiori 
the farthest extent of which the eye could not attain. The march was headed by police 
mounted and on foot and behind them the most enom1ous number of school students. 
The students of every school participated as a body, marching separately from the others, 
bearing banners draped with black. Marching first were the students of the late leader's 
school, then the students of the prepatory school, then the students of the Victoria 
College, then the students of the Agricultural School bearing a tree hung with black, then 
the students of the Teachers' College, then the Dar al-'Ulum, then those of the Khedivial 
School, then the Medical College, then the Law School. The bier had been wrapped with 
the Egyptian flag and above it had been raised a green banner upon which had been 
written "the proprietor of al-Liwa'"32 . 
The al-Muqattam conespondent lists as sources of organized groups in Kamil's funeral 
30. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 321. 
31. Constance E. Pad wick, Temple Gairdner of Cairo (London: Society for Promoting Western Knowledge. 
2nd ed 1930) p. 165. 
32. al-Muqattam 12 February 1908 p. 5. 
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the most prominent West-patterned institutions of secondary and tertiary education. 
Significantly, the only religious Islamic institution mentioned as providing an organized body of 
mourner-marchers was the post-traditional Dar al- 'Ulum founded in 1871 to produce teachers of 
Islamic subjects and Arabic simultaneously trained in modem secular subjects. al-Muqattam 
identified elements of the adult professional classes as present in number: notably professional 
people in the judiciary or law, private or government-employed (rijal al-qada' wal-nivabah)33 for 
admission to whose ranks Kamil had originally been educated. 
At Kamil's death, then, his movement had organizationally covered the whole of the 
Muslim secular-stream students and, less completely, the graduate professionals such as civil 
servants, lawyers and teachers34. al-Hizb al-Watani's anti-imperialism, patriotism and 
pan-Islamism spoke to the needs of this core class-constituency, so constricted in employment 
and culturally assaulted by the British and the resident foreigners. 
The Threat of Deculturation Under the British 
Lirnrnistic Assaults. British educational policies worked to create a small modem 
Muslim elite sharply separated in class background and culture from Egyptians in general. In 
1902, the British spent on education less than 1 % of all Egyptian state expenditure: in response 
to nationalist criticism, the rate increased between 1907-1912, but never exceeded 3.4% of total 
budget35. Cromer imposed stiff fees to knock the children of the poor and the petty bourgeoisie 
out of the government's secular-stream primary and secondary schools. Such restrictions on ~ 
popular education shrank the pool of students for tertiary medical, engineering and law colleges, 
deeply alienating the Jaridist-Ummah paternalists, motivated to collaborate by all that the British 
had done to foster the growth of their land-holding Arab-Egyptian elite36. By 1900 the British 
33. Ibid. 
34. The Jesuit-founded Bayrut Catholic mouthpiece al-Bashir printed a report from Cairo observing that 
Kami! had been given "a rarely-paralleled funeral in which thousands of the leaders, scholars, headmasters, anny 
officers and students of the country walked ... The crowds of people stopped the trams from traveling for about two 
hours". al-Bashir 17 February 1908 p. 5. Ghali characterizes al-Hizb al-Watani at the death of Mustafa Kami! as "a 
party of youth, students, civil servants, [secular] lawyers", drawing on Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid's contrast of "the 
youth" in Kamil's party to the seasoned mature notables in Hizb al-Ummah. Ibrahim Amin Ghali, L'Ef!vpte 
Nationaliste et Liberale de Moustapha Kamel a Saad Za2loul. 1892-1925 (Hague: Martimus Nijhoff 1969) p. 82. 
al-Mugattam stressed the wine-like irrational impact of Kami! on "the Egyptian youth" who followed him "refusing 
to listen to other arguments". al-Muqattam 11 February 1908 p. 6. 
35. Tignor, British Colonial Rule p. 346; Mellini, Gorst p. 130. "The Neglect of Education", Peter 
Mansfield, The British in Egypt (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1971) pp. 139-150. 
36. al-J aridah was concerned at the small numbers of Egyptians enrolling in medicine and engineering in 
English as secondary 
not at . This replacement by 
educated Egyptians from British a concessive gesture, Cromer 1906 had the 
former 'Urabist, Sa'd Zaghlul, associated with the group that was to found al-Ja1idah and the 
gradualist nationalist Hizb al-U mrnah in 1907, appointed Minister of Education with permission 
to award more scope to Arabic in the schools. To control Zaghlul, Cromer simultaneously 
promoted as Adviser to the Ministry of Education the ex-missionary Douglas Dunlop, who had 
been associated since the late 1890s with linguistic anglicization campaigns in Egypt's schools38 . 
Despite the nationalists' attacks, Dunlop kept control of education until after the First World 
War39• In a poem of farewell to Cromer on his departure from Egypt in May 1907, Hafiz 
Ibrahim wrote "you destroyed the mother of languages [Arabic] which is our destruction or a 
the relevant tertiary colleges in Egypt, and constriction of career opportunities in those professions by British 
recruits and resident Europeans. "Nazarat al-Ma'arif --- al-Majaniyyah wa Madrasat al-Muhandiskhanah" (The 
Ministry of Education --- Free Instruction and the School of Engineering), al-Ja1idah 23 May 1907 p. 3. This article 
deftly rebutted the excuses given by the puppet Ministry of Education for abolishing free education at primary and 
tertiary level, while still allocating P 1,600 to it at the secondary level: "a nation in which no more than 5% can read 
and write is among the nations in direst need of government assistance for [its] primary education". Ibid. Another 
item toyed with a remedial etatism from primary to the conclusion of tertiary education: the governments of 
Muhammad 'Ali and Khedive Isma'il had educated the children of the poor to get a source of recruits for the 
understaffed bureaucracy. Those regimes used to forcibly place such children in boarding-schools and encouraged 
enrolments by providing free food, clothing and even stipends --- the interventionist alternative to British 
tight-fistedness. "al-Ta'lim fi Madaris al-Hukumah" (Education in the Government Schools), al-Jaridah 17 March 
1907 p. 1. 
37. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 326, 328-329. 
38. Mellini. Sir Eldon Gorst p. 129. Zaghlul, the third and last Arab Egyptian to get a ministry under 
Cromer, "was appointed Minister of Public Instruction four months after Dinshaway to deflate the growing 
nationalism the incident had aroused" (Collins). Writing to the British Foreign Minister at the time, Cromer termed 
Zaghlul "a competent man from Muhammad' Abduh's gradualist school whose members could be safely put into 
positions of power to replace [Turco-Circassian and Christian Armenian] 'dummies or figureheads'". Collins, 
Egyptian Elite pp. 223-4. Displaying courtesy and resolve, Zaghlul was able to limit some de-Arabizing excesses of 
Dunlop and other British "advisors" in his Ministry. Yet. previously a critic of the British imposition of European 
languages as the core and medium of education, as Minister (October 1906 - February 1910) Zaghlul "became the 
[policy's] defender, although in a limited way". Lois Aroian, Education, Lansrnage and Culture in Modern Egypt: 
Dar al-Ulum and its Graduates (University of Michigan: PhD 1978) p. 232. 
39. Tignor. British Colonial Rule pp. 329. Dunlop' s stultifying school regulations and curricula, uniform 
down to the minute throughout the length and breadth of Egypt, alienated even some of his better British teachers. 
Ibid pp. 328 - 329. In contrast to Cromer, Gorst had impulses to remove the rigid bureaucrat Dunlop. Mellini, Ql2,_ 
cit pp. 170, 172-3. Contemptuous of literary Arabic, Dunlop assaulted his pupils with immersion in English more, 
Aroian argued, than with imperial ideology: he did not take up some British Colonial Office proposals to incorporate 
materials on the British Empire in the curricula of government schools. Aroian, op. cit p. 229. The gaps in basic 
knowledge of Islam manifested to the late 1920s by such intellectuals as Haykal, products of Dunlop· s schools, do 
not enhance Aroian's contention that Dunlop did not restrict Islamic education. For an example, B 400 - 401. 
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pathway to [encompass] it"40 • Gradually, English became the main second language read and 
spoken by the younger generation of the Muslim petty bourgeois class "who lacked means.for 
private education and the acquisition of culture" and sought careers in a civil service that the 
British were changing over from French to English41 • French held out in the School of Law, 
Kamil's and Lutfi's Alma Mater, where French lecturers strove to transmit not merely the 
elements for specialized legal careers but generalist Enlightenment concepts such as the Rights 
of Man that they relished might destabilize the British in Egypt --- and which had drawn many 
Muslims such as Kamil to the school42. Linguistic Anglicization was meant to provide jobs 
relief for Britishers and to fit some Muslim Egyptians to serve as docile functionaries, not to 
open into fundamental encounters with any Western culture: Cromer tried to prevent any 
Egyptians at all going to study in unsettling Europe, and obstructed the opening of the 
small-scale (old) Egyptian University, which went ahead only under his successor. This 
Arabic-medium core for a University was the joint achievement of a decade-long drive by the 
Kamilists, Muhammad' Abduh and his disciples, the Jaridists, al-Mu'ayyad and the Khedivial 
family, and the SC al-Ahram and al-Muqattam. The foundation of the University drew attacks 
from Le Progress branding such innocuous disciples of' Abduh as Qasim Amin as Kamil's 
fellow-"revolutiona1ies". Lutfi al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah were drawn into religio-political 
polarization of (a) resident Europeans and the British against (b) all Egyptian groups and 
political factions, branded as collectively "fanatical"43 . The French-modelled nature of Egyptian 
law, some scholarly institutions, and the urban private sector because of the resident Europeans, 
40. 'Abd al-Latif Shararah, Hafiz: Dirasah Tahliliyyah (Bayrut: Dar Sadir 1965) p. 111. 
41. Jacques Berque, Egvpt: Imperialism and Revolution tsd Jean Stewart (London: Faber and Faber 1972) 
pp. 204-5. 
42. Berque correctly notes the purely functional contact with English language and culture to which the 
British wanted to confine the Egyptian elite. "It proved a disadvantage to English to be thus limited to these 
practical ends, aiming no higher and no deeper, and thus satisfying neither the Arabs' powerful intellectual 
aspirations nor their ideological interests, which for a long time found champions in the Ecole de Droit". Ibid. 
Upon finishing high school, Mustafa Kamil wrote to his brother of his intention to join the Egyptian Law School 
because it was "the school for writing, oratory and the ascertainment of the rights of individuals and nations". After 
one year there, he concurrently joined the French Law School, which prepared Cairo students for examinations 
given in France. Farhat Ziadeh, Lawyers. the Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern Egvpt (Stanford, California: 
Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University 1968) p. 63. 
43. Lutfi's bitter mid-1907 exchange with Le Progres, Safahat Matwiyyah pp. 170-172. The University 
opened in 1908 with distinguished European Orientalists among its lecturers, although they taught in Arabic: Tignor. 
British Colonial Rule pp. 337-338. "Intellectual members of the Ummah Party were in the lead of those Egyptians 
who in 1908 successfully realized through general subscription the creation of the Egyptian University". Ziadeh, 
Lawyers p. 91. 
- Al45 -
all helped maintain French as an intellectually more prestigious opposition to English and the 
British: yet the alternation of the two languages also increasingly brought home the shared 
anti-Muslimism of Europeans in general. Even for the wealthiest Muslim Egyptians, the utmost 
linguistic Anglicization seldom opened humane interaction: future Liberal Constitutionalist PM 
Muhammad Mahmud was popular at Oxford but on returning home found himself unwelcome in 
the clubs and sporting societies within which Egypt's British had irreversibly segregated 
themselves44• So often, Jaridist-Siyasahist pan-Islamism, pan-Easternism and pan-Arabism had 
that quasi-intimate fury ignited when an admired group rebuffs and excludes. The Jaridists 
respected the economic and technical skills of Cromer and his colleagues --- the perennialization 
of irrigation and the booms enriched their class --- and even the Kamilists paid tribute to 
Britishers who benefited Egyptians45 • Yet British linguistic depersonalization in education, their 
restriction of primary, secondary and tertiary education and their subjection of what Egyptians 
they recruited into the civil service radicalized the conservative Ummah-Jaridists almost as much 
as the less-propertied, more urban-bourgeois Kamilists46• 
44. William J. Welch, No Country for a Gentleman: British Rule in Egypt 1883 - 1907 (New York: 
Greenwood Press 1988) p. 43. 
45. al-Liwa' approved when a meeting of Egyptian writers decided to send a letter of thanks to the 
Englishman Ernest Cassel for his work to combat eye diseases in Egypt: the remissness of "our rich ones" in 
promoting popular health lost them the respect Cassel won. "Shukr al-Muhsin" (Thanking a Benefactor), al-Liwa' 
13 January 1903 p. 2. In mid-1908, Lutfi paid tribute to British irrigation works that had restored international 
financial confidence to Egypt. While assailing the political stagnation, Lutfi categorized Cromer as a great 
economist and financier who made Egypt solvent again: "how greatly the area of cultivated land has increased from 
1883 to today [1908]: how much the value of agricultural land and real estate has been raised due to his policy". 
Safahat pp. 142, 71. Lutfi believed that Cromer had striven with success to release the peasants from usurers by 
establishing the Agricultural Bank. Ibid p. 71. In his generally mordant poem farewelling Cromer, Hafiz Ibrahim, 
too, gave him credit for the hydraulic works that made many Egyptians rich, while denouncing his contraction of 
education. Shararah, Hafiz p. 110. 
46. For typical Kamilist denunciations of the British "advisers'" subordination of Egyptian ministers and 
officials, Sayyid 'Ali, "Hadhihi Natijat al-Istislam Ayyuhal-Wuzara' al-Fikham" (This is the Consequence of 
Submission, Honorable Ministers), al-Liwa' 8 April 1908 p. ~d,.M.qp~mmad Sadiq' Anbar, "Sawt al-Ummat 
al-Misriyyah fi Asma' Nuzzar al-Hukumah" (The Voice of th~mflort Resounds in the Ears of the Government 
Ministers), al-Liwa' 21 April 1908. Lutfi's early al-Jaridah articles and his speeches voiced deep if controlled anger 
at the extent to which British "advisers" had taken over the governmental apparatus: Egyptian head engineers had to 
refer technical questions about any given canal to an English "irrigation inspector": Egyptian military officers and 
judges faced the same subordination as Britain filled the judiciary. Safahat pp. 26 - 7. Egyptian ministers had been 
made the subordinates of the "advisers". Ibid pp. 16-17. Cf. ibid pp. 276-277. See also fn 36. 
ALTERNATION AND SYNTHESIS OF CULTURES AMONGST KAMILISTS 
The Cultural Duality of Kamil and His Watani Followers 
Both contemporary British observers and subsequent Orientalist analysts were by 
the influence of European concepts, culture and life --- particular their French variants ---
upon Mustafa Kamil and his colleagues. Nadav Safran (1961) characterized Kamil as "the son of 
an engineer who had been educated in the schools established by [the Westemizer] Muhammad 
'Ali and who had spent all his life in government service. The only traditional [Muslim] 
education ever received by Mustafa was one year of learning the Qur'an between the ages of five 
and six. Following that, Mustafa attended secular primary and secondary schools" and tertiary 
secular law institutions, which made him bilingual in French. "A specimen of the newly arisen 
modern class with no attachment to previous forms of social organization, Mustafa was 
instinctively orientated towards the modern [=West European] concept of the nation state as the 
basic political-social entity"47 . 
Lord Lloyd in 1933 described Kamil as "opportunistic" in preaching pan-Islamism. 
Describing Kamil's dress and appearance as dandyishly European, he wrote that "his culture was 
essentially French and as a Moslem he was not devout, not even particularly croyant. Such was 
the leader who became the pioneer of the young nationalism: the older Moslems looked 
somewhat askance at him: but the students followed him eagerly, and, when he died, mourned 
him with real fervor" 48 • However, the Turcophile French writer Pierre Lo ti, a sort of friend of -
Kamil, came to understand his cultural duality. When the two called together on the Rector of 
al-Azhar in 1907, Lo ti was struck when Kamil engaged with the Rector in an intense discussion 
--- "as if it was a matter of present-day interest" --- about "events which followed the death of the 
Prophet, and the pat1 played by 'Ali". 
In that moment how my good friend Mustafa, whom I had seen so French in France, 
appeared all at once a Muslim to the bottom of his soul! The same thing is true, indeed, 
47. Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1961) p.86. Safran took no account of significant links of Kamil's extended family to al-Azhar, formal traditional 
Islam and extra-Egyptian classical Arabs: for instance, his father had originally intended to become a theologian 
before Muhammad 'Ali made him train as a building engineer; and his mother Hafizah, daughter of Captain 
Muhammad Fahrni, claimed descent through al-Husayn from the Prophet Muhammad. Fritz Steppat, Nationalism us 
und Islam Bei Mustafa Kami! in Die Welt des Islams IV 1956 pp. 242 - 243. 
48. Lloyd, E2:vpt Since Cromer v. I. p. 41. 
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of the greater number of these Orientals, who, if we meet them in our own country, seem 
to be quite parisianized; their modernity is only on the surface; in their inmost souls Islam 
remains intact49 . 
Loti had grasped a key aspect of acculturation: that modem Muslim Egyptians did not 
have to have been formally grounded much within educational institutions in the Qur'an, Islam 
and the literature of the classical Arabs to be influenced by them. The pan-Islamist Kamil's 
interaction with the Rector of al-Azhar had its political functions: it still instances how political 
activism regularly exposed acculturateds to a range of monolingual, non-Westernizing-educated 
Islamic counter-elites who offered them intact sectors of Islam and the Arab past. Ahmad Lutfi 
al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah, and after 1922 the West-steeped Husayn Haykal and al-Siyasah, also 
kept continual exchanges and personal interaction going with Azharite and other Islamic elites at 
which their modernist contributors nonetheless sniped50. 
Kamil and his multilingual colleagues kept up a talking relationship with Muslim learned 
clerical elites who could give the Islamic and Arab knowledge that Dunlop --- and French 
lecturers in the School of Law? --- denied them in formal education. Loti was right that 
nationalist acculturateds of Kamil' s pattern came to hold their own with Azharites, but missed 
the Kamilists' sense that al-Azhar's cmTicula and learning were not enough on their own --- not 
restructured enough to function --- in the modern world. Relevant here is a distinction of Tignor 
between (a) the intellectuals of Khedive Isma'il's time who "having been trained in [the] 
institutions" of traditional society "were not ready to admit that the West was superior to the East 
in anything except naked power" and saw the problem as effective resistance to the West's 
expansion, and (b) "the later generation" of students and professional people produced by more 
modern, Western schools. The latter Egyptian generation (Tignor characterized) came to favor 
49. Pierre Loti, ~ tsd. W.P. Baines (London: T. Werner Laurie Ltd., nd ---1909?) p.66. Kamil over the 
years got himself well and truly associated in the minds of his French sympathisers with Islamic religious revivalism 
and pan-Islam, as well as the Egyptian cause narrowly considered. For instance, the Turcophile Pierre Loti 
dedicated La Mort de Philae to "the memory of my noble and dear friend Moustapha Kamel Pasha who succumbed 
on the 10th February 1908 to the admirable task of re-establishing in Egypt the dignity of the Homeland and of 
Islam". Quoted Ghali, L'Egypte Nationaliste p. 43. Cf. fn 89. 
50. Lutfi's relaxed access as editor of al-Jaridah to the al-Azhar hierarchy was shown when an impressive 
coalition of the mosque-university's lecturers and students moved to expel Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, Mahmud Zanati 
and Taha Husayn in their iconoclastic late adolescence. Taha might have liked an ultra-public martyrdom, but Lutfi 
only telephoned al-Azhar Rector Hassunah al-Nawawi that the three young men should not be branded apostates for 
life because they had been indulgent to an unconventional classical remark about Muhammad's grave: al-Nawawi at 
once cancelled their expulsion. Dr Mahdi' Allam, "Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat", Majallat Ma'had al-Buhuth 
wal-Dirasat al-'Arabiyyah March 1969 p. 156. See B 241. 
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wholesale adoption from the modern West of a liberal constitutional regime and laissez faire 
economic system that would assure their own political and economic predominance51 • 
(Certainly, al-Jaridah's interest in private commercial and capitalist possibilities already fostered 
crude pan-Arab impulses even before 1915: Ch. 6). Passages in al-Liwa' by people who 
obviously know Europe, developed al-Nadim's much earlier recognition of the West's 
dominance in the modem world and his call for a pupil-like adoption of the techniques and 
institutions that gave it strength. Such writers in al-Liwa' sometimes demonstrated an 
admiration for the excellence of Western civilization transcending the narrower question of the 
West's power over the East. One 1903 number of al-Liwa', for instance, described European 
civilization as "a light that could not be resisted with darkness"52. Another 1903 article by "Katib 
Majid" was titled "How Can the Nation Progress/Evolve? How can that Objective be Attained?" 
"There is no escape from imitating the West whether the soul desire it or hate it". Relentlessly 
cataloguing the revolution in the environment, in architecture, in clothes, in the forms of life that 
the advance of Western civilization had produced in the East in the past century, the author 
warned that "for a man ... to try to side-step or escape it is to cut himself off from life itself ... In 
short there is no remedy for the sickness of backwardness that backward nations are afflicted 
with in this age other than skilful self-transformation and imitation of the West, the lord of this 
age's life". The only alternative to modernization for Egypt was subjugation: there was no 
longer any refuge to which nations that rejected modernization could flee. 
Behold, the flood of civilization's waters have surged out engulfing even the plains and 
the wilderness. These backward nations with their bare feet run before it as it overtakes 
them from behind and he whom the waters overtake and engulf is dead.53 
In regard to the consistency or inconsistency of Kamil' s statements to varied audiences, 
the section of this chapter examining the international community identifications of his 
movement during lobbying will show that Kamil from the outset presented himself in France as a 
pro-Ottoman pan-Islamist. This is despite his statements in later years identifying French people 
as hostile to Muslims as an international group. 
Arabic communications of members of the paity of Mustafa Kamil --- intended for 
51. Tignor, British Colonial Rule p. 255-256; more generally, pp. 252-264. 
52. al-Liwa', August 17, 1903 
53. "Katib Majid" (pseud.), "Kayfa Tataraqqa 1-Ummah? Kayfa al-Wusul ila dhalik?" (How Can the 
Nation Progress/Develop? How Can that Objective be Attained?), al-Liwa' 9 August 1903. 
where motive was 
--- corroborate sincere emotional to strongly 
identifying the latter with France's specific culture history, as Kamil' s speeches and 
writings (Arabic as well as French). An article published al-Liwa' in May 1908 opposed the 
teaching of British history at the Egyptian University, 
opened on a small scale in that year. It cited as grounds that the English had 
no history, literature or philosophy that merited teaching at a tertiary level, but interestingly 
proposed the French Revolution as embodying alongside "the exalted Arab civilization" those 
aspects of humanity's past development that liberal education for Egyptians had to cover. The 
article, with its gross en-ors about the details or socio-political issues of the Wars of the Roses, 
illustrated Britain's continuing low cultural prestige in comparison to France, a much 
longer-standing collaborator in Egypt's modernization and still revered as the pioneer and 
enduring model of liberatory Western civilization. 
We ask the Committee of the Egyptian University what benefit the Egyptian students 
could gain from being taught the history of a nation [England] lacking any history in the 
proper sense of the word? What advantage will the Egyptians get from instruction the 
history of a nation that --- until a recent age --- was involved with [primitive] passion in 
the pursuit of raids and invasions of every kind, a nation devoid of any ancient 
civilization from which people could learn the process of Man's gradual upward 
development; devoid, too, of any historical work(s) from which the advancement of 
mankind's thought can be understood as is the case, for instance, with the history of the 
great French Revolution and that of the exalted Arab civilization. What have I to gain 
from learning the judgement of the two roses and the outbreak of war between two kings 
among Britain's monarchs occasioned by nothing else than the desire of one of them as 
the bearer of the red rose to gain precedence in functions (hafalat) over the wearer of the 
yellow rose?54. 
The aim that al-Liwa' held up to the Egyptian University was thus a cultivated Egyptian 
equally well read in (a) the literature and histories produced by the classical Arabs' Islamic 
civilization and (b) the modern positivist-secular West initiated by France's Enlightenment and 
Revolution. The concern for a thought and upward development (I1!Qiy) of mankind extending 
beyond the Arabo-Islamic heritage (which it relativizes), and the consequent assumption that no 
Egyptian is truly educated if not equipped to apprehend the literature and history of the modem 
54. '"A Misriyah hadhihil-Jami'ah 'am Inkiliziyah?" (Is this University Egyptian or English?), al-Liwa' 9 
May 1908, p.5. 
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secular West, showed how far Kamil's Egyptian quasi-nationalists had moved by 1908 from any 
insular Egyptian Islamic traditionalism. 
This Kamilist formulation that the Arabo-Islamic heritage is an indispensable component 
of a comprehensive humanism was representative. Kamilist communications often instanced the 
tenacious appeal of sectors of the classical Arabo-Islamic tradition to Egyptians far removed 
from it by their formative non-indigenous institutional educations and by prolonged interaction 
with Europe and Europeans. A few ultra-modernizing al-Liwa' items did envisage further, much 
more far-reaching, West-modelled repatterning of Egyptian, Arab and Ottoman education, 
rejected for not having truly duplicated the (lethal) Western dynamism without which the 
Egyptians and Ottomans could never have a true "Renaissance" --- such discussion, though, 
solidifying the sense of some supra-Egyptian community, Ottoman, Arab, Muslim, Eastern, 
facing that Wesr55. Sometimes the Western and high Arabo-Islamic facets alternated in spasms: 
more often, the two blended in unstandardized but often constructive ways. 
The Kamilists' Links to Arabo-Islamic Culture and Thought 
al-Hizb al-Watani reconnected Egyptians to the classical Muslim Arabs in two main 
sectors: (a) aesthetic-literary and (b) ideological: ie. Islam should somewhat prescribe in even 
.-
modern societies. (The Ka~sts thus maintained al-Nadim's two great fundamentals of 
nationhood --- the continuity of the language and the religion). In contrast, al-Jaridah's narrower 
Arabist humanism stressed that West-influenced writers had to read the classical Arabs' works 
and reapply their language patterns within modem literature and discourse (Ch. 6). This 
relativized aesthetic continuity of the J aridists did not require the classical Arabs to be superior 
55. al-Liwa's pragmatic correspondent in Istanbul grimly set out "all the eternal means --- commerce, 
agriculture, industrial, domination, force, enslavement" --- used by "the West" to effect that subjugation of all 
humanity to which it had dedicated "its whole life". "The East" could examine and strive to duplicate patriotic 
(secular, anti-clerical-DW) education in France --- it was survival "to imitate the Westerner in everything that has 
helped him Progress (raqqahu) and made him a man". The item scathingly derided the educational "renaissance of 
the dead people" brought by the non-religious governmental schools established in Egypt, Syria, 'Iraq and Turkey: 
these inculcated no motivating values and the only aim of those who attended was to win on graduation 
modestly-paid careers in the state bureaucracies and some empty titles and ranks. The item was interesting for its 
proto-pan-Arab perspective within Ottomanism, and probably implied the necessity for a new Muslim modern 
private enterprise and for constitutional limitations on the Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid and other Muslim rulers (=the 
Khedive 'Abbas?). Despite its concern to learn from Westerners to become equal with them, the item understood 
why "Eastern" parents who had to hand their children over to foreign schools in Egypt and the Ottoman State 
("hadhihil-bilad" --- in "these lands") felt "heartbreak":= the irreducible hard Muslim core in Kamilism. "Dar 
al-Sa' adah --- al-Inqilab fil-Ta'lim" (Istanbul --- the Revolution in Education), al-Liwa' 17 January 1903 p. 1. 
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Classicoid Aestheticism. The earliest, youthful Kamil, not yet totalistically political, 
an initial period had a sensitive ear for poetic beauty in old Arabic literature, transmuting the 
Andalusian style anthologized by Ibn Hazm into the vigorous dialogues of his 1893 play Fath 
al-Andalus (The Conquest of Spain), a triumphalist celebration of the early Arab Muslim 
capacity for conquest, therapeutic for the colonized Kami!. International strength and the 
al-Nadim-like clashes and warfare of rival religion-focussed far-extending blocs, already the 
perspective within which Kamil depicted the struggle for Spain, would henceforth always be 
central for the Kamilists. The play was interwoven enough into the parochial ethnic and political 
Egyptian realities of the day: its 'Abbad, the Chief Minister who had lived all his life among the 
Arabs but was Byzantine-descended, tried to dissuade them from invading Spain: that warned 
Egyptians not to trust the resident Christian Syrians and Armenians, 
liable to collaborate with Cromer. Yet, more than just a political-ethnic barb, Fath 
al-Andalus also presented 'Abbad, courted by Byzantine emissaries, as an individual wracked 
specific ways by the dual loyalties that can make members of a marginal sect betray a religious 
nation to Christian outsiders56. Kamil could have become a creative writer with nuanced ad hoc 
insights: even as a political organizer and orator, though, he always maintained love for its own 
sake of a classical Arabic that subverted his and his audiences' Egyptian specificities, powerfully 
homogenizing them with past and present Arabs outside Egypt. 
Guidance In Modem Societv. The language and poetry of the classical Arabs kept their 
sometimes integral grip on Kamil, although he selected and restructured their history and social 
56. Mustafa Kami!, Fath al-Anda I us republished Cairo 1973 passim but esp. pp. 25 - 28, 35, and 46. I am 
deeply indebted to Professor Arthur Goldschmidt Jr of Pennsylvania State University who took the time to locate, 
xerox and airmail this edition to me from Cairo while researching two books of his own there. The play's original 
edition was published in Cairo by al-Adab Press and reprinted by 'Ali Fahrni Kami!, Mustafa Kami I fi 34 Rabi'an 
(Cairo: Mitba'at al-Liwa' 9 vols 1908 - 1911) v. 2 pp. 165ff. Dr Michael Carter, an authority on classical Arabic 
literature, assessed that the play's passages of poetry "do capture the medieval ethos, largely because they are so 
entirely within the convention of the love poetry of the period. You can verify this by browsing through Ibn Hazm 's 
Tawq al-Hamamah, which is more or less an anthology of Andalusian love poetry with all the theory added in the 
form of commentary". Personal letter from Dr Carter, at that time Lecturer in Arabic at the Department of Semitic 
Studies, Sydney University, 2 August 1982. The play's figure 'Abbad may be meant to cast doubt on the loyalty of 
such dukhala' (interlopers) as the Egypto-A1menian Nu bar Pasha, several times Foreign Minister and Prime 
Minister: fn 112. 
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and political realities to serve the needs of his colonized compatriots. The vehement "superficial 
religiosity" of his highly political Arabo-Islamic past57 would not make SCs or Copts feel µ10re 
welcome in Egyptian Arabism but, as much or more than aestheticism, recurred in the responses 
of Liwa'ists to classical Arab materials. The Azhar-educated 'Abduh might have published the 
Nahj al-Balaghah (Highroad of Eloquence) ascribed to the fourth Caliph 'Ali, from aestheticism, 
as beautiful high literature decidedly not by that Caliph, but some al-Liwa' acculturateds did turn 
to it for religious-social guidance. A pseudonymous al-Liwa' writer warned that 
those who would nominate themselves to tomorrow become the planners and the 
executors and the spokesmen in the service of this dear homeland EGYPT must give this 
book the thought it deserves, so that, when they have comprehended its secrets and 
understood its aims, they can put its incomparable verses into practice ... to help them 
overcome their illusions and the devils from which they suffer: that it may smash the 
chains and shackles that the party of greed and imperialism have placed around their 
necks, hands and feet58. 
Like al-Nadim, then, this 1908 al-Liwa' writer was alert to the political effects of 
acculturation, which in some respects gave the modem Muslim professional classes more affinity 
with ascendant aliens than to Egyptians in general. There was the sense in the ranks of the 
Kamilists that the dual-cultured elite from which they recruited could swing either way 
politically, as well. Exposure to the primary classical Arab works of, or on, Islam's first period 
of greatness was crucial to morally emancipate the educated elite from the "illusions" as well as 
vested interests that still bound it in collaboration to the masters, hampering it from assuming the 
leadership role it alone could play in the imminent period of decolonization. The article, 
however, also conceived both "the Islamic spirit" and the "Muhammadan Civilization" 
(al-madaniyyat al-Muhammadiyyah) in pai1ially socio-economic terms broader in scope than the 
moral liberation that the Nahj al-Balaghah's "wisdom" offered from imperialism and 
57. This is a translation of Fritz Steppat's concept of "oberflachliche Religiositat" in Nationalismus und 
Islam Bei Mustafa Kami! pp. 269 - 271. The simple Islam-fired conquering Arab superhumans that Kami! depicted 
took scant account of the Prophet Muhammad's warning to victorious followers that they had returned from the 
lesser struggle (al-jihad al-asghar) to the greater struggle (al-jihad al-akbar), that to subdue their own passions. The 
play's Arabo-Muslim heroes are harmoniously one in their ideological drive to expand the realm of the universal 
Caliphate centred in Damascus. Kamil did not mention such personality clashes and jealousies as that the Arab 
governor of North Africa, Musa Ibn Nusayr, at Toledo whipped and put in chains his conquering Berber lieutenant 
Tariq Ibn Ziyad for refusing to obey orders to halt in the early stage of the campaign. Philip K. Hitti, History of the 
Arabs. from the Earliest Times to the Present 10 ed. (London: Macmillan 1970) p. 496. 
58. "Mufakkir" (pseud.), "Hal Sami'tum bimithli hadha min Qabl?" (Have You Heard Anything Like This 
Before?), al-Liwa' 16 May 1908, p.2. 
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self-interest. Anybody wanting to be well-info1med about the Islamic spirit and "the 
laws/codes/foundations (qawa'id) of Muhammadan civilization cannot confine himself to simple 
study of the Qur'an and the sunnah (practice) of the Prophet". He must also closely examine, as 
recorded in the classical works, "the principles and the socio-economic and political regulations 
and keys to happiness in both this world and the next world" (mafatih al-sa'adatayn) that the 
Qur'an and the sunnah contained as further implemented in the statements and actions of the first 
generation of Muslims upon whom the Prophet Muhammad had himself bestowed his personal 
guidance and instruction59 • Beyond personal religious beliefs, worship and morality, Islam was 
thus presented as, in at least its first period of greatness, a comprehensive code impinging in 
detailed ways upon social, economic and political life. 
The impression that a socio-economically prescriptive "Muhammadan Civilization" could 
be implemented in Egypt's present,too, was strengthened by an accompanying item that 
presented a "monumental study on usury" by the Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar60• This 
distinguished Dar al-'Ulum scholar, after World War I, took part in the Young Men's Muslim 
Association (Jam'iyyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin) founded by veteran pan-Islamists from Kamil's 
movement. al-Najjar was to be active in organizing the YMMA'S solidarity with the 
Palestinians during their clashes with Jewish settlers in 1929 and well into the 1930s (B 130 fn). 
The acculturated Kamilists encouraged Dar al-'Ulum authors to produce new guiding 
works to the classical Arabs' complex civilization that were modern in arrangement. Dar 
al-'Ulum lecturer Hasan Tawfiq al-Adl (1862 - 1904) published the first modern history of 
Arabic literature in Arabic, Ta'rikh Adab al-Lughat al-' Arabiyyah: Mustafa Kamil along with 
Shaykh Muhammad' Abduh attended al-' Adl's 1904 funeral in Cairo61 • The Dar al-'Ulum 
intellectuals formulated Islam and the old Arab learning in ways that addressed modem 
Europe-developed knowledge and contemporary situations, thus exactly meeting some very 
special needs of the modernity-conscious Kamilists. Tantawi Jawhaii (1870-1939), an Azhar 
graduate and Dai· al- 'Ulum lecturer, in encyclopaedic writings amalgamated Qur'anic motifs and 
the West's modem sciences: he voiced activist anti-British nationalism from the pages of 
59. Ibid. 
60. "Bahthun Jalil fil-Riba lil-Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar" (A Superb Study of Usury By the Shaykh 
'Abd al-Wahhab al-Najjar) in al-Liwa' 16 May 1908. pp.2-3. 
61. Aroian, Dar al-'Ulum p. 128. 
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al-Liwa' 62. Before Kamil's death in 1908, Dar al-'Ulum intellectuals were influencing al-Liwa' 
more, for instance through the recruitment of the Tunisian-born 'Abd al-' Aziz Shawish 
(1867-1929) as editor, in which role he intensified the ethno-sectarian conflicts Muslim 
Egyptians had with Copts and the Syrian Christian residents. Yet as editor of al-Hidayah, 
Shawish, like Jawhari, was striving to document the harmony oflslam with Europe's modem 
scientific theories while answering Christian missionary attacks63 . 
KAMILIST ATTITUDES TO WOMEN 
Islam-Qualified Adjustment to the Urban West 
Changing relations between the sexes measured (a) how far the Kamilists would adjust to 
West European norms, and conversely (b) how seriously they wanted to install Islam as social 
ideology or at least as discourse motifs within the new urban modernity. Some members of the 
movement and its constituency had, or would have when they launched their careers after their 
studies, the economic means to maintain households in which the women could be secluded and 
economically non-productive and perhaps bear the heavy cost of polygamy if they wished. 
Among Egyptian historians, Salah 'Isa tried to explain away Kamil and al-Liwa's 
"savage" and "prolonged" campaign against Qasim Amin's arguments for the abolition of the 
veil and women's (qualified) right to employment as "political" --- motivated by the intensely 
conservative attitudes of the Egyptian public, or by enmity between Amin and Kamil's then 
political patron the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi caused by other issues64. Ibrahim Amin Ghali 
claimed that Kamil in the controversies that Qasim's w1itings niggered "became the prisoner of 
the ideas of his compatliots" --- an argument that maintains intact his presentation of Kamil as 
"l'homme evolue" who had assimilated, and was committed to implant, the culture of the West. 
Kamil publicly took sides with "a reactionary conception" because of his political need to stand 
62. Jawhari collected his anti-colonialist and patriotic al-Liwa' articles in his 1908 book Nahdat al-Ummah 
wa Hayatuha (The Renaissance of the Nation and its Life). Yusuf As'ad Daghir. Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyyah v 
2 (Bayrut: Matabi' Lubnan 1956) p. 282. 
63. Ibid p. 250. Many of Shawish's al-Liwa' articles were about "Egyptian Woman" and thus contributed 
to the further lslamization of discussion of that issue in al-Liwa', examined in the next section. Sha wish' s collectior 
of his al-Liwa' articles titled Abhath 'an al-Mar' at al-Misrivyah wal-Shu'un al-' Ammah noted Daghir, Masadir p. 
251. 
64. Salah 'Isa, "Mustafa Kami! Mufakkiran Burjwaziyyan" (Mustafa Kami! as a Bourgeois Thinker), 
Oadaya 'Arabiyyah (Bayrut) March 1976 p. 113. 
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well with the Khedive and because championing changes to the status of Egyptian women would 
divide the by and large still conservative society that Kamil before everything was intent to unite 
in struggle against imperialist rule65 . 
Urban students and professionals made up the core following and constituency of 
Kamil's movement; yet their secular West-modelled educations did not always preclude 
conservative stances towards women shared with other strata and classes. Muhammad Husayn 
Haykal's memoirs attest that young Egyptians being educated in French or English medium, and 
who generally supported Mustafa Kamil's activities to end British rule, overwhelmingly 
perceived Qasim Amin's call for the liberation of women as a threat to their religion, Islam. 
Haykal first became aware of the controversy over Amin's writings while a student at the 
Khedivial Secondary School, probably through the pan-Islamic political papers most students 
read66. Around 1906 Haykal entered the School of Law, participating there in the 1906 Law 
School strike organized by Mustafa Kamil: Amin' s writings and the literature of reply forced 
"youth" --- he obviously means the acculturated group receiving West-modelled education --- to 
"think seriously about the issue" of the position of women. "Most of them", though, viewed 
Qasim's call as "an aposta~y from religion paving the way for atheism"67 . 
The stance that Islam should limit or direct change was pronounced in a 1908 al-Liwa' 
article assailing increased free mixing between men and women, and titled "Religion Obliges the 
Giving of Good Counsel". The article quoted the Qur'anic verse "and I did not create jinn or 
human beings except for them to serve/worship me"68 : worship/service of the Creator had to 
regulate human relations in detail. To assail the growing freedom of movement and repudiation 
of the veil by women, the article in addition to Qur' anic verses mustered supporting quotations 
from genuine and some less assuredly authentic hadiths: "the best mosques for women are the 
rooms of their houses" and "whoever looks at the attractive features of an unrelated woman out 
of lust, his eyes will be afflicted on Resurrection Day". But there is also the muddled "quotation" 
65. Ghali, L'Egypte Nationaliste pp. 45-46. 
66. Haykal, Mudhakkirat fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah (Cairo: 2 vis Mitba'at Misr 1951-3) v. 1, p. 24. Haykal 
mentions Qasim Amin's Tahrir al-Mar' ah (The Emancipation of Women), first published too early (1899) for 
Haykal, born in 1889, to have read an initial serialization in al-Mu'ayyad as an adolescent, as too, perhaps, was 
Qasim's 1900 al-Mar' at al-Jadidah. But his interest in Qasim Amin's writings may well have been first aroused by 
continuing controversies around his ideas in the political and pan-Islamic papers. 
67. Haykal, Mudhakkirat v. 1 p. 24. 
68. "Wa ma khalaqtu 1-jinna wal-insa ilia liya'buduni", Qur'an 51:56. 
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from memory of a hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad is supposed to have said "what has 
the meaning" (ma ma'nahu) "I am a man who feels jealousy and there is no man who does. not 
feel jealousy unless he has lost self-pride". The quality of !rhavrah (solicitude, possessiveness, 
jealousy over a spouse) the article saw as having been lost by "some men" who negligently 
allowed their wives to leave their chambers at home and go forth unveiled in the full light of day 
without reason, leading to the corruption of many for "their going forth in this condition is a 
temptation to those men in whose heart is a sickness, and many are they". The article imaged 
widespread change in Egyptian society: "the vulgar unveiled costume has spread widely among 
all the classes, alas! "69 • 
Other al-Liwa' items perceived changes in the life-patterns of women in better-off or 
educated strata, again implying assent from their menfolk. Sayyid 'Ali interlocked contemporary 
patriotism with traditional "religious" regulation of human behaviour to resist increased freedom 
of movement and mixing between them in his May 1908 article titled "Shame and Chastity Cry 
Out for Rescue Before the Free MovementNnveiledness of the Fair Young Women". Sayyid 
'Ali argued that spreading free movement and disuse of the veil by (urban?) women was an issue 
in which "every person who is sincerely devoted to homeland (watan), his children and to saving 
Egypt's feminine society from pollution is obliged to take an interest". As with most al-Liwa' 
articles on the theme, this was no one-sided criticism of the female younger generation. Men 
69. "al-Din al-Nasihah" (Religion is Advice) al-Liwa' in 9 April 1908, p.2. In our examination of this and 
other al-Liwa' items we translated the root tabarraja roughly as signifying repudiation of the veil and unregulated~ 
movement outside the home on the part of women. al-Liwa' uses tabarruj which in modem standard Arabic means 
makeup in a wider, more inclusive, classical Islamic sense. The Qur'an in Surah al-Nur (24:60) permitted women 
past any prospect of marriage (al-qaw'aid) to take off their outer clothes "ghayra mutabarrijatin bi-zinatin" m 
without flaunting or displaying any ornament. al-Baydawi's interpretation of the "root meaning" of al-tabarruj is "to 
purposely reveal that which would be hidden". Safinatun barijah is thus an uncovered ship; al-baraj is expansion of 
the eyes to show white parts around the iris normally covered, For a woman it thus means "her purposely displaying 
her ornament (zinah) and her physical charms (mahasinaha) to men": al-Baydawi, Anwar al-Tanzi! wa Asrar 
al-Ta'wil (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi. 1955) pt. 2, p. 6. al-Baydawi's gloss of the use of tabarraja in this verse 
thus demonstrates that it could have been applied by al-Liwa' to mean displaying the normally covered face or hand~ 
or other parts of the body with sexual appeal rather than, narrowly, using makeup after eliminating the veil. 
al-Baydawi seems to regard the root as elsewhere also connoting movement by women. The wives of the Prophet 
are instructed in Surah al-Ahzab (33: v.33) "wa qarna fi buyutikunna wa la tabarrajna tabarruj al-jahiliyyat al-ula": 
"stay in your houses and do not flaunt/display your finery (adornments) or physical charms as was done in the first 
paganism". al-Baydawi explains that in "the first paganism", --- the time between Adam and Noah or the period of 
kufr (unbelief) preceding Islam --- "women used to wear pearls and walk in the road exhibiting themselves to men". 
Ibid pt 2, p. 131. Thus the classical Islamic use of the term would cover dispensing by women with the veil and 
their displaying of their ornaments, makeup. or areas of their body, perhaps while moving outside in public, with the 
purpose or effect of arousing male sexual feelings. 
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also must spend more time at home shunning bars, clubs, coffee-shops and houses of ill-fame: 
"Will they do so, then, to protect their honor and the reputation of their families and to w~d off 
from Egyptian society a danger before which those perils most destructive of societies pale into 
insignificance?"70. Sayyid 'Ali's blending of Islamic and Western elements was typical of 
Kamilist dual-culturedness. In blasting bars, he responded to the effects that European milieus in 
Egyptian cities had upon post-traditional Muslim men and their family life; their apathy to 
unveiled movement in public places by their womenfolk had adjusted to Western patterns. 'Ali's 
demand for veiling and segregation of women as a precondition for close-knit family units drew 
on traditionalist religious puritanism. On the other hand, equating coffee houses with infidel bars 
and brothels criminalized a normal male Muslim form of leisure: his insistence that Muslim 
Egyptian husbands and wives spend the maximum time together in their homes thus covertly 
ushered in the Europe-patterned bourgeois monogamous family. Kamilist demands that women 
be educated to within sight of the level of men --- not for careers but to equip mothers to educate 
their sons in hyper-patriotism in the home --- further fostered tightened bourgeois soul-mate 
marriages, although not with Qasim Amin' s less blended Westernism. 
Not all items in al-Liwa' identified only changes in the behavior or roles of women as 
threatening the (Muslim) territorial nation. The past or established situation of Egyptian women 
was one cause contributing to the Egyptian nation's backwardness. One 1903 front-page 
al-Liwa' article "What Must be Done by a Nation that has Lacked the School of the Mother?" 
blamed the lack of education of many mothers as responsible for their transmission of grotesque 
superstition, cowardice, servility, cruelty, hatred for education and other anti-social behavior, and 
moral and intellectual damage to their children71 . This article is aware of a new age and that 
modernization required sharp breaks with features of traditional Egyptian society. The 1903 
article carried forward Qasim Amin' s 1899 argument that the relations of mother with child are a 
main source of the social virtues, that the virtues which exist in the family will exist in the 
70. Sayyid 'Ali. "al-Haya'u wal-'Iffah Yastaghithani min Tabarruj al-Ghaniyat" (Shame and Chastity Cry 
Out for Rescue Before the Unveiledness of the Fair Young Women) in al-Liwa 17 May 1908, p. 5. My analysis of 
this and the other al-Liwa' articles on women's issues owes much to two sessions of discussion in 1981 with Ms 
Pam Doherty, an Arabic graduate of the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Melbourne University who has 
done historical research in Egypt and Jordan. She identified these items' incorporation of patterns from the West 
European bourgeois family within assertion of Islamic puritanism, a key aspect I had not noticed. 
71. "Madha Yajibu 'ala Ummatin Faqadat Madrasat al-Umm?" (What must be Done by a Nation that has 
Lacked the School of the Mother?) al-Liwa', 17 August 1903. 
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nation, and that Muslim countries are decaying and backward because neither women nor men 
are educated to create a real family life72 . 
Kamil's own pronouncements on women sometimes were like moderately 
West-influenced liberal w1iters of the later al-Jaridah or the less post-religious liberal Arab 
nationalists of the 1930s and 1940s, in adjusting a che1ished Islam to the central European 
patterns. In a second category of communications, though, he evoked incongruent sectors of 
Islam almost with relish, to contrast the national collectivity against the West. In the first mode, 
Kamil spoke for his small acculturated Muslim elite, and its adjusted ethos, when he observed 
that "all the educated people in Egypt hate polygamy": the Qur'an had required husbands to treat 
any plural wives with complete equality in order to prevent "custom from distorting heavenly 
religion" --- heading for the standard interpretation of Arab (eg. Jaridist) and Indian 
acculturated-liberal Islam that Qur'an 4:3 recommended monogamy. (Yet Kamil was as 
aggressive as defensive towards the Westerners who repatterned him --- the Christians permitted 
themselves in the name of romantic passion the polygamy that the Muslims permitted with 
Islam). Was Emancipation of Women so needed in Islamic countries in which the Qur' an urged 
believers to respect and obey their mothers73 . Women had to be given extensive education so 
that they could skilfully inculcate nationalism in their children. In his somewhat more integralist 
Islamic mode, however, Kamil warned that unadapted Western or Western-style education might 
influence Egyptian women who received it to repudiate the veil etc and therein posed "a great 
danger to the future of the nation". The significant point, though, is that in affirming the 
distinctness of Egypt's social patterns in respect to women from the modern West, he closely 
identifies the authenticity of the Egyptian "nation" with the wider non-Western communities of a 
general Islamic "civilization", the world's Muslims, "the East". Kamil in 1899 founded the 
distinct personality of the Egyptian nation threatened by importation of West European female 
education, upon a separate non-Western civilization (madaniyyah) irreconcilable in areas with 
the West's: 
Every nation has its own civilization. It would not become us to be apes blindly imitating 
foreigners. We must preserve our good virtues and take from the West only its virtues. 
Kamil described the veil as "a protection from sin" ('ismah) in the East and advised his 
72. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age p. 164. 
73. 'Isa, "Mustafa Kami! Mufakkiran Burjwaziyyan" pp. 112-113. 
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Cairo audience to accordingly maintain their wives and daughters in it74. 
The regulation of the relations between the sexes is a singularly sensitive and intimate 
aspect of any society and in any individual's psyche. This area instanced the deep influence of 
the modem West on dual-cultured nationalists of Kamil's type, his tenseness towards Westerners 
as he acknowledged their impact, and his compensating impulse to sectionally differentiate 
Egypt from them with Islam. He strove to reconstruct and unify Western and Islamic concepts in 
the context of dialogue with such French friends as Juliette Adam, who came to accept Islamic 
and Egyptian theory and treatment of women as better than their subordination under French 
custom and law75 • The comparative statuses of women in the West and Islam/"the East" 
continued as a spiritually violent front of reaction by such France-educated Egyptian intellectuals 
as Tawfiq al-Hakim against the West into the 1950s (B 470 - 471). 
In Parochial Partisan Politics 
In one (admittedly very factional) context, Kamil in violent language denied the right of a 
woman to choose a maniage partner against her father's wishes. He took the lead of the hostile 
campaign that his al-Liwa' waged against the 1904 maiTiage of al-Mu'ayyad's now pro-British 
editor Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf to the daughter of the Shaykh al-Sadat (a head of the descendants of 
the Prophet in Egypt) against her father's wishes. "The Khedive supp011ed the marriage 
although it scandalized Egyptian Muslim public opinion", Kamil publicly breaking with the 
Khedive on the issue76. 
At issue in the savage denunciations by Kamil and colleagues of this marriage is the 
extent to which traditionalism continued to exert a hold over their emotions, thoughts and actions 
in despite of their massive exposure to Western-type education. The left-Arabist Salah 'Isa 
describes the case as presenting two fundamental and far-reaching issues to Egyptian society: 
1. Whether an adult sane (rashidah) woman had the right to marry herself under Islamic 
Law to someone she chose and who chose her regardless of her guardians' opposition. 
2. Whether social standing derived from inhe1ited (DW:extra-Egyptian, Arabian) lineage 
74. Ibid 
75. Juliette Adam, L'An!Ileterre en Egypte (Paris: Imperimerie du Centre 1922) pp. 284-288. 
76. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian National Party" p. 319. 
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or from an individual's efforts to raise himself and serve his homeland77 . 
Goldschmidt characterized that Kamil's sensitivity as a politician to public opinion, 
overwhelmingly hostile to 'Ali Yusuf's mairiage, decisively led him to oppose the match78• In 
trying to explain away the non-modernity of Kamil's hostile reaction, Salah 'Isa stresses Kamil's 
ideological-political conflict as an anti-imperialist patriot with 'Ali Yusuf as the latter 
accommodated himself (with the Khedive) to British power in Egypt following the 1904 Entente 
Cordiale79 • Another factor was the journalistic-professional iivalry that had gradually developed 
between the younger Mustafa Kamil and the older Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf. The Shaykh's 
al-Mu'ayyad had provided the pan-Islamic forum for Muslim Egyptian aspirations when Kamil 
launched his nationalist career in the 1890s. Long dependent on al-Mu'ayyad's columns to reach 
Egyptians, Kamil in 1900 launched his own al-Liwa', making himself a newspaper proprietor 
comparable to Shaykh 'Ali80. 
We now directly analyze communications from Kamil's movement on the relationship 
between the Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf and the Shaykh al-Sadat's daughter. Mustafa Kamil's first 
savage article from Devon titled "From Scandal to Scandal" vented long-standing personal 
dislike of 'Ali Yusuf. Yet the denunciation entailed emotionalist exaltation of an independent 
Islamic social order out of any control from the broader Westernizing outlook and aims some 
ascribe to Kamil and his acculturated colleagues: 
Which of the two is better: a man of us unpredictable in his principles who makes a 
mockery of Holy Law (yaskharu min al-shari'ah) and customs and ethics and morals a~d 
makes a trade of personal abuse or a foreigner to us proclaiming open hostility against us 
77. 'Isa, "MustafaKamil...",p.114. 
78. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian National Party" p. 319. 
79. 'Isa, "Mustafa Kamil..." p. 114. 
80. 'Ali Yusuf was the pioneer of native Egyptian political journalism and pan-Islamism who founded 
al-Mu'ayyad in 1889 to voice Egyptian and pan-Islamic views at a time when Syrian Christian editors almost 
monopolized the Arabic press. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 152 - 153; P.J. Vatikiotis, The History ofEll:ypt 
from Muhammad 'Ali to Sadat (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1980) pp. 202-204, 228-229. 'Ali Yusuf was a 
supporter of the Khedive as was the much younger Kami! for a time: for a jaundiced account of Yusuf's 
participation in the Khedive's promotion of Arab proto-nationalism in Ottoman West Asia, his increased 
accommodation to the British along with his royal patron, and of the evolution of Kamil's initially dependent 
relationship with him see Awrag Muhammad Farid v. 1 (al-Hay'at al-Misriyyat al-' Ammah lil-Kitab 1978) pp. 
122-123. In fairness to Shaykh 'Ali, he refused to share some of the Khedive's enemies: "although ... not in 
sympathy with' Abduh's progressive religious philosophy, he was never the bitter personal enemy of the man that 
'Abbas became. Indeed, he tried to reconcile the two, and remained on good terms with such friends of the Mufti as 
Hasan 'Asim and Sa'd Zaghlul". Aroian, Dar al-'Ulum p. 500. The Shaykh 'Ali of course let 'Abduh use 
al-Mu'ayyad as a forum to conduct his fierce 1900 polemic against French Foreign Minister Gabriel Hanotaux. 
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in weal or woe? .... Should not disobedience by daughters against their fathers be 
considered destruction for the Family ... and obliteration of the influence that the p4rified 
Shari'ah Law has on people's souls?81 
At the least, this outburst by Kamil would again constitute his recognition as a percipient 
politician of the continued attachment felt by his Muslim student and white-collar professional 
constituency and the press' general literate readership, to Islamic Law (shari'ah) insofar as it 
would regulate roles and relations of the sexes. 
The Kamilists' denunciation of Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf's match in terms of Islamic religion 
and law put further strain on relations between Muslims and Copts whom Kamil's movement 
was supposed to integrate in a united Egyptian national struggle. The somewhat pro-Occupation 
Coptic al-Watan felt obliged to defend' Ali Yusuf on this occasion also, although with at least 
verbal expression of diffidence because Islam and Islamic law were supposedly involved. 
al-Liwa' in reply desciibed the Chiistian newspaper as disrespectful oflslam, as "wounding the 
feeling of the masses and elite of the Muslims" and denied al-Watan's right to examine the 
testimony of witnesses that preceded the Shar'i Court's decision against' Ali YusuF2• Mustafa 
Kamil's followers on al-Liwa' were thus, even during his lifetime, prepared to pursue and 
develop the Islamic religious terms of the attack upon Shaykh 'Ali Yusuf where that accentuated 
the sense of difference between Coptic and Muslim Egyptians, to detriment of multi-sectarian 
territorial Egyptian nation-building. 
The above responses by Kamil and his followers to issues involving male-female 
relations ran against simple Westernization or a pure secular bi-sectarian territorial nationalism. 
The input from a spasmodic and politically selective classical Islam, here, again,underscores that 
the Kamilists were not a simple Westernized or Westernizing but dual-cultured decolonization 
movement. With the blending typical of acculturation, the Kamilists adapted to West Europe's 
monogamous ethos but synthesized radical Islamic restorationism with the close-knit West 
European bourgeois-urban nuclear family. The new family as the basic cell of the territorial 
nation, and their discussions of inter-sex issues, alike resistantly focused classical Arabic and 
classical Islam as definants of the political community. 
81. Mustafa Kami!, "Min Fadihah ila Fadihah: As'ilah Sarihah" (From Scandal to Scandal : Some Frank 
Questions), in al-Liwa', September 6, 1904, p. l. 
82. "Jaridat al-Watan wal-Qada' al-Shar'i" (al-Watan Newspaper and the Application of Islamic Laws), 
al-Liwa 13 August 1904, p.2. 
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OUTREACH TO EUROPE THEN PAN-ISLAMIC WITHDRAW AL 
Acculturation As One Motive in Outreach 
In appealing to France, in particular, to eject Britain, Kamil and similar intellectuals were 
measuring the strength of the international rivalry of these two powers. However, as secular 
lawyers they had been educated both in Egypt and France in French legal and political concepts, 
and in book-myths, that were highly formal and theoretical. Kamil mistook the extent to which 
appeal to these could fmther draw the French to confront B1itain in the Nile Valley. Attaching 
Egypt's need to the Enlightenment, he compared himself to Benjamin Franklin when he asked 
Voltaire to urge French aid for American independence83• Fueling French rage over British 
pressure on French personnel and French in the School of Law and other Egyptian institutions, 
Kamil sometimes rather manipulatively fused France's interests and Egyptian nationalism84. Yet 
these cultural motifs were more than levers for Egypt's interests: Kamil in his precocious, 
fast-adapting appeals also was testing out French conceptual structures installed by education in 
his --- and his proto-elite's --- provisional personality. Would the French take back their 
liberalism and radicalism from Muslims as real coinage for new wider communities? (His elite 
was sure to swing sharply if the mentors of Progress rebuffed). Outreach was more than cultural 
naivety: independence via Europe would spare Kamil' s still fragile elite from having to ally with 
popular classes for a devastating direct showdown with Britain85 . Kamil in France sincerely 
praised the French as Egypt's most important instructors in "civilization" before 1882 and 
probably did hope that they could become so again for the long term after evicting Britain. In a 
83. Moustafa Kamel, "L' Absorption par l' Angleterre", La Nouvelle Revue 15 December 1895 p. 823. 
84. In an early Nouvelle Revue article, Kami! welcomed British description of the Egyptian Nationalists as 
"the French party" as recognition "by our enemies" themselves that "our cause and that of France form but one". 
Kami!, "L' Absorption par I' Angleterre" p. 811. Similarly tongue-in-cheek for the long term, greatly though the 
Caisse hindered Cromer, may have been Kamil's 1895 assurance to the French that Egyptians did not want, and 
never had, to manage their country's finances other than under the "international institutions" set up by the powers 
for Egypt's European creditors. Ibid p. 821. 
85. Tignor argued that building up an anti-British movement at home would have meant going outside the 
narrow student and professional sectors supporting Kami! 's campaign for independence and that such "broadening 
of the nationalist movement implied concessions in Mustafa Kamil's political, social and economic program to othe1 
groups, such as the urban proletariat". So long as hope of securing Britain's evacuation from Egypt through 
pressure from (in particular) France remained, the Watani movement "preferred to take a try at the easier way of 
obtaining independence" by lobbying in Europe. Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in 
Egypt. 1882-1914 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966) pp. 268-269. 
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courteous but firm way, though, he made clear that his movement sought complete independence 
for Egypt. France had never tried to dominate Egypt before the B1itish conquest86, Arabic-had 
been the medium of teaching in the schools and te1tiary colleges Frenchmen helped set up under 
Muhammad' Ali and Khedive Isma'il and was to become so again after the British87 , Britain was 
being 
striving to abolish the mixed courts asAa bar to its complete control but Kamil left little doubt that 
the Egyptian nationalists hoped Europe would dismantle them after independence88. Kamil's 
vulnerability was --- would the French accept that the cultural affinities of his elite entitled Egypt 
to an equal alliance and independence? 
Pan-Muslim Self-Identification Before West 
From his earliest appeals for support to French audiences, Kamil identified himself, his 
independence movement and Egypt as Muslim and allied to the Ottoman State. He reiterated to 
his French audiences that the world's Muslims were a loose political community89• This, and his 
constant characterization of Europeans as Christians, harked back to traditional Muslim habits of 
thought. The very young Kamil, though, wanted to synthesize the traditional wide Muslim 
community with new associations across religions imposed by the modern age. In 1895, he 
proposed, to the French public, an alliance of Turkey with Russia and France against England, 
which would check B1itain 's alleged encouragement of secessionist Christian movements 
to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Kamil's proposal amounted to an association of the two 
European powers with the world's 300,000,000 far-dispersed Muslims against "anti-Muslim" 
Britain. Support by France and Russia for "weak and humiliated Turkey" and Egypt's freedom 
from British rule would put the two European powers on "good terms with the Islamic world" 
86. Ibid p. 812. 
87. Kamil stressed that Arabic, "the national language of the country", was the medium of instruction in the 
numerous schools that Frenchmen helped establish from the time of Muhammad 'Ali. The British had ended 
Arabic's role as the language of instruction. Ibid p. 814. Kamil's French audiences would have understood that the 
nationalists' promotion of Arabic after independence would limit the scope of French while eliminating English. 
88. Ibid p. 812. 
89. As Wendell observed, "Kamil's annual banquets and speeches, generally given in Paris, on the 
anniversary of the Sultan's coronation, were ... not likely to convince anyone that he was not a loyal Ottoman 
subject and a supporter of the pan-Islamic ideology". Wendell, Egyptian National Image p. 250. Kami! in 1897 was 
active in organizing appeals among Egyptians resident in France for the Ottoman war effort against the Greeks. 
Ahmad Rashad, Mustafa Kami!: Hayatuhu wa Kifahuhu (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Sa'adah 1958) p. 113. This despite 
Mme Adam's philo-Hellenism! Cf. fn 49. 
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and further "lasting reconciliation between Muslims and Chiistians"90. Addressing the French 
early in his career, Kamil evoked a new age of open, fluid relations between the Muslim and 
Christian worlds. He foresaw negative alliances by Muslims with European states against 
Britain's imperialism and more long-tenn associations to realize non-religious "joint interests": 
yet Christianity and Islam would continue to sustain their two distinct political "worlds". Kamil 
rather vividly evoked to his French audience the capacity of religious emotions over distant 
external issues --- not local interests --- to inspire violent action by a Muslim population against 
Europeans. In Paris in 1895, he depicted India's Muslims as ready to make the blood of their 
British masters flow and die themselves because clashes between distant Turks and Armenians 
seemed to them a British action against "the Caliphate"91 . 
Kamil's consistent affirmation down the years to European and Muslim audiences alike 
that Muslims were a "world", a far-flung religio-political community, argues that he always 
sincerely felt some pan-Islamic emotions. 
The fortunes of the Ottoman Turks and those of the Egyptians would remain so 
connected that he had to promote both in Europe, he believed. His French communications 
sometimes were a thinking-aloud that strove to get an analytical grip on his region, rather than 
diplomatic images of it modulated to advance Egypt's interests of that day. Kamil could even 
analyze the revered Caliphate in an alienated way as an instrument that, misapplied, could harm. 
The Ottoman Caliphate had on occasion undermined rather than heightened the Muslims' 
resistance to British imperialism. Kamil thought that the Sultan 'Abdul-Majid's disapproval at 
once quelled all resistance by India's Muslims during the Rebellion ·of 1857 
to the British, his Crimean allies92. Similarly,' Abdul-Hamid's 
declaration that 'Urabi Pasha was a rebel destroyed the will of 
Egypt's soldiers to resist the British conquest93 . Kami! characterized the Turks in unflattering 
terms as dupes of British diplomacy in the events of 1881 and 1882 through which Britain 
conquered Egypt94. He expressly condemned Turkish foreign policy which since the 1877-1878 
90. Mustafa Kami). "Une Alliance qui s'lmpose: Le Sultan et l'Europe", La Nouvelle Revue 15 November 
1895 pp. 377, 383. 
91. Kami!, "L'Angleterre et !'Islam", La Nouvelle Revue, 15 October 1895 p. 835. 
92. Ibid p. 836. 
93. Kami!, "Une Alliance qui s'Impose" p. 379. 
94. Ibid pp. 378-381. 
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Russo-Turkish war aligned Turkey with Britain while isolating it from other European States95• 
His French audiences must have noted Kamil's wariness of harm that the Ottoman State's 
conduct of its international relations might do to Egypt's national interests. Yet by already 
depicting Egypt's and the Turks' sovereignties as so interdependent, he could not be pursuing 
nationalism of an atomistic kind in international relations. Dislike of Turks had deep roots in 
French high culture96. Kamil virulently denounced in La Nouvelle Revue those Christian 
subjects who challenged the authority of the Muslim Turks. A voiding serious discussion of 
intercommunal relations in the Ottoman State or of Armenian nationalism97, he instead presented 
the Armenians as an instrument of the British imperialists. Bearing British 
arms and the British flag, the Armenians were the aggressors who 
"provoked" or carried out the massacres throughout the Ottoman Empire. Kamil was aware of 
the "excited support" that they had won in Europe, he implied somewhat even in France and 
Russia with which he wanted the Ottoman State allied98• He may, to some extent, have been 
right that Armenian nationalists sometimes did launch attacks against Muslims in the Ottoman 
95. Th.id pp. 377, 382. Kamil also had to accommodate to the specifities of the Anglophobia of his French 
supporters. When Kamil Pasha{l832 - 1913: Ottoman Grand Vezir 1885 - 1891, 1895, 1908-9 and 1912 - 1913) 
was again appointed to the Chief Vezirate in 1895, Juliette Adam described him as "l'homme de l' Angleterre". She 
depicted England and Germany, both detestable to her, as controlling many prominent Ottoman statesmen. Juliette 
Adam, "Lettres sur la Politique Exterieure", La Nouvelle Revue, 15 October 1895 p. 833. 
96: See Clarence Dana Rouillard, The Turk in French History. Thought and Literature 0520 - 1660) (Paris: 
Boivin 1940). Mahomet the Conqueror's career drew from Philippe de Commynes an early instance of the Western 
stereotype of the shrewd, cruel and lascivious rulers of the Turks, dividing their time between wars of conquest and 
the luxury of the seraglio: p. 27. There was "intense popular concern in France upon occasions of some especial 
menace of the Turks, as when public rejoicings followed Christian victories over the Turks at the Siege of Malta 
(1565) and the battle of Lepanto (1571), or when French armies were helping to repulse the Turks in Hungary (1593 
- 1601). Thi.d p. 357. Francis I took pains to disguise and deny his alliance with Su layman --- proof enough of 
strong hostile opinion in France against the Turks. IJ.lli!.. 
97. In an 1895 letter from Paris, Kamil was inclined to seek lessons and organizational patterns for Egypt's 
independence movement from the "Eastern" (sic) Armenians' activism. But he also described the Armenians as 
having "no right entitling them to win their demands whereas your [the Egyptians'] rights are the greatest of rights". 
'Ali Fahrni Kamil, Mustafa Kamil Pasha fi 34 Rabi'an v. 3. p. 65. However, there was a basis in the demographic 
realities for tl}e refusal of the acculturated Muslim Egyptian intellectuals to consider the Armenians' claims for 
independence. H.G. Hogarth pointed out that there was no "geographical u~it of the Ottoman [Empire] in which 
Armenians are the majority. If they cluster more thickly in the vilayets of Angora, Sivas, Erzeroum, Kharput, and 
Van, i.e. in easternmost Asia Minor, than elsewhere, ... they are consistently a minority in any large administrative 
district". Where, then, was it possible to constitute an autonomous Armenia? Quoted Sir J.A.R. Marriott, Europe 
and Beyond : A Preliminary Survey of World Politics in the Last Half Century. 1870-1920 (London: Methuen 1933) 
p. 253. Juliette Adam had already forseen the demographic impossibility of an Armenian state: La Nouyelle Revue 
January-February 1895 p. 413. There were about 1,500,000 Armenians in the Ottoman Empire around the end of 
the nineteenth century, and 1,000~000 under Russian rule. Art. "Armenia", EB 10th ed. v. xxv. p. 637. The 
populations of Armenians ruled by Tsarist Russia had some importance for Kamilist journalism. These inhabited 
Karabakh (incorporated from the Ottoman Empire in 1813), Erevan and Nakhichevan (taken from the Ottomans in 
1828) and Kars (conquered from the Ottomans in 1878). 
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Empire in the 1890s, triggering off some bloody reprisals --- although to manipulate the British 
more often than the other way around99. 
The French Anglophobes with whom Kamil had linked had little hostility left over for 
Muslims and Turks, but this was already a preliminary fault-line between them and the Egyptian 
nationalists. In remarks preceding Kamil's very first article in La Nouvelle Revue Juliette Adam, 
while accusing Britain of fostering the Armenians' "Christian fanaticism", warned the Sublime 
Porte that "the massacres must stop, Muslim fanaticism must be brought under control at all 
costs" 100. Henry Spont observed in La Nouvelle Revue after a 1903 tour of complex, strife-tom 
Ottoman Macedonia that French public opinion "favors the Bulgars although it knows nothing 
about them" because "they are Christians and that suffices" --- anti-Muslim phobia throughout 
Europe of which the Kamilists were ultra-conscious by then 101 . Kamil' s readiness to identify 
himself and Egypt's independence movement with a not particularly popular Turkey in 
France/Europe does attest to his pan-Islamic impulse. When discussing the Armenian question 
to his French (Christian) audience Kamil --- quite oblivious to the Copts' existence, here, ---
spoke of Egyptians only as an Islamic community. 
98. Kamil's accounts varied somewhat. Armenians, armed with British weapons and bearing the British 
flag, "provoked" massacres in the Ottoman capital itself. "L' Angleterre et l'Islam", Joe. cit. p. 836. Or "Armenians 
disguised as Muslims, even 'ulama', with arms furnished by the English [committed] all the excesses and massacres, 
to sow ruin and death in all the Empire. then win as the prize of their misdeeds so much aroused (excited) support! 
France and Russia themselves had to intervene". "Une Alliance qui s'Impose" pp. 376-377. Cf. findings that 
Armenian nationalists provoked the communal clashes to involve the Powers, in Jeremy Salt, Britain and the Cause 
of Ottoman Reform 1876-1896, Australian Middle East Studies Association Working Paper 8 (August 1986) pp. 
17-18 and passim. 
99. Elie Kedourie argues from official British documents of the time that Armenian nationalists in the 
1880s and 1890s mounted armed attacks on Muslims with the deliberate intention to provoke maximum Turkish 
violence against their own Armenian communities. The "clear" aim of Armenian nationalists in such organizations 
as the Dashnakzoution (Armenian Revolutionary Federation established in 1890) "was to create 'incidents', provoke 
the Turks to excesses and thereby bring about the intervention of the Powers" --- who would force the Turks to grant 
autonomy (ultimately independence) to the Armenians. Armenian committees in Erzerum were procuring arms for 
revolt as early as 1882. Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and Other Essays (London : Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1970) p. 295. Kedourie, a Jewish Iraqi scholar by ethnic origin, opposed all Middle East nationalisms. Cf. 
Salt, op. cit. 
100. Juliette Adam, "Lettres sur la Politique Exterieure", La Nouvelle Revue, v. xcvi 15 October 1895 p. 
833. See fn 95. 
101. Henry Spont, "A Travers La Macedoine", La Nouvelle Revue l May 1903 p. 52. An article titled 
"al-Mas'alat al-Maqduniyyah" (The Macedonian Question), al-Liwa' 16 February 1903, noted that hatred of Turkey 
had reached a peak in general Europe. Gladstone in 1876 had promoted press campaigns to whip up feeling over 
Bulgarian massacres as an excuse to dismember the Ottoman Empire. But even if a major European newspaper took 
Turkey's side now, "the policy of the [European] States toward her would not change for a single instant". Turkey 
had no one to help her in Europe: she could rely only on the sword she had in her hand and on her brave troops. 
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Their acquired French culture conditioned the bilingual Kamilists to seek humane 
relations with a true liberal Europe, against an unrepresentatively predatory Britain. Egyptian 
interests further fostered selective perception of Europe. Kamil' s call that "the Sultan take the 
hand of Russia and France" ignored --- only for the time --- the fate of extensive Muslim 
populations in Central Asia under Russian rule102 and of the North African and sub-Saharan 
Muslim populations conquered, or being conquered, by France. Continuous interaction with 
French culture and France was to confront such anti-imperialist Egyptian intellectuals as Kamil 
and especially Muhammad Farid with French colonialism in Algeria in particular (Chs. 4 and 5). 
Seeking France and Russia's help to dislodge Britain, the anti-colonialist Egyptian 
intellectuals may even in this initial phase have felt, but repressed, reservations about French and 
Russian colonization of Muslims. 
Kamil's presentation of himself to the French as the spokesman of a wider pan-Muslim 
political community as well as of Egypt was consistent throughout his whole nationalist career. 
In one plain-spoken 1903 Le Figaro article, he introduced himself as a link of communication 
between two civilizations, "the brilliant, immortal [Islamic] civilization" and that of the West: 
"he who addresses [Frenchmen] now is a Muslim Egyptian who yet received his education from 
French professors and is inclined with all his soul to promote conjunction and lasting peace 
between Muslims and Christians". France had not yet signed the Entente Cordiale, but Kamil by 
1903 voiced a depressed awareness of how far the educated French public shared a general 
European distaste for Muslims and of France as a participant in imperialist conquests and 
colonialism. It was "a false charge" that the Muslims hate "the contemporary sciences" and 
"modern civilization": "if the Muslims hate Europe and its civilization and everything that comes 
from it, that is only because it ... robbed them of their independence" 103 . Kamil was thus 
consistent over a decade that dual culture emotionally pushed him and his small elite to seek an 
alliance with Europe: but the colonialist drive of European powers, including France, against 
102. Russians were engaged in conquering the vast area of the Kazakh steppe from 1730. In the nineteenth 
century, Russia conquered sedentary peasant or urban Muslims in Central Asia. The Russians attacked the Khanate 
ofKokand in 1864 - 1865, conquering Tashkent. In 1868 they invaded Bukhara, reducing its Amir to vassal status. 
The Russians occupied the Turkmen country between 1873 and 1884. Nine million people in the Kazakh steppe and 
Central Asia were under Russian rule by 1881. Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modem History of Soviet Central Asia 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964) p. 65. Captain Alexander de Mayer, a participant narrated Russia's 
bloody conquest of Turkmen and other Muslims in "Les Memoires d'un Blesse", La Nouvelle Revue 
January-February 1895 pp. 85-97, September-October 1895 pp. 266-280, and November-December 1895 pp. 
727-749. 
103. Mustafa Kami!, "Urubba wal-Islam" (Europe and Islam), al-Liwa' 22 September 1903. 
- A168 -
Muslims had ignited a popular fury against everything at all linked to the West that jeopardized 
, 
even internal modernization by West-orientated Muslim elites like his own. (Haykal and the 
Liberal Constitutionalists in the 1920s, but especially after 1945 as the West imposed Israel, had 
some parallel perceptions: Britain and other Western states were not adequately rewarding 
acculturated incrementalists who wanted to move to equal alliances --- indeed, in inflicting 
Israel, they ignited fundamentalism likely to destroy the dual-cultured elite: B 133 - 135; B 203 -
209). 
Circumstances of international politics and Egypt's interests cannot wholly explicate the 
Watani intellectuals' statements that general Europe did not mean harm to the Ottoman State. 
Years after hopes for alliance with European states to dislodge Britain from Egypt faded, 
Kamilist intellectuals occasionally felt an urge to deny that general Europe was hostile against 
the Ottoman State and the world's Muslims. As late as April 1908 Sayyid 'Ali in al-Liwa' tried 
to counter the impression that a range of European States were pursuing policies detrimental to 
"our Ottoman State". He advised his Egyptian readers "to look for the English hand in the 
troubles of the Ottoman State": it was England that incited "the States of Europe to draw the 
sword of enmity in the Ottoman State's face". "Were we to scrutinize every event in which a 
State among the States has appeared as hostile to the Caliph we would find that it was the 
English hand which ignited the fire from behind a screen" 104• Sayyid 'Ali's argument might 
pragmatically concentrate Egyptians' hatred of the imperialist, Christian West against the British 
enemy who had to be dislodged from Egypt's chest (internal mobilization). But we view his 
argument that general Europe was fundamentally benign towards the Islamic Ottoman State as 
also determined by culture. It was Sayyid 'Ali's private French self-bilingualization and 
continuing interactions with France105 that made him psychologically unwilling to credit the 
reality that most Europeans disliked Muslims and that this had to affect the policies of their 
governments to the Ottoman State. 
104. Sayyid ·Ali, "Ibhathu 'an al-Yad al-Inkiliziyyah fi Mashaghil al-Dawlat al-' Aliyyah" (Look For the 
English Hand in The Troubles of The Ottoman State), al-Liwa' 22 April 1908. 
105. Sayyid 'Ali (1880-1932) after secondary school studies worked as a translator in al-Liwa'. He studied 
at Cairo's French Law School. When Mustafa Kami! established L 'Etendard Egyptien (March 1907) he appointed 
Sayyid 'Ali to translate excerpts from the Arabic press into French for publication. and in 1907 sent him as a 
correspondent of al-Liwa to Paiis. I am grateful to Professor Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. of the University of 
Pennsylvania for supplying me with this biodata on Sayyid 'Ali. 
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Early Kamilist outreach to Europe was not too expedient. Kamil's frank discussions to 
the French were clearly not meant to appease the Ottoman State, which did have legal title to 
endorse Britain in Egypt: he rather was feeling for a complex, long-term alignment of Egypt, the 
Ottoman State and France-Europe strenuously built to last. To both French/European and 
Egyptian audiences, Kamil long presented himself as representing the chain of acculturated elites 
modernizing the Muslim world. Conditioned by Arabic, he defined the extensively laicist French 
more as Christian (and Egypt more as Muslim) than he need have. His earlier impression that 
French culture could tolerate alliance with a Muslim camp and his later one that France was a 
component in a Christian camp subjugating Muslims both heightened his consciousness of a 
wide pan-Muslim political community. 
Acculturation Could Also Alienate From Other Muslims 
Kamil's early stress to European audiences on Egypt's achieved or prospective 
Europeanization was more than manipulation. Connected with self-image in his suggestions that 
Egypt might become a conduit or intermediary for French/European culture and interests to flow 
to still-traditional Muslim peoples, this was a cultures-determined identification. It will recur at 
intervals whether appropriate to the political situations these intellectuals face, or not. 
Throughout all the shifts of his attitudes to other Muslims and Westerners, Kamil 
remained consistent that a Europe-derived facet was central to his elite. Statements by Kamil in 
1895 (Paris) and 1906 (to the English) voiced with consistency these intellectuals' 
acculturation-created marginality between (a) the general xenophobic Islamic and Afro-Asian 
world and (b) the colonizing West. In 1895, he warned La Nouvelle Revue's readers that around 
half of the world's Muslims believed in the "systematic hostility" of general Europe against 
Islam: in contrast, he represented that "small minority" of "old students of France" now 
struggling to draw a xenophobic Muslim world into alliance and collaboration with the European 
states (minus Britain)106. In 1906, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey justified the 
Dinshawai executions as a response to fanaticism spreading along all northern Africa. Denying 
in a 1906 interview to the Daily Chronicle that Egypt's Muslims were "fanatical" against 
Christians or would politically reamalgamate an independent Egypt in the Islamic Ottoman State, 
106. "Un Alliance qui s'Impose" p. 377. 
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Kamil observed 
We have taken great pride in our schools and in our intellectual movement ... since. the 
days of Muhammad 'Ali because the Egyptian nation is the first Islamic nation to 
embrace the European civilization. However, it seems to us now that the English look 
upon us as though we were the natives of the Congo! It is well known that our young 
men used to be sent from a century back to France and Germany and England to receive 
their education ... in those countries' institutions. The result is that we Egyptians now 
enjoy a higher education in no wise less than that available in the greatest of the 
European countries. It is an error, then, that we be compared to Morocco or to the natives 
of Lake Chad as the majority of the English compare us107. 
He was at risk here of internalizing "civilizing mission" motifs, with which France would 
justify her conquest of Morocco 108 and of (partly Muslim) black West African populations (Lake 
Chad, Zinder), motifs with which the Belgians rationalized their ravaging of the Congo. 
Unconsciously, Kamil was unde1mining political solidarity by Egyptians with major Arab and 
African populations resisting colonization. His humiliation as an acculturated that Britishers 
should associate Egyptians, perceived by him as widely European-educated, with Morocco 
voiced scant regard in this particular context for unmixed traditional Arab-Islamic culture, which 
Morocco had. Indeed, Kamil bracketed traditional-literate Islamic Morocco with the non-literate 
(if until recently Arab-influenced) animist Congo. 
Kamil conceived the black African populations with which he refused to identify Egypt 
in London in 1906 as to a great extent Muslim. Those around Lake Chad (Central Africa) and in 
Zinder (West Africa) mentioned by him included many Muslims with some 
Arabic literacy. Kamil in England specifically connected rejection of sub-Saharan black 
Africans of Lake Chad and Zinder to his rejection of traditional Islamic "fanaticism" which 
fostered hostile acts against Europeans merely because they were non-Muslim: 
No ... Egypt is not at all fanatical, and it would be truly bad faith to compare it to Chad, to 
107. Interview to (London) Dailv Chronicle, translated in "al-Sultan wal-Islam" (The Sultan and Islam), 
al-Liwa' 28 July 1906 p.l. 
108. France's conquest of Morocco was progressing when Kami! gave his 1906 London interview. In 1902 
the young modernizing Sultan 'Abd al-' Aziz was forced to recognize French authority in the Tuat region of the 
central Sahara. In 1903, the French occupied Colomb, and in 1904 Berguent, on the Algerian frontier. In 1904 
England had given France a free hand to conquer Morocco in return for France's recognition of the pennanency of 
British rule in Egypt. In 1912, Sultan' Abd al-Hafiz signed the Treaty of Fez, establishing a French Protectorate 
over the whole country. Juliette Adam's own Nouvelle Revue published a racist article by Albert de Pouvourville in 
1904 anticipating the extinction of Algeria's Arabs. The article envisaged Morocco as one of the "successive 
annexes" of future French expansion from Algeria. Albert de Pouvourville, "Peuplement Rationnel de I' Afrique du 
Nord", La Nouvelle Revue 15 September 1904 pp. 147, 148, 153. 
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Zinder and to other lands sunk in the worst darkness of ignorance 109• 
Kamil's 1906 outburst at British application of anti-Islamic stereotypes against Egyptian 
nationalism brought out that he sometimes somewhat shared their view of the overall Muslim 
world. He empathized why most Muslims felt as they did about Westerners but Egypt's 
Europe-derived facet could never fit into insularist Muslim societies, whether pre-colonial or 
those reacting against colonial rule. Kamil even implied that the Ottoman state had progressed 
less on the spectrum away from those purist Muslim societies than Egypt: he felt some alienation 
in respect to modernization from the Turks, also. In this type of spasm, he wanted to limit 
Egypt's reintegration with the Ottoman Turks and certainly with pre-modern Muslim societies 
whose xenophobia clashed with the acculturative functions of his class. He wanted to direct 
some time and energy away from other Muslims into building new relationships with Western 
societies. 
Gradual Equation of all Europeans as Fanatical Ae:ainst Muslims 
Not always facile or slick, Kamil made clear to Europeans that he was working for a new 
extension of relationship not just between Egypt and France but between an array of Muslim and 
European communities. The compound architecture could fail and could endanger his elite. 
New secular nexuses between Muslims and Europeans --- common interests, liberal-progressive 
ideology, French culture --- initially subordinated, but for Kamil never eliminated, Islamic and 
Christian impulses and identities. There was little reason why he had to raise Armenians and 
Turks at all in France from the angle of Egypt's narrow inten::st: yet Kamil thought the new 
energies and bases for relationship that had opened in the European mind gave him leeway to 
address points of Muslim-Christian antagonism. He was banking that most Europeans were 
unfired by the anti-Islamism that Britain whipped up, that there was religiously neutral liberalism 
as well as imperialists in Europe. 
He early had doubts that the British might not be so unrepresentative. To a French 
109. Mustafa Kamil's press conference on 26 July 1906 at Carlton Hotel, London, in Juliette Adam, 
L' Angleterre en Egypt p. 161. In denying that Europe-dyed Egypt was "fanatical" like pre-modern Morocco etc, 
Kami! was refuting British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey. In order to justify the executions of peasants at 
Dinshaway, Grey rambled in Parliament that "all this year a fanatical feeling in Egypt has been on the increase. It 
has not been confined to Egypt, it has been stretching along the north of Africa generally. It is for that reason a little 
time ago that the garrison had to be increased". The Times 6 July 1906 p. 7c. 
1 the 
countries of the the pretext of civilizing . But "Egypt has civilized" (had 
Europeanized itself of own will) "without having to be subjected to power" (force ---
puissance). There was incipient scepticism here about the motives of most Europeans in 
international relations. Stronger, though, is Kamil's hope that Europe will treat Egypt, because it 
had modernized itself, differently from non-self-modernizing peoples it colonized .. Europe 
should free Egypt, given its record of self-modernization, "to prove that Europe works 
disinterestedly for the happiness of all men" 110. 
Differences of religion and race were possible barriers to sympathy from Europeans. 
Already in 1895 Kamil sensed a racial orientation in the French whom he addressed. Appealing 
for Europe's aid to free Egypt from British rule, he rhetorically asked whether the same rights 
did not apply to the man of Africa as to the man of Europe111 ? Kamil ultimately came to 
consider Western religious hostility to Islam the reason why Europeans refused to treat the 
Muslim Egyptians as they treated other Europeans. In his initial optimistic appeals to Europe, 
however, he obviously thought prejudices against Islam secondary in the personality of the 
French: he would not otherwise have repeatedly mentioned Egypt's Mu slimness. 
He had, of course, been aware that B1itish politicians took account of the Islam of 
Egyptians. As Prime Minister, the Liberal leader Gladstone presided over Britain's conquest of 
Egypt in 1882. Yet, as Kamil grew to manhood, Gladstone in violent language demanded 
autonomy or independence for Christian nationalities in the Ottoman Empire. Kamil at first 
thought in terms of nations fonning relations across religious lines as interests dictated, but then 
circumstances entangled Egypt's independence with European pan-Christianism and conflicts 
between Muslims and Christian nationalities in the Ottoman Empire, in his mind. Kamil in 
1896, in two letters, asked Gladstone to call for British evacuation from Egypt. But Gladstone, 
who had recently championed the rights of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, did not raise 
his voice for the liberation of Egypt. Steppat presents this incident as a turning-point in Kamil's 
attitude to the general West, rather than to Britain al~ne. Gladstone's contrasting attitudes to 
llO. "L' Absorption par L 'Angleterre" p. 822. Karnil's choice of words associated British imperialism and 
that of the other European countries whose aid he sought (France in the first place). The European countries "se sont 
emparees de" (have seized) the countries of the Orient. Britain's great aim was "s'emparer definitivement de 
l'Egypte". Ibid p. 820. 
111. "L' Absorption par r Angleterre" p. 823. 
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Christian Annenians and (predominantly) Muslim Egyptians opened up a chasm between the 
Christian West and the Muslim Orient in the young Karnil's mind, and he generalized from the 
individual Gladstone's inconsistency that a religious fanaticism was the driving force of general 
European politics112• 
Kamil had been already hostile to Gladstone in his communications to the French in the 
previous year, in which he identified him as incarnating British forces acting from Christian 
drives against Muslims, especially "les Tures" and the Egyptians. Kamil vitriolically assailed 
Gladstone's pretensions to "have only humanity in view", to "have no bias against the Turks", to 
be "the liberal man" 113 . The British distorted Europe's secular humanitarianism to cloak their 
anti-Muslim expansionist drive. Could they thereby corrupt even the French, whose aid Kamil 
sought? Even in 1895, he had a stab of apprehension. He characterized B1itain as endeavoring 
to create "a profound abyss between Islam and Ch1istianity in its own interest and only in its own 
interest" 114. Kamil defensively mentioned to the French alleged British charges that Egyptians 
opposed the Occupation out of religious fanaticism 115 : he probably feared that such British 
charges might activate Christian anti-Muslim feelings in even the more secularized French and 
other Europeans --- making them legalize British control. He sometimes revealed considerable 
apprehension that any incident could involve France in joint political action with Britain against 
Muslim interests. Thus, he tried to convince French readers that Britain organized "the 
disturbance at Jeddah in which were wounded the consuls of England" (sic) "of Russia and of 
France", to involve the two latter powers more deeply in Ottoman Armenia116. 
At the time of the early 1895 appeals to Europe, Kamil wanted to believe that "there is no 
prejudice against Islam" in general Europe. France and Russia had intervened in the Armenian 
question as mediators, not like Britain as the Ottoman State's enemy117 . Kamil's Arabic 
112. Steppat, National ism us p. 307-308. Kami! saw the Annenian Nubar Pasha, at various times Egypt's 
Foreign Affairs minister and Prime Minister under the British. as collaborating with them in the expectation that 
they might help his people carve an independent homeland out in the Ottoman Empire. The young Kamil's sense 
that Armenians were collaborative "interlopers" (dukhala') comparable to certain subsidized SCs was fueled by 
praise of Nu bar by Colonel Baring. brother of Cromer, with whom Kami! conversed on a steamer en route to Paris 
for a lobbying session. Letter by Kami! to Khedivial official Ahmad Shafiq Pasha, cited Muhammad Muhammad 
Husayn, al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyvah fil-Adab al-Mu'asir (Bayrut: 2 vols Dar al-Irshad 1970) v. 1pp.222 - 223. 
113. "L' Angleterre et l'Islam" p. 836. 
114. "Une Alliance que s'Impose" p. 377. 
115. "L' Absorption par l' Angleterre" pp. 821-822; "L · Angleterre et !'Islam" pp. 836-837. 
116. "L'Angleterre et !'Islam" p. 837. 
117. "Une Alliance qui s'Impose" p.377. Yet Russia always was much more manipulative than Britain, and 
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speeches suggest that his interactions with Europe very quickly convinced him that Europeans in 
general were religiously hostile to Ottoman Turks: this sharpening perception worked to alienate 
him from non-British Europeans quite independently of their attitudes to Egypt's independence. 
Kamil lost hope that European powers would intervene to expel Britain from the Nile Valley 
when Britain intimidated France to back down at Fashoda in 1898. Even in the previous year, 
though, he was speaking of the European states in general as hostile to the Ottoman State out of 
animosity to Muslims in general. Resident foreigners criticized Egyptians for sending aid to the 
Ottoman State in the 1897 - 1898 Greco-Turkish War. In a speech of 7 June 1897, he replied: 
From the religious viewpoint no intelligent person could blame Egypt for the aid she 
gives to the Khilafah (Caliphate), for the govern~ts of Europe have openly proclaimed 
that the basis of their policy in the East is to assis11'Christians by all means. This is a 
principle to which they have clung tenaciously and carried far118. 
Kamil in that speech did not name France, which claimed to protect Ottoman Syria and 
'Iraq's Catholics, and sought a special status in Syria119. Even at that rather early date, however, 
he clearly perceived that religious sectarianism dete1mined the foreign policies of the European 
states in the Muslim East: they were banding together to harm the Muslims' interests. 
Responding in self-defence, Muslims were banding together on the international stage on a basis 
of shared religion as well as shared interests. Two hostile religious international blocs were 
forming. The situation is becoming like the classical dar al-Harb vs dar al-Islam paradigm. 
Kamil's recent dream of secular alliances between Muslim nations and Christian European states 
was already collapsing. 
The most secular Western concepts may have pulled the very young Kamil towards the 
attitude that religions need not define either atomistic nations or their international relations at 
all. His and his colleagues' pan-Islamism, though, is not to be viewed nan-owly as a resurgence 
of Arabo-Islamic cultural survivals (that culture, anyway, always remained vital under pounding 
and resource-starvation) when Europe's anti-Muslimism so strongly worked to pan-Islamize the 
even subtly hostile, to an Armenian nationalism that she was detenTiined would never loosen her grip over her own 
Armenian subjects. Kedourie, Chatham House Version p. 443. al-Liwa' bitterly accused Westerners of anti-Muslim 
prejudice in denouncing "our Ottoman State" over the Armenians, while turning a blind eye to sweeping 
confiscations by the Tsarist authorities of the church properties and lands of the Armenians living within their 
territories. "al-Ard fil-Rusiya" (Land Issues in Russia), al-Liwa · 21 September 1903 p. 1. 
118. Rashad, Mustafa Kami!, p. 116. 
119. Steppat. National ism us pp. 309-3 IO, cites Kamil's awareness of competition between the European 
powers to take over the Holy Cities of Palestine. This would cover French ambitions in Syria. 
most contact texture of 
conceptualization of international affairs the journalistic 
Kamil had to draw into support for Egypt's independence. 
over 
opinion leaders whom 
anti-Islamic phobia many 
Europeans had against the Turks constantly jaITed his nerves as he propagandized for Muslim 
Egypt, uphill enough a venture in itself. Kamil cited solidarity with Armenians and Bulgars by 
such British Christianist Turcophobes as Gladstone to bring home to Europeans how normally 
Europeanoid was his own movement's symmetrical --- but similarly limited --- counter-solidarity 
with the Turks120. But it was the Fr~~ ~~~e opened himself with least reservations, that 
showed how pervasively Christianity defined European nations both internally and in world 
affairs. Kamil repeatedly encountered in France anti-Semitism sparked by the drawn-out 
Dreyfus affair, which dragged on from 1894 through 1906: such mainly French anti-Semitism 
was one more phenomenon dliving home to him that "religious fanaticism" was after all the 
fundamental force in European politics 121 . 
Given their cultural and emotional vulnerability during pre-1919 outreaches to 
Europeans, the incoITigible Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in all Western states had to bulk 
somewhat out of perspective for Kamil and other acculturated intellectuals. They did not, 
though, dream up these lethal heritages that mutated more than they guessed for post-Christian 
settings. Europe's example could sectarianize as well as secularize the Egyptian polity and its 
120. Kamil's London Chronicle interview, tsd "al-Sultan wal-Islam", al-Liwa' 28 July 1906 p. 1. If _ 
Gladstone could call the Armenians his "Christian Brothers", the Egyptians had the same right to a parallel "inhereni 
natural sympathy" for the Turkish cause. They would not, however, be reincorporating Egypt into the Ottoman 
Empire. Ibid. For the accusations of" fan:Hicism" that Kami! was answering from Sir Edward Grey, see fn 109. 
121. Steppat, Nationalism us p. 310. Edouard Drumont, the anti-Semite who edited La Libre Parole and 
wrote La France Juive was one of the rightist literati to whom Mme Juliette Adam introduced Kami! and who helpec 
open the pages of leading Paris newspapers to him. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" Joe. cit pp. 314-315. 
Drumont branded French Jews as disloyal in his newspaper following Captain Dreyfus' conviction for treason in 
1894. Drumont's paper was among a few far-right organs that kept up attacks on Britain in Egypt after the Entente 
Cordiale detatched mainstream French conservatives from Egyptian nationalism. Arie, "Juliette Adam" pp. 135-6. 
Kami!, though, at last let slip what he thought of such continental elements at a 1906 press conference in London. 
Egyptians were not religiously fanatical (as Sir Edward Grey was charging), he told the British --- "it is impossible 
that there could exist in Egypt parties like the anti-Semitic parties or the extreme political parties or the religious 
parties found in Europe now". London Dailv Chronicle interview translated in "al-Sultan wal-Islam" (The Sultan 
and Islam), al-Liwa· 28 July, 1906. p. 1. This stance was traditional among Egyptian pan-Islamists: 'Abdallah 
al-Nadim's paper had argued that eruptions by Russians against Jews showed Europe's Enlightenment and 
philosophers had not overcome the persecutory fanaticism almost inherent in its brand of Christianity. "La Ikraha 
fil-Din" (No Compulsion in Religion), al-Ustaclh 27 December 1892. pp. 442-443. For European anti-Semitism as: 
motif in acculturated Muslim Egyptian anti-Coptism at the close of the 1920s B 38-39. Cf. Stephen Wilson, 
Ideologv and Experience: Anti-Semitism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair (Rutherford, New Jersey: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press 1982). 
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international relations: Haykal was to cite British restrictions on Jews to justify political 
limitations against Egyptian Christians at the end of the 1920s (B 38 - 39). 
Assessment 
The Kamilists were much more a movement of youth --- specifically, of that youth 
minority receiving the most Westernizing educations --- than was any other political current in 
British-ruled Egypt. The age-category of the bulk of members and followers, and the cultural 
deprivations amid which they grappled with two civilizations, had to entail some half-baked 
episodism. Yet, for all the gaps that the British enemies mocked, Kamil and his collaborators got 
a great body of data about both Islamic and Western civilization and societies across to an 
emerging, shaky Muslim Egyptian elite --- and were already often able to relate and interweave 
those two worlds. Egypt between 1882-1922 did not encounter either Britishers or British 
culture at their best and the Kamilists did not attempt some younger Jaridists' engagement with 
the purple poetry as well as thought of Britain and English-speaking America. Nonetheless, they 
gave at least French liberal secularoidism rectment hearings and, in their lobbying outreach, 
recycled and tested it as the basis for a new equalized world order. Kamil and his colleagues 
could selectively highlight exactly those sectors of the Arabo-Islamic past of most use to focus 
cun-ent resistance to impe1ialism, but they did not concoct the slabs they presented. For many 
Muslim teenagers whom Dunlop otherwise could have cut off in his secular-stream schools, 
al-Liwa' offered continuous access to Islam and its classical Arab history --- as it did many busy 
professionals who read and heard mainly French and English in Alexandria and Cairo. Islam anc 
the classical Arabs fitted vividly with the modern West in symbiosis or dichotomized, but the 
Kamilists need not have kept them that central. The British had phased standard Arabic out of 
modern institutions but the Kamilists would never leave it alone in the mosques to die. It could 
have made good sense for instantly mobilizing all classes of Egyptians had they orated or even 
written in the colloquial. Instead, al-Hizb al-Watani with never-ceasing classical-medium plays, 
mass oratory, indoor functions, lectures, anti-British poetry --- and an al-Liwa' each of whose 
40,000 copies was read by and intoned to multiple individuals --- obliged at least educated 
Egyptians to daily follow standardizing pan-Arabic in their most topical concerns. 
There were always some tensions between the Kamilists' Islamic-Arab and Western 
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components but at all stages they held the two in gradually-changing mixes. It was in regard to 
the allocation of roles between the sexes that Islam made Kamil and his colleagues (including 
Muhammad Farid122) significantly diverge from even their France, yet we showed that the 
Liwa'ists' ostensible restorationism was really a covert synthesis with West Europe's urban 
bourgeois nuclear family. Outreaches to Europeans engaged the Watanists more deeply with 
Western secularoid ideologies. Yet, the very young Kamil made clear from the start to the 
French he courted that his aim was a completely independent Egypt with standard Arabic as its 
official and educational language: the French would have roles only as allies and advisers. From 
the outset, Kamil strove to build a lasting association with European states: accordingly, he 
urged, notably, the French to fit an adjusted relationship with the Ottoman Turks into the coming 
alliance with Egypt, given that relations with one of these two Muslim peoples entailed a 
relationship with the other. He sincerely, not diplomatically, admired a French language and 
thought that were a component of his and his colleagues' psyche, and the early tensions in his 
outreach sprang less from Arabo-Islamic incongruence with more secularoid French liberalism 
and nationalism than from from his doubts that the French or other Europeans would live up to 
the leeway for friendship with Muslims that their formal ideologies offered. 
Their earlier exposure to modernist European thought and languages significantly 
alienated Kamil and his cormades from monocultural, traditional Muslim populations, Arab or 
black African. Later, their progressively heightening sense that Westerners and 
Muslims/Easterners were becoming two warring blocs was to make them feel more like Muslim 
populations (and Congolese) that had not self-Westernized with the resolve of Egypt since 
Muhammad' Ali. Nonetheless, their initial pursuit of the West permanently marked the 
Kamilists. They always kept their sense that Egypt and Muslims had to duplicate not just the 
West's technologies and patterns of strength but its internal liberal-parliamentary order. The firs 
thrust for independence of these Francophone secular lawyers had been water-tight legal briefs 
presented to the true Europe: and even after Gorst and Kitchener drove them out of Egypt, such 
al-Hizb al-Watani leaders as Muhammad Faiid would remain very reluctant to take the road of 
122. In 1913, Muhammad Farid in his diaries rapped the defeatism of Rifa'at Pasha, Ottoman ambassador 
to Geneva, who accepted that "the Muslim Woman" in Turkey would have to give up the veil. Farid in contrast 
wanted women to be educated at all levels including the tertiary, but could not but "deeply disapprove any proposal 
to make the Muslim woman like the European woman in morals, after the moral corruption we see here [in Europe] 
among all classes as a result of free-mixing". Farid, Awraq p. 118. 
tandem long the uprising to 
Kamil was a preliminary. rn so it been the and 
courting of such a range of Europeans that pulled together Kamilisrrfs longer-term image of the 
West as one enemy entity and fueled its counter-integration of the Arabo-Islamic camp (Ch. 4). 
The Europe-bound Kamilists of the 1890s were the archetype for all subsequent 
predoomed, radicalizing outreach by other groups of Muslim Egyptian acculturateds up to the 
1952 coup. Despite repeated rebuffs, the later Kamilists, the Jaridists and post-1922 
al-Siyasah/Liberal Constitutionalist intellectuals and politicians clung to the cultural illusion that 
appeals to the West's formal liberal ideologies --- after 1922 its literary aestheticisms also figure 
more --- would convince Westerners that they owed Egyptians concessions or aid. The 
languages and journalistic and intellectual discourses in the West had become a part of their 
make-up. Through their outreaches, Egyptian intellectuals repeatedly set themselves up for 
sweeping reaction against Westerners or things Western when too many rebuffs came. 
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CHAPTER 4: PAN-ISLAMISM AS A MODERN IDEOLOGY IN THE PARTY OF 
MUSTAFA KAMIL 
ATTITUDES TO OTTOMAN TURKS 
Egyptianist and Islamic-Campist Dualities in the Kamilists' Relations with the Ottoman State 
Mustafa Kamil and his comrades tirelessly strove to achieve Egypt's independence. The:; 
also devoted much effort, however, to relating their movement to the Ottoman Empire and its 
cause. Educated Egyptians have naturally differed about the ultimate meaning of the movement 
launched by Kamil. Was it primarily Egypt-centred, ushering in a self-contained Egyptian 
nationalism? Or did Kamil's movement unleash Islamic community emotions of strength that 
might: 
(a) Abort the growing consciousness of an Egyptian territorial nation of Copts and 
Muslims. 
(b) In the long term reamalgamate Egypt as a political entity with another Islamic state 
(the Ottoman State). 
In the period of British colonial rule, Kamil' s colleagues put about equal weight upon his 
promotion of pan-Islamic community and his contribution to the growth of specifically Egyptian 
national consciousness. Such dual characterization spoke to the pan-Islamic orientation of 
Kamil's urban efendi constituency. The 1908 evaluation of Kamil published soon after his death 
by his successor Muhammad Farid balanced in this fashion Kamil's pan-Islamism with his 
promotion of specific Egyptian interests and identity: 
Has he [Kamil] not played the main role in calling on people to adhere to the most 
illustrious throne of the Caliphate, to be devoted subjects of His Highness our Lord the 
Commander of the Believers and to ward off the evil designs of the invader authorities 
from the legal Khedivial authority? Has he not been a long-standing advocate of the 
Egyptian national university and the strengthening of the Islamic fleet and aid for the 
project of the Hamidian Hijaz Railway and ... with his two strong hands smashed in the 
doors of prison, releasing the Dinshawai prisoners? 1 
However, in an oration at Kamil's grave, Farid hailed Mustafa Kamil as having by his sacrifice 
1. Farid's tribute was printed in Ali Fahrni Kamil, Mustafa Kamil fi Arba'a wa Thalathina Rabi'an (Cairo: 
Mitba'at al-Liwa, 1908 -1911) vol. 1. pp. 50-51. 
I 
one 
published pioneered a new 
consciousness. It was founded on pride belonging to the Egyptian homeland and directed to 
political action to achieve that homeland's independence3. 
In contrast, a former member of al-Hizb al-Watani, the historian' Abd al-Rahman 
al-Rafi'i, in 1939 argued that Kamil's affirmations of a relationship with the Ottoman State were 
a mere tactic. Kamil limited his patriotic struggle to the British occupation because he "rightly" 
saw that their withdrawal would in itself give Egypt full independence. With the British gone, 
getting free from Ottoman suzerainty would be easy, for the Turks' suzerainty "had long been 
getting looser and looser, nothing remaining of its visible manifestations save the jizyah" ---
which Egypt in any case paid to Turkey's European creditors until 1935. Kamil' slip-service to 
Ottoman suzerainty al-Rafi'i called "a wise national stand" that enabled him to disingenuously 
ask the British to end their ostensibly "temporary" occupation of Egypt and thereby fulfil the 
international treaties to which they were signatory: especially the 1840 Treaty of London in 
which the Great Powers recognized Egypt's independence under the family of Muhammad Ali, 
with a nominal Ottoman suzerainty. Kamil was "unable to achieve both the abolition of Ottoman 
sovereignty and a British evacuation simultaneously"4• 
al-Rafi'i's thesis that Kamil's relationship to the Ottoman State was nothing but an 
international legal expedient to achieve Egypt's independence has become almost an orthodoxy 
among secularist Egyptian historians, including pan-Arabist ones5. Such post-World War I 
accounts of Kamil sometimes rather blatantly rewrote history --- including, on occasion, the 
2. Ibraham Ghali, L'Egypte Nationaliste et Liberale de Moustapha Kamel a Saad Zaghlul, 1892-1927 (The 
Hague: Martimus Nijhoff 1969) pp. 76-77. 
3. Farid's full formulation ran that Kamil "was the first Egyptian whose voice resounded in the East and the 
West. He was the first Egyptian to finnly and consistently demand evacuation and the end of the occupation. He 
was the first Egyptian who raised his head with an open pride in declaring that he belonged to the Egyptian 
homeland and in mounting a public campaign to defend its reputation and dignity; he was the first Egyptian who 
saw that national anniversaries and indigenous occasions were observed --- using them to remind, alert, and warn 
and also to give hope of the future". 'Ali Fahrni Kamil, op. cit., pp. 50-51. 
4. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, Mustafa Kamil. Ba'ith al-Barakat al-Wataniyyah (Cairo: np. 1939), p. 341. 
5. Among pan-Arabs, Salah 'Isa in a 1974 seminar on the centenary of Mustafa Kamil's birth organized by 
the Egyptian Society for Historical Studies, argued that Kamil only used to "appear an Ottoman sometimes" under 
compulsion of "alliances"; much the same thesis was argued there by Muhammad 'Imarah in his paper "Mustafa 
Kamil and Ottoman Community". Salah Isa, "Mustafa Kamil Mufakkiran Burjwaziyan" (Mustafa Kamil as a 
Bourgeois Thinker) Oadaya Arabiyah (Bayrut) March 1976 p. 105. 
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biographical record of the authors themselves6 --- to make him and his party more attractive in 
the era of the Egyptian nation state and Arab nationalism. 
The fact remains that the Kamilists did regularly adopt positions liable to motivate a 
tightening of Egypt's bonds with the Ottoman Empire, rather than the steady loosening 
visualized by al-Rafi'i in 1939. Under Farid's leadership, the Hizb al-Watani responded to the 
Committee of Union and Progess' 1908 restoration in Turkey of constitutional politics with the 
request that representatives of Egypt be admitted to the new Ottoman parliament. This demand 
was also directed against the Khedive 'Abbas, adverse to a constitution for Egypt, and Farid' s 
personal enemy7• Parochial-factional and adventitious dimensions, though, cannot detract from 
the avant-garde grip the rebirth of its parliamentarism gave Turkey on the psyche of Egyptians. 
Farid, like his predecessor Kamil, had a sense of an (Arab) Egyptian homeland and nation that 
was to make trouble for the young Turks later: yet achievement of modernity and strength by the 
Ottoman State could downgrade and dilute it. Lutfi al-Sayyid and al-Jaridah in 1908 feared, 
perhaps rightly, that the attraction of an Ottoman State now both modern-parliamentarist and 
Muslim could draw Egypt into a federation incompatible with the discrete nationhood Egypt had 
been developing since Muhammad 'Ali8• By trying to enter the restored Ottoman parliament, the 
6. Muhammad Husayn Haykal in his 1951 memoirs remembered "my friend"' Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i as 
in the British-Ottoman period "an enthusiast, since he was a student at the Law School, for the principles of the 
Patriotic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani) ... intense of belief in the Caliphate of the Ottoman ruling family". Haykal, 
Mudhakkirat fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah (Cairo : Maktabat Nahdat Misr 1951), v .1, p. 63. If Haykal recalled accurately, 
al-Rafi'i's 1939 non-Ottomanist characterization of Kamil's career was one more adaption by an Egyptian 
intellectual formed before 1918 to post-World War 1 Egyptianist and Arabist ideological fashions. 
7. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr, "The Egyptian Nationalist Party: 1892-1919" in P.M. Holt (ed.) Political and 
Social Change in Modern Egypt : Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic 
(London: O.U.P. 1968) p. 324. Bayyumi reconstructed that Muhammad Farid initially resisted proposals in al-Hizb 
al-Watani to work for representation of Egypt in the new Parliament of Committee of Union and Progress-led 
Turkey. Zakariya Sulayman Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani wa Dawruhu fil-Siyasat al-Misriyyah. 1907-1953 (Cairo: 
Wikalat Fabrant 1981) p. 197. The atmosphere and motivation were very Islamic: some members of the Party's 
Executive Committee suggested that Egypt send the deputies to the Majlis-i-Mab'uthan in Istanbul in order to unify 
"the Islamic element" with "the Turkish element". 'Isam Diya' al-Din, "al-Hizb al-Watani fi Misr wa 'Alaqatuhu 
bi-Turkiya 1-Fatat" (The Patriotic Party in Egypt and its Relationship with Young Turkey), al-Afaq al-' Arabiyyah 
(Baghdad) September 1976 pp. 13-14. 
8. "Some of us think that it is in Egypt's interest for us to have deputies in the Majlis al-Mab'uthan 
(Parliament in Constantinople),. .. that that will not lose us our right of independence and our internal sovereignty 
(autonomy). Indeed, they almost say that our Government remains despotic, and that a sovereignty that has no resul 
or serves no interest of the nation is meaningless and that it is better then for the nation to forego that autonomy and 
join the Ottoman State so long as it be constitutional ... [They believe] that the privileges given to Egypt [under the 
rule of Muhammad Ali by the Otoman Sultan] were given to the royal family alone, not to the whole Egyptian 
nation as an entity". Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Safahat Matwiyyah min Ta'rikh al-Harakat al-Istiqlaliyyah (Cairo: 
Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Misriyyah 1946) p.37. 
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Kamilists were attempting a confederal first step. The residual sense that Egypt was a part or 
extension of the Ottoman State sometimes had consequences for nationalism's educational and 
cultural policies. al-Liwa' assailed the British-directed Egyptian Government's Education 
Department for describing Turkish as optional and failing to allocate it fixed periods in the 
schools9• While Turkish was a prerequirement of any serious relationship with the Ottoman 
Empire, it was a side issue here to restoration of Islam's classicist Arabic in Egyptian education 
and life. 
That Egyptians and outside Turks should remain politically apart in two separate states, 
despite shared belief in Islam, was strongly argued by Ahmad Hilmi in al-Liwa' of 19 August 
1906. After waging so hard a struggle to wrest independence from Britain, Hilmi argued, 
Egyptians would not open the doors of Egypt to the Turks because they are Muslims ... If 
you have an ornate --- or perhaps a not quite so fancy --- house and someone had usurped 
it, and you dispute with this usurper until you regain your house, it certainly goes very 
hard for you to leave it for your brother who is of your mother and father. But this does 
not exclude your being independent in your house and loving your brother at the same 
time, simultaneously10• 
Hilmi's primary political unit is thus Egypt. His affirmation here that the Egyptian independence 
movement of his party was separate from --- and yet so lovingly related to or aligned with ... ! ---
9. Mudarris ("Teacher"), "Dusturun am Istibdad?" (Constitution or Despotism?) al-Liwa', 8 January, 1903, 
p.1. The religious motivations of this article must be stressed, although French and other European linguistic 
nationalisms structured his detailed programatic vision of the extensions to Arabic and to published works in it, 
needed to make it cover all modern education and life. Qur'an-defined standard Arabic must be made the standard 
medium of instruction in Egypt's schools because it is the tongue of the Egyptian' s "religion and prophet" --- a 
formulation that did not much perceive the Copts and Syrian Christians in the Egyptian landscape. Restoration of 
Arabic is motivated by devotion to Islam and to "your [Ottoman] Sultan" (the pan-Muslim Ottoman link) --- could 
there be anyone who would deny(=' Abbas? British-fostered SC journalists?) that Egypt was a possession among the 
possessions of the Ottoman State? This modernity-addressing pan-Muslim, if proto-Arabist, article showed the 
seriousness of its quest for religious political community by its drive to ground Egyptians in the Turkish of the other 
party. Ibid. 
10. Ahmad Hilmi, "al-Istiqlal! al-Istiqlal!" (Independence! Independence!), al-Liwa 9 August 1906. 
Ahmad Hilmi (1875-1963) seems to have been senior staff writer for al-Liwa' up to 1908. His articles often had a 
secularist thrust which he wove into the period's Islamic community emotions. Hilmi would have absorbed Westerr 
nationalism's secular outlook from the acculturated milieu of the journalistic-oratorical intelligentsia and through 
self-education. He did not receive acculturating formal education. His father, a Cairo (Khan al-Khalili) bazaar 
merchant named Hasan' Ali al-Mahdi, died before he was born. "Hilmi was then raised by his mother's brother, a 
government clerk in the Irrigation Department, who seems to have expected that Hilmi would follow in his 
footsteps. Accordingly, he sent the boy to a maktab called Khan Ja'far in the Husayni quarter of Cairo. Hilmi 
learned French by working for a private company in Alexandria, and gained further knowledge of Islam and Arabic 
from an Imam in an Alexandria mosque. He became a government clerk. But he never received more than a 
primary certificate". Private letter from Professor Arthur Goldschmidt Jr utilizing Ahmad Ahmad Badawi, Ma'a 
al-Suhufi al-Mukafih, Ahmad Hilmi (Cairo, n.d.). 
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the Ottoman State may, though, have been partly to fend off Egyptian circles enraged by the 
Kamilists' support for Turkey's territorial position in Sinai during the May 1906 Tabah crisis. 
Yet, in November 1907, al-Liwa' voiced apprehension that Turkey, legally Egypt's suzerain, 
might conclude an agreement with Britain in which it would sacrifice Egypt11• 
A discrete Arabo-Egyptianist nationalism had from the outset been solidifying in the 
movement Kamil launched in 1893. In reply to a foreign journalist who had depicted him as an 
instrument of Turkish policy, Kamil denied (1907) that "we want freedom for Egypt only to 
restore it to the rule of the Turks". The aim "Egypt for the Egyptians", "unequivocally stated 
thousands of times" by the watani movement was the chief principle guiding "our life and 
actions" 12• In a 1906 interview to the London Chronicle he depicted Egypt's national political 
community and her religion-founded international relationship with the Ottoman State as two 
separate planes of association. Kamil exalted the papacy-like "religous influence" that the 
Ottoman State's Sultan exerted as Caliph over all Muslims in the world including the Egyptians 
regardless of the plural state structures. This in effect whited-out the specific political suzerainty 
that the Sultan traditionally had over Egypt, once. Kamil denied that a single state would in 
future unite Egypt and the Ottoman State. The English were wrong to suppose that the Egyptiam 
would again enter under the protection and rule of Turkey upon withdrawal by Britain of her 
garrison. The Ottoman Sultan as Caliph exerted over the Egyptians as Muslims a religious 
authority like that which the Papacy exerted over the world's Catholics, but nothing suggested 
that "Turkey" (sic) intended to intervene politically in Egypt's affairs. "Turkey" had always 
respected "internal independence" ("autonomy" --- al-istiqlal al-dakhili) which it granted Egypt 
in 1840 in the Treaty of London, resisting the European States' pressure upon her to send troops 
to Egypt at the time of 'Urabi' s revolt. And Egypt had all the means to defend herself in the 
twentieth century13• 
The role allocated to the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph of the world's Muslims, here, kept 
him at arm's length as far as Egypt's administration was concerned. Kamilist pan-Islamism had 
made Egyptians like remote Indonesians whom Turkey had never ruled: the Sultan could lead ---
11. On 14 November 1907, al-Liwa' published an article voicing apprehension that an agreement could be 
concluded between Turkey and Britain at Egypt's expense. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani p. 31. 
12. al-Rafi'i, Mustafa Kamil p. 345. 
13. Mustafa Kamil, "al-Sultan wal-Islam" (The Sultan and Islam), al-Liwa' 28 July 1906, p.1. 
- A184-
but had no specific title to govern. Diffusing the Ottoman State's leadership out over the whole 
far-flung Muslim world made the Sultan's traditional claim to administer nearby Egypt fade from 
mind. 
Kamil in Europe may have muted his movement's real Islamic commitment to the 
Ottoman State, as by 1906 the Kamilists well understood the antipathy towards the Muslim 
Turks existing everywhere in Europe14• The Egyptians, Kamil told the British, did hope that 
"Turkey" --- post-Ottomanist terminology! --- would modernize and become an internationally 
strong state like Japan. He reassured his English audience, however, that neither Egyptians nor 
"Turks" intended to merge in one state again "because we know very well that that would unite 
Europe together in opposition against us"15• By now, Kamil saw mainstream or official France 
as having much the same attitudes to Muslims, including Egyptians, as his nation's British 
enemy. The interconnected Islamophobic discourses of the British and French spurred him to 
tighten pan-Islamic relationship with the Ottoman State beyond his common sense about the 
weakness of all Muslims. In September 1906, Kamil responded with hurt and anger when the 
establishment Le Temps readily echoed a French journalist in Cairo that his movement wanted 
Turkish troops to invade in order to restore Egypt to administration by Istanbul: Kamil, Le 
Temps soon stereotyped, had made "L'Egypte vilayet turc" his followers' guiding slogan16• 
14. Ahmad Hilmi noted that "there exists in England a large party opposed to further colonial expansion. 
However, this party does not incline to Turkey to the extent that it does not wish to even hear her name, such is its 
extreme hatred". "Quwwat al-Wataniyyah" (The Power of Patriotism), al-Liwa' 7 August 1906, p. 1. 
15. Kamil, "al-Sultan wal-Islam" (1906). Kamil did not dream up --- although he overrated --- the capadty 
fear of pan-Islam had to bring together European nations that usually loathed each other. French diplomats learned 
in 1881 that exiles contributed from Istanbul to the Algerian rebellion of 1871, with modest facilities from Ottoman 
officials, and were fanning preparations for another uprising (shortly to break out in Wahran). The French greatly 
feared this rising tide of "Muslim fanaticism", and kept the British informed of all they learned about the world-wide 
agitation --- implying that the two powers, despite their differences, had a common interest in controlling 
pan-Islamic anti-imperialism together. Kemal H. Karpat, "Pan-Islamism: Imperial Plot or Muslim Popular 
Resistance to Imperialism?" (preliminary paper prepared for ICOPS conference on Ottoman studies, June 30-July 4 
1981, Madrid) pp. 14-15. One French ambassador to Istanbul, though, had enough common sense to assess in 1880 
that the pan-Islamic "conspiracy" existed mostly in the minds of the French and English: all the Porte actually 
wanted in establishing closer relations with far-off Muslim leaders was to strengthen its position at home and to have 
the help of Muslims in case of a war between the Ottomans and Europe. Ibid pp. 16-17. 
16. Kamil, "Le Patriotisme et Pan-Islamisme", Le Temps 8 September 1906 pp. 1-2. Kamil wrote this 
article to refute a denunciation of him and his movement by an anonymous French journalist resident in, or at least 
writing from, Cairo: "Le Pan-Islamisme en Egypte", Le Temps 22 August 1906. This writer charged that the 
al-Liwa' nationalists were hostile to all European powers, including to France and her control in North Africa, and 
that this "fanaticism" had turned all French-language newspapers in Egypt against Kamil. Significantly, Kamil did 
not in his reply claim to have any friends left in Egypt's French press, nor did he much localize that press and its 
criticisms as promoting the communalist self-interest of resident Europeans more Francophone than French. Rather, 
Kamil accepted its increased support for the British Occupation as a reflection of the convergence of metropolitan 
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Karnil mocked the joint paranoia of the French and British that "the peoples of Islam" would 
either want or be able to band together to wage war on Europe. The never-ending uprisings of 
peninsular Arabian insurgents against the Porte cast doubt on Turkey's capacity, as well as will, 
to lead other Muslim peoples into any such conflict. "Pan-Islarnism as understood in Europe has 
no existence" because "the Muslims, Turkey at their head, have understood for a long time that 
no nation can live isolated" --- to be cut off from the West's modernity was to be "condemned to 
death" for his cultures-incorporating "enlightened" elite. The other side of Kamil, though, 
ignited that "Europe intervenes in Turkey for the Christians and in the name of humanity" ---
"anti-Muslim actions" that made him defiantly defend pan-Islarnism as the natural 
counter-measure17• Here, Karnil perceived anti-pan-Islam as a culture-motif with which British 
leaders like Sir Edward Grey --- reinforcing joint interests from the 1904 Entente --- could well 
win the assent of France about Egypt. 
Discrete "Interest of the Homeland". To Egyptian audiences, Karnil did defend alliance 
with the Ottoman State as in Egypt's interest. He was Egyptianist enough to carefully try to keep 
space between the two political units, but failed to award Egypt the self-contained history and 
freedom of action vis-a-vis the neighboring nation that West European nationalisms stipulated. 
Thus, in an 1897 speech in Alexandria, Karnil defended his party's support for the Ottoman State 
in its current war with Greece in t~rms of Egypt's interests: "what would have been the political 
fate of Egypt had --- God forbid! --- the Ottoman troops been defeated?" The defeat and 
partition of the Ottoman State, Egypt's legal suzerain, would have led to "Egypt being lost 
forever in the hand of the occupiers". To the argument of his critics that Egypt had under 
Muhammad 'Ali fought the Ottoman State, Karnil rhetorically replied: 
France's interests with those of Britain since the Entente Cordiale. "Le Patriotisme ... " His opponent was very 
French in his defence of his British co-imperialists: they had eliminated previous tyranny and almost doubled 
Egypt's trade: the flaw was their arrogant self-segregation from natives who wanted to self-Europeanize under their 
direction(= versus France's gregarious missionary assimilationism in Tunisia and Algeria). Le Temps accepted his 
claim that Kami! wanted the Turks to take Egypt in "Le Pan-Islamisme en Afrique", Le Temps 23 August 1906 p. 1, 
and in "L'Effervescence Musulman en Asie" ibid 24 August 1906 p. 1. 
17. Kami!, "Le Patriotisme ... " Despite his clear sense by 1906 that all European powers, including even 
more laicist France, were very susceptible to pan-Christian anti-Ottoman, anti-Muslim emotions and appeals, Kamil 
yet again refused to move away from the ideologies of large religious supra-national camps or political communities 
that turned Frenchmen against Egyptian independence. As he had in 1895, he yet again offered an alliance of 
pan-Muslim and pan-Christian camps: "as Muslims, we are for an entente between the Islamic World and the 
Christian World". His reply in Le Temps once more amounted to making Egyptian "patriotism" take responsibility 
before French opinion for the Ottoman Turks' conflicts with the Christian nationalities they had ruled or continued 
to govern --- as if winning some sympathy for Egypt was not a big enough task! Ibid. Cf A 171-175. 
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Yet are Egypt's hostilities with the Ottoman State in 1840 inherently fated to last forever! 
Are not nations, like individuals, brought together by interest and common benefit? Did 
France not fight Russia in 1854 yet today they have become united? Did not Germany 
fight Austria and Austria fight Italy, and yet these three states united and remain united? 
Was not England a friend of Turkey, yet today has become her greatest enemy?18 
Here Kamil for the while disregarded traditional Islamic political concepts. These had 
considered the political unity of the Muslims to be prescribed by religion, and disunity as a 
reproach. Kamil in this passage formally argued that Egypt and the Ottoman State were two 
discrete political units. These would adopt friendly or hostile relations towards each other, in the 
same way that independent nation-units in Europe alternately warred and allied as their shifting 
discrete interests decreed. Moreover, Kamil' s observations about change in relations between 
England and Turkey implied that the same fluid alliances of interests could also occur between a 
Muslim and a Christian-European state. 
Kamil's ingrained assumption of the inherent (if non-unitary) political community of all 
Muslims left him unable to duplicate the atomistic nationalism that Europe patterned, even in the 
same speech: 
Yes, Egypt was against the Ottoman State in 1840 and was in grievous error to be so, 
Yes, Muhammad 'Ali was wrong and he knew before his death that he had been misled 
and erred. Politically, Egypt's hostility with the Ottoman State was a great error; a 
mistake, too, in terms of Egypt's ~d the Ottoman State's interests alike19• 
Under the surface of the words and arguments excqanged with the European enemies of his 
movement, Kamil maintained intact key attitudes from traditional Islam. He never genuinely 
considered the possibility that a clash of fundamental interests between two Muslim political 
units could lead to a true antagonistic relation, of which war would be the natural resolution. N01 
that a Muslim population or polity might in pursuit of its interests ally with a European State 
against a Muslim enemy. For Kamil, Muslim nations had no absolute right to pursue their 
external interests at the expense of other nations in Islam's international bloc-community. He 
could not bring himself to be cold-blooded about the Turks or other Muslim nations in the way 
that a secular Egyptianist nationalist could be. 
al-Rafi'i and later Egyptian historians were right, then, that Mustafa Kamil wanted to 
keep Egypt a separate state. Kamil was no reunificatory neo-Ottomanist and, as Steppat 
18. Ahmad Rashad, Mustafa Kamil: Hayatuhu wa Kifahuh (Cairo: Mitba 'at al-Sa'adah 1958) p. 183. 
19. Ibid. 
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assessed, was not 
device to consolidation British Kamilists, repeatedly rebuffed by an 
expansionist Europe prone to parallel anti-Muslim discourses, came to view international 
relations as between broad antagonistic blocs or camps (Christian Europe and Islam) rather than 
atomistic nations. To beat back the West, they wanted to solidify and more tightly integrate the 
far-flung Muslim world. Most of it was now colonized --- with the enfeebled Ottoman State its 
residual core for sovereignty. The world's Muslims had to strengthen it so that one day it could 
become a strong modern state, and not just militarily --- a rallying-point for Muslims to recover 
strength against the colonialist Europeans. 
Although it was not a drive to reincorporate Egypt into the Ottoman State, West-activated 
Kamilist pan-Islam so identified the Ottoman "Caliph" 
with Islam as to irreversibly restrict the policy options that the leaders could consider. 
The enraging Islamophobe discourses of most Europeans and the slivers from traditional Islam 
locked together in an almost fated way, here. And in a 1903 La Figaro article, Kamil finally 
almost assented to become something akin to what the French (of whom he had despaired) 
insisted he and all Muslims could only be: 
There is a lot of talk Europe about Muslims uniting. They consider it a great danger to 
peace and more evidence of Islam's mythical fanaticism. We must place everything in its 
context forcefully to refute this charge, since ... Islam has prescribed mutual assistance 
by Muslims as a pre-condition for their strength and military preparedness --- although 
the stupidity of some [local] princes/rulers (umara') and the ignorance of the rabble have 
undone the bonds of unity between the Islamic nations for past centuries, tempting 
Europe to enslave them one after the other. But the covert Crusader Wars that Europe 
wages against Islam have alerted the Muslims to [the necessity for] mutual love and 
maintaining interest in each other's affairs and for rallying around the banner of the 
Sultan, who is at once the Commander of the Faithful (Amir al-Mu'minin) and their 
Khalifah (Caliph), that is to say the religious and political head of the whole Islamic 
World21 • 
However uneven his acquaintance with classical Islamic terminology, Kamil's 1903 cri 
20. Fritz Steppat, Nationalismus und Islam Bei Mustafa Kamil in Die Welt des Islams v. iv (1956) pp. 
287-289. Kamil once stated that to return Egypt to the status of an ordinary Ottoman province would be at variance 
with the age of civilization and international law. At most, he was at odd times prepared to include Egypt among the 
"Ottoman nations" in the plural, but never in a single "Ottoman nation" (al-Ummat al-'Uthmaniyyah). Ibid p. 288. 
21. Mustafa Kamil, "Urubba wal-Islam" (Europe and Islam). al-Liwa' 22 September 1903. 
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de coeur to La Figaro and the French had an unusually vehement and undivided pan-Muslim 
community impulse. This derived its force from an uncommon conjunction of (a) the most 
noxious European attitudes --- including unrealistically unitary ways in which Westerners 
perceived Muslims --- with (b) Arabic's high cultural memory of earlier grand classical 
Arabo-Muslim empires (already adapted by al-Afghani and Kamil's mentor al-Nadim). 
Conceivably, had enough such Western and Arab culture pressures coincided with masterly 
Ottoman self-modernization, Kamil might have accepted some kind of reincorporation. As 
Egypto-Arab history proceeded to develop, though, the communication is most significant as a 
view of indigenous history that for decades was to sap and obstruct particularist evocation after 
1922 of a separate Egyptian history under Islam. Here, early Arabo-Islamic united empire was 
the golden age and later break-up barbarization. After Egypt obtained independence in 1922, 
however, secularish writers such as Ahmad Amin, Taha H(!.sayn, Tawfiq al-Hakim and 'Abbas 
Mahmud al-' Aqqad seized on the breakdown of the political unity of the' Abbasid Muslim 
empire through the ambition of various usurpers as asse~ing a qiscrete Egyptian nation's will to 
independence22• From the 1930s, poetry by classical Arabs resident in Egypt was scanned for 
cultural expression of a separate territorial Egyptian nationality (B 179-184). The more 
quasi-unitary pan-Muslim statements by Kamil and his colleagues before 1918, prefigured how 
persistently classical Arab culture would continue to condition Egyptians to lament the later 
pluralization of power centres and state units in Islam as decline and dangerous weakness before 
the West --- not the particularoids' restoration of normality. This negativity would be crucial to 
the triumph of the pan-Arab ethnic national identification in the 1930s and 1940s. Kamil's 1903 
and 1906 remarks to the two Paris papers, though, show how semi-unitary periodization of 
Arabo-Muslim history (he just maintained umam, plural Muslim nations) could get heightened 
through self-definition against the discourses of an imperialist Europe. One needed the foreign 
languages, though, to hear the Western voices that Islamized. 
22. Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 
1961) p. 143. Ahmad Amin in 1929 and 1945 cited Ibn Tulun's ninth century secession from the Baghdad-centred 
'Abbasid Empire, the establishment of the anti-' Abbasid Fatirnid state in Cairo, and the later Mamluks. Amin 
admitted that the partition of the 'Abbasid Empire weakened Islam internationally, but argued that the multiplication 
of Muslim political centres improved local administration, kept each country's wealth at home, and furthered local 
development of culture. Ibid pp. 143-144 and 162. 
needs of 
a new age varieties of strength the imperialists commanded to be 
duplicated. sense that Egypt could not go it alone, but would have to build joint economic 
and political as well as military strength with a Muslim bloc centred around the Ottoman State, 
was structured as a response to the global scope of Western nation-states in the era of 
imperialism. 
Classical and post-classical theories of Islamic Caliphate varied: all preferred one united 
Islamic state, but some offered leeway for plural Muslim state-units23 • The journalists and 
orators of Kamil' s movement synthesized emotional motifs from universal Caliphate with 
modern technologies and ventures, to put together a quite new relationship with "the Turks". 
Their pan-Islam did have some nostalgia for early Ottoman prowess against Europe, but usually 
did not seek to reincorporate Egypt into the Ottoman Empire it helped restrengthen. 
The modern West's own pan-Christianism in international relations fueled and 
legitimized the symmetrical community that the Kamilists early constructed around 
the Ottoman State. Chapter 3 showed that Kamil during 1897-1898 Greco-Turkish War 
already defended his movement's fund-raising for the Ottoman Army --- while "religious" --- as 
a response to all the aid a range of European states (not just Britain) gave Christian nationalities 
in "the East" to revolt against, or attack;, the Ottoman Empire (A 174). Kamilist writers depicted 
the drive to strengthen the Ottoman State to the followers as a religious duty imposed by Islam, 
comparable to the duty to win independence for Egypt. Ahmad al-Badawi in an al-Liwa' article 
on "Islam and Independence" defined the lifting of the yoke of occupation as "our first demand" 
23. According to H.A.R. Gibb, "even in the Sunni community, there was no one universally accepted 
doctrine of the Caliphate". Gibb, "Some Considerations on the Sunni Theory of the Caliphate", Studies on the 
Civilization of Islam (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1962) p. 148. al-Mawardi (d. 1058) denied that there could 
be two Caliphs at one time --- although 'Abd al-Qahir Ibn Tahir al-Baghdadi (d. 1037) already accepted the legality 
of the existence of two Caliphs in widely separate lands. "al-Mawardi's Theory of the Caliphate", in ibid. p. 153. 
The Caliph Harun al-Rashid in 800 AD had recognised the hereditary amirate of the Aghlabites (theoretically 
vassals) over North Africa, although al-Mawardi tried to centralize every function of state upon the 'Abbasid Caliph. 
Ibid pp. 162, 153. Later theories held that rulers who enforced the shari'ah won title to be termed caliphs in their 
own domain without any expectation that any would come to rule all Muslims: figures like the Grand Moghul 
Awrangzeb in India and the Ottoman Sultan were accepted as simultaneous caliphs, although they lacked any 
blood-link to the Prophet. " ... Sunni Theory of the Caliphate", ibid pp. 144-147. It looks a contradiction that Kamil 
(a) exalted the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph oflslam and sought to make and tighten a host of novel linkages with his 
State, while (b) not raising or sidestepping political reincorporation. Yet he may not have been so unconnected with 
Muslim tradition given the diversification in Sunni thought that Gibb uncovered. 
as to "support 
commanded us "we [Egyptians] be discharging a religious 
obligation". al-Badawi thus readily accepted title of' Abdul-Hamid as Caliph to command 
outside Muslims to undertake specific international acts designed to help him defend his state. 
The colonialist West's power made al-Badawi think in terms of all Islam, of the early Arab 
Caliphs' Islamic universal empires, of the need of the world's modern Muslim nations for a 
successor international power centre: 
Islam was established only through the aid men gave it [the Caliphate], had strength only 
through preservation of its [the Caliphate's] entity ... [and] can have glory only through 
the sacrifice of martyrs and property when the time comes to defend it [the Caliphate]; 
Islam has no boast except through the Caliphate's independence and repelling all enemies 
who try to touch even a span of its [the Caliphate's] land24 • 
A 1903 article titled "The Ottoman State's Need of a Fleet" likewise conveys the 
Kamilists' intense involvement the survival and strength of the Ottoman State. The Ottoman 
Sultan, and the interests of his state, are closely identified with universal Islam. M. 'Izzat 
identifies the Ottoman State Egypt's (and the general Islamic world's) condition 
colonial rule. Powerless, subjugated Muslims desperately yearn for Islam's world power-centre, 
the Ottoman State, to achieve strength on their behalf: 
The recent war between the Ottoman State and the Greeks had hardly broken out ... 
before all Islamic nations were craning their neck ... to find out how much resistance [the 
State] could mount ... The Muslims now, in all areas of the earth are not forgetful of the 
promise the Khalifah made to them to continue his efforts to restore Islamic naval 
strength to its previous might and past glory, that the [Ottoman] State may gain capacity 
to resist all adversities and demonstrate before the European world a might that will win 
respect ... Ah, it is as if I can see all the Muslims who have veritably flocked to the 
Residence of the Caliphate (Dar al-Khilafah: Constantinople) from every side and comer 
and have lined up before the Yildiz palace ... all begging with a single voice 'O 
Commander of the Believers ... Can you not bestow one piercing glance on the Islamic 
fleet and resurrect it anew ... that you may revive the hopes of the Muslims ... all devoted 
to you, be they your subjects or non-subjects, alike?' 25 • 
This sense of the Ottoman State's Sultan as international Islam's "Caliph" perpetuated some 
24. Ahmad al-Badawi "al-Islamu wal-Istiqlal" (Islam and Independence) al-Liwa', 23 August 1903. We die 
not find any biodata about Ahmad al-Badawi. 
25. M. Izzat, "Hajat al-Dawlah li-Ustul" (The Ottoman State's Need of a Fleet), al-Liwa' 8 August 1903 
p.l. I found no biodata about M. 'Izzat. 
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slow to 
appeal charismatic 
Sultan-Caliph, who heads Islam's universal as well as the Ottoman State. This Leader 
activates his semi-magical power to instantaneously make "the broken inert wood" of the Islamic 
fleet "throb with the blood of new life". This in part late-traditional messianic Muslim outlook 
could, in spasms, obscure the engineering and detail of administrative institutions and processes. 
The Sultan-"Caliph" 'Abdul-Hamid's very religion-justified autocracy might have hampered 
initiative and increased specialization in the bureaucracy. More complex, diffused government 
was a prerequisite for constructing modem armed forces, navies and merchant fleets. 'Izzat 
vividly evoked the military greatness of the Ottoman State's early past: "that happy age in which 
the Ottoman family had a fleet that was a byword for invincibility and people titled their Sultan 
'Sultan of the two Continents and Emperor of the two Seas"'26• Pan-Muslim restoration of the 
Empire as a centre of military and economic strength for the globe's Muslims had to renew, and 
was inspired by, the Ottoman Sultans' early internationally feared might. Only, when the 
Ottoman Sultans were strongest, rule over Egypt, a province of Empire, was 
tightest. Working in the other direction, "non-subjects" could be members in the pan-Muslim 
political community with the "Caliph" along with "the subjects". 
'Izzat and al-Badawi pervasively connected the Ottoman State's Sultan, as "Caliph", to 
Islam. This religious definition would not orientate the constituency to a pragmatic, reversible~ 
alliance with the Ottoman State. Both writers gave the Ottoman State's Sultan-Caliph an 
international religio-political standing that would entitle him to command Egyptians to undertake 
specific measures to strengthen his State. Moreover, 'Izzat' s priority that Muslims achieve 
international strength, and nostalgia for the might of the Ottoman State (when it firmly ruled 
Egypt), might have assented to reamalgamation with it had it really managed to modernize itself. 
Both, though, knew that any such happy outcome could be in the distant future: like 
Kamil sometimes, they saw the current Ottoman State as ramshackle and vulnerable, and bound 
to remain so for some time at the least. 
Kamilist pan-Islam ran gripping, vivid, primary motifs from traditional Islam as a 
26. Ibid. 
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motivating fuel into a collective nations-spanning self-modernization frankly out to naturalize 
sectors of Europe's civilization in the Islamic world. Incorporative of non-Muslim strength ---
but also liberalism---, Kamil declared to a British audience in 1906 that Egyptians hoped the 
Ottoman State could become a strong state with developed civilization like Japan27 . A 1903 
number of al-Liwa' carried an account of the Ottoman Imperial factory at Herkeh, so productive 
that the Sultan ordered installation of electric lighting to make night shifts possible28• But 
al-Liwa's Istanbul correspondent on the same page saw the lack of practical education in "the 
East" as the great stumbling-block to the development of indigenous manufactures and 
commerce that the pan-Muslims craved29• With its usual reflex, acculturation viewed 
self-Westernization by Turkey as carrying forward the dynamic of classical Arab Islam. In 1893, 
the youthful Kamil hailed "the Commander of the Faithful" 'Abdul-Hamid's construction of 
numerous Europe-modelled government schools throughout his State as restoring to "the 
Easterners" the educational endeavor of the first Caliphs: that "the quality of education offered" 
was "no less than in comparable schools in Europe ... promises a bright future" to "us 
Ottomans"30• If the Ottoman State truly developed modernity able to contend with the West's, it 
could build up assent to reincorporation in Egypt --- if the Sultan and then the CUP had enough 
interest and courage to press for that. Kamil and his colleagues, though, to his death learned 
from the Ottoman State as another self-modernizing entity comparable with Egypt, rather than a 
more advanced model. However, collective modernization could unprecedentedly integrate a 
widening pan-Muslim community extending far beyond any borders the Ottoman Turks had ever 
governed, making memories of past political unity between Egypt and the Ottoman State less 
pertinent. The Kamilists sought West-like commercial and economic means --- not an 
amalgamation of states --- to unprecedentedly integrate the far-flung international Islamic 
community. 
A case in point is a 1903 al-Liwa' article titled "A Great Islamic Project" detailing 
discussion in Constantinople among "the major Muslim traders" of plans to expand trade 
27. Ka.mil, "al-Sultan wal-Islarn", al-Liwa' 28 July 1906 p. 1. 
28. al-Liwa' 17 February 1903. 
29. "al-Hayat al-Wahiyah wal-Hayat al-Mu'abbadah" (Insubstantial Life and Eternal Life), al-Liwa' 17 
February 1903 p. 2. 
30. 'Ali Fahrni Ka.mil, Mustafa Kamil fi Arba'a wa Thalathina Rabi'an 10 vls (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Liwa' 
1908-1911) v. 2 p. 9. 
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between Constantinople and the Far East. A Muslim international trading company was to be 
established with large capital to "win control over the resources of trade between Islamic fands 
from the Near East to the Far East". The implicitly anti-Western project would utilize a 
Muslim-owned fleet of steamers to transport grain from al-Basrah and Baghdad and salt from 
other Ottoman territories to India; from China the steamers would bring silk and tea; from Java 
and Sumatra tea and spices and other products from the tropics; from Rangoon rice, from 
Calcutta jute and indigo, and so forth31 • 
al-Liwa' gave an enthusiastic front-page welcome to this ambitious project to 
economically integrate geographically very far-flung regions inhabited by Muslims --- in some, 
such as China, only as a minority. Once more, the desired Muslim political community was 
being expanded out far beyond Egypt's historical Ottoman political community. The item 
instanced how (a) the Karnilists' Islamic ideology and (b) their perceptions of current 
international activities and realities still controlled by the West, structured each other and 
inter-penetrated. The item on the Islamic Fleet is like al-Liwa's coverage of the Hijaz railway 
project, discussed below. In both categories, the paper interwove and fused Islam as a ritual 
religion into modernizing temporal endeavors: religion, geo-political power and economics are 
synthesized. The ritual of hajj is a common element present in the two ventures that points the 
Kamilists' adroit acculturated unification of (a) immemorial religious rituals and (b) the modern 
and secular sector. During the hajj season, the forthcoming Company's steamers would transport 
the pilgrims. Like the Hijaz railway, the project to economically mesh the Ottoman Empire, 
India and Burma, China and Indonesia would thus "facilitate the hajj for the pilgrims to God's 
Sacred House in all the Islamic lands". Somewhat as for the Ottoman Empire's construction of 
the network of railroads for heavily military-strategic --- although, to a lesser extent, also 
economic --- purposes, a connection with the pilgrimage to Mecca thus heightened the 
description of the economic venture of trade between Constantinople and the Far East as 
"Islamic". As with communications calling for aid to the Ottoman State itself, including its 
geo-political Hijaz railway project, vocabulary and assertions were applied to inject Islamic 
religious content into what would seem to non-Muslims not particularly religious --- economic or 
military --- phenomena. Constantinople was, in accordance with consistent Kamilist practice, 
31. "Mashru' Islami 'Azim" (A Great Islamic Project), al-Liwa' 18 February 1903 p. 1. 
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termed Dar al-Khilafah ("the Abode of the Caliphate"). The proposed commercial fleet was 
termed "Islamic" although some places with which it would have dealings --- Rangoon, East and 
West India, China, and (less markedly because there were Bengali Muslim elements) Calcutta ---
could not accurately be described as predominantly Muslim. al-Liwa' still categorized them 
among "the Islamic lands"32• However, Sumatra did have solid orthodox Muslim populations. 
The Ottoman Turks had supplied artillery, munitions and military advisers to Acheh's Muslims 
during their sixteenth century wars with the Portuguese in Malacca. Acheh appealed to Turkey 
in 1873 for protection against the invading Dutch; there consequently was consciousness of this 
past relationship with Sumatra among the Middle East's Turks33 • 
The Islamic fleet project stemmed from some Ottoman Turks' history and interests, but 
the Egyptian intellectuals' acculturation motivated the enthusiastic welcome they gave this 
non-Egyptian project. These Western-cultured intellectuals knew too well Europe's modern 
instruments of military and economic strength --- which they wanted Muslims to duplicate as 
tools with which to integrate Islam's global sovereign community. The economic scope of 
British power --- spanning homelands and continents and through trade present in lands Britain 
did not administer --- imposed the new comprehensive world Muslim counter-community or 
bloc. Modern imperialism-fostered communications patterned means to pull together the widest 
Muslim community in new integrations that would not require a single state. Kamilist ideology 
exalted and applied the Caliphate in new ways that could restore meaningful leadership over the 
Muslim nations to the Ottoman Sultan: a future strong Ottoman State could help colonized 
Muslim peoples, near and far, rebuild sovereignty. The Islamic Fleet project made the Kamilists 
expect that a resurgent Ottoman State would direct economic resources and instruments it 
achieved out to Islam's most far-scattered peoples, to mutual benefit. With no individual 
Muslim nation viable alone in the age of global imperialisms, the scope of pan-Islamic 
community and interactions, cultural, political and economic, had to expand further and further 
32. Ibid. 
33. The Ottoman Turks' relationship with the Muslims of Acheh was surveyed by Anthony Reid, 
"Sixteenth Century Turkish Influence in Western Indonesia", Journal of Southeast Asian History (Singapore), v. x 
(1969) pp. 395-414. The Turks mainly supplied arms in the sixteenth century to the Achehnese Sultan' Ala' al-Din 
Ri'ayat Shah al-Qahhar (1537-1571). Descendants of Turkish and Syrian advisers and artisans lived in the village o 
Bitay named after Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem). Ibid p. 398. Dr Reid mentioned a semi-scholarly article on the 
historical Ottoman relationship with the Achehnese --- a 1912 article by the naval historian Saffet Bey in the 
historical magazine Tarihi Osmani Encumeni Mecmuasi. However, that was nine years after our al-Liwa' item. 
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out from the Ottoman State and Arab lands it still ruled or once had. Kamilist ideology 
demanded that the Caliph lead Muslims, rather than govern them. With peoples whom the 
Ottoman State never governed being integrated into this supra-statal pan-Islamic community, 
Egypt's separate statehood would not look un-Islamic. 
The Hijaz Railway 
Known in Arabic as al-Sikkat al-Hamidiyyah, the Railway of' Abdul-Hamid, this was to 
link Arabia to the main arteries of Turkish railways in Anatolia and 'Iraq. The section from 
Damascus to Medinah was completed in 1908 but the extension from Medinah to Mecca never 
was. 'Abdul-Hamid adopted a project of a railway to Arabia in response to an 1898 insurrection 
headed by the Imam of Yemen and defeats that Wahhabis led by' Abd al-' Aziz Ibn Sa'ud 
inflicted upon the Turks in Eastern Arabia. "The main reasons for initiating the Hejaz Railway 
were ... military and political, to strengthen the Sultan's authority in the Arabian Peninsula, 
chiefly in the Hijaz and Red Sea area"34• However, the Ottoman Sultan' Abdul-Hamid stressed 
in communications to the world's Muslims that the railway would facilitate pilgrimage to Mecca. 
This religious characterization made outside Muslims generously donate towards its construction 
costs. We shall see that the Kamilists were to appeal to Egyptians to contribute towards the 
railway on grounds that it would tighten Ottoman control over Arabia, not just facilito.+"-
pilgrimage. The Kamilists also repeated to Egyptian audiences justifications of the railway as a 
means to bring economic development to nomadic and semi-nomadic Arabs, made to Arab 
populations under Ottoman rule. ·. 
The Kamilists had to knit together a range of classes to aid this life-and-death Ottoman 
enterprise. Kamil's, and the other Kamilist leaders', mobilization propaganda addressed to their 
widest Egyptian audiences identified 'Abdul-Hamid as Caliph and therefore entitled by 
divine-revealed Islam to command believers resident in any state to contribute. In a 1903 Arabic 
article, Kamil wove references to Islamic congregational prayers into his plea for Egyptians, 
especially the wealthy, to help finance the railway. Every Friday the Muslims gather in mosques 
in the furthermost Eastern and Western reaches of the earth to call for aid to the Commander of 
34. Jacob M. Landau, The Hijaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage : A Case of Ottoman Political 
Propaganda (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1971) pp. 12-13. 
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the Faithful and the strengthening of his State --- "a call necessitating the uniting of these nations 
(umam) and peoples (shu'ub) around the banner of the Caliphate"35• The item thus identified 
political support for the Ottoman Sultan's cause as a religious duty of Islam, as binding as its 
prayer-rituals. It inextricably wove Turkey's Middle East power interests and instruments into 
the ritual life of the world religion that the Sultan headed. In Karnil's presentation, Islam is of 
wider scope than ritual devotions linking the individual believer to God. Islam's religious rituals 
galvanize the believers once more into collective participants in contemporary international 
political history, still controlled by the West: 
The whole world has its eyes on the Muslims in these days and is asking: Are they so 
weak and their resolution so dead that they are incapable of helping the Ottoman State 
extend a railway when the most insignificant of companies in Europe construct numerous 
railways on the initiative and efforts of a few individuals?36 
Westerners made history at that point of time. Yet this selective ultra-political Islam could 
motivate the Muslims, including Egyptians, to construct the modern economic and strategic 
instruments to beat them off. This reformulated Islam, polarized as the antithesis of the West, 
would build up the will and structures among Muslims to economically as well as militarily 
become like --- as well as dislodge --- those enemies. 
Kamil to Egyptians pervasively alternated, juxtaposed and identified the Ottoman State's 
instruments of political power with international Islam and its survival in the world. Egyptians 
who do not help the Caliph in Constantinople extend the Baghdad railway to Mecca and 
Medinah, whatever their intentions might be, in reality offer "support for the sentence of eternal 
death and extinction that Westerners pronounce on Muslims" as a whole. "Muslims in all 
corners of the world" know that the religion's and their own survival depends on the survival of 
the Ottoman state that maintains the Caliphate37 • 
Islam was a unifying trans-class and trans-elite bond. The Kamilists might materially aid 
geo-political instruments to integrate and defend the Ottoman State in other provinces. Yet the 
Hijaz was religiously very special for Muslim Egyptians --- the land into which God sent down 
his Qur'anic revelation to the last Prophet, Muhammad. Pilgrimage to Mecca was also a central 
religious obligation prescribed by Islam for every able Muslim: pilgrims to Mecca usually then 
35. Mustafa Kamil, "Quwwat al-Khalifah" (The Caliph's Strength), al-Liwa, 20 August 1903, p. 1. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid. 
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visited Medinah, 225 miles north-west, where Muhammad lived for ten years and was buried, 
and then often the Masjid al-Aqsa in Jerusalem38• Responding to the frustated religious drives of 
the bourgeois constituency, some of the first numbers of al-Liwa' attacked the Egyptian 
ministers for placing restrictions upon the pilgrimage to Mecca39• Educated Egyptians' religious 
needs would strongly motivate the Kamilists to support the new railway, which would offer 
swift, comfortable transport to Mecca. Egyptian pilgrims had suffered hardships and 
maltreatment by nomads in journeying on foot and camel to Mecca. 
Religion and its shrines were again fused with regional politics in a speech delivered by 
Mustafa Kamil's brother' Ali Bey Kamil at an open-air meeting in the provincial township of 
al-Zaqaziq in 190340• 'Ali Fahrni applied the idiom of religious fervor to raise donations for the 
the Hijaz railway from an audience possibly more popular and less sophisticated or 
secularizing-educated--- less urban --- than the movement's usual Cairo constituency. 
'Ali Kamil was acculturated41 --- but not the less sensitively attuned for that to the 
Islamic religious needs of the Egyptians whom he addressed at al-Zaqaziq. He hammered home 
to them that the railway would make it easy for Egyptians to make combined pilgrimages to 
Mecca, Medinah and Jerusalem42• 'Ali Kamil knew that this religious consideration would win 
generous donations. 
God: 
Like Mustafa, he identified the Sultan and his gee-political requirements with Islam and 
My dear brothers, the person ordering the Railway's construction is His Highness the 
Commander of the Faithful, the Khalifah (Successor) of the Prophet of the Lord of 
38. Charis Waddy, The Muslim Mind (London: Longman 1976) p. 30. 
39. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 318. Cf. the demands that more facilities be granted 
Egyptians to make the hajj pilgrimage in the front-page spread "al-Hajj! al-Hajj!", al-Liwa' 10 January 1903 pp. 1-2. 
40. For al-Zaqaziq ("Zagazig"), capital of al-Sharqiyyah province, see The Statesman's Year Book of 1903 
(London: MacMillan & Co 1903) p. 1195 and EB 11th ed 1911. It contained large cotton factories and offices of 
numerous European merchants: its population in 1907 was 34,999, including 1,355 Greeks. Ibid. 
41. 'Ali Fahrni Kamil's career as an officer in the Egyptian army proved abortive. His nationalism brought 
him into collision with the British, who stripped him of his rank and interned him. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian 
Nationalist Party" p. 316. 'Ali Fahrni translated into Arabic (1909) Juliette Adam's collection of letters from the lat( 
Mustafa: Lettres Eg)'.l)tiennes-Francaises adresses a Mme Juliette Adam. 1895-1908; and also her 1922 L' Angletem 
en Eg)'.l)te --- transmuted into Injilitarra fi Misr (Cairo: 1922). Among' Ali's own French writings that explained 
Egypt's cause to Europeans was his "La Question d'Egypte", Orient et Occident May 1922 pp. 5-20. Thus, 'Ali 
Fahrni Kamil was acculturated to a degree with some active bilingualism in French. Data supplied by Dr Arthur 
Goldschmidt Jr of Pennsylvania State University, in part drawing on al-Zirikli's al-A'lam. 
42. Khutbah bil-Zaqaziq fi-htifalin lil-Sikkat al-Hijaziyyah" (A Speech at al-Zaqaziq in a Meeting on the 
Hijaz Railway), al-Liwa' 9 August 1903 p. 1. 
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Worlds, the Sultan our Lord 'Abdul-Hamid Khan, may Allah aid and support him! ... If 
we want to be Muslims who hold on to our Islam we have no choice but to follow the 
path of true guidance and to gather around the banner of the Sultan. 
'Ali Kamil's cry was "Come, 0 Ye Muslims". Certain of his words and phrases suggest that the 
Sultan's authority or commands derived from or were the authority or commands of God 
Himself. For instance, he reproaches the Egyptians because they still lack "the Arab initiative, 
the religious zeal and the Islamic fervor the bearer of which knows nothing but obedience to the 
command/authority (amr) of Allah and so obeys him who has charge of authority (waliy 
al-amr)"43• 
Pan-Arabism Subsumed Under Ottomanism. The railway would facilitate commerce 
between regions (aqtar) of the Ottoman Empire. It would also "develop agriculture in those 
golden lands" (Transjordan and peninsular Arabia). Contribution by Egyptians to the Hijaz 
railway was "charity" (al-ihsan) that would "bring prosperity to your Arab brothers". It was "the 
relieving of the sufferings of orphans and the poor, righteousness, commanded by religion44• 
Religion in such Egyptian pan-Islamic communications had economic and social life as a sphere. 
As ever in Kamilism, religion and political power, too, were closely connected in' Ali 
Kamil' s speech, intensified by the religious Hijaz context. 'Ali was well aware that this "purely 
religious project" of the Hijaz railway was, among other aspects, an instrument to redistribute 
regional political power. Once completed, it would enable the Ottomans to stop Britain from 
further expanding her influence among the tribes from the coastal colonies and trucial states that 
she already held in the peninsula: it would strengthen the Ottoman State's authority in Arabia. 
The Railway would make possible swift Ottoman troop movements not just to quell lawlessness 
by nomads affecting the movement of pilgrims but "to resist the hidden hands that work in the 
dark to rob this vast glory from the ummah"45 (=here the Muslim world community or nation). 
43. Ibid 
44. Ibid. 'Ali Kamil' s justifications of the Hijaz railway to Egyptians recall earlier ones that the Ottoman 
establishments argued to convince that Empire's Arabs. Thamarat al-Funun, a Sunni Muslim paper in Bayrut, had 
predicted in 1900 that the railway would help repopulate southeastern Syria, pacifying the nomadic tribes and 
halting their raids. It would stimulate agriculture and the exploitation of natural resources, help the Sultan impose 
his authority and enable Muslims from all over the world to make the pilgrimage. Landau, Hijaz Railway p. 20. 
Muhammad' Ariflbn al-Sayyid al-Munir al-Husayni al-Dimashqi, a Damascus educationalist, wrote a book in 
Arabic championing the railway. Like' Ali Fahrni Kamil and Thamarat, he, too, stressed its economic as well as 
purely religious advantages: for instance, it would facilitate the introduction of civilization among "savage 
populations" --- Arab desert nomads, towards whom the Kamilists, too, had their ambivalences. Ibid p. 196 
(Arabic). 
to Hijaz as a 
on of 
mused cannot a Muslim believing Allah and 
Last Day" who could do anything but respond to the Sultan's call for aid. Calculating that 
al-Liwa's modern-stream student readers for religious reasons supported the Hijaz railway, this 
writer tried to discredit al-Mu'ayvad editor' Ali Yusuf --- =the Khedive 'Abbas who financed tha 
paper and had turned against the increasingly populist Kamil --- by charging that he refused to aid 
"this great Islamic project"46• Muhammad Farid in his tributes to Mustafa Kamil upon his death 
assumed that Kamil's support for the Hijaz railway would see;'creditable to the educated 
followers. 
The audiences addressed by Kamil and by coleaders even during his life-time perhaps wer 
already starting to widen out into groups beyond the attached acculturated core-constituency ---
reaching urban workers and even some peasants47• But modernizing-educated Egyptians were as 
readily mobilized into aiding the Hijaz railway by identification of it with religion as Muslim 
Egyptians in general. Indeed, the drives to extend ritual religion into contemporary international 
relations and economics, to make Europe-developed instruments of economic or political power 
(railways, steamers) serve a religion-founded international political community, were the product 
of the conjunction of the two traditions, Islamic and Western, through acculturation. It was the 
religious duty of Egyptians to obey 'Abdul-Hamid's geopolitical commands. The scope that the 
45. 'Ali Fahrni Kami! at al-Zaqaziq, loc. cit. 
46. "Nahnu wal-Mu'ayyad" (We and al-Mu'ayyad), al-Liwa' 3 August 1904. Yet' Ali Yusuf's pan-Islamic 
pro-Ottoman zeal had cooled as the Khedive moved from 1904 towards rapprochement with the British presence in 
Egypt. Wendell documented from a 1907 al-Mu'ayyad article the convergence of his later positions with the --- at 
least in formal argumentation --- more systematic and ideologized Egyptianist particularism of Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyi 
and the Jaridists who (at least on the plane of verbalization) called for pan-Islamism and the link with Ottoman Turb 
to be phased out, ignoring their own deep bonds to that Empire's Turks and Arabs. Lutfi-like, 'Ali Yusuf denied int 
1907 piece that al-Jami' at al-Islamiyyah --- ambiguously, either wider Islamic community or pan-Islamism --- ever 
had had, or ever could have, a political expression. Yusuf now argued that a political pan-Islamism by "the Muslim 
nations" would band European states together against the Muslims in a countering "Christian league" (jami'ah 
Masihiyyah). Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From Its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi 
al-Sayyid (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972) p. 229. 
47. George Young, writing in retrospect after World War I and Egypt's recovery of limited independence, 
characterized that the pre-1914 nationalist movement's "spokesmen were journalists, its thinkers ... lawyers". Yet his 
impression was that al-Hizb al-Watani at some point came to reach out beyond its urban efendiyyat constituency to 
rural audiences: nationalism's "main activity became a vituperative anti-British agitation in French and Arabic journ: 
which were discussed in the town cafes and declaimed aloud in the villages". Young, Egypt 2nd ed. (London: Emes 
Benn 1930) p. 179. Haykal recalled that the rural population was already being reached by Kamil's death, since eve1 
people from far-flung comers of the countryside came to his 1908 funeral in Cairo: B 394-5 fn 57. 
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Kamilists award him to direct Egyptians is material support to the instruments that strengthen and 
integrate his Ottoman state: he would not give orders about Egypt's strictly internal matters. 
Despite this restrictedness, the religious rhetoric with which the Kamilists appealed to Egyptians 
to materially aid the Ottoman State committed them too deeply to leave open a reversible alliance 
of convenience. Religiosity would not equip any Egyptian group to critically assess the Ottoman 
State's policies and needs from the viewpoint of Egypt's interests. However, the British 
Arabophile Wilfrid Scawen Blunt in 1906 characterized Kamil as allied with the Ottoman State 
out of fear lest' Abdul-Hamid barter away Egypt's independence to Britain "for some personal 
interest or fear" --- a perspective perpetuated by such West-resident scholars as Wendell and' Afa 
Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot48• Aid to the Ottoman Empire's judicious railway projects would make it 
less ramshackle before Western powers. 
There were individuals or groups in Istanbul, both officials and private merchants, who 
called for construction of a modem Ottoman navy and also merchant fleet that could command 
military and economic respect. And the Ottoman Turks had some historical linkages with even 
such faraway Muslim countries as Indonesia. Nonetheless, M. 'Izzat' s perception that Ottoman 
officialdom was not getting enough done quickly enough towards making the Islamic fleet a 
reality, and that pressure to get the project moving came from the Caliph's non-subject Muslims 
beyond his Empire as much as from the subjects he administered within it, was lucid. Kemal 
Karpat's researches indicate that more ambitious international pan-Islamism to checkmate or sap 
or confront the expansionist West and centred around the Ottoman core, was not of much interest 
to the cautious, practical' Abdul-Hamid II: rather, "the idea belonged to the outside or peripheral 
Muslims who were seeking a rallying-force" (colonized or threatened Muslims in Egypt and Nort 
48. Wilfred Scawen Blunt, My Diaries (London: Martin Secker, 1919-1920) v. 2 p. 156. Blunt wrote this 
mid-1906 entry immediately after he met Kamil for the first time. He had the impression that Kamil "like all educate 
Egyptians hates and distrusts 'Abdul-Hamid as a tyrant and a dangerous man": his hope lay in the Sultan's death and 
"a liberal and reforming successor to the Caliphate". It is to be noted, though, that Blunt was a Turcophobe: 
Gladstone-like, he penned a pamphlet against 'Abdul-Hamid over the 1894-1896 "Armenian massacres". Ibid p. 455 
It is a fact that Kamil's September 1906 communication on pan-Islamism to Le Temps showed some acquaintance 
with the writings of liberal-secularoid Young Turkey exiles in Europe opposed to 'Abdul-Hamid. "Le Patriotisme et 
Pan-Islamisme" loc cit; cf. Steppat, Nationalismus pp. 290-291. Karpat assessed Sultan' Abdul-Hamid II as quite 
prepared to sacrifice or cede attached lands or peripheral areas of the Ottoman Empire to expansionist Christian 
powers as part of his strategy to buy peace and time for the Ottoman core that he was intent to preserve. 
"Pan-Islamism ... " pp. 5,-6, 27. 'AfafLutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, too, assessed nationalists such as Kamil as afraid that a 
treaty with Turkey might win Britain a legitimate sanction to remain in Egypt permanently. al-Sayyid-Marsot, E!l:vp 
and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations (New York: Praeger 1969) pp. 47, 130. 
to movements change, 
to 
not seek of Islamic World both 
Europeans and Muslims --- who had entirely opposite reasons for wanting to take part in the 
movement --- to accept an important role" as Caliph-symbol. The global Pan-Islamic movement 
needed that central emblemic authority-figure "to achieve the degree of unity necessary for 
resistance". The Sultan-"Caliph" evoked pan-Islamism in order to manipulate colonial powers 
fearful of its appeal to their Muslims --- Britain, France and Russia --- into acquiescence with the 
continued "integrity of his realm, rather than actually to oppose European imperialism". Some 
"high Ottoman officials such as Sa'id Pasha, Khayruddin Pasha and several generals --- not to 
speak of religious leaders --- developed elaborate projects for organizing an Islamic Union", but 
'Abdul-Hamid adroitly kept them only paper schemes50. 
'Abdul-Hamid had manipulated the Kamilists, like other colonized Muslim groups, into 
strengthening his realm by contributing to the Railway. He had met their minimum requirement 
by not legalizing Britain's Occupation of Egypt, which would have ended his own 
bargaining-power as well. Yet Kamil and colleagues --- more modern as well as more 
religious in their supra-statal concept of sovereignty than either 'Abdul-Hamid or post-World Wa 
II orientalists --- wanted much more. 
Anti-Turkish Christian Nationalisms 
Kamilist solidarity with Turkey against Christian nations she had once ruled, or which 
were still fighting her for independence, perceived those nationalities vividly from a number of 
acculturated angles. Like the Jaridists (Ch. 6), the Kamilists imaged Armenians, Greeks, Bulgars 
etc almost as intimately as they characterized Turks --- making their pan-Islamism very different 
from the simpler variant of monolingual Egyptians. Kamilist opposition to these Christian 
nationalisms was diverse and inconsistent, the more emotionally involved because of multiple 
angles and ambivalences. It was unpredictable and out of control of calculated pursuit of Egypt'~ 
49. Private letter from Professor Kemal H. Karpat, Department of History, University of Wisconsin-Madise 
dated 2 November 1981. 
50. Karpat, "Pan-Islamism: Imperial Plot or Muslim Popular Resistance to Imperialism?" pp. 6-7, 28-29. 
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international interests that required a strong Ottoman State. 
Early in the Nasir period, the Egyptian pan-Arab journalist-analyst Ahmad Baha' al-Din 
faulted Katnil for identifying his independence movement so closely with the cause of the 
Ottoman regime: it could only harm his lobbying of European support to evict Britain, given that 
such "European peoples" as the Greeks were "revolting against Turkish imperialism"51• Althougl 
not so much as would have been the case had he mainly addressed the British public, Kamil 
undoubtedly found his support for' Abdul-Hatnid against Greek, Armenian and other Christian 
nationalisms a PR problem when appealing to the French. Mme Juliette Adam and associated 
French nationalists may have sometimes even gone so far as to credit British manipulation of 
Greek and Armenian insurgencies against the Turks for expansion, but it was delicate chemistry j 
even La Nouvelle Revue might not lapse into Turcophobia when serious blood-letting got 
underway52. It would be inadequate, though, to view Katnil' s posture of opposition to those · 
insurgent Christian nationalisms only as a residual traditionalist dysfunction in his psyche that 
resurges against requirements in the Francophone milieus he had to court. Greeks and Armenian 
51. Ahmad Baba' al-Din, under Nasir an incisive pan-Arab columnist in al-Ahram and the weekly 
al-Musawwar, felt that the Kamilists' vocal apologetics for Turkey lost the cause of Egyptian independence support 
from Europeans sympathetic to the Christian nationalities fighting for independence, and also, to a degree, even to 
Turks working to replace' Abdul-Hamid's despotism with constitutional government. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani l 
30. Did Mustafa Kamil know Egypt's interest, Baha' al-Din queried, given that the Sultan' Abdul-Hamid had issue< 
the famous statement that 'Urabi was an apostate rebel, as the British attacked? --- to which we saw (Ch. 3) the 
youthful Kamil's eyes were well open as he put together his intial Pan-Islamic-Egyptianist position in Europe: A 
164. 
S'l. The chemistry of La Nouvelle Revue could ignite either way, although it usually scorched Britain arour 
the time of Kamil's conjunction. The extreme of anti-Britishism was Juliette Adam's 1895 formulation that "the 
terrifying [British] octopus is fastening its tentacles around the bodies of all the nations": it was Britain that was 
inciting the Cretans as well as Armenians to dismember the Ottoman Empire in order to occupy 'Iraq and make 
Armenia its route to India. La Nouvelle Revue November-December 1895 pp. 387-389, 166-167. Classicist literar) 
Graecism and their residual but durable identification with all Christians, in combination made La Nouvelle Revue 
contributors open to Hellenic nationalism --- more than to Armenian insurrectionism. The 1897 struggle and war O> 
Crete won 'Abdul-Hamid and the Turks unfriendly notices in La Nouvelle Revue. The Greek nationalists had an oi:; 
forum, presenting images of "les massacres de nos freres Cretois", sanitizing out the latters' pogroms against the 
Muslim-Cretan minority: "S.L." (Athens), "La diplomatie Europeane dans le conflit Greco-Turc", La Nouvelle Revt 
July-August 1897 pp. 618-627; cf Jean Pischari, "Les Armeniens, les Cretois et l'Europe", La Nouvelle Revue 
May-June 1897 pp. 54-70 and Comte de Chalo, "En Yacht au Pays de la Guerre Greco-Turque", La Nouvelle Revue 
September-October 1897 pp. 480-497, 694-713. Juliette Adam, too, responded with comparatively moderate and 
judicious sympathy for the "wise'; Orthodox Cretans --- voicing the hope that they would win from the Powers, 
without whose duress 'Abdul-Hamid would not budge, an autonomy that foresaw something very like what they we 
in fact to be granted. Adam's item had a sharp, cherishing awareness of contemporaneous Greek royalty. La Nouv1 
Revue May-June 1896 p. 716. Massacres against Christian nationalities in the Ottoman Empire and despotic 
repression by 'Abdul-Hamid --- although with some sympathy for his constitutionalist Turkish as well as Armenian 
victims, also --- were flayed by Joseph Denais in "Le Sultan", La Nouvelle Revue March-April 1897 and his "Les 
victim es du Sultan: la demission de Fouad Pacha", ibid May-June pp. 71-78. 
Europeans 
to themes by those two 
consciousness with he had to cope from the French, further irritated and inflamed his sour 
perceptions of the disparity between (a) Muslim Egyptians and (b) minority Christian Greeks or 
Armenians in Egypt who linked out into distant anti-Ottoman nationalisms. Kamil voiced 
considerable awareness to the French of Egyptian PM Nubar's Christianity and that he was 
racially non-Egyptian, a member of an Armenian nation centred outside who pursued its interests 
within Egypt. To dispel impressions in France that (Muslim) Egyptians were religiously fanatical 
Kamil in 1895 observed that "Nubar Pasha, who is Christian, presided last year in the Khedive's 
name over our most important [Islamic] ceremony, the ceremony of the sacred cloth [mahmal], 
and that to the applause of the crowd"53 . Elsewhere, though, Kamil argued to his French readers 
that Nubar's non-Egyptian origin made him readier to betray Egypt's interests than Muslim 
ministers, themselves often Turco-Circassian, who collaborated with the British occupation. 
Following the 1882 conquest, the Sudanese revolted, and the British pressed the Egyptian 
government to renounce rights over the Sudan. The Prime Minister Sharif Pasha resigned 
rather than comply. "But Nubar, the Armenian, taking power, accepted that which so outraged his 
predecessor and renounced the Egyptian Sudan"54. In Kamil's mind, Nubar sacrificed Egypt's 
Sudan because his supreme political loyalty was extraterritorial, to the Armenian nation: Colonel 
Baring, Cromer's brother, told him that Nubar had asked the British to work for Armenia's 
national independence from the Ottoman State to reward his services to Britain's policies in Egyp 
and the Sudan55. 
Bad parochial relations with an immigrant Christian minority also fed his solidarity with 
the Turks before Europeans in regard to Greek nationalism. The Kamilists' support for the 
Ottoman State in the 1897 war brought tensions with Egypt's resident Greeks near flash-point. 
53. Mustafa Kamil, "L' Absorption par I' Angleterre", La Nouvelle Revue 15 December 1895 p. 821. 
54. Kamil, "Une Alliance qui s'Impose", La Nouvelle Revue 15 November 1895 p. 380. Tignor notes that 
Sharif, although Turco-Circassian, had, prior to the British conquest, won some popularity among nationalist 
Egyptians because he favored constitutionalism as Prime Minister. Robert L. Tignor, Modernization and British 
Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914 (Princeton University Press 1966) pp. 63, 175. 
55. Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu'asir (Bayrut, 2 vols: Dar 
al-Irshad 1970) v. 1 p. 223. 
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Kamil hastily returned to Egypt from Paris in 1897 (as he wrote to Juliette Adam) to head off 
near-successful attempts by the British to incite resident Greeks to rise up and attack "the 
Muslims"56. Kamil's statements in Egypt worsened Greek-Muslim relations. He publicly 
proposed to the victorious Ottoman Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid that Turkey not withdraw from Thessal; 
until Britain withdrew from Egypt. The proposal triggered off an accusation by the Greek-owned 
Phare d' Alexandrie that Kamil was anti-Greek57• Kamil's perceptions of Greeks in Egypt were 
very much religious. In 1895 he told the French that the Greeks living among the non-fanatical 
fallahs in Egypt's villages "traffic in alcohol and take interest, both prohibited in the Muslim 
religion"58• 
Although parochial sourness was important, Kamil and fellow acculturated Muslim 
Egyptian intellectuals had also been exposed from formative adolescence to articulations of Gree~ 
nationalist ideology by resident Greek journalists. Those local French newspapers and such 
Hellenophile metropolitan French organs as La Nouvelle Revue built up a substantial feel for the 
historical view of Greek Nationalism among Kamilists --- who evoked it to mollify Egypt's 
Greeks to the extent possible while supporting Turkey against Greece. An instance was Mustafa 
Kamil's reply, published in Alexandria's French-language La Reforme in mid-1897, to attacks by 
the Greek John Haicalis in his Phare d' Alexandrie upon Kamil's proposal that the Ottoman State 
withdraw from Thessaly only when Britain withdrew from Egypt. Kamil urged Egypt's Greeks t' 
respect our views as we respect yours. You see things from the angle of the interest of the 
Greeks while we see them from the vantage-point of Egypt's interests. It is only just that 
each of us5hould be sincere in devotion to his homeland ... Regardless of all these politica 
considerations, and the sensitivities of our ummah (nation), we do appreciate the patriotis1 
of the Greeks, for any Egyptian cannot but respect all who defend their homeland whatev( 
their nationality might be59• 
It was not only when conducting intercommunal diplomacy for Egypt's independence tha 
Kamil expressed interest in the ideologies motivating the struggles of Christian nationalities 
against the Islamic Ottoman State. He showed in communications to his Egyptian followers a 
genuine analytical interest in more secular aspects of these anti-Turkish, anti-Muslim movements 
Kamil early recognized that these Christian nationalities had a more advanced stage of 
56. Rashad, Mustafa Kamil p. 113. 
57. Ibid pp. 113-114. 
58. Kamil, "L' Absorption ... " p. 821. 
59. Rashad, Mustafa Kamil p. 114. 
as to 
own movement 
diffused general Egyptian by 
Kamil's collection, applied to anti-Ottoman Christian nationalities the very positive Kamilist tem-
"Eastemers" (sharqiyyina) and held up their nationalist activism for emulation: 
Do you not have in some Eastern races like the Serbs, Bulgarians and others a tremendous 
lesson? Remember now the Armenians who do not flag one instant in founding societies 
and delivering speeches although they have never before known the meaning of 
independence, and who to date have never tasted the sweetness of unity of action and 
freedom from the dead hand of foreign [rule] over their country in the way that you 
yourselves tasted their sweetness in the age of the noble Khedivial dynasty. Besides that, 
they have no right entitling them to win their demands, whereas your rights are the greate~ 
of rights. You have no way to recover them except through publicizing the facts in Europ 
and seeking her help60• 
In at least this formulation, Kamil demonstrated some preparedness, then, to view the Ottoman 
government like the Armenian nationalists, as "foreign" rule by one nation over another in 
Armenian-populated areas. Kamil did take a stride in this 1895 letter towards a true nationalist 
world-view, which would accept secession by non-Turkish nationalities from the Ottoman Empiri 
as as natural as Egypt's --- still much more legalistic --- struggle 
rule. 
independence from British 
Contact with anti-Ottoman Greek nationalism helped Ahmad Hilmi to develop towards 
such an atomistic secular-nationalist world-view. In a 1906 al-Liwa' article, Hilmi denied the 
reality of supposed supra-national communities, pan-Christian or pan-Muslim, inspired by 
emotions. He argued Egyptians would not when they regained independence from Britain 
reamalgamate Egypt in the Ottoman State merely because Turks were fellow Muslims. Cultural 
factors, or common European identity, played no role at all in the support that Russia gave to the 
early struggle of the Greeks for independence from the Turks' rule. European states were 
motivated by cold self-interest; they therefore still would give the same support to an effective 
Egyptian independence movement that Russia gave to the Greeks' original independence struggl( 
Hilmi's latter thesis had an acculturated impulse to keep up the fruitless lobbying of Europe, and 
to negate the growing sense in the Kamilist movement that European states, as a virtual camp, 
60. 'Ali Fahrni Karnil, Mustafa Kamil Basha fi Arba'a wa Thalathina Rabi'an v. 3 p. 65. 
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discriminated between Muslims and Christians in "the East". 
Hilmi's fair knowledge of Greek nationalism might, as with Kamil, have been picked up 
from the resident Greek journalists who owned or published in local French papers. His 1906 
article was reasonably well-informed on the nature of the Philiki Etaireia ("Friendly Band") 
"terrorist" organization founded in 1814 at Odessa to launch the liberation of Ottoman-occupied 
Greece from the sanctuary of Russian soil. The Russian Tsar Alexander I's patronage of, and 
material support for, the Greek uprising for independence Hilmi interpreted not as due to the Tsar 
being "a lover of the ancient Greeks" (or to common Orthodox Christianity?) but a tactic in 
power-politics --- an attempt by the Russian to weaken his great antagonist, the Ottoman Sultan 
Mahmud. Despite his obvious dislike for the Philiki Etaireia terrorists, Hilmi added that like then 
the Egyptians could also get the European powers' support against occupying Britain "if we get u 
and act"61 • 
This article was another example of the Kamilists seeking to learn about the ideology and 
techniques of all nationalist groups, even the most anti-Ottoman and anti-Islamic, with the purpo~ 
of adapting their methods where suited to Egypt's own struggle for independence. Muhammad 
Farid in late 1908 similarly expressed respect for the energy and skill with which the Bulgarians 
and their monarch had wrested independence, while voicing al-Hizb al-Watani's ongoing suppor1 
for the Ottoman State's suzerain rights over Bulgaria62• The Kamilists' inherent pan-Muslim 
connection with the Turks, and the genocidal lack of pity with which insurgent Slavs, Bulgaria ar 
Greece slaughtered and drove out Muslim populations resident in Macedonia, assured that 
61. Ahmad Hilmi, "al-Istiqlal! al-Istiqlal!" (Independence! Independence!), al-Liwa' 9 August 1906. 
Leadership of the Greek independence movement was taken in 1820 by the Prince Alexandros Ypsilantis. Ypsilanti 
came of a family of Phanariot Greeks; he became an officer in the Czar's Imperial Guard and had the Czar's approvi 
when he crossed the Prut river with an armed band on 6 March 1821: however, Russia disavowed Ypsilantis when h 
was defeated by the Turks and the native Rumanian population deserted him. On March 25 the sporadic uprisings ir 
the Morea, which Egyptian troops were to fight, broke out. As previously stated (fn 10), Ahmad Hilmi did not recei 
formal education beyond primary level: his basic grounding in French and in Greek nationalism would thus have co1 
both from Greek colleagues when he worked in a private company in cosmopolitan Alexandria, and from perusing a 
the French newspapers and magazines that Egypt-resident Greeks brought out. While Hilmi' s articles often present( 
secularoid analyses of modern Muslim history, like all dual-cultured Muslim Egyptian intellectuals he had 
non-Western Islamic spasms at least. Thus, he participated in the Kamilists' denunciation of' Ali Yusuf's elopemen 
(al-Liwa' 27 July 1904 pp. 1, 2); and Hilmi's insistence that children not be sent to government or private schools 
controlled by Britishers or residents --- that the nationalists had to build schools of their own --- may have had an 
Islamic as well as its "patriotic" motive: "al-Sha'b al-Misri" (The Egyptian People), al-Liwa' 26 February 1903. 
Westernization: the latter item wanted to educate "the Egyptian People" to become a Boer people or a Polish people 
and if Hilmi was hitting 'Ali Yusuf to strike Khedive 'Abbas, his constitutionalist "true patriotism" held up Victor 
Hugo's resistance to the Emperor of France who persecuted the liberals --- Hilmi, "Quwwat al-Wataniyyah" (1906). 
62. Bayyumi, al-Hizb al-Watani p. 196. 
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al-Liwa' would vituperatively deny the Christians of that Ottoman province title to secede ---
despite their own insistence on British evacuation63 • al-Liwa's engaged highlighting of 
Christian-Muslim slaughter in such faraway Ottoman provinces as Macedonia, like its coverage o 
conversions to, or progress of, Islam in China and India, alienated such more secular and open 
Copts as Salamah Musa from Kamil's independence movement64• Although more diverse than 
usually imaged in the literature, Karnilist pan-Islamic solidarity with the Ottoman Turks did 
hamper the non-sectarian territorial nationalism Karnil professed, and thus a united independence 
movement, from getting off the ground. Yet the Karnilists kept it up because they cared about th~ 
Turks and Muslims in the Balkans, as well as Coptic fellow-Egyptians. 
The ill-controlled and unpredictable character of Kamilist responses to anti-Ottoman 
63. Traumatized by the mass killings of Muslims, al-Liwa' in 1903 condemned the refusal of Bulgar 
independence fighters to collaborate with the Ottoman reforms conducted by Governor Husayn Hilmi in Macedonia. 
"Those are the evil souls which blew up houses and castles and assassinated pure men, made orphans of children and 
devastated their land. They claim that the Ottoman State (may Allah protect it!) treats them with a constant oppressi1 
and injustice that are incompatible with any code, so that they have sought independence through threat and menace" 
"Lima Qataluhum wa Hum Abriya'?" (Why Have They Killed Them When They Are Innocent?), al-Liwa' 15 Augm 
1903 p. 1. The complex, bitter, prolonged Macedonian problem, including the religious and ethnic diversity of its 
population, and the subversion by rivals Bulgaria and Greece that intensified the slaughter, are surveyed by Stanford 
and Ezel Shaw, Histoiy of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press 1976-1977) v. 2 pp. 207-211. Macedonia contained Turkish-speaking and Slavic Muslims, slightly 
outnumbered by Bulgars, Serbs, Greeks and Vlachs. This degree of diversity had no equivalent in Egypt; and Husay 
Hilmi (to become Ottoman Grand Vezir in 1909) no doubt carried out his reforms in the "excellent" manner al-Liwa 
imaged. The fact remains that al-Liwa' advised the Macedonian Orthodox to accept Ottoman status and an Ottoman 
military presence while denouncing Egyptian Ministers who worked with British "advisers". "Had our ministers 
shared our nation's patriotic feelings ... not a single [British] soldier would remain to ... make the hearts [of Egyptians 
bleed with his sight". Sayyid 'Ali, "Hadhihi Natijat al-Istislam Ayyuhal-Wuzara' al-Fikham" (This is the Consequer 
of Surrender 0 Proud Ministers), al-Liwa' 8 April 1908. 
64. 'AfafLutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot assessed that Kamil's "support for Turkey on religious grounds ... frighteni 
away" from his movement many prominent or gifted Copts attracted by its drive for independence and Egypt-centre< 
motifs. al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt and Cromer p. 160. Salamah Musa's social radicalism, marked even from his yout 
before World War 1, was rare in his sect, but he did faithfully illustrate some perceptions --- and misunderstandings 
about --- Muslim Egyptian pro-Ottoman pan-Islam that alienated from Kamil Copts who might otherwise have joine 
up. In his 1927 al-Yawm wal-Ghad, Musa depicted the Khedive 'Abbas, al-Mu'ayyad and Mustafa Kamil as 
responsible for "an apostasy from the patriotic idea": all "returned to Islam as the community bond (jami'at al-Islam: 
saying that Egypt was a possession of the Ottoman State. Musa vehemently assailed al-Mu'ayyad and al-Liwa' for 
claiming that Egyptians were "Ottoman [subjects] obliged to fight the Macedonians to defend 'Abdul-Hamid and hi~ 
subjects, that' Abdul-Hamid was the Caliph of the Muslims whom every Egyptian was duty-bound to obey. Mustaf: 
Kamil and the editors of his paper almost caused a communal clash among [the Muslims and] Copts through this 
stupidity and raving". Musa's al-Yawm wal-Ghad cited Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, Ittijahat v. 2 p. 225. In hi 
1947 autobiography, Musa again wrote that the collective Coptic minority shunned the nationalism articulated by 
al-Liwa' and al-Mu'ayyad because it mingled recognition of Ottoman suzerainty with demands for Egypt's 
independence. The Education of Salama Musa tsd L.O. Schuman (Leiden: F.J. Brill 1961) pp. 42-44. Musa took at 
face value, as a dangerously unitary Ottomanism, al-Mu'ayyad editor' Ali Yusuf's call for Egyptians to send 
representatives to the CUP-restored Ottoman Parliament: ibid p. 34. This missed Khedive 'Abbas' "Arab Caliphate' 
undermining of all Istanbul regimes --- and that Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid assessed Yusuf's call as only' Abbas' ploy t 
block an Egyptian constitution or parliament: Ch. 6, fn 53 (A 304). 
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Christian nationalisms has to be stressed. The Karnilists were not able to synthesize together the 
sectors of the world-view they evoked. The availability of multiple perspectives in al-Liw'a', sorr 
of them relatively open or cold-blooded, fleshed out the Serbs, Greeks, Armenians and Bulgars to 
Egyptians, making their voices heard with that immediacy enemies have in modern multi-lingual 
nationalisms. Moreover, as each people in a string of Christian nations is concretized, the oppose 
Christian camp takes form. French and British publications and politicians had made the threat tc 
the Ottoman Empire of those Christian nationalisms central in the minds of the Karnilists. 
Karnilist counter-solidarity with the Turks (pan-Islam) --- modern and acculturated --- had many 
features symmetrically patterned by the pan-Christianism underlaying British and French support 
for Greeks and Armenians. Karnil was surely correct that Europeans had no right to deny him hi~ 
mirror-retort as atavistic "fanaticism" --- although it was precisely this charge in Western 
languages that could spiritually fuse the Kamilists with threatened Turkish and Slavic Muslims65 . 
THE WIDER PAN-MUSLIM WORLD 
The present section analyses later, 20th-century communications of the Karnilists 
denouncing subjugation or mistreatment by Europeans other than the British of Muslim 
populations outside Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. We choose Karnilist views of European 
imperialism in the later period in which they reacted against general Europe. 
The section will trace the intellectuals' mounting sense, as they reject the West, that 
religions determined international political actions and associations. 
S teppat underscores the carnpicizing comprehensiveness of Karnil' s reaction against 
Europe when it did not respond to his early appeals on Egypt's behalf. Europe never freed a sing 
Muslim nation. The Dutch tyrannized the Javanese, Austria confiscated the religious properties c 
the Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina (detached from the Ottoman Empire after the 
Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878), Russia the wealth of Kazan's Muslims. Europeans oppressed 
Muslims in the Caucasus, the Crimea, Algeria, Tunisia, India and Zanzibar66• In his earlier hopef1 
approaches to Europe, Kamil's concern was concentrated upon narrower segments of the world's 
65. Lashing back at European writers and journalists who depicted Turks as murderous fanatics, al-Liwa's 
Istanbul correspondent in 1903 estimated that 1,250,000 Muslims had fled from the Russian Empire, Serbia, Rumani 
and Bulgaria in the preceding 25 years. "Man Hum al-Muta'assibun?: Hijrat al-Muslim wa Hijrat al-Masihi" (Who 
Are The Fanatics?: The Flight of the Muslim and That of The Christian), al-Liwa' 24 February 1903 pp. 1-2. 
66. Steppat, "Nationalismus" p. 311. 
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Muslims: upon his Egyptian nation and the Muslims of the contiguous Ottoman state. He 
initially pursued in Europe Egypt's and the Ottoman State's interests with talk of a vague wide 
"Muslim world". Smarting from Europe's indifference to Egypt's cause, Kamil then developed a 
sharp Muslim internationalist consciousness. He frequently denounced European governments 
that had done Egypt no harm, for ill-treating around the globe distant Muslim populations with 
which Egypt had few contacts or common secular interests. Steppat credits Kamil with 
popularizing consciousness of a far-flung "Muslim world" in Egypt: al-Liwa had a Muslim 
correspondent in Calcutta and was distributed as far as Singapore67• 
The Problem of "Fanaticism" 
The Muslim intellectuals' treatment of European imperialism in the Muslim world was 
given direction by their acculturation. Thus, they addressed the Europeans' concept of "religious 
fanaticism" almost as much as real military, administrative and economic phenomena of 
imperialism in Muslim lands. The intellectuals' attempts, even in Arabic, to harmonize their 
promotion of the causes of Muslim populations with modernist repudiation of religious 
fanaticism show that they continued to hear the criteria evoked in liberal European 
intellectualism. 
Wendell has outlined the appearance of the problem of "fanaticism" among Muslim 
intellectuals in the nineteenth century. He argues that pious Muslims, and even the in some 
respects non-traditional Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, found difficulty in understanding "the nature~of 
the accusation" of fanaticism made against Muslim populations by expansionist Westerners68• 
Wendell shows the affinity of (a) Kamil's argument that fanaticism in Egypt was due to 
ignorance of true Islam and would disappear when the Muslims were adequately educated in 
their religion with (b) similar early argumentation by 'Abduh69• The use of the charge to screen 
Britain's record in Egypt from scrutiny enraged Egyptians as never before in the wake of 
Dinshawai. al-Liwa' in 1906 quoted British Foreign Affairs Secretary Sir Edward Grey's 
dismissal of Egyptians' reactions to Dinshawai as "fanatical". Grey predicted that as their 
67. Ibid p. 282 fn 4. 
68. Wendell, Egyt>tian National Image pp. 196-199. 
69. Karnil's view ibid p. 253; 'Abduh's p. 199. 
opposed 
Occupation out of "religious against 
Grey's argument that the fanaticism the Egyptians was linked to related Muslim 
fanaticism against France in North Africa was granted a hearing among colonialist-expansionist 
circles in France71 • A Catholic Syrian friend of Kamil, Shukri Ghanim, tried to reassure the 
French from Eclair that there was no "fanaticism" in Egypt against Christians in general: writing 
from Cairo, a French journalist replied in Le Temps that Kamil fitted Grey's analysis, and that 
his pan-Islamic movement was indeed out to subvert French authority in Tunisia and Algeria72• 
Rising to its imperial responsibilities, Le Temps assessed that elite Algerians and Tunisians were 
reading Egyptian pan-Islamic journals and that 100 --- "far too many" --- were studying at 
al-Azhar. But North Africans were necessarily accepting irreversible French settlement and 
municipal elections, forgetting Islam: it was in French sub-Saharan Africa (eg. Zinder) that 
pan-Islamic fanaticism fanned from Egypt still might harm73• However, the anti-Muslim, 
imperialistic Louis Bertrand 866-1941) heightened French fears of the effects that Kamil' s 
70. Summary of Sir Edward Grey's speech and an Egyptian reply in "al-Jami' at al-Islamiyyah wal-Siyasat 
al-Injiliziyyah" (Pan-Islamism and British Policy), al-Liwa' 8 July 1906. Grey's bracketing of Egyptian and North 
African discontent as "fanaticism" caught French attention, and also ignited even the fury of Copts like Salamah 
Musa when the British-subsidized al-Muqattam used the motif to justify Dinshawai executions. Musa, Education 
pp. 31-33. "Although Grey defended the policy [of the British in Egypt following Dinshawai] and contended that 
severe action was warranted in the light of the growing Muslim fanaticism in Egypt, his defence was only lukewarm 
The private correspondence of Liberal-imperialists like Grey reveals that they, too, were extremely embarrassed by 
the harshness of the British policy". Tignor, British Colonial Rule p. 283. 
71. Andre Servier, Islam and the Psychology of the Musulman tsd A.S. Moss-Blundell (London: Chapman 
and Hall 1924) p. 260. Servier was a shadowy but spasmodically well-briefed writer who may well have worked in 
some French agency; his book was in gestation in the pre-War years. He characterized al-Liwa', al-Mu'avyad and 
(sic) al-Jaridah as "tribunes of Islam" that threatened French rule in North Africa. Ibid. Servier's tenth chapter, "The 
Nationalist Movement in Egypt", described Mustafa Kamil Pasha as the "the leading spirit" of a new, more 
dangerous form of pan-Islamism. Although not as primary as alarmist French operatives feared, Lutfi and the 
Jaridists did have their pan-Muslim and proto-pan-Arab twinges that made them sympathetic to North African 
Muslims under French rule: A 259-260. 
72. Anon (from Egypt), "Le Pan-Islamisme en Egypte", 22 August 1906. 
73. "Le Pan-Islamisme en Afrique", Le Temps 23 August 1906 p. 1. Although somewhat concerned at the 
possibility of coordinated resistance by widely separated populations, Le Temps --- and the French ruling class for 
which it spoke --- could also rein in its fears. An editorial perceiving Muslim ferment throughout the whole of Asia, 
portrayed Muslims attacking Armenians and Russians in the Caucasus, identified the mullahs as the crucial group 
responsible for the Shah's conceding of an Iranian National Assembly, and saw Mustafa Kamil as a sinister agent of 
Istanbul --- yet, against British paranoia, assessed that few Indian Muslims, whatever their respect for the (Ottoman) 
"Caliph", wanted to give him any political authority over them. "L 'Effervescence Musulman en Asie", Le Temps 2L 
August 1906 p. 1. 
movement on 
against the Muslim populations 
1 -
as a common 
states together as a broad bloc 
they colonized. The article of attack from Cairo 
contemptuously crushed Kamil's claim that he led an enlightened elite intent to bridge Western 
civilization and Islam: modem-educated Egyptians were an insignificant handful and Islam and 
the West's humanism irreconcilable75• In reply, Kamil defended al-Liwa's printing of letters 
from Algerians and Tunisians --- their only way to get their "suffering" and the arbitrary 
"asphyxiation" and "enslavement of human beings" across to France: "Egypt's Muslim 
newspapers" were "criticizing" France for her own self-reform, not "attacking". Unlike 
Muhammad Farid's attacks on France, Karnil did not, at least here, evoke shared Arabness while 
bracketing (a) Egypt and (b) Algeria and Tunisia as all Muslim. His response was pan-Muslim, 
rather than Arabist. Kamil retained a residue of his old attitude that France could be better than 
Britain: al-Liwa' had praised more well-intentioned governors such as Jonna.rt who honor France 
in Algeria --- but then he distinguished two Frances, the political and the scientific-literary. 
France had long before abandoned Egypt, whose nationalists now relied on themselves76 . 
Kamil, then, kept on addressing the French even after Egypt's short-term interest had less 
to hope, given that they had become Britain's "best friends and auxiliaries"77 • His 
ultra-acculturated elite retained some emotional cultural bonds with France that kept them 
talking, and some sense of difference from non-Westernized North Africans whom 
splendidly-endowed France could have uplifted with a different approach. It showed the 
widening of the Kamilists' delimitation of inner indigenous community that he tried to get how 
"the Muslims" of Algeria felt across to a French establishment that drew calm satisfaction from 
all its achievements there. France, universal as ever, will continue to print your Parisian 
cadences, Moustafa, although haven't you fully worked out yet that only Gaul-like Aryanoid 
Berbers who have the blue eyes and renounce Islam can have scope to prosper, in their station, in 
74. Ghali, L'Egypte Nationaliste p. 43. This, though, would have been mainly in Le Mirage Oriental, 
published after Kamil's death in 1909. 
75. "Le Pan-Islamisme en Egypte" loc. cit. 
76. Kami!, "Le Patriotisme et Pan-Islamisme", Le Temps 8 September 1906 pp. 1-2. 
77. Ibid. 
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our new Algeria department --- its Arabs with your olive skin and crimped hair, because their 
fanaticism refused to fit in, have bound themselves off for extinction78• 
On the whole, France's antipathy to Islam and Muslims, and her colonialism, was fusing 
her with Britain --- and fusing Algeria with Egypt --- for the now intensely campist Kamilists. 
Crude Secular Explication of Colonialism and Muslim Resistance: Zinder, West Africa. 
The previous Chapter excerpted 1906 London press statements in which Kamil disdained 
the sub-Saharan Black African Muslims of Zinder as (along with traditional, illiterate 
Moroccans) a separate category from the sectionally self-Westernizing Egyptians. A side of him 
was inclined to accept French claims that anachronistic Islamic "religious fanaticism" motivated 
discontent against colonial rule there. 
A few days after its account of Grey's "fanaticism" speech, al-Liwa' printed a front page 
item ironically headlined "Islamic Fanaticism" ("al-Ta'assub al-Islami") on a supposed attempted 
revolt in what had since 1899 been the French-occupied town of Zinder79• Zinder is situated on 
the northern margin of the West African Soudan and had importance in the early twentieth 
century as an exporium of the textiles and spices trade across the Sahara between the Hausa 
78. In 1906, Le Temps brushed aside with statistics any misgivings that the European settlement and 
agricultural development of Algeria had been at the expense of the natives, or would seriously harm them in future. 
The colons had developed much of their fertile agricultural lands from previously uncultivated waste-land. 
Europeans had had to confiscate some very fertile lands from Algerians, yet although the lands that remained in the 
hands of Algerian farmers now were poor for the most part, their adoption of some European techniques had more 
than compensated by raising yields. The Algerian peasants and landowners were learning the value of the 
market-place: it would draw them into a mutually profitable community with Europeans in which Islam would be 
forgotten. The fair-haired, blue-eyed Berbers were predestined to flourish in partnership with the French community 
in the new Algeria: in this process, though, "the Arab element which refuses to adapt to our way of life necessarily 
will be eliminated". "Une Enquete Sur La Colonisation en Algerie: Les Effets de la Colonisation Sur La Societe 
Indigine", Le Temps 24 August 1906 p. 1. In a 1904 call for "rational [European] settlement of North Africa", 
Albert de Pouvourville sharply distinguished the Berber race, stable or increasing in number, from the Arabs in 
Algeria. That conquering race, in Algeria only to prey on and enslave the country "following the method of 
Mahomet", lost its reason to exist when the French wrested away its power: "the old [Arab] ruling race is 
diminishing day by day, and the time is not distant when it will completely disappear". Albert de Pourvourville, 
"Peuplement Rationnel de l'Afrique du Nord", La Nouvelle Revue 15 September 1904 pp. 147-8, 153. Ageron has 
synthesized a grim survey of massive land confiscations, the pauperization and deliteratization of the rural Algerian 
population, responding savagely-suppressed revolts, and routine French political repression, throughout the 
nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries. Charles-Robert Ageron, Modern Algeria: A History From 1830 to the 
Present (London: C. Hurst 1991). The contribution of the colons to Algeria's economic development, and the 
prejudice they faced because of Spanish or Italian origins from the real French, has been stressed by Prochaska, but 
he, too, documented the destruction of indigenous Algerian institutions and society. David Prochaska, Making 
Algeria French (Cambridge University Press 1990). 
79. "al-Ta'assub al-Islami" (Islamic Fanaticism), al-Liwa' 29 July 1906 p. 1. 
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states of the South and the Tuareg lands and Tripoli in the North80• The city thus had long had 
economic and ethnic as well as religious bonds with the North African wing of the Arab World. 
Prior to the 1899 conquest, Zinder had been the capital of a Muslim dynasty established in the 
eighteenth century81 • 
al-Liwa rejected the claims of Temps that the motive of the 1906 unrest in Zinder was 
religious fanaticism 
when incidents more violent and terrible than that are undertaken against Christian 
governments by their Christian subjects seeking freedom, justice and equality. Why do 
the French say that the motive of the population of Zinder is religious, not political, when 
the misdeeds that the rulers commit against the subjugated force the latter finally to 
sacrifice their blood for liberty and independence?82• 
The formal argument of the al-Liwa' item on Zinder --- as Ahmad Hilmi argued about the 
Ottoman Empire, Greece and Russia --- thus marginalized religion in international politics. 
Secular political and socio-economic interests mainly, motivated the French to conquer and fired 
the (Muslim) West Africans to revolt against them: The item equates violent resistance by 
Zinder' s Muslims against non-Muslims with social, economic and political uprisings by 
oppressed Christian social groups and nations against other Christians in Europe. It is strikingly 
secular to award the same inevitablity to both. These sub-Saharan African populations are 
Muslim. But the political independence or sovereignty for which they revolt is not motivated by 
either their or their oppressors' sect. The same violence would automatically break out when any 
nation deprived another of its natural political sovereignty even if both had one faith. 
However, an article's emotional impact can be different from its formal argument. In 
answering French arguments, al-Liwa took up the Islam-versus-Christianity perspective of 
France's colonial Governor-General Roume and of a conservative and sometimes jingoistic 
French newspaper. Le Temps' perceptions did (qualifiedly) prod the Liwa'ists to connect 
Muslim discontent in French West Africa, unrest against French rule in North Africa, Egypt's 
80. Art. "Zinder", EB (MCMII) v. 33 p. 927. From the French exploration and geographical literature, 
especially the 1899 account of Feureau, this article described turn-of-century Zinder as "a large and fine town 
surrounded with high earthen walls, very thick at the base and pierced with seven gates. It covers a large area, and 
its houses, in part built of clay, in part of straw, are interspersed with trees, which give the place a pleasing aspect". 
Ibid. Zinder is today situated in South Central Niger and is the town centre of an important peanut-producing regior 
of Africa. The town served as the capital of French West Africa until 1926: unrest in 1906 could threaten France's 
hold over the region. 
81. "Zinder" EB (MCMII). 
82. "al-Ta'assub al-Islami", loc. cit. 
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Kamilist pan-Islam that definitely did fuel the latter, and an Ottoman State whose will and 
capacity to harm the French overrated (Le Temps was chafing at the bit to hit the Ottomans in 
Libya)83• The French press impressed upon Egyptians the Islamophobia of all European powers, 
and that Islam was one bond with sub-Saharan Africans under French rule. 
Secular-Islamic Duality. Robert Tignor has drawn attention to duality in Mustafa 
Kamil's accounts of the West's imperialism. On the one hand there was his nee-traditionalist 
"emphasis on the anti-Muslim drives in European civilization". On the other hand, notes Tignor, 
Kamil was indebted to European leftist thinkers for concepts of imperialism as "economically 
motivated, undertaken for the purpose of exploiting Egypt's resources" 84• This powerfully 
supra-Egyptianizing synthesis of religious and left-secular perspectives was present in 
Muhammad Farid' s 1903 account of French rule in Tunisia and Algeria. Before the 1904 
Entente ended the last hopes that France might break ranks with England and take Egypt's side, 
Farid already in 1903 lamented the "ill-fate" that brought Tunisia and Algeria "under French 
colonialism". On the one hand Farid stressed agrarian dispossession, "the unjust laws that France 
issued in Algeria and had others issue in Tunisia to rob the lands of the tribes" and hand them 
over to French colons. Here, he viewed French colonialism as motivated by material-economic 
drives to seize property, natural resources and wealth from the indigenous inhabitants. On the 
other hand, however, Farid described French actions in Algeria and Tunisia as also motivated by 
religious-confessional fanaticism or ta'assub: "the fanaticism of the French against the Arab". 
Basing himself on Muhammad Abduh's impressions during a 1902 visit to Algeria, Farid 
stressed the damage that agrarian dispossession by the French did to the religious-charitable 
83. Le Temps had described the Zinder incidents as "of a local nature": it nonetheless related the Zinder 
unrest to other "sporadic" wider "effervescence" in West Africa "mainly due to religious fanaticism" --- although 
therefore "devoid of political importance" according to M. Roume, Governor General of French West Africa. 
Among manifestations of Muslim fanaticism, Roume mentioned the assassination of Lieutenant Fabre at Nyame, 
and the murder of two guards at Kokobitanda. "Les Incidents de Zinder", Le Temps 20 July 1906 p. 1. The "Zinder 
plot" was one symptom of a "religious fanaticism that is manifesting itself at various points, widely separated from 
each other, in our African territories". "Le Complot de Zinder", al-Liwa' 23August1906 p. 2; directly above this 
appeared the item "Arrestation d'un Agitateur en Algerie". Aware of the volatility of Zinder and other possessions 
in the Soudan, Le Temps elsewhere advocated that France maintain its prestige by occupying the two oases of 
Djanet and Bilma, over which the Ottoman State claimed jurisdiction from Tripoli. With insulting ominousness, it 
warned the Ottoman State not to foolhardily assert any claim. "Djanet et Bilma", Le Temps 3 August 1906 p. 1. In 
November, Le Temps charged that riders driven off with heavy loss of life from a French post at Bilma had come 
from Tibesti at the instigation of Turkish authorities in the Fezzan. "Affaires Colonial es: un Incident a Bilma", Le 
Temps 10 November 1906 p. 1. 
84. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 264-265. 
thus 
to 
"oppression" of Algerians 
More secular analyses of imperialism resistance from Kamilist acculturateds 
draw on those already installed the Afghanist- 'Abduhist classicoid view of overall indigenous 
history. 'Abduh had earlier alternated non-religious, cold-blooded responses to French 
imperialism with Islamist ones in various turn-of-century replies to Gabriel Hanotaux, French 
historian and a former Foreign Minister (1894-1896). From al-Mu'ayyad, 'Abduh desc1ibed 
France as cynically manipulating Catholic missionary activity and education abroad to gain 
control over the Islamic lands, notably the Ottoman Empire --- in particular Lebanon/Syria, 
which he had viewed as an exile. In France itself, he derided, the very same laicist French 
governments expelled Jesuits and limited the Church's authority86• 'Abduh characterized that 
differences of religions did not much motivate either French colonial policies or resistance by the 
Algerians to the French: "if the entire French nation embraced Islam, with M. Hanotaux at the 
fore, but still treated non-French people in the fashion familiar in Algeria and Madagascar, could 
it hope that the populations its colonies not seize any opportunity to revolt?"87• This 
is like the Zinder item's affirmation the colonized fight imperialists over secular sovereignty, 
not religion --- and states that a single religion cannot on its own impose or define a humane 
political community. But could the parallel struggles of Muslim Algerians and non-Muslim 
Madagascans against the same enemy open into some loose anti-imperialist political community 
or alliance that would span Afro-Asian sects? 
Deep emotional hostility could narrow perceptions of imperialism by acculturated 
Egyptian writers: yet the 'Abduh-Manarist, Kamilist and Jaridist schools built up a diverse 
85. Muhammad Farid, "Halat al-Jaza'ir wa Tunus" (The Condition of Algeria and Tunisia), al-Liwa' 29 
September 1903. Farid wrote up his impressions of his repeated journeys to Algeria, Tunisia, (Ottoman) 
Tripolitania and --- in the best acculturated Arab-ethnicizing pattern --- Andalusia, in his 298-page book Rahalatu 
Muhammad Farid: Yusuf As'ad Daghir, Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyvah v. 2 (Bayrut: Matabi' Lubnan 1956) p. 
635. 'Abduh had made his visit to Algeria in 1902, the year before Farid's al-Liwa' article. Advance notice of the 
visit in al-Manar had assured 'Abduh a good reception from local followers of his unusually liberal salafi Islamic 
revivalism, notably Shaykh 'Abd al-Halim Bin Simayah and Muhammad Ibn Mustafa Khojah. Muhammad Burj, 
"al-Jaza'ir fi Kitabat Muhammad' Abduh" (Algeria in the Writings of Muhammad' Abduh), al-Asalah (Algiers) 
December 1977 p. 23. 
86. Burj, "al-Jaza'ir" p. 23. 
87. Ibid p. 21. 
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enough shared stock of angles on Western behavior to discipline their Islamic anger and help 
them sidestep simplicism. 'Abduh' s ability in 1900 to take some of Islam's lenses off and· 
scrutinize the French anew to figure out what really drove them was to persist in Egypt's 
Arabo-Islamic community tradition. The Young Men's Muslim Association was to ascribe the 
drive of the French to detach the Berbers from Arabic, Arabs and Islam through the mid-1930 
dahir to the secular power drives that 'Abduh had considered thirty years before. Accepting that 
the French political establishment was truly laicist and anti-clerical, the YMMA analysed that 
France was trying to break Islam in Morocco for the pragmatic motive that it was an obstacle to 
the strengthening of her control. The non-Christian French ruling class promoted French 
missionary activity as a catspaw for its imperial expansion: B 71-72 fn. Condemnations of 
France in North Africa by Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat and his journal al-Risalah (from 1933), 
developed the Kamilists' and Jaridists' interest and concern. However, despite his excellent 
French and acquaintance with even some classical French works, al-Zayyat --- like Kamil and 
Farid more than 'Abduh --- was, in his denunciations, fixated on Christian, Islamophobic drives 
in French misdeeds in the Arab West (B 259, 337). 
Remote Muslim Populations Oppressed by Europeans: Russia's Muslims, Indonesia 
Other al-Liwa' items lack such quasi-secular explanations of conflicts between Muslims 
and Westerners in history. The Kamilists sometimes projected their religion-determined Muslim 
international community identification out onto European colonialists almost mechanically, 
without seeking the latters' real motives. al-Liwa' conveyed to Egyptians images of violence 
and murder around the world by the most diverse range of Europeans against Muslims ---
explicating the attacks in terms of Christian "religious fanaticism": it was in these terms that it 
reported such remote massacres as an alleged 1906 Cossack pogrom against Muslim Ingush in 
the Caucasus88• A failure to have a direct source that could provide facts from the area may be at 
issue in an item about Indonesia carried by al-Liwa' in August 1904. This consisted of a report 
from its correspondent in Java ("limukatibina") dated 21 July 1904 claiming a massacre of 100 
innocent Muslim villagers by Dutch troops at Surabaya but headlined (as it seems by al-Liwa') 
88. "Barid al-Islam", al-Liwa' 25 July 1906. 
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"The Fanaticism of the Europeans against the Muslims"89• There was much fighting between 
Dutch colonial armies and Muslims in Sumatra, particular Acheh, in 1904. But there does-not 
seem to have been any clash at Surabaya comparable to that claimed by al-Liwa'90• Rashid Rida 
tried to demonstrate that, despite its dateline, al-Liwa' did not truly have a correspondent in Java 
--- yet the Kamilists really may been disinformed by tawdrier pan-Islamists from there91 • 
The Zinder item dismissed religious antagonisms as a false issue evoked to disguise from 
French public opinion the sordid politics of the subjugation of a West African population. The 
Surabaya item presents a more traditional, Islamoid conception of Europeans. Rather than 
alternation, though, blendings of selected old Islamic motifs with radical-modernist patterns 
enabled the Kamilists to integrate some unprecedented pan-Muslim relationships. The 
Kamilists' expanding links with Russia's faraway Muslims were an example. The Kamilists 
chose to evolve these not with traditionalist Islamic leaderships in Russia and Central Asia but 
with the opposed jadid movement, launched by the great Tatar educationalist Isma'il Gaspirali 
(1851-1914). This current wanted to lance out whole sectors of Sunni late-traditionalism and 
synthesize those heightened Islamic elements maintained with modern Western patterns. In 
Gaspirali's vision, though, there could be no salvation for individual Muslim nations outside a 
unified and regenerated world of Islam: he came to Egypt and in 1908 tried to initiate a Universa: 
Islamic Congress to be held in Cairo. Excited by jadid attempts to perpetuate Islam within a 
modernization of Muslims, al-Liwa' declared in November 1907 that if the Islamic world could 
achieve a renaissance, this would be due to the efforts of the Russian Muslims so brilliantly 
represented by Gaspirali92• By 1916 the jadidists were to have built 5,000 schools throughout the 
Tsarist Empire93 • al-Liwa' publicized, and took sides with, the vulnerable jadidists' efforts for a 
Reformation of Islam in all the still very medieval Central Asian statelets ruled from Russia: a 
1904 item titled "Education in Bukhara" printed an inside jadidist view of the movement's 
89. "Ta'assub al-Urubiyyin Didd al-Muslimin: Jawah fi 21 Yulyu li-Mukatibina" (The Fanaticism of the 
Europeans Against the Muslims: Java on 21 July from Our Correspondent), al-Liwa' 16 August 1904. 
90. I am indebted to Dr Anthony Reid of the Australian National University for his observations on this 
matter. 
91. Steppat, "Nationalism us" p. 282. Dr Reid has described misleading propaganda diffused over the 
Middle East, charging Dutch mistreatment of Indonesian Muslims, by Kiamil Bey, Turkish Consul-General in 
Batavia from 1897-9. There were attempts to define Indonesians, especially those of Arab descent, as Ottoman 
subjects. Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia", Journal of Asian Studies v. 
26:2 (February 1987) pp. 267-283, esp. pp. 280-282. 
92. C.W. Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets (London: Allen & Unwin 1957) p. 125. 
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educational endeavors in that ultra-hostile traditionalist city, a centre of immemorial religious 
schools and colleges94• al-Liwa's coverage of Russia's Muslims placed emphasis upon 
educational matters95• 
The Kamilists got material aid through to Russia's Muslims where needed. In 1907, 
Kamil organized throughout Egypt the collection of a fund for the relief of famine-stricken 
Muslims in Nukha96 in Adharbayjan. The money was conveyed to them through the Ramiev 
brothers, editors of the Ohrenburg Tatar journal Wag_t (Vakit). A letter of thanks to Kamil was 
published immediately after his death in an Arabic daily al-Nahdah, which Gaspirali briefly 
edited from Cairo in early 190897• Pro-jadid Islamic theology students in Egypt were a 
bridge-elite with active command of classical Arabic. They and Gaspirali could not sustain the 
Arabic al-Nahdah, the hoped-for forum for a much more far-reaching conjunction of the Tsarist 
Empire's self-Westernizing Reformedjadid Islam with the politically more vocal, but likewiSe 
acculturation-stimulated, Kamilist pan-Islam. Yet, the Kamilist press published both Arabic and 
French versions of Gaspirali's addresses in Cairo98 • Translated extracts from Waqt articles also 
appeared in Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid's al-Jaridah as well as the Kamilist media: these denounced 
the drive of Russian chauvinism to stop Muslims from taking part in the Tsarist Empire's 
abortive post-1905 parliamentary politics (A 296 fn 36) --- also raised by Gaspirali in 
al-Nahdah. In his communications to Egyptians, Gaspirali (like al-Liwa') condemned the 
93. Thomas Kuttner, "Russian Jadidism and the Islamic World: Isma'il Gasprinskii in Cairo --- 1906", 
Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique v. xvi: 3-4 (July-December) 1975 p. 389. For all the movement's reverence 
for the West's modernity, instruction in Arabic and in religious sciences with Arabic texts still took 53% of 
teaching-time in jadid-influenced schools on the eve of the 1917 revolution. Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and 
Islam in Russia (Harvard University Press 1960) p. 289. 
94. "al-'Ulum fi Bukhara" (Education in Bukhara), al-Liwa' 20 August 1904. Gaspirali's account to his 
Egyptian readers of his 1893 visit to Bukhara, indicated that its Amir received him with official respect and 
munificent facilities. Gaspirali, though, voiced to Egyptians many criticisms of social decay and ignorance in that 
traditionalist Amirate. Kuttner, "Gasprinskii in Cairo" pp. 399-400. 
95. al-Liwa' on 11July1906 (pp. 1-2) published accounts of the Association of Teachers at Baku, a 
petition by Crimean (Tatar) Muslims to the Duma, and the foundation by Muslims in Ashkabad of a 
scientific-industrial school. al-Liwa' also carried a lengthy front-page round-up of news about Russian-ruled 
Muslims in its issue of 1 April 1908. 
96. Nukha is in the Northern part of the Adharbayjan Republic, on the south of the Greater Caucasus. The 
Russians conquered this former Khanate in 1806. Nukha is in a fruit-, rice- and silk-producing area: the city had 
37 ,000 inhabitants in 1932. The Columbia Lipoincott Gazetteer of the World (New York: Columbia University 
Press 1962). 
97. Kuttner, "Gasprinskii in Cairo" pp. 407-8. 
98. For some examples, ibid p. 421 fn 37. 
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Egyptian ruling classes' ill-treatment of the peasantry99: like the Kamilists, he sniped at 
late-Sunni scholastic education as the reason for Muslim backwardness, demanding new 
education that would incorporate the West's strength. Paralleling the Kamilists, he argued from 
al-Nahdah that Muslim women had to be almost equally educated so as to effectively rear 
children in the home: he went beyond Kamil, however, by advocating deveiling and the right of 
women to work, for instance as government-school teachers, as the completely Westernized 
Polish Muslim women did100• 
The encounters and exchanges between (a) Kamilist Egyptian pan-Muslims and (b) 
Turkic jadidists artistically repressed by the Russians, illustrate that small Muslim elites alienated 
from late Sunni Islam, rather than traditional clerics, have the strong Islamic commmunity drive 
to link up across very great distances. The Kamilists and J adidists both drew energy from 
combining (a) energetic borrowing of modernity from Westerners with (b) a sense of the same 
Westerners as malevolent subjugators and excluders of Muslims, with a camp or bloc the retort. 
Watanist Egyptians and Russia's Jadid intelligentsia did effectively use their media to exchange 
thought and experiences. The Kamilists showed that they cared for their distant coreligionists by 
delivering the aid required for their survival. 
POTENTIALITY FOR SECULAR MULTI-SECTARIAN AFRO-ASIAN COMMUNITY 
The section tests potentiality for multi-sectarian Afro-Asian community in Kamilist 
communications. The data, though, again underscores Islam's at least short-term ability to 
pervasively tint and determine the conceptualization of communities in this acculturated party. 
99. For a denunciation by Gaspirali from his Arabic al-Nahdah of the Egyptian ruling class' ill-treatment, 
exploitation and neglect of the ignorant Egyptian peasantry, ibid pp. 406-407. The outburst may have been 
influenced by Russian populism as Kuttner speculates: he is wrong, though, that the Tatar modernist was introducing 
educated Egyptians to a more radical social consciousness. Kamil's al-Liwa' had, years before in 1903, mordantly 
advised the Egyptian government and the British "advisers" who directed it to supply hygienic drinking-water to the 
Egyptian countryside, not just Cairo and Alexandria --- after all, epidemics that broke out in the villages would reach 
them, too, in the end! "Miyah al-Sharb" (Drinking Water), al-Liwa' 7 January 1903. al-Liwa' thanked the 
Anglo-Jewish international financier and philanthropist Ernest Cassel (1852-1921) for his work to combat eye 
diseases in Egypt, such a contrast to the "remissness" of rich Egyptians. "Shukr al-Muhsin" (Thanking a Benefactor) 
al-Liwa' 13 January 1903 p. 2. Cassel had organized Egypt's modern banking system and the financing of the 
construction of the Aswan dam, and was a close collaborator with Cromer. Tignor, British Colonial Rule pp. 368-9, 
222 and 373. 
100. Kuttner, "Gasprinskii" p. 392. 
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1. Kamilist Responses to the Emergence of New Japan 
new powerful a more impression 
upon the Kamilists than any other non-Muslim Afro-Asian group. Her defeat of Russia in the 
1904-1905 war came at a time when France was corning to terms with her former enemy 
England and Egyptian nationalists had lost hope of aid from Europe. In a period when 
Westerners seemed to be drawing together against the East, Japan's victory showed that Eastern 
peoples could achieve sovereignty and strength by their own efforts. Karnil' s reaction against 
general Europe was clear in a statement to French friends. "Are not the Japanese the only 
Oriental people which has put Europe in its place? How could I possibly not love them?" 101 . 
As Karnil responded to Japan's victory, his sense of a Muslim international community 
widened out to an Afro-Asian sphere of solidarity. Steppat analyses this as natural: the 
neo-traditional "Islam-Christianity antithesis" had been dormant at first in the young Kamil's 
initially rather secularoid thought. It was the circumstances of the clash with the imperialist 
West that activated it, so that the dichotomy of Islam versus Christianity now "symbolizes" for 
Mustafa Kamil the opposition between the and Occident. When Japan's victory over 
Russia in the 1904-5 war suggested a new source of hope for Egypt against imperialism, Kamil's 
feelings of pan-Islamic solidarity readily got "overlaid" with the broader Oriental 
solidarity-feeling102. 
Before we analyse Kamilist responses to victorious Japan, it might be noted that J apan~s 
self-modernization had impressed Middle Eastern Muslims even earlier, in the nineteenth 
century. Such interest was shown by both Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and by the Ottoman Sultan 
'Abdul-Hamid. 'Abdul-Hamid had in 1890 sent the screw training-ship Ertogrul to Japan: 
however, that wooden vessel went down within sight of the Japanese coast (25 November 
1890)103 • The attempts by pan-Islamic Turkey to link up with the new, militarily 
self-strengthening Japanese, however, were in conjunction with an impulse to Islamize them. 
101. Steppat, "Nationalismus" p. 283 fn 4. Kamil's French friends, who had hitherto mainly seen his 
Francophile motifs, were disconcerted by his exultation at the downfall of Russia, an ally on which France 
depended. The article "al-Yabaniyyuna fi Biladihim" (The Japanese in their Land), al-Liwa' 24 July 1904, spoke 
with scathing contempt not merely of Russia, but also of its ally France. 
102. Steppat, "Nationalismus" p. 283. 
103. Art. '"Abd al-Hamid II", EI2 v. l p. 64. 
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Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, during his second stay in Istanbul (from 1892), advised' Abdul-Hamid 
how to achieve it. The Sultan was thinking of sending a delegation of his capital's 'ulama"', in 
accordance with an invitation from the Japanese Emperor, to spread Islam in Japan, but 
al-Afghani disagreed. "The 'ulama"', he replied, "have alienated the Muslims from Islam so it is 
most likely that they will turn the unbelievers against it. My view is that you should send some 
presents to the Emperor with a letter in which you shall promise him to meet his request, and that 
we then work hard to graduate/produce a group of 'ulama' fit to convey Islam's message and 
able to approach missionary activity in a rational way11104• 
Jamal al-Din had been alienated by rational sectors in the Islamic heritage, and by contact 
with the West's thought, from traditional Islam and its clergy. Yet Islam still held as a basis for 
all positive international communities in his thought. 
The Kamilists' responses to the new Japan tested how much connection they kept up with 
Islamic tradition. Their preparedness to accept non-Muslim Japan, following its victory over 
Russia, as a model for reorganization and modernization of Muslim countries retreated from 
Islam as a comprehensive socio-economic order. al-Liwa' in August 1904 advertised Mustafa 
Kamil's book al-Shams al-Mushriqah (The Rising Sun) as 
the source from which Egyptians could understand Japan's progress and development, 
the secrets of her power and greatness and the devotion that her leaders show in her 
service ... the most momentous lessons for the nations of the Orient that have been 
ignorant of patriotic sentiment so that they became disunited ... giving the foreigner sway 
over them105• 
The non-Muslim Japanese had found answers to the challenges of life in the modern world that 
were independent of Islam. They provided an effective model for Muslim Egyptians' own 
achievement of sovereign nationhood. The advertisement indicated that Kamil meant to provide 
Egyptians with detailed accounts of Japanese society, politics and geography. 
Kamil himself planned to visit Japan. Such direct contact would certainly have been an 
important step towards establishing a real reciprocal relationship with the "Eastern" Japanese. 
104. 'Abd al-Qadir al-Maghribi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani --- Dhikrayat wa Ahadith (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif 
1948) p. 31. 
105. "al-Shams al-Mushriqah" (The Rising Sun), al-Liwa' 9 August 1904. "al-Yabaniyyuna fi Biladihim" 
(The Japanese in their Land), al-Liwa' 24 July 1904, almost endorsed inhuman fanaticism antithetical to Islam. The 
article printed the report of a European traveller that a Japanese whose wife had died, and who found no one to care 
for his two children save himself, killed them in order to serve in the army. "The Homeland is dearer than these 
two" he cried, as he plunged in the knife. 
He was, 
Islam could be a common element 
conversion by the Japanese. The item was occasioned by a conference on world religions 
in Tokyo. The writer thought that the activity of Chinese, Indian, Tatar and British Muslims 
attending or in correspondence with the Conference had led the Japanese scholars present to 
show "some leaning towards us". The Conference had been convened in order to "make an 
overall review of the beliefs of the human race and choose from among them what would most 
suit their [Japanese] scientific and social-economic advancement". The Japanese might adopt 
Islam as they had adopted wholesale the West's scientific and industrial knowledge: hence, 
al-Liwa' alerted, preparations should be made for Egypt, as a centre of Islamic learning, to 
receive future delegations of Japanese scholars. They would want to join the al-Azhar university 
for instruction in Islam's traditional sciences (al-'ulum al-naqliyyah) 107, to return back to Japan 
after graduation to transmit their new knowledge to their people. This article clearly indicated 
the ambivalence of the modern-educated but believing Kamilists towards Arabo-Egyptian 
commented that al-Azhar should be 
radically reformed well in advance if the modem-minded Japanese were to master Arabic and 
Islam "since the Arab who speaks Arabic cannot after spending twenty years at learning Arabic 
in the Azharite fashion ... correctly understand an eloquent maqal (article/essay)" 108. 
The writer's contempt for the ineffectiveness of al-Azhar's timeworn methods in 
transmitting Islam and its "sciences" manifested the European-type education received by many 
in al-Hizb al-Watani. Maintaining continuity with the traditionally-educated pan-Islamic school 
of al-Afghani, however, the writer wanted to cull and upgrade the ancient Sunni religious 
learning, and its clerical elite, and incorporate them in international modernity, not eliminate 
106. Steppat, "Nationalismus" p. 283 fn 4. 
107. "al- 'ulum al-naqliyyah". Wendell gives a list of these traditional subjects of Sunni scholasticism. 
They included jurisprudence (fiqh), theology (tawhid), traditions of the Prophet (hadith), Qur'anic exegesis (tafsir), 
Qur'anic recitation and such "sciences" of language as semantics and expression (ma'ani), rhetoric (bayan), stylistic 
embellishment (Qadi'), logic (mantiq), syntax (nahw), and prosody ('arud). Wendell, Egyptian National Image pp. 
205-206. The al-Liwa' writer thought the Japanese students and scholars who would come to Egypt should be 
instructed in the "pith" or "quintessence" (lubab) of all these sciences, rather than exhaustively master them. 
108. al-Liwa' 17 July 1906, p. 1; cf. report on Muhammad Sadiq Fakhr al-Islam, the Persian da'i (Islamic 
preacher-missionary) who attended the religious conference in Tokyo: al-Liwa' 29 July 1906 p. 1. 
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them. The acculturated Arabo-Islamism of al-Jaridah before 1915 and of Ahmad Hasan 
al-Zayyat after 1930 would develop this impulse to take over and restructure Islamic learning 
and its clergy elite to then reapply them in Islamizing activity around the globe (A 151-2'l g ; B 
300-302). 
The contraction of the modern world, and the shared interest that far-flung Eastern 
populations now had unitedly to beat back the West's power, might bring widely-separated 
Egyptians and Japanese into relationship. It would be founded upon radically different bases 
from preceding international communities of Egyptians that had been determined by contiguity 
and religion. Some Kamilists, however, refused to accept the terms of a novel secular situation. 
They wanted to make the Japanese "pillars of [the Muslims'] community/league Gami'atihim) 
and guardians of their unity". The Japanese would still have leadership as the model for 
self-strengthening modernization but within the constraints of membership in Islam's 'ummah.109. 
For attraction to become community, the Japanese would have to embrace Islam. 
2. Kamilist Attitudes to Non-Muslim Negroes 
As late as 1906, the acculturated Kamil had a reflex when addressing Europeans to 
dissociate Egypt from black Africans (Muslim as well as pagan) stereotyped as primitive in 
Europe (along with pre-colonial Moroccans). But as their all-embracing repudiation of the 
whole West gained momentum, the acculturated intellectuals whom Kamil headed declared their 
identification with powerless groups that Westerners despised and ill-treated the most. Met are 
condemnations, for instance, of Belgian atrocities in the Congo, committed to force the Blacks to 
grow rubber there110'. al-Liwa' expressed sympathy for Negroes facing discrimination and 
violence in the United States in two articles bitingly headlined "Hamajiyyat al-Mutamaddinin" 
(The Barbarism of the Civilized People)111• 
Neither Belgians nor Christian Americans had politically harmed Egypt or the Ottoman 
109. al-Liwa' 17 July 1906 p. 1. 
110. "Mas'alat al-Kunghu" (The Congo Question), al-Liwa' 26 July 1904, p. 1. 
111. One of these articles (al-Liwa' 8 March 1903, p. 1) assailed bigoted reaction among "both the elite and 
the masses of Americans" to President Theodore Roosevelt's gestures of inviting a black lecturer (Booker T. 
Washington) to dinner, or appointing an American black as head of a post office. The whites' reactions included 
threats from the Southern states to have Roosevelt assassinated as Lincoln had been. The other article under this 
heading (al-Liwa' 25 July 1904, p. 1) detailed violation by whites of black women in the USA's Southern states, 
lynchings and torture of a black man and his wife who fled from Doddsville, Mississippi, after being falsely accused 
of killing a white farmer. 
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State or Muslims. Long-standing Islamic hostility to a generalized "Abode" of Unbelief 
(narrowed to Western Christians by al-Nadim etc) continued in these intellectuals' drive to 
condemn the whole.Christian West. Some very distant Afro-Asian populations of course 
included Muslim minorities. The Kamilists' channel of communication with such areas would 
tend to be the Muslim minority: they therefore imbibed and diffused those distant minorities' 
viewpoints about non-Muslim neighbors. Propagating such viewpoints might hamper Muslim 
Egyptians' development of a sense of affinity and community with non-Muslim Afro-Asians. 
The Kamilists' perceptions of black Africans demonstrate the problem. On one hand, 
al-Liwa' berated mistreatment by white Belgians and Americans of Negroes. But in 1903 it also 
diffused in Egypt rejection by Indian Muslims in South Africa of community with the country's 
Africans. al-Liwa printed an article from its correspondent in Pretoria condemning racist 
treatment by the British of South Africa's Indians of whom a section was Muslim. However, the 
Muslim Indian writer did not absolutely oppose British racial segregation of public facilities etc: 
his objection was rather that the British were treating South Africa's Indians on the same level as 
the Negroes (al-' abid --- "the slaves") "although we are as the Europeans in education, 
knowledge and perception". Although he accepted Gandhi as the political leader of all sects of 
Indians in the country, he manifested the same sense of social distance from Hindu Indians. The 
British forced the Muslim Indians to use, along with Hindu Indians and the Bantu, segregated 
post-offices with the sign "Hindu Post Office". This phrase infuriated the (Indian) Muslims 
"because the Hindus are the idol-worshippong pagans"112• 
3. Kamilist Images of Mixed (Muslim-Pagan) Populations: India and China. 
(a) Anti-Imperialist Territorial Patriotism. al-Liwa' approved the non-communal nature 
of mourning in Calcutta and Sylhet where Hindus and Muslims joined to express their sympath) 
to the Egyptian people at their loss of "Mustafa Kamil Pasha the great leader of the Egyptian 
patriots". The atmosphere evoked here is of bi-sectarian nations, the Indian and the Egyptian, 
determined by secular factors of territorial homeland, perhaps race, and history. These factors 
112. "Pretoria, fi 15 Shawwal li-Hadrati Mukatibina" (Pretoria, on 15 Shawwal from Our Esteemed 
Correspondent There), al-Liwa' 16 February 1903 p. 1. Cf. text of petition denouncing residential segregation 
submitted by Gandhi to Colonial Affairs Secretary Chamberlain during his visit to South Africa. al-Liwa' 1 Marc 
1903, pp. 1, 2. Although unfriendly to Hinduism, the correspondent was prepared to accept Gandhi as the 
representative of Indians as a general entity including Muslims. 
followers were made 
aware Islam as a bond between Egypt and the Bengal populations question113 . By death, 
Kamil really had caught the attention of some up-and-coming young nationalist Hindu leaders in 
Bengal and other areas of India --- his impact was not an illusion of al-Liwa's Cairo head office. 
Already, Hindu communalism dogged the Indian nationalism of Sri Aurobindo Ghose 
(1872-1950), editor of the Calcutta Bande Mataram: Ghose was well aware in his 1908 tribute 
that "the religious solidarity of Islam" had been pursued by Kamil alongside appeals to Europe to 
advance Egyptian independence --- "but he never suffered it for a moment to interfere with the 
distinct existence of Egyptian Nationality". Thus, Kamil's similar territorial-Egyptianist 
"patriotism" and the harm he did the common occupier outweighed his perhaps instrumental 
pro-Ottoman pan-Islam for Bengali Hindu Anglophobes114• 
The relationship with Indian militants deepened after Kamil's death. In August 1909, 
al-Liwa' even praised Madha Lao Dhingra, a 25 year-old Hindu from the Panjab who on 1 July 
1909 had assassinated Lt. Col. Sir W.H. Curzon Whyllie, Political Aide-de-Camp to the 
Secretary of State for India, London115 • Explosive members of al-Hizb al-Watani came to 
prefer militant nationalist Hindus over Muslim Indians whom --- so Ibrahim al-W ardani, assassin 
of PM Ghali, perceived --- collaborated with the British out of minority insecurity116. The Indian 
revolutionary Khrishnavarna encouraged the exiled Watanis to proceed along the path of 
terrorism and insurrection: established lawyer-leaders such as Muhammad Farid were not 
113. al-Liwa' 14 April 1908. The deeply religious --- but bi-sectarian --- character of Bengal society was 
conveyed to Arab readers by the item. The meeting of mourning in Sylhet consisted of teachers and students: the 
headmaster chairing the gathering concluded his speech by urging the Muslim and Hindu students to go to their 
respective houses of worship to pray for God's mercy for Mustafa Kamil' s spirit. The Calcutta meeting was chaired 
by Mawlana Sayyid Shams al-Huda "and was attended by a great gathering of leading Hindus and Muslims". Those 
presiding announced that they would send condolences to Muhammad Farid, the successor as President of al-Hizb 
al-Watani and to Kamil's family: the Bengali sympathisers thus had correspondence contact with Egypt's 
pan-Islamic independence movement. Ibid. 
114. Aurobindo Ghose, "Mustafa Kamil Pasha", Bande Mataram 3 March 1908; reprinted in Sri 
Aurobindo, Bande Mataram: Early Political Writings --- 1 (Pondicherry: Birth Centenary Library 1972) pp. 
722-723. 
115. Goldschmidt, "Egyptian Nationalist Party" p. 325. 
116. For text A 115 fn 8. The Jaridists, too, tended to image that India's Muslims were more liable to 
collaborate with the British than the Hindus, the pace-setters of the movement for Indian independence: eg. Lutfi 
al-Sayyid, October 1911 A '3~7. 
17 
as or Egyptian, each struggle against rule, 
anticipated key assumptions about the national and the Afro-Asian communities later developed 
in Nasirism. But al-Liwa's non-pragmatic commitment to Islam's propagation as a necessity for 
itself ran against such secularization of national and wider community. al-Liwa in 1906 in its 
"Barid al-Islam" (Muslim World Reports) section reported that "four virtuous Brahmans have 
embraced the upright religion of Islam in the town of Lahore ... This results from India's 'Ulama' 
carrying out their religious duties as regards the propagation of Islam according to the Quran' s 
precepts". It was time, al-Liwa' bitingly commented, that "all the 'ulama' of Islam fulfil their 
religious function" and convey the Quran to those non-Muslims from whom its teachings "are 
covered even today": would al-Liwa' even support a missionary movement to Islamize 
Christians in Egypt, as well?118. al-Liwa' presented China's Muslims as prosperous and 
flourishing: "as a result, the pagans there incline to them, entering into the religion of Allah in 
great multitudes" 119• Such Islamist coverage of China and India by al-Liwa' convinced such 
Copts as Salamah Musa that Kamil's independence movement was not for non-Muslims120• 
In covering India and China, then, al-Liwa' manifested two contradictory attitudes to the 
world. On one hand, it viewed multi-sectarian nations, each welded by a territorial homeland 
from diverse sects, as humanity's main community units. Territorial nationalism would direct 
energies very much to temporal politics, immediately to achieving the nation's independence 
117. Arthur Goldschmidt, "The National Party from Spotlight To Shadow", Asian and African Stu dies 
(Hayfa) v. 16: March 1982 p. 17. 
118. "Ba.rid al-Islam" (Muslim World Reports), al-Liwa' 11 July 1906. It is to be noted that unfulfilled 
plans by Kamil to travel to India were specifically to visit "Islamic India". Steppat, "Nationalismus" p.282 fn 4. 
Kamil's early images of Indian Muslims were --- perhaps quite acutely --- of their pan-Islamism: their preparedness 
to almost suicidally attack the British to defend the Ottoman State's Caliphate, without mentioning Indian 
independence as their goal. Kamil, "L' Angleterre et l'Islam", La Nouvelle Revue 15 October 1895 p. 835. 
Haphazard pan-Islam: the Francophone Kamil won access to this Indian Muslim mood only because he had recentl: 
met an Englishman who translated for him the substance of an article in a Madras journal. Ibid. 
119. "al-Muslimuna fil-Sin" (The Muslims in China), 7 July 1906 p. 1. The phrase "entering into the 
religion of Allah in great multitudes" is a quotation from the Qur'an, surah 110 "al-Nasr" (Victory), describing the 
mass conversions of Arabia following the Prophet Muhammad's final triumph. 
120. Salamah in his 1927 al-Yawm wal-Ghad: "Mustafa Kamil out of his ignorance of our age's spirit use1 
to inform us --- as the remnants of the editorial staffs of al-Mu'ayyad and al-Hizb al-Watani continue to inform us 
Egyptians --- about Islam in China under the heading 'Islamic World News'". Quoted Muhammad Muhammad 
Husayn, al-Ittijahat al-Wataniyyah fil-Adab al-Mu'asir v. 2 p. 225. 
to as the 
an 
Indian or Chinese ,_,~,,i~·w~L 
Attitudes of live-and-let-live towards each other's disparate religious beliefs would be 
crucial to (a) the viability of individual territorial multi-sectarian nationalities and (b) 
international alliances between them. But the Kamilists' religious side wanted Islam to advance 
sweepingly around the world at the expense of other faiths. Such rapid mass conversions to 
Islam in countries like India and China could not but activate communal tensions disruptive of 
territorial political nationalisms. Involvement by the Kamilist movement itself in Islamic 
missionary activity abroad would rule out alliance on the basis of secular common interests 
(anti-colonialism, modernization) with predominantly non-Muslim nationalisms, such as the 
Indian. 
The tensions and dilemma about the wide East caused by the Liwa'ists' mix of elements 
unfolded over the next few decades in acculturated Egyptian Arabo-Islamism. Joint interests 
such as achieving independence from the same colonizer, cultural exchanges with Hindu Indians, 
acculturated distaste for traditional India as Egypt, tended to facilitate an 
Egyptian conjunction with Indian nationalism from 1922. Paradoxically, though, the 
ultra-acculturateds' very preoccupation with modern international realities and transformations, 
their Westernized knowledge of new means to connect continents, simultaneously equipped them 
to become the directors of an international modernist Islamism that disrupts multi-sectarian 
nationalisms or Afro-Asianism. The balance in these intellectuals between (a) Arab-centric and 
modernizing dislike of the decidedly non-classical Islam of ordinary Indian Muslims and (b) 
religious gulf vis-a-vis non-Muslim Afro-Asians whom joint interests link to Egypt, was always 
very delicate. These Egyptian intellectuals could swing either way in regard to the wide 
multi-religious "East", in the 1930s and 1940s as in the time of Mustafa Kamil (eg. vis-a-vis 
Indians: B 60-4, B 90-3; B 170-176). 
KAMILIST PAN-ISLAM: ASSESSMENT 
The literature in Arabic as well as Western languages has tended to view the 
Ottoman-centred pan-Islamism of the party of Mustafa Kamil in terms of a modest carry-over or 
-A228 -
residue from Islam: the Ottoman Empire was dwindling away, Egypt's links with it progressively 
attenuating, and even the Kamilists were rigorous about an Egyptian nation and its need for a 
discrete state. Yet the Islamic Ottoman Empire as so habitual a part of the conceptual universe 
of Egyptians would continue to bulk large until World War I smashed it. 
Our communications sampling highlighted more the experimental potency of Kamilist 
pan-Islam as a novel synthesis of (a) functional segments selected from Islam with (b) elements 
and patterns from the West. Scholarly discussion around whether the Kamilists would or would 
not have reincorpated (or confederated) Egypt into the Ottoman State has overlooked the 
unprecedented character of pan-Islam as a drive to effect with the West's technologies a 
supra-statal camp-community to hold back the West Kamilist pan-Islam alternated an 
impressive range of themes --- grippingly simple Islamic rituals, classical Arabs, contemporary 
holy war against Christian incursions, new crusades, the titanic contest for survival between two 
wide camps --- to galvanize Egyptians into modernizing behavior and enterprises modelled from 
the West, internally and regionally. The Kamilist bracketing of old Islamic motifs with even 
economic modernity today might look half-baked or preposterous or manipulative or transitional 
--- but may have affinities to some supra-nationalist rightist-Christian or pan-Latin ideas that 
after 1945 were to foster West European and pan-American counter-integrations against the 
communist camp. 
For a colonized country, the Kamilists often effectively integrated their new, wide 
Muslim community. Their media did achieve patchy or selective exchanges of ideas and 
experiences with comparable West-tinged elites in the Ottoman Empire, India and even Muslim 
populations ruled by Russia. Nor did the exchanges stay cultural: they got not just Arabic books 
but some food to far-off hungry non-Arab Muslims. In their narrower supra-Arab region, they 
mobilized diverse Egyptian strata to help the Ottoman State build railways by which it could stoi: 
Britain expanding from Egypt. The Hijaz Railway was an effective instrument of regional powe1 
that did tighten the Ottoman Empire's hold on the Arabian peninsula and proved hard for the 
Britsh to destroy during World War 1. Although Kamilist pan-Islam had rational, instrumental 
enterprises patterned by the model enemy West's capitalism, the West's racist, Islamophobic and 
high literary discourses also ignited or inflamed other of its more subjective and emotionalist 
aspects. On the whole, Kamilist pan-Islamism was pervasively tinted and structured by a West 
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perpetually overheard through acculturation. 
The Kamilists' ideological and political exchanges with Ottoman Turks were not 
superficial. In aesthetic matters the relationship could not match the knitting of Egyptian with 
other Arabs that the Kamilists fed by their promotion of a single standard language. 
Pro-Ottoman pan-Islamism politically retarded the evolution of an Egyptian-led pan-Arabism 
before 1919 to the extent that it led the Kamilists to stand with the Turks against autonomist or 
nationalist protests from Ottoman Arabs (Ch. 5). Yet Kamilist pan-Islam left long-term legacies 
to post-1922 Egyptian political pan-Arabism. Although sometimes only perceiving other 
Muslims, it increased interest in Algerian and other North African Arabs. It started the flow of 
Egyptian foodstuffs, guns and fighters to Libyans resisting Italy. And the Kamilists' attitude that 
sovereignty was larger than Egypt or any single Muslim state-unit, and their ceaseless discussion · 
of modern economic instruments for integrating that camp, fostered a frame of mind that after 
1922 was to try to integrate the Arabs with steamers, cross-investment and regional companies.· 
Chapter 2 
Arab-led 
stress 
conquests, wide empires intellectual centers. This Chapter 
traces contemporary applications by the Kamilists of such Arab classicist motifs: to the parochial 
struggle between Arabic and Western languages, the definition of self in the face of imperialism, 
in internal Egyptian ethnicites, and to the regional relations with Ottoman Arabs and Turks. 
Chapter 4 showed that Europe's expansionism made the acculturated Kamilists close ranks with 
the Ottoman central government: we now see how long they stayed hostile to efforts by Ottoman 
Arabs to wrest powers or independence from Istanbul's Turks. The pan-Islamic Kamilists urged 
Egyptians to donate to the Hijaz railway in order to tighten the Turks' hold over their Arabian 
territories against Britain --- if also to help modernize "Arab brothers". This Chapter sets out 
countering Arab ethno-linguistic affinities that finally even led some Kamilists to cheer the 
Sharif Husayn's 1916 Arab Revolt. 
Two .... ,...,,,....,,, are suggested formulations to be 
examined in Chapter. One is an identity combining Arabic Islam --- a pan-Arab nation 
within Islam's belief-community. But the present chapter also examines relations of Muslim 
Egyptians with resident Syrian Christians and Copts to test if the Arabic language and images of 
the classical Arabs' past can detach from Islam to thread together divergent Arab sects and 
homelands of origin. 
Accumulating Parochial Arab Ethnicity in Egypt 
Nineteenth century Muslim Egyptians were conscious of at least partial descent from 
Arabians who had moved into Egypt during or following the Islamic conquest. Egyptian 
peasants expressed their sense of being Arab in distinction from the other Muslim ethnic groups 
by applying the proverb "the oppression of the Turks rather than the justice of the Arabs" to 
oppressive Arabic-speaking Egyptians appointed by Muhammad' Ali as district governors, 
previously generally appointed from the Turks1• al-' Arab, however, also meant in spoken Arabic 
1. E.W. Lane, The Manners and Customs of the Modem Egyptians (London: Evermans 1908) p. 293. 
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the Arab nomads of the desert by this period and Lane referred to a term aw lad al-' Arab or sons 
of the Arabs with which Arabs living in houses described themselves2• The terms aw lad 
al-'Arab and abna' al-' Arab (sons/children of the Arabs) was applied to Egypt's general 
sedentary Arabic-speaking population in the second half of the nineteenth century to mark them 
off from other ethnic-linguistic groups. The Khedive Sa'id, in trying to replace Turks in (mainly 
lower ranks of) the administration in the 1850s addressed the Egyptians appointed as abna' 
al-' Arab "making them responsible, in case of failure, for perpetuating the rule of abna' 
al-Turk"3• 
Arabness: Possibility for Christians?. 'Abdallah al-Nadim and' Ali Mubarak (Ch. 2) 
located Egyptians' "forefathers" in "the Arab Nation" (al-Ummat al-' Arabiyyah), viewed as a 
non-current Islamic ideological community. al-Nadim's one-time constitutionalist comrade the 
Jewish Egyptian-nationalist journalist and playwright Ya'qub Sanu' (1839 - 1912) in his 19th 
century play al-' Alil applied the term awlad al-' Arab to Arabic-speaking non-Muslim Egyptians, 
also. The true love of the man Mitri is about to be married off by her father against her will to a 
Monsieur Hunayn: when the beloved protests to Mitri that she will never accept such a match, he 
observes ruefully that 
such talk would be in place with European families, but as regards us, children of the 
Arabs (awlad al-' Arab), a girl has no say, even though we have started getting civilized 
[al-tamaddun: wordplay "settling down in towns"?] and it is allowed for us to enter and 
go out among each other4 
The term awlad al-' Arab is here used by non-Muslim Arabic-speaking Egyptians to 
distinguish a multi-sectarian ethnic group from the resident Europeans. Arabness was evoked as 
a means of identifying with Muslim Egyptians by Syrian Christians, also, in the circle of 
al-Afghani. The Muslim al-N adim was seen in Chapter 2 to have in 1892 used ibn 'Arab and ibn 
2. Ibid, p. 27, fn. 1. 
3. Gabriel Baer, "Social Change in Egypt: 1800-1914" in P.M. Holt (ed.), Political and Social Change in 
Modern Egypt: Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conguest to the United Arab Republic (London: OUP 1968) p. 
148. 
4. Quoted in Sa'd al-Din Hasan Daghman, al-Usul al-Tarikhiyyah li-Nash'at al-Drama fil-Adab al-' Arabi 
(Arab University of Bayrut: Dar al-Abad Press 1973), p. 123. In his play Moliere Misr wa ma Yugasihi (Egypt's 
Moliere and all he Suffers), Sanu' bracketed the two terms awlad al-' Arab and awlad biladi (the Sons of my 
Country) to designate the community for which he was creating an "Arab Theatre". Ibid p. 194. From Paris exile 
following Britain's 1882 Occupation of Egypt, Sanu' in 1888, 1901 and 1907 celebrated the (classical?) Arabs' 
generosity, honesty and treatment of women. Irene L. Gendzier, The Practical Visions of Ya'gub Sanu' 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966) pp. 131, 174. An account of Sanu's pioneering contribution to 
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Turk to distinguish native ethnic groups from Europeans in context of the groups' educated 
youth adopting European languages in place of indigenous Arabic and Turkish5• al-Nadim let 
Syrian Christians evoke Arabness as a joint community with Egyptians and himself did so even 
towards SC residents who collaborated with the British occupiers. On the other hand, we 
encountered no communication in which he termed Copts Arabs. As well as first language, some 
racial-kinship link with Muslim classical Arab "forefathers" was another determinant of 
Arabness, leading al-Nadim sometimes to use "Arabs" and Copts as mutually exclusive ethnic 
categories in the Egyptian context despite the Copts' Arabic speech. 
Multi-Elite Restoration of Classical Arabs 
The period of British colonial rule saw an accelerating, increasingly documented and 
original, restoration of the classical Arabs within intellectual life and high literature. The 
mutually-reinforcing efforts of a range of culturally divergent elites in Egypt --- but also from 
other Arab countries --- by 1919 had built up a diverse body of Arabist motifs and elements: 
acculturated Muslims could pick what met their needs. The power of the West was on the mind 
of all elites that contributed, even representatives of traditional monolingual Sunni Muslim 
learning. 
'Ali Mubarak published his translation of Sedillot's 1854 Histoire des Arabes in 1892. In 
that same year, the rather more acculturated Ahmad Zaki Pasha (1867 - 1934), a graduate in the 
French-derived secular law (1887), a professional Egyptian government French-Arabic translator 
and Arabist who extensively interacted with orientalists in Egypt and in European conferences, 
made his first journey to Spain. Ahmad Zaki viewed himself as "the Arab Muslim" during an 
audience with the Regent Queen Christina6, toured the Arab sites in the main Spanish towns and 
commenced forthwith in al-Ahram his forty-year-long Egyptian press popularization of Arab 
Spain as "the Lost Islamic Paradise"7• Zaki represents tense, ambivalent stances towards the 
West manifested by some acculturated intellectuals. Colonized, these intellectuals must 
the Arab theatre is Matti Moosa, "Ya'qub Sanu' and the Rise of Arab Drama in Egypt", IJMES, 5 (1974) pp. 
401-433. 
5. "Madrasat al-Banat", al-Ustadh 10 November 1892 p. 247. 
6. Anwar al-J undi, Ahmad Zaki al-Mulaililab bi-Shaykh al- 'Urubah (Ministry of Culture and National 
Guidance, Cairo: MaktabatMisr c. 1964) (series "A'lam al-'Arab"; no. 29) pp. 103-104. 
7.Ibid,pp. 15,39. 
to 
to 
as 
Spain hearteningly to the emergence modern 
and "the power attained by Islam ... when its banners fluttered above Andalusia, its peoples 
spreading ... civilization ... the days when the Western Caliphate surpassed its Eastern rival in 
luxury, grandeur and intellectual life to the extent that the Kings of Europe curried favor with the 
Caliphs, seeking their patronage and protection"8• Even more in the twentieth century, 
acculturated Egyptian intellectuals were apt to connect the modern Egyptians to the Arabs in 
Spain when arguing the political relationship between Egyptians and the occupying British. The 
highly acculturated, racially sensitive Duse Mohamed, in 1911 flung back at Britishers who were 
disdainful of Egypt's Westernizing-educated intellectuals, the Arab capability witnessed "by 
those who have visited Spain, gazing admiringly on the Alhambra and other remnants of 
Moorish architecture wrought by the forebears of that very Arab stock who at present inhabit the 
[Nile] Delta"9• The anti-Muslim Louis Bertrand observed 19 that it had become the fashion 
Egyptian nationalists to go to meditate in the gardens the Alcazar of Seville or 
in the Alhambra of Granada on the defunct splendors of Western Islam. Such Egyptians tended 
to ascribe to Europe's modem civilization an Islamic Saracenic origin, "the total annexation of 
France to Morocco" 10• 
Contributions from very diverse Arab --- not just Egyptian --- elites fed the rise of 
acculturated Arab historical consciousness. The Khedive 'Abbas' mouthpiece al-Mu'ayyad 
publicized research works on the classical Arabs published by traditional scholars in the whole 
Arab world. In 1905 it gave a general account of the three-volume work Bulugh al-Arab fi 
Ma'rifat Ahwal al-' Arab published in 1899 in Baghdad by the 'Iraqi Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi 
(1857 - 1924), identifying the Cairo bookshop selling it Most of the work was an account of the 
peninsular Arabians in their pre-Islamic period. In assessing this work's potential to promote a 
non-religious sect-integrative Arab national identity in Egypt, the religious orientation of both 
8. Ibid, p. 99. 
9. Duse Mohamed, In the Land of the Pharaohs: A Short History of Egypt (London: Stanley Paul & Co., 
1911), p. 5. 
10. L. Bertrand, Le Mirage Oriental (Paris 1910) quoted by Lothrop Stoddard, The New World oflslam 
(London: Chapman and Hall 1922) pp. 98-99. 
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the pan-Islamic al-Mu'ayyad and al-Alusi should be borne in mind. Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi 
came of a Baghdad family with a tradition of scholarly Islamic writing11, he was basically a 
latter-day follower of Taqiy al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah and many of his works listed by Daghir were 
tracts on purely religious controversies12• Study of the pre-Islamic Arabs and their poetry by 
Muslims was to explicate meanings of the revealed Qur' an and Islam's initial history. This 
religious impulse is mentioned by al-Mu'ayyad as inspiring al-Alusi to write his work, but in 
conjunction with his national identification with even pre-Islamic Arabians. The (1889) 
International Congress of Orientalists, held in Stockholm, called on the East's scholars to write 
about the history of the (classical) "Arab nation". Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi "moved by Arab zeal 
and the racial link and the religious community" thereupon penned his monumental work on the 
classical, chiefly pre-Islamic, Arabians. Hailing it, al-Mu'ayyad, saw the early Arabs as 
providing (a) the model for Arabic language usage and (b) for cultivating such virtues "as 
magnanimity and courage in battle/readiness to aid the hard-pressed (al-najdah) and chivalry and 
compulsion to take the side of any in distress (al-hamiyyah) and group spirit and preservation of 
family honor and attention to the rights of neighbors and honor shown to guests and sacrifice of 
one's own life in defence of a stranger". An important point is that the Arabians had already 
developed their model virtues before --- and independently of --- revealed Islam. al-Alusi's 
work, al-Mu'ayyad informed its Egyptian readership, "began from the first [pre-Islamic] 
emergence of the Arab nation" (a 1-U mmat al-' Arabiyyah). It gave a detailed account of the 
customs and tribal genealogies of the Arabian peninsula's pre-Islamic racially unmixed 
"authentic Arabs" who spoke the original pure Arabic (al-' Arab al-' Ariba'), "their fine ethics", 
"their poets, their sages and their religion of worship before Islam and the tactful way in which 
the Prophet Muhammad changed their inherited mores and the traditions that they had zealously 
handed down" 13• The Prophet Muhammad and Islam modified but harnessed and fulfilled rather 
than replaced the characteristics that the Arabians had already developed. 
al-Mu'ayyad in the al-Alusi item speaks of "the Arab nation" as a bygone entity which on 
11. Account of the Wahhabi-leaning al-Alusi family in Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 
1798 - 1939 (London: OUP paperback 1970) p. 222. The religious works of Mahmud Shihab al-Din al-Alusi and 
Nu'man al-Alusi were published in Cairo from 1880: ibid p. 375. 
12. See Yusuf As' ad Daghir, Masadir al-Dirasat al-Adabiyyah pt. 2 (Bayrut: Matabi' Lubnan 1956) pp. 
41-45. 
13. "Bulugh al-Arab fi Ma'rifat Ahwal al-' Arab", al-Mu'ayyad 23 July 1905. 
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the strength of its unique virtues gained pre-eminent glory over all other "states and nations" in 
"the ancient ages". It nonetheless provided the "origin" (uss) in which the contemporary 
successor entities of "the sons of the Arabs" (abna' al-' Arab) and "the East" can command 
"honor" before the West14• The non-Egyptian al-Alusi's work, through subsequent Cairo 
editions, conveyed authentic data about the early Arabians to Westernizing-educated Muslim 
Egyptians in the isolationist-particularist 1920s and during the 1930s (Arabo-Islamic reaction 
against the West)15• Its non-Muslim classical Arabs could validate Arab political community 
with Christians. 
al-Mu'ayyad also publicized contributions by local Egyptian authors to the literature 
about the classical Arabs. In 1905 it hailed the Ta'rikh Duwal al-' Arab wal-Islam (The History 
of the States of the Arabs and Islam) by Muhammad Tala'at Harb, the pioneering Egyptian 
businessman, financier and industrialist (d. 1941)16 --- who was to be a pioneer of economic 
pan-Arabism in the 1920s and 1930s (B 45 - 51). Harb had links to 
Mustafa I<amil's al-Hizb al-Watani but was closer to al-Jaridah and the less anti-British 
al-Ummah Party17• 
al-Mu'ayyad presented the classical Arabs, conceived as ethically formed before Islam, 
as a behavioral model to reform contemporary Egyptians. One article ruefully accepted the 
charge of the English-owned Cairo Momin~ News that Egyptians were congenital perjurors, 
made to present them as unfit to rule their own country. Yet "falsehood is not of the inherent 
nature of either the Arab or the Easterner. Rather truthfulness was the adornment of the Arab, 
more than with any other race, in a number of ages before Islam and after it". In assessing the 
secular community potential in this sense of "the Arabs" as independent in origin of Islam sight, 
once more, must not be lost of the symbiotic Islamic function of the virtue in question, here 
truthfulness. True testimony is crucial to the functioning of Islamic religious law (shari' ah): 
14. llid. 
15. Details of a 1924 Cairo edition, a 1925 review by SC-owned al-Mugtataf calling the modernist 
intelligentsia's attention to the work, and of a 1935 abridged Cairo edition in Daghir, Ql2....cil, p. 42. 
16. "Ta'rikh Duwal al-'Arab wal-Islam" al-Mu'ayyad 17 July 1905. Harb's Islamic conservation was 
illustrated when in 1323H (1905 AD) he published a 199 page reply titled Tarbiyyat al-Mar' ah wal-Hijab ~ 
Eciucation of Women and the YeiD to Qasim Amin' s call for the emancipati~n of women. 
17. Muhammad Farid, who succeeded Kamil as leader in 1908, felt that Tala'at Harb was using financial 
connections with al-Hizb al-Watani to try to take over its press and twist al-Liwa's militant opposition to the British 
to the perceivedly pro-Occupation line of al-Hizb al-Ummah and al-Jariclah. AwraQ Muhammad Farid v. 1, (Cairo: 
al-Hay'at al-Misriyyah al-' Ammah lil-Kitab 1978) pp. 70-71. 
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intentional perjury is in consequence termed al-yamin al-ghamus, "the plunger oath", because "it 
plunges he who commits it into sin or into hell-fire as though complete belief (iman) is 
synonymous with complete truthfulness". Islam deepened the Arabs' innate truthfulness, which 
made them the most tenaciously truthful of the nations "in the days of their first power/glory"18• 
Important is the article's implicit periodization of Islamic history. "Muslims whether in 
Egypt or elsewhere" are dishonest today because, after the end of the Arabs' "days of first 
power/glory" long ago, Muslim governments inflicted oppression and ignorance upon "these 
nations" 19• The periodizing low esteem for post-classical --- largely non-Arab --- Muslim 
governments is akin to the al-Alusi review's concept that latter day "ages [dahr] of corruption 
and pressure of the kings of despotism" threatened with extinction the Arabic works that alone 
can preserve the history, virtues and language of the classical Arabs20• 
All the writers thus far examined were Muslims who always saw the classical Arabs in 
relation to the entity of Islam. But Syrian Christians resident in Egypt also exalted the 
prescriptive virtues of the sects-neutral, pagan pre-Islamic Arabians. An instance is the 1909 
play al-Samaw'al aw Wafa' al-Arab (al-Samaw'al or the Faithfulness of the Arabs) by Antun 
al-Jumayyil (1887 - 1948). Editor of the Catholic-Jesuit al-Bashir while in Bayrut, in Egypt he 
became an editor of the (from 1930 pan-Arab) al-Ahram and later a member of the Egyptian 
parliament. al-Jumayyil's play illustrated the pre-Islamic Arabs' prescriptive faithfulness to 
trust: it depicted the Jewish pre-Islamic Arabian al-Samaw'al Ibn 'Adiya's choice, rather than 
hand over to enemies of Imra' al-Qays the daughter whom Qays left in safe-keeping, to see them 
murder his own captured son before his castle's walls21 • (For al-Jumayyil and al-Ahram and 
pan-Arab Egyptians 'Abd al-Rahman' Azzam and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat in the 1930s and 
1940s: B 229, B 334). 
THE KAMILISTS 
The West's Presence. The modern West's broader creativity as well as might is very 
18. "al-Inkaru wa Shahadat al-Zur" (Denial and False Witness), al-Mu'ayyad 30 July 1905. 
19. Ibid. 
20. "Bulugh al-Arab fi Ma'rifat Ahwal al-' Arab", loc. cit. 
21. Antun al-Jumayyil published al-Samaw'al aw Wafa' al-Arab in Cairo (the al-Abram press) in 1909. An 
account of the play is given by Daghman, fil.:.lifil!l p. 136. 
a context s 
over 
latter psychologically tolerable for Egyptian Muslims. 
capacity the al-Mu'ayyad items on perjury and the book that al-Alusi wrote in response to a 
scholarly institution in the West 
As a movement dedicated to wresting political sovereignty back from imperialist 
Christians, the Kamilists identified more with the wide conquests and organized, internationally 
powerful state empires of the Muslim classical Arabs, than with pre-Islamic Arabia. 
Steppat pointed out Kamil's youthful pride in the achievements of the classical Arabs, 
which he expressed in a vivid play he wrote titled The Conquest of Spain22• Often performed, 
the verisimilitude of its recreation of the Andalusian Arabs' poetic idiom diffused pan-Arab 
historical identifications and the ability to read classical Arab sources, over decades, in Morocco 
as well as Egypt23• Kamil's play celebrated the wide Arabs' demonstration of Muslim capacity 
to match or surpass Europeans' military strength, an aspect of al-Nadirn's and Ahmad Zaki 
Pasha's to Muslim Spain 
somewhat identify himself and Egypt 
early 1890s. However, Kamil also was prepared to 
the pre-Islamic pagan Arabians the eyes of Europe 
(secular Arab virtues). Thus, he was the one whose urging motivated the Syrian poet Shukri 
Ghanim to compose his French play 'Antarah in order to acquaint the European public with the 
22. Fritz Steppat, Nationalismus und Islam bei Mustafa Kamil, Welt des Islams, iv (1956) p. 252. I am 
shortly to publish a full literary and political study of Kamil's play. 
23. Halstead equated Kamil's play and his books on Egyptian and pan-Islamic issues with Jurji Zaydan's 
magazine al-Bilal and Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat's al-Risalah as all crucial stimulants of the development of an 
urban-centered Moroccan nationalism. Kamil's Conquest of Spain was frequently acted in Morocco in the 1920s, 
1930s and 1940s and thus helped bring the growing urban Muslim middle classes and workers into a form of 
Moroccan nationalism with significant wider pan-Arab connections and historical consciousness. John P. Halstead, 
Rebirth of a Nation: the Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism. 1912-1944 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press 1967) pp. 130-131. The odds against standard Arabic becoming the language of a modem 
successor-collectivity were much more severe in French-occupied Morocco than in British-occupied Egypt. In 
1952, while in Marrakish, A.J. Arberry found that even reciters of the Thousand and One Nights were dependent on 
editions of individual tales imported from distant Tunis: "for in Morocco itself, that ancient Moslem land of 
once-brilliant culture, no books, or virtually none, are being printed in Arabic". Arberry, Scheherezade: Tales From 
the Thousand and One Nights (London: Allen & Unwin 1953) pp. 21-22. Moroccan youth were dependent for 
modem forms of Arabic culture on the dribble of publications that the French could not stop getting through from 
Egypt. In the Moroccan context, the classical language was becoming confined and moribund within mosques: 
Kamil's play helped extend it into a new public politicizing sphere, giving wider classes of Moroccans the bases to 
understand classical Arabic literature. 
master 
as light 
nation a state ignorance" conquerors and educators 
of the world: "a degree of knowledge not witnessed [today] and which never will be 
witnessed"25• In such explications of history, Kamil falls into a traditional commitment to Islam: 
a divinely-revealed religion is the transforming factor enabling a people incapable in their human 
resources, not just to conquer but to sustain a long-term literate-intellectual civilization. Kamil 
stereotyped the Arabs at Islam's revelation as nomadic despite the Qur' an' s criticisms of the 
mercantile urban life of Mecca, immediate milieu of Muhammad's message. 
As with al-Afghani earlier, Kamil's movement worked for the construction of 
modernized Muslim states with the strength to maintain or wrest back political sovereignty in 
face of the West's dynamism. The classical Arabs became a source of confidence for 
strength-building, self-Westernizing endeavors in the aspect of the educational dynamic and 
intellectualism their organized wide states under the Arab Caliphs. In an early (1893) essay, 
Kamil the the Empire's success in Arabic 
and Islam, and thereby maintaining itself, to Islam-prescribed "universalization of education"26• 
Sultan' Abdul-Hamid's construction of West-modelled schools in his empire, Kamil thought in 
1893, restored this educational dynamic of "the Easterners" under "the first Caliphs"27• The 
Umayyad and 'Abbasid states presented a prototype of organized Islamic states with interventive 
24. According to 'Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, Ghanim was a personal friend of Kamil. Kamil was the one 
whose urging first prompted Ghanim to write his French play 'Antarah, which was perfonned in Egypt as well. 
Kami! paid eloquent tribute to Ghanim's poetry at a Cairo reception held for him in January 1906. al-Rafi'i, 
Mustafa Kamil: Ba'ith al-Harakat al-Wataniyyah (Cairo: np. 1939) p. 390. Shukri Ghanim in collaboration with 
Georges Samne, expounded Syrianist rather than Lebanonist national ideas from Paris, although they, too, had some 
encouragement from the Quai d'Orsay. They were committed to the classical Arabic language and its "memories" 
as a basis for identity in Syria. Hourani, Arabic Thought p. 286. Ghanim's criticisms from Paris triggered a 
high-point of ethnic tension between Turks and Ottoman Arabs in 1910: fn 77. After the Sharif Husayn launched 
the 1916 Arab Revolt, Samne called for France to impose a protectorate on a united Syria so that it would not come 
under the rule of a more nomadic population liable to impose Islamic religious law at the expense of liberal, 
Europe-oriented Christian minorities in Syria. "Sharif Makkah wal-Wahdat al-Suriyyah" (The Sharif of Mecca and 
Syrian Unity), Fila (Bayrut) April 1982, reprinted al-Nahdah (Sydney) 6 January 1983 pp. 5, 7-8. 
25. "Nur al-Islam fil-Afaq" (Islam's Light Fills the Horizons [=World]), in Ali Fahrni Kamil, Mustafa 
Kamil Basha fi 34 Rabi'an (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Liwa' 1908-1911), v. 1, pp. 271-273. 
26. Ibid v. 2, p. 4. 
27. Ibid v. 2, p. 9. 
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bureaucracies able to direct society's development. In contrast, pre-Islamic Arabia lacked 
organized government or educational institutions: it was the Arab period of least use to the , 
Kamilists. 
The Kamilists' preference for wide, at least nominally Islamic, classical Arab states made 
future Arab nationalism less likely to be secular and worked against the narrower Egyptian 
homeland framing political community. 
It is revealing to compare Kamil's Arabizing conceptions of the race and culture of 
Egypt's peasantry to those of true particularist nationalists. Of course, in certain situations, to 
make Muslim Egyptians and Copts feel closer during sectarian polemics, Kamil and his 
followers did evoke the Egyptian population's partial Pharaonic racial origin across sect 
differences. Yet they did not on that account develop theories parallel to those tangentially 
suggested by Lutfi al-Sayyid under the British occupation and elaborated after World War I by 
Muhammad Husayn Haykal, 'Abdallah 'Inan and Tawfiq al-Hakim: that the Egyptian peasantry 
as a cultural and to some extent racial Pharaonic core had preserved Egypt's eternal self from the 
impact of the Arabs and other alien conquerors and immigrants. The peasantry in Kamil' s 
thought, too, was a repository of Egypt's authentic identity, but unlike Lutfi al-Sayyid's or 
Tawfiq al-Hakim's Pharaonic core, owed its nobility and the characteristics it prescribed to its 
Arabization in blood and values: 
Arab generosity ,.U still intact in the Egyptian peasant in all its expressions. Wherever 
you go you will find the doors open to the guest, the tables set up and loaded, and a joy . 
general whenever any stranger comes, without regard to his religion or race. The reason 
why this custom is so deeply rooted or innate among the Egyptians after they were famed 
from a thousand years for miserliness and greed for money is that Arab blood mingled 
with theirs and its nobility of ethics became predominant among them, to the extent that a 
man will give his own life as ransom for yours if you seek refuge with him or invoke the 
protection of his standing --- and so with other renowned and exalted Arab 
characteristic s28• 
When comparing this 1898 passage to Kamil's observations upon the relation between 
28. Excerpts from a study by Kamil on the Egyptian Peasant first published in an Italian agricultural journal 
on 1 April 1898: excerpts ibid v. 6 pp. 211-212. Sometimes in affirming that the wide classical Arabs are definitive 
of modem Egyptians, Kamil rather attempted to relate and synthesize the separate Pharaonic and Arab motifs in his 
nationalist communications. He once argued that Egyptians merited political independence because they were "the 
heirs to two great civilizations --- the Pharaonic and the Arab --- and it is our right and our duty to sit among the 
civilized nations". Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image. from Its Origins to Ahmad 
Lutfi al-Sayyid (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972) p. 248. 
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the fortunes of the early Arabs and transforming Islam, one is struck by the rather secular nature 
of the Arab influences and qualities transplanted into the Egyptian environment. 
Some Arab qualities such as hospitality that Kamil in 1898 mentioned the classical Arabs 
as having naturalized overlap with virtues that the 1903 al-Mu'ayyad item on al-Alusi originated 
in the Arabs' pre-Islamic period. The pro-Khedive, Islamic al-Mu'ayyad had been one of 
Kamil's main forums before he founded his al-Liwa' in 1900. The Arab readiness of Egyptians 
to give their lives as ransom for any who seek protection is akin to the hamiyyah --- the flaming 
compulsion to go to the aid of those in trouble --- ascribed by al-Mu'ayyad to the classical Arabs. 
Westernizing-educated anti-imperialist intellectuals typified by Kamil, and traditionally-cultured 
Arab Muslims with Islamic formal education projected from al-Mu'ayyad, were both developing 
related basic concepts. 
Mustafa Kamil in 1898 depicted the incoming Arabs' blood and social virtues as having 
transformed Egyptian social mores and behavioral patterns for the better --- running against 
particularist theses of continuity of Egyptian national personality down the ages. He was 
prepared to view the Egyptians' established pre-Islamic ethical norms as incompatible with the 
incoming Arabs' ethics, but to opt for the latter. It was left unclear how extensively Kamil 
rejected the Pharaonic "golden age". His phrase that Egyptians were notorious for miserliness 
and greed for 1,000 years prior to the Arab advent might rhetorically characterize all Egypt's 
pre-Islamic past. If precise, the time-span for which Egyptians were bereft of basic ethics would 
be mainly covered by foreign Persian, Macedonian, Ptolemaic, Roman and Byzantine rule. 
Kamil's remark ultimately derived from Josephus and possibly other late classical and 
early post-classical writers in Greek. Josephus (37 AD - c. 93 AD), in a communalist apologetic, 
ascribed persecution of the prosperous Jews in Egypt following the death of Joseph, to the 
Egyptians' "love oflucre"29• Josephus' anti-Egyptian stereotypes could have passed into 
Byzantine and modern Greek Christian literature, and thence into such Greek-edited Egyptian 
29. Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, tsd by H. St. J. Thackery (London: Heinemann, 1930) v. II, p. 251. 
Josephus' most sustained abuse of the Egyptians occurs in his Against Apion: this refuted the anti-Semitism of, 
among other writers of Greek, Apion, Alexandria-educated grammarian and historian who, however, was born in 
Upper Egypt, and the Egyptian priest Manetho. A Latin letter of Hadrian in Ammianus Marcellinus described the 
Egyptians as long-celebrated for their love of money and their hatred of paying taxes. Art. "Kibt", Ell p. 999. In 
regard to Kamil' s image that the pre-Islamic Egyptians were miserly, Smith in A Dictiomuy of the Bible (London: 
John Murray, 1863, p. 501) described the ancient Egyptians as "frugal", although without specifying the classical or 
Christian source. 
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French-language newspapers as Le Phare d' Alexandrie. Kamil in 1897 engaged in polemics in 
Egypt's French press with John Haicalis, Greek editor of Le Phare d' Alexandrie, when he , 
accused Kamil of expressing hostility to Greeks --- including Egypt's Greeks --- over the 1897 
war between Greece and Turkey30• Kamil's homogenizing Arab-centrism may have made hirri 
take up the slur from a Francophone Greek or from classical Arab sources, with their abundant 
Hellenistic materials. 
Persistent Kamilist Arabism. Kamil's brother, 'Ali Fahrni Kamil, printed the Arabic 
translation of the 1898 article, originally published in an Italian journal, in the collection of 
Kamil's speeches and writings edited by him following Kamil's death in 1908, giving it its 
widest, most authoritative impact on the mourning secular-educated constituency. Although 
Egypt's ancient Pharaonic period was also being internalized more, the Arabness of Egyptians 
recurred in wide circles associated with Kamil's independence movement, up to World War I. 
Thus, al-Liwa's senior staff writer Ahmad Hilmi in August 1906, still approved when Egyptian 
secondary school students justified Egypt's independence by simultaneously claiming the 
supra-Egyptian classical Arabs and the ancient Pharaonic Egyptians as ancestors: 
We have received a letter from the Khedivial School informing us that the teacher of 
history said that 'the European states were solely inspired to help the Greeks win 
independence from the Turks because they were the descendants of the heroes of the past 
ages'. This teacher (I do not know what I should call him) had hardly finished delivering 
this sentence before the brighter of his students began to ask 'If this is the reason, why, 
then, does Europe not help us win independence, when we Egyptians are either the 
descendants of the ancient Egyptians who created sciences and civilizations, or 
descendants of the Arabs who conquered (all) lands and established justice between 
(God's) servants (humanity) and were distinguished by the noblest qualities and became 
the spring from which Europe drank deep of science and philosophy?'. Such comments 
show that the seeds of the love of independence have begun to grow in the souls of 
Egyptian students31 • 
Ironically, post-World War I particularists would have condemned this (qualified racial) 
identification of an Egyptian political nation with the classical Arabs as --- in contrast to the link 
of descent affirmed with the Pharaonic Egyptians --- more a false than a nationalist 
30. Ahmad Rashad, Mustafa Kamil, Hayatuhu wa Kifahuhu (Cairo: Mitba'at al-Sa'adah 1958) pp. 113-114. 
31. Ahmad Hilmi, "al-Istiqlal! al-Istiqlal!" (Independence! Independence!), al-Liwa' 9 August 1906. The 
secularist Copt Salamah Musa had grim memories of impersonal repression and sadism by British teachers in early 
twentieth century primary and secondary schools, including the Khedivial College. Musa, The Education of 
Sa1amah Musa tsd. L.O. Schuman (Leiden: FJ. Brill 1961) pp. 11-12, 27-28. 
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consciousness. The school students represented a new politicized, anti-imperialist generation, 
and yet there had not been much advance towards particularist Egyptian nationality independent 
of the Arabs from when Kamil and his peers had been in school. Ahmad Hilmi, a member of the 
older founding generation of acculturated nationalists (he was born in 1875, the year after 
Kamil), endorsed the adolescent students' 1906 identification of Egypt's political nationality 
with wide classical Arabs centered outside Egypt. 
The Khedivial College students in 1906 carried forward al-Alusi's, al-Mu'ayyad's, 
Kamil' s --- and disliked (post?)-Christian Egypto-Syrians' ! --- sense that the classical Arabs are 
the source of prescriptive virtues. They also developed the religion-inspired 1893 motif of the 
West-steeped educationalist' Ali Mubarak that the Arabs conquered in order to give humanity 
justice under law, offering access to Qur'anic divine revelation. 
Arabic and Education 
Islam the religion and the classical Arabs were among the motives of an al-Nadim-level 
commitment to Arabic in the party of Mustafa Kamil. The Kamilists and the more pragmatic 
proto-particularists around Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid/al-Jaridah diverged on language issues. 
al-Jaridah's coverage showed that public feeling ran with the Kamilists' vehement drive to 
establish classical Arabic's primacy in education and public life. Both (a) some Jaridists' 
contrasting pragmatic pursuit of modernization, which subordinated their commitment to Arabic 
and (b) the depth and extent of the public feeling developing for Arabic, were caught by the tone 
of an anonymous 1907 writer on the language issue in Lutfi's al-Jaridah. Moderate, neutral, 
giving both sides of the argument and disposed to propose two linguistic streams, Arabic and 
foreign-language, in education, the writer yet found in 1907 "the question of instruction in 
Arabic medium the talk of the meeting-places". Its supporters, he noted, argued that "rejection of 
this proposal would pain the whole nation without exception: never in this country has there been 
such unanimous approval for anything as for this demand". Shortage of Arabic-medium teachers 
and the inadequacy of Arabic for expressing modern sciences was al-Jaridah's argument for a 
linguistic duality in education. This writer apparently viewed the Egyptian education system's 
urgent task as to import and diffuse the modern West's sciences in backward Egypt: promoting 
Arabic for its own sake was a secondary luxury. Arabic had never been the medium of a true 
not not 
give 
medium of European languages, higher stages especially32• 
In contrast to the utilitarian pro-Western stance of a few in Lutfi's group was the 
Kamilists' and al-Liwa's fierce ideological commitment to (classical) Arabic as the only 
acceptable medium for all education in Egypt Mustafa Kamil and his followers manifest an 
attitude in which promoting standard Arabic for its own sake has priority in nationalist activities 
of education and political mobilization. Steppat points out that Kamil, while still a student, "in 
al-Madrasah expressly rejects al-lughat al-darijah (colloquial Egyptian Arabic) on grounds that 
--- a considerable error --- almost everybody understands al-lughat al-fusha"33 • Kamil's use of an 
uncomplicated classical style to mobilize Egyptians is contrasted by Steppat to 'Abdallah 
al-Nadim's preparedness to write sometimes in colloquial to reach the widest popular audience34. 
The Kamilists' tightened-up use of classical Arabic broke with al-Nadim's practice, but 
implemented his ideological drive to make the classical Arabs' tongue again current35 • 
... u'""""""-"• West-obsessed Kamilists wanted to diffuse the West's modem sciences 
as important for the nation's renaissance. Their propagation through education, though, had to 
be combined with the overriding aim of imparting mastery of classical Arabic by imposing the 
language as the standard medium of instruction. 
al-Liwa's stance was partly influenced by ethnic-linguistic European nationalisms as well 
as immemorial identification of Arabic with Islam. One 1902 al-Liwa' writer thus paid tribute to 
the struggles of the Maltese, the Bohemians in the Hapsburg empire and the Poles to preserve 
32. Ahad al-Kuttab ("a Writer"), "al-Ta'lim bil-Lughat al-' Arabiyyah" (Education in the Arabic Language), 
al-Jaridah 11 March 1907, p. 4. The writer tended to identify as model for possible linguistic duality of education in 
Egypt the experience of Turkey. There the Dar al-Funun (the Muslim' World's first indigenous university, opened 
in Constantinople in 1900) used Turkish in teaching --- while the Mak:tab-i-Sultani used purely French medium to 
teach modem subjects. 
33. Steppat, Nationalismus p. 253 fn. 1. 
34. Ibid. 
35. al-Nadim masterfully used the colloquial in al-Ustadh's written dialogues to raise Egyptians' national 
and social consciousness. Sight must, however, not be lost of his attitude, resulting from the classical Arabs 
providing the language norm, that the colloquial was a temporary evil for communicating. al-Ustadh's short 
colloquial section was al-Nadim' s means to "lead the ignorant common man from a hatred of hearing books to love 
of books ... Then there will be no need to write other than correct [language)". "Bab al-Lughah", al-Ustadh, 30 
January 1893, p. 468. 
overseas 
industries, discoveries reforms m "all education 
language of the country, its religion and the indigenous population that properly possesses 
it as is the norm in all countries". The article was written, (as it seems by a teacher since the 
author uses the pseudonym "Mudarris") in context of pressure in the Egyptian parliament that 
had "sought from the Education Ministry of this Arab(ic) land that its language get its due 
position" as the medium for teaching "the contemporary sciences". But the Egyptian Ministry of 
Education "looked with no kindly eye on the proposals of the representatives" of the Egyptians 
--- as though nothing remained of Arab zeal (al-hamas al-' Arabi) in this Arab(ic) department". 
Egyptians should take a leaf from the book of the foreigners in Egypt who "faithfully served their 
land, their nation and their kingdom" by reducing use of Arabic to one fourth of the 
teaching-time at secondary level. The 1903 al-Liwa' denunciation of education under the 
Occupation identified the survival of standard Arabic with that of Islam. The "spokesman" of the 
Ministry is virtually calling upon Egyptian to "come ... I may recite to 
sacred foreign languages to make you relinquish your religion, repudiate your language, and 
forget the feats of your ancient forefathers ... ". The European languages and Arabic thus 
additionally represent two warring religions, Christianity and Islam --- developing Abdallah 
al-Nadim's themes of the early 1890s. To eliminate or disestablish Arabic is to attack the Islam~ 
to which the language gives the Egyptian nation (ummah) access. Elsewhere, the writer defines 
Arabic as "the tongue of the Egyptian's forefathers, of his religion and his prophet"36• 
Emotionalistic commitment to Islam and its de-particularizing language could make Egyptians 
accept as their definitive forefathers the Arabian people who conveyed the Qur'an to the world 
--- not the Pharaonic Egyptians. In this very much West-stimulated Kamilist vision of history, 
Arabic had a dual character: it provided the Egyptian nation's means of access to a divine 
religion, but also to the "feats" of the historical classical Arab human community ("ancestors"). 
Both Kamilists and Jaridists celebrated the physical land or watan of Egypt, but standard 
Arabic, too, was crucial and central in nationality for each. Kamilist definitions of what was 
36. "Mudarris", "Dusturun am Istibdad?" (Constitution or Despotism?), al-Liwa', 8 January 1903, p. 1. 
are 
taught at level but "what type is the 
colloquial Arabic that pupils know from their earliest childhood (leading to) ignorance their 
language and the tongue of their forefathers"37• This position rejects the distinctive everyday 
usage of contemporary Egyptians as a corruption or deviation from the norm of their linguistic 
identity established a millennium before by Islam and early Arabs, mainly outside Egypt 
Extensions of this attitude long were to inhibit development in creative literature of even a 
distinctive Egyptian style, let alone literary language. 
Many highly Westernizing-educated Egyptians associated with Kamil's independence 
movement strove like Mudarris to combine (a) maintaining continuity of language with --- and 
thus access to --- extraterritorial classical Arabs and (b) propagating the West's contemporary 
sciences in Egypt. An instance is a 1907 article by Dr 'Uthman Ghalib in l'Etendard Egyptien 
opposing the Occupation-period contraction of government education and imposition of foreign 
languages. reply to those who accused Arabic of "sterility" as an instrument to express 
scientific thought (some Jaridists as well as Britishers?) Ghalib described Arabic as "the 
scientific language par excellence under the civilizations of Spain and Baghdad". He viewed the 
development of Arabic as the medium of instruction in the tertiary colleges, many scientific or 
technical in nature, initiated by Muhammad 'Ali as the achievement of the Egyptian scholars 
who "recovered from oblivion the scientific nomenclature of the Arab savants of Spain and 
Baghdad". Pan-Arabizing: Ghalib argued that restoration of the Arabic-medium secular higher 
education suppressed by the British would serve not Egypt alone "but all the lands of Arabic 
speech"38• 
Like the Jaridists, Ghalib denounced the occupying British for dismantling previous mass 
37. Ibid. 
38. Dr. Osman Ghalleb, "Le Mouvement National et la Question de l'Instruction", l'Etendard Egyptien 5 
March 1907; reprinted Juliette Adam, L' Angleterre en Egypte (Paris: Imprimerie du Centre 1922) pp. 101-107. 
Ghalib was a lecturer in Medicine at the Qasr al-' Ayni Medical College, and an old friend of Muhammad' Abduh. 
Ibid p. 168. Duse Muhammad was acculturated beyond most of al-Hizb al-Watani's leadership by continuous 
residence in the colonizing West's very heart, London. Nonetheless, here again he closely follows the Kamilists' 
stances. The Arab science and culture in the Middle Ages give the lie to the British administrators' excuse that there 
were no textbooks with which to teach sciences in Arabic. In The Land of the Pharaohs p. 278. 
